It is worth noting and worth mentioning that in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Gurmit Singh Bhatia Vs Kiran Kant Robinson and others in Civil Appeal Nos. 5522-5523 of 2019 delivered on July 17, 2019, the Supreme Court while exercising its civil appellate jurisdiction has reiterated that, in a suit, the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of law. All the courts must always bear this in mind while delivering judgments in such matters. There can be no denying or disputing it! 

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment authored by Justice MR Shah for himself and Justice DY Chandrachud of Supreme Court wherein it is pointed out that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 3.7.2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 856/2012 and order dated 5.8.2013 passed in Review Petition No. 169/2013 in Writ Petition No. 856/2012 by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, by which the High Court has allowed the said writ petition preferred by the original plaintiffs and has quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned trial Court allowing the application preferred by the appellant herein for impleading him as a necessary party to the suit filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 herein – the original plaintiffs, the original applicant – appellant has preferred the present appeals.”

To recapitulate, it is then stated in para 2 that, “The facts of the case leading to these appeals in nutshell are as follows:

Respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein – the original plaintiffs filed a suit against respondent no. 1 herein – original defendant no. 1 for specific performance of the agreement to sell/contract dated 3.5.2005 executed by respondent no. 1 – original defendant no. 1 in the Court of learned 4th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur. That during the pendency of the aforesaid suit and despite the injunction against respondent no. 1 herein – original defendant no. 1 – original owner not to alienate or transfer the suit property, respondent no. 1 herein – original defendant no. 1 executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant herein vide sale deed dated 10.07.2008. The appellant herein – purchaser who purchased the suit property during the pendency of the suit filed an application in the pending suit under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC for impleadment as a defendant in the suit. It was the case on behalf of the appellant herein that he has purchased the suit property and is a necessary and proper party to the suit as he has a direct interest in the suit property. That by an order dated 5.11.2012, the learned trial Court allowed the said application and directed the original plaintiffs to join the appellant as a defendant in the suit.”

Put plainly, it is then pointed out in para 2.1 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned trial Court dated 5.11.2012 allowing the application and permitting the appellant herein to be joined as a party defendant in the suit filed by the original plaintiffs – respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein, respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein filed writ petition No. 856/2012 before the High Court of Chhattisgarh. By the impugned judgment and order dated 3.7.2013, the High Court has allowed the said writ petition and has quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned trial Court allowing the impleadment application preferred by the appellant herein by holding that as regards the relief claimed against the original defendants and as no relief has been claimed against the appellant herein, the appellant cannot be said to be a necessary or formal party. That thereafter the appellant preferred a review application which came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeals by way of special leave petitions.”

Be it noted, para 3.1 then discloses that, “Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that once the learned trial Court allowed the impleadment application submitted by the appellant herein under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC holding that the appellant is a necessary and proper party, the High Court, in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, ought not to have interfered with the same.”

Moving on, para 3.2 then further discloses that, “It is vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that as such the appellant has purchased the suit property from the same vendor and, in fact, the appellant was in prior agreement to sell holder and to protect the interest of the appellant, the appellant is a necessary and proper party. It is submitted that therefore the learned trial Court rightly allowed the impleadment application submitted by the appellant.”

Going forward, it is then further added in para 3.3 that, “Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Robin Ramjibhai Patel v. Anandibai Rama @ Rajaram Pawar, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 614 and the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Swastik Developers vs. Saket Kumar Jain, reported in 2014 (2) Mh. L.J. 968, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the learned trial Court.”

On the contrary, we then see that para 4 discloses that, “The present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri M. Shoeb Alam, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiffs. It is vehemently submitted that in fact the appellant purchased the suit property during the pendency of the suit and that too in violation of the injunction granted by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that as such the prior agreement to sell upon which reliance has been placed by the appellant is a concocted and forged one. It is submitted that in any case the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in a suit filed by the original plaintiffs for specific performance of the agreement to sell/contract to which the appellant is not a party. It is submitted that the original plaintiffs are the dominus litis and without their consent nobody can be permitted to be impleaded as defendant.”

While citing the relevant case law thus adding more ammunition to its submissions, it is then pointed out in para 4.1 that, “It is vehemently submitted that as such the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered against the appellant in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 733”.

Furthermore, it is then illustrated in para 4.2 that, “Insofar as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Robin Ramjibhai Patel (supra) as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Swastik Developers (supra) by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, it is vehemently submitted by Shri M. Shoeb Alam, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiffs that the said decisions shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It is submitted that in the aforesaid two cases, it was an application by the original plaintiff to implead the subsequent purchaser who purchased the property during the pendency of the suits. It is submitted that as held by this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra), it is for the plaintiff/plaintiffs to implead a particular person/persons as defendant/defendants and if he/they does not/do not join then it will be at the risk of the plaintiff/plaintiffs. It is further submitted that the plaintiff cannot be forced to implead any other person, more particularly who is not a party to the contract, against the wish of the plaintiff. It is submitted that therefore the aforesaid two decisions, upon which reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It is submitted that as such the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) clinches the issue and shall be squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand.”

To put things in perspective, it is then ruled in para 5.1 after hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties at length that, “At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiffs filed the suit against the original owner – vendor – original defendant no. 1 for specific performance of the agreement to sell with respect to suit property dated 3.5.2005. It is an admitted position that so far as agreement to sell dated 3.5.2005 of which the specific performance is sought, the appellant is not a party to the said agreement to sell. It appears that during the pendency of the aforesaid suit and though there was an injunction against the original owner – vendor restraining him from transferring and alienating the suit property, the vendor executed the sale deed in favour of the appellant by sale deed dated 10.7.2008. After a period of approximately four years, the appellant filed an application before the learned trial Court under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC for his impleadment as a defendant. The appellant claimed the right on the basis of the said sale deed as well as the agreement to sell dated 31.3.2003 alleged to have been executed by the original vendor. The said application was opposed by the original plaintiffs. The learned trial Court despite the opposition by the original plaintiffs allowed the said application which has been set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order. Thus, it was an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC by a third party to the agreement to sell between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no. 1 (vendor) and the said application for impleadment is/was opposed by the original plaintiffs. Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration before this Court is, whether the plaintiffs can be compelled to implead a person in the suit for specific performance, against his wish and more particularly with respect to a person against whom no relief has been claimed by him?”

As it turned out, it is then envisaged in para 5.2 that, “An identical question came to be considered before this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) and applying the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court observed and held that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. The tests are – (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. It is further observed and held that in a suit for specific performance the first test can be formulated is, to determine whether a party is a necessary party there must be a right to the same relief against the party claiming to be a necessary party, relating to the same subject matter involved in the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. It is further observed and held by this Court that in a suit for specific performance of the contract, a proper party is a party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held that the parties claiming an independent title and possession adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are not proper parties and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for title and possession, which is impermissible. It is further observed and held that a third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit for specific performance, merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. It is further observed and held by this Court that a third party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character.”

More significantly, it is then further added in this same para 5.2 that, “That thereafter, after observing and holding as above, this Court further observed that in view of the principle that the plaintiff who has filed a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell is the dominus litis, he cannot be forced to add parties against whom, he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. In the aforesaid decision in the case of Kasturi (supra), it was contended on behalf of the third parties that they are in possession of the suit property on the basis of their independent title to the same and as the plaintiff had also claimed the relief of possession in the plaint and the issue with regard to possession is common to the parties including the third parties, and therefore, the same can be settled in the suit itself. It was further submitted on behalf of the third parties that to avoid the multiplicity of the suits, it would be appropriate to join them as party defendants. This Court did not accept the aforesaid submission by observing that merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added in a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell because they are not necessary parties as there was no semblance of right to some relief against the parties to the contract. It is further observed and held that in a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell the lis between the vendor and the persons in whose favour agreement to sell is executed shall only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide whether any other parties have acquired any title and possession of the contracted property. It is further observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the plaintiff who has filed a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell, even after receiving the notice of claim of title and possession by other persons (not parties to the suit and even not parties to the agreement to sell for which a decree for specific performance is sought) does not want to join them in the pending suit, it is always done at the risk of the plaintiff because he cannot be forced to join the third parties as party-defendants in such suit. The aforesaid observations are made by this Court considering the principle that plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of law. Therefore, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra), the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the suit filed by the original plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no. 1 and in a suit for specific performance of the contract to which the appellant is not a party and that too against the wish of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs cannot be forced to add party against whom he does not want to fight. If he does so, in that case, it will be at the risk of the plaintiffs.”

It cannot be lost on us that it is then envisaged in para 6 that, “Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Robin Ramjibhai Patel (supra) and the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Swastik Developers (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant is concerned, the aforesaid decisions shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand as in both the aforesaid cases, it was the plaintiff who submitted an application to implead the third parties/subsequent purchasers who claimed title under the vendor of the plaintiff. Position will be different when the plaintiff submits an application to implead the subsequent purchaser as a party and when the plaintiff opposes such an applicant for impleadment. This is the distinguishing feature in the aforesaid two decisions and in the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra).”

All told, it is then finally held in the last para 7 that, “In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for. The appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the suit for specific performance of the contract between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no. 1 against the wish of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the present appeals stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.”

In the ultimate analysis, the Apex Court has made it absolutely clear in this notable case that plaintiff cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of law. It has been elaborated upon also in great detail which we have already discussed above. No doubt, all the courts must always comply with it in all such cases!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

“Truth and justice have prevailed. Congratulations to ICJ for a verdict based on extensive study of facts. I am sure Kulbhushan Jadhav will get justice.”

– PM Narendra Modi

It goes without saying that in a major legal and diplomatic victory for India and also simultaneously in a major legal and diplomatic setback along with global embarrassment for Pakistan, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held upfront that Pakistan violated the Vienna Convention in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case and it should review and reconsider his conviction and sentencing while allowing India consular access to the Indian national. Importantly, the ICJ ruling said unequivocally that the stay on the death sentence pronounced on Jadhav must remain. It minced no words in saying clearly, categorically and convincingly that, “The court considers that a continued stay of execution constitutes an indispensable condition for the effective review and consideration of the conviction and sentence of Jadhav”.

To be sure, while indicating its unhappiness with the judicial process regarding Kulbhushan Jadhav, the ICJ said that, “Court considers it imperative to re-emphasise that the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Jadhav must be effective.” This clearly comes as a rap on the knuckles of Pakistan’s opaque way of trial of Jadhav by military courts which is the biggest proof that it was just a sham trial and everything was pre-decided! It is a no-brainer that this sharp observation of ICJ clearly tantamount to an open indictment of Jadhav being tried before secret military “black” courts where the evidence against him and his legal defence remains unknown! How can this by any standard be termed as “fair trial”?

What’s more, while rejecting all the major contentions put forward by Pakistan, the ICJ said the Vienna Convention was applicable in the Jadhav case regardless of allegations that he was engaged in espionage. It also conveyed unambiguously that, “Pakistan must inform Jadhav without further delay of his right under Article 36 and allow and arrange for his legal representation”. Pakistan should be ashamed that ICJ has to remind it that what all legal rights should be provided to Jadhav!

Bluntly put: If Pakistan has nothing to hide as it repeatedly asserts and tries to present a brave face then why was it so determined to deny even consular access and legal representation to Kulbhushan Jadhav? This itself is the biggest testimony of the irrefutable fact that Pakistan has a lot to hide and has very little to show and has no genuine proof to vindicate its false claim that Kulbhushan Jadhav is a spy and a terrorist! Why ICJ conveyed its unhappiness with the way Jadhav was tried in Pakistan? Still should Pakistan not wake up its ideas and act in the right manner?

Before proceeding ahead, it would be pertinent and imperative to mention now the entire sequence of events in which the Jadhav case unfolded. This will help us understand better the entire case and how it reached its logical conclusion. It is as follows: –

2016

March 3: Kulbhushan Jadhav, then 46 years, is arrested by Pakistan allegedly from Mashkel in Balochistan Province. Pakistan terms him “an Indian spy” for India’s external intelligence agency, RAW.

March 25: India notified about Jadhav’s arrest in a press release by Pakistani authorities. India rejects Pakistan’s claims and says there’s no proof that he was arrested in Balochistan.

March 26: The then Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Vikas Swarup releases a statement stating that while Jadhav was a former naval officer, he had no links with RAW or the government.

March 29: India seeks consular access to Jadhav which Pakistan does not provide.

March 30: Union Minister Kiren Rijju rubbishes Pakistan’s claims and calls Jadhav’s “confession” about his alleged involvement in terror activities in Balochistan a lie. Indian authorities claim Jadhav was abducted from Iran where he was conducting business after retiring from Navy.

December 7: Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz confirms that conclusive evidence against Kulbhushan Jadhav has not been found. Pakistan Foreign Ministry then makes a U-turn on its earlier released statement.

2017

Jan 6: Pakistan announced that it has submitted a dossier to the new United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres over Indian interference in Islamabad, which was aimed at “destabilising” the nation.

April 1: India starts sending diplomatic communications to Pakistan for providing consular access to Jadhav. Authorities claim that access denied despite repeated requests.

April 10: Pakistan army says Jadhav has been sentenced to death by a military court for espionage and waging war against the country.

April 12: According to a media report, Jadhav is charged with terrorism and sabotage by a court.

May 8: India moves ICJ against Pakistan’s decision and for “egregious violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”. It seeks ‘provisional measures’ from ICJ and asks it to issue instructions to Pakistan to not take any action on the death sentence till India’s request for ‘provisional measures’ was considered by the court.

May 9: What came as a shot in the arm for India was ICJ staying Jadhav’s execution on India’s request. ICJ sends urgent communication to the Pakistan PM asking the country not to take measures that would result, in an ICJ ruling not having the appropriate effect thus prohibiting Pakistan from executing Jadhav.

May 15: ICJ begins hearing. ICJ hears India’s request for ‘provisional measures’.

May 18: In a further major gain for India, ICJ unanimously issues binding order on ‘provisional measures’, says all measures to be taken to prevent execution of Jadhav pending the final judgment.

June 16: World Court asks India to make its submission by September 13.

Sep 13: India files its memorial (first round of written pleadings), Pakistan follows with counter memorial on December 13, 2017.

Dec 19: India seeks 3 months to file reply (2nd pleadings). Pakistan opposes India’s request.

Dec 25: Pakistan facilitates meeting of Jadhav with his mother and wife in Islamabad but here too they are subjected to undergo humiliation like asking them to remove mangalsutra, bindi, shoes etc.

2018

Jan 17: ICJ accepts India’s request and gives 3 months each to India and Pakistan to file a second round of written pleadings.

April 17: India files second round of written pleadings.

July: Pakistan also follows with its own filing of second round of written pleadings.

Oct 3: ICJ fixes dates for final hearing in the matter.

2019

Feb 18: ICJ begins four-day final public hearing in this case.

Feb 21: ICJ concludes the hearing and reserves the order.

July 17: ICJ orders that Jadhav must be given consular access. ICJ also orders that it has jurisdiction to decide India’s plea for Kulbhushan Jadhav. It also holds that stay of Jadhav’s execution ordered by Pakistan’s military court will continue and Pakistan has to review and reconsider conviction and sentencing of Jadhav.

Be it noted, all the 16 Judges of ICJ on the panel unanimously ruled that the ICJ’s jurisdiction held over the case. It said that the court “unanimously, finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 1 of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, to entertain the Application filed by the Republic of India on 8 May 2017”. The judgment which was read out by Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf who is the President of the ICJ at the Peace Palace on July 17, 2019 was decided with 15 judges in favour while only Pakistan’s ad-hoc Judge – Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jilani was the lone dissenter! Pakistan must be gracious enough to accept this biggest slap on its face and comply with the order passed by the ICJ to save its own reputation in front of the world!

What’s more, the ICJ specifically ruled that it “finds that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is under an obligation to inform Mr. Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav without further delay of his rights and to provide Indian consular officers access to him in accordance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”. Pakistan till now was totally opposed to giving any consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav but now it has no option but to comply! The ICJ said that the court finds that the “appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to provide by the means of its own choosing, effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Jadhav so as to ensure that full weight is given to the effect of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention.”

Not stopping here, it added that a “continued stay of execution constitutes an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Jadhav. The Court also found that, “by not informing Jadhav without delay of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”, Pakistan “breached the obligations” incumbent upon it under that provision. It also said that by “not notifying the appropriate consular post of the Republic of India in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan without delay of the detention of Mr Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav and thereby depriving the Republic of India of the right to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to the individual concerned, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan breached the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”

What a pity that it is now after such a long legal battle that ensued and raged on in ICJ for more than 3 years and after ICJ asked Pakistan to comply that it has finally buckled after being forced to eat the humble pie and say in a mellowed manner that it has decided to grant consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav hours after Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar sought it following the ICJ verdict! Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry announced in a statement that, “Pursuant to the decision of the ICJ, Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav has been informed of his rights under Article 36, Paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. As a responsible state, Pakistan will grant consular access to Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav according to Pakistani laws, for which modalities are being worked out.” One fails to understand that why it took so long for Pakistan to become a responsible state? Why was it an irresponsible state for so long? Why it took ICJ’s intervention for Pakistan to realise its responsibility of providing consular access to Pakistan? Were Pakistan’s lawyers who claim to be very intelligent not aware even of this also that it had to face so much of international humiliation and now finally it has decided to relent on this? I pity them!

Needless to say, Pakistan’s move has to be viewed as a ritualistic peace missive to India following its increasing isolation in the international community. We all know that the Financial Action Task Force has already placed Pakistan on its grey list and can be blacklisted also by October if it fails to mend its ways even now and find itself in the company of rogue countries like North Korea and Yemen among others! Can Pakistan afford this? Certainly not!

While making a statement in both Houses of Parliament on the judgment by the ICJ, Foreign Minister S Jaishankar said that, “Pakistan was found to have deprived India of the right to communicate with Jadhav, have access to him, visit him in detention and arrange his legal representation”. Has Pakistan been able to justify this in ICJ? Certainly not!

This alone explains that why following this landmark ICJ judgment, the Pakistan Foreign office in a terse statement has said that, “Having heard the judgment, Pakistan will now proceed as per law.” What does this reflect of Pakistan? That it was not even aware of what the law is!

As things stand, we thus see that Pakistan is compelled to act now after this landmark ICJ ruling. It has now no other option but to act as per the directions of ICJ of providing Jadhav consular access, legal aid and trying him properly as per law. It is most astounding to see that Jadhav who is a retired Indian Navy officer was sentenced to death by the Pakistani military court on charges of “espionage and terrorism” after a closed kangaroo trial in April 2017. Jadhav was not just denied consular access but also denied all type of legal aid! If this is not an open mockery of justice then please tell me that what else is?

Let me say this on record: The sole credit for this landmark ICJ verdict goes to eminent lead lawyer in this case and former Solicitor General of India Harish Salve who charged just one rupee for this case and left no stone unturned and pulled out all the stops to ensure that Kulbhushan Jadhav gets justice from ICJ. It is this same Harish Salve who had earlier ensured that Lt Col Shrikant Prasad Purohit who was most wrongly kept in jail for about 9 years without even charge sheet being filed against him could walk in the open air once again by securing bail for him and pointing out how injustice had been meted out to him. His popularity has increased manifold since then not just among people but even among the legal fraternity including me!

To say the least, in Jadhav’s case, Harish Salve while expressing happiness at the landmark ICJ verdict said that, “The ICJ verdict calling for the consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav and making it incumbent upon Pakistan to ensure an effective review of its legal processes is a victory of the rule of law that has ‘gladdened our hearts’. There is relief, satisfaction and a lot of hope. The judgment has restored our faith in the rule of law, in the ICJ and in the systems which we as mankind put together to protect the citizens of the world.”

Going forward, Salve further disclosed that, “We had challenged the conduct of Pakistan in its brazen refusal to adhere to the Vienna Convention and allow consular access to Mr. Jadhav. The court found Pakistan guilty of internationally wrongful acts and that it must cease those acts. It is important to be positive after such a positive ruling.” He also said that he hoped Pakistan would fully comply with the judgment and that its conduct will be under watch in case it chooses to “brazenly violate” the ruling in any way.

Interestingly enough, Harish Salve also added that any violation of the order would mean taking things back to the ICJ to seek further instructions. Can Pakistan afford this now? He also warned that sanctions in the United Nations Security Council and other remedies could also come into play if Pakistan fails to comply with the ICJ order. He also further added that, “The ICJ had been categorical in its verdict that Pakistan must do everything to make the Vienna Convention a living reality. The government of Pakistan must ensure all necessary “review and reconsideration” measures, including ‘legislative’ means.”

To put things in perspective, this landmark verdict clearly denotes that Jadhav will continue to be protected from the death sentence on spy and terror charges as Pakistan could not prove anything against him and now that the ruling has gone against them, Islamabad will certainly find it too difficult to risk international criticism and opprobrium by ignoring the ruling. No wonder that Pakistan as anticipated sought to downplay the big setback arguing that ICJ did not order Jadhav’s release but even they too cannot deny that the court clearly said that Pakistan is “under obligation” to review the conviction and carry out retrial in a more transparent manner which they know would ostensibly lead to Jadhav’s acquittal as they have no reliable evidence to convict him!

As it turned out, the ICJ rejected Pakistan’s contention that it had no jurisdiction and that India’s complaint is not admissible. Even the Chinese Judge Xue ruled against Pakistan! ICJ held that, “Pakistan’s objection based on ‘clean hands’ doctrine must be rejected. Pakistan has not explained how any of the wrongful acts allegedly commited by India may have prevented Pakistan from fulfilling its obligation. The court finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain India’s claim. India was under no obligation to consider other dispute settlement mechanisms prior to instituting proceedings. Thus, Pakistan’s objection based on alleged non-compliance cannot be upheld.” The ICJ also held that the 2008 India-Pakistan bilateral agreement in no way trumped Islamabad’s obligations under the Vienna Convention. The ICJ was abundantly clear to hold that Pakistan had violated Article 36 of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in denying consular access to Jadhav!

Happily enough, while addressing a press conference in London, Harish Salve remarked confidently that, “I have a degree of personal satisfaction that a lot of adjectives were used by Pakistan in its submissions that I described as unfortunate because of my upbringing as Indian. The Court has said Pakistan is guilty of internationally wrongful acts and it must cease those acts. This is a trenchant indictment”. He also said that, “The court said Pakistan has to do everything to make the Vienna Convention a living reality” while pointing out that the international legal body also asked for a fair trial of Mr Jadhav. There can be no denying it!

Suffice it to say, Salve rightly said that the judgment gives India a “good moment” to help Mr Jadhav get justice. He also very wisely pointed out that a re-trial of Mr Jadhav in a military court in Pakistan would not meet the standards set by the ICJ. He also rightly described the verdict as a victory for the rule of law.

It is heartening to note that even the Opposition parties have welcomed the verdict. Former Union Finance Minister and also a senior Supreme Court lawyer P Chidambaram said that, “ICJ delivers ‘justice’ in the true sense of that word, upholding human rights, due procedure and the rule of law.” Former Union External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj too said that, “I wholeheartedly welcome the verdict of International Court of Justice in the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav. It is a great victory for India.” Very rightly said!

It also cannot be lost on us that Gautam Bambawale who as India’s envoy to Pakistan when Jadhav was arrested had bombarded the Pakistani government with repeated official requests for consular access, thereby creating the right conditions for India’s case at the ICJ has said most unequivocally that, “ICJ has clearly ruled that Pakistan must review the case. This implies that the earlier military court proceeding did not give Jadhav due process. So a retrial must take place which must be fairer than earlier, with full consular access and a defence attorney for Jadhav.” The ICJ has worked with precedents in the cases of Germany vs the United States (LaGrand) and Mexico vs the United States (Avena), and in both these cases it had ruled that the US was in violation of the Vienna Convention and ordered a “review and reconsideration” of its process!

It is worth mentioning here that ICJ emphasized in no uncertain terms that the review of Jadhav’s case by Pakistan must be effective as the outcome of his mercy petition to the Pakistan Army Chief was not known, and no evidence was submitted to the court on the presidential clemency procedure. ICJ noted that Pakistan had stated during arguments that its high courts were competent to carry out a review.

Going forward, ICJ also observed that Article 199 of Pakistan’s Constitution had been interpreted by the Supreme Court as limiting the availability of such a review for a person like Jadhav, who is subject to the Pakistan Army Act. The ICJ in its historic verdict also said that, “Thus, it is not clear whether judicial review of a decision of a military court is available on the ground that there has been a violation of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention.” The verdict, however, added that, “Pakistan contends that its domestic legal system provides for an established and defined process whereby the civil courts can undertake a substantive review of the decisions of military tribunals, in order to ensure procedural fairness has been afforded to the accused, and that its courts are well suited to carrying out a review and reconsideration that gives full weight to the effect of any violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.”

Before parting, it must be said that in a 15-1 order, the ICJ held that Jadhav’s execution will remain on hold until Islamabad “effectively reviews and reconsiders’ his execution. ICJ also made it amply clear that, “A continued stay of execution constitutes an indispensable condition for the effective review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence of Mr Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav”. The World Court also ruled decisively in favour of India’s plea to allow it full consular access to Jadhav which Pakistan has consistently denied so far.

It is most heartening to note that the Pakistani Judge Tassaduq Hussain Gilani from Pakistan was completely isolated and was the only one to go against the majority judgment. Even the Judge from China – Vice President Xue also voted in favour of the judgment. India could just not secure the annulment of Jadhav’s conviction by the military court in Pakistan and his immediate release. But here too now Pakistan is under an obligation to ensure that the trial held is proper, legal and fair! The ICJ found that Pakistan deprived India of the right to communicate with and have access to Jadhav, to visit him in detention and to arrange for his legal representation and thereby breached obligations incumbent upon it under the Vienna Convention! Pakistan is left now with no option but to comply gracefully with this historic ICJ judgment as it has itself conceded also! What more could India have asked for than this?

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

It is most heart warming to note that Delhi High Court in a latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment titled Anita Suresh vs. Union of India & Ors in W.P.(C) 5114/2015 delivered on July 9, 2019 has rightly gone the extra mile and imposed Rs. 50,000 cost on a woman for false sexual harassment plea. The blatant misuse of laws against men is all too well known even though much as woman activists among others would like to gloss it over on one ground or the other! But this latest extraordinary judgment has served to send a very loud and stern message to all women that they dare not try to misuse laws against men without any valid cause and if they dare to do so then they should be prepared to face the music and cough up a huge amount as fine! From now onwards, women must always ensure before approaching courts that their own hands are clean and if they still don’t care then well they might find themselves landing in a hot soup as we see has happened with the petitioner in this commendable case!

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this notable judgment by Justice JR Midha of the Delhi High Court wherein it is pointed out that, “The petitioner has challenged the order dated 20th January, 2012 of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). The petitioner is seeking a direction to respondent No. 2 to withhold the retirement benefits of respondent No. 3 to initiate independent departmental enquiry against respondent No. 3 and to also prosecute respondent No. 3.”

To recapitulate, it is then outlined in para 2 that, “The petitioner was working as an Assistant Director with ESI Corporation in Manesar, Gurgaon in July 2011. On 08th July, 2011, the petitioner made a written complaint to the Director General of ESI Corporation alleging sexual harassment by respondent No. 3. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 3 misbehaved and made attempts of sexual advances. The petitioner reported following two incidents dated 07th July, 2011 in the complaint:-

(i) ‘Yesterday when I was seated with my colleagues on the 1st floor of the building, Sh. Verma came and commented indicating sexual advances. I cannot for the reasons of modesty bring on papers the filthy language he uses for me’.

(ii) ‘Yesterday in the presence of my staff and other members he asked me to come alone to check the shortcomings of the male toilet when nobody is there and I will follow you soon’.”

To be sure, para 3 then states that, “Respondent No. 1 constituted an Internal Complaints Committee to examine the complaint of the petitioner. Respondent No. 3 appeared before the Committee and denied all the allegations made by the petitioner. According to respondent No. 3, the petitioner made the complaint because of the grudge against him due to certain official work disposed by him in her absence.” Para 4 then reveals that, “The Committee examined the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3. The Committee examined eight witnesses namely Rashmi Kapoor (O.S.), Lakhan (Supervisor Housekeeping), Rajender Yadav (SSO), Prasanna (Staff Nurse), Hema (Staff Nurse), Pradeep Kataria (Nursing Orderly), Jai Bhagwan (Nursing Orderly) and Kalpana (Dietician).”

Be it noted, para 5 then envisages that, “The Committee submitted its report on 20th January, 2012, in which it observed that the exact content of communication of the incident dated 07th July, 2011 could not be established. The Committee gave benefit of doubt to respondent No. 3 and recommended relocating both the petitioner and respondent No. 3 from their present posting.”

Needless to say, para 6 then brings out that, “Learned counsel for the petitioner urged at the time of the hearing that the findings of the Committee are erroneous and unjustified. It is submitted that the petitioner had proved by sufficient evidence that respondent No. 3 misbehaved and made attempts of sexual advances against the petitioner on 07th July, 2011 mentioned in the written complaint on 08th July, 2011. Respondent No. 3 pressurized the petitioners to withdraw her complaint whereupon a warning was issued to him on 04th November, 2011. The transfer of both the parties to different places was not a justified penalty to the respondent No. 3.”

As things stand, para 7 then discloses that, “Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 urged at the time of the hearing that respondent No. 1 transferred both the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 from their posting. It was further submitted that respondent No. 3 superannuated on 28th February, 2015.”

Furthermore, it is then disclosed in para 8 that, “Vide order dated 28th March, 2019, this Court directed the employer, ESI Corporation to produce the original relevant records which were produced on 09th April, 2019 and have been examined by this Court.”

Moving on, it is then illustrated in para 9 that, “The petitioner made the complaint dated 08th July, 2011 against the respondent no. 3 which is reproduced hereunder:-

‘To,

The Director General,

ESI Corporation,

Hqrs. Office, CIG Marg,

New Delhi – 02.

Sub: Sexual harassment by Sh. O.P. Verma, Dy Director, ESI Hospital, Manesar, Haryana.

Sir,

I am posted as Assistant Director in the office of ESI Hospital, Manesar. In the same office another officer Sh. O.P. Verma, Dy. Director is seated in the adjoining room where I work. For some time passed Sh. O.P. Verma has been misbehaving with me and makes attempts of sexual advances. It was only yesterday when I was seated with my colleagues on the 1st floor of the building. Sh. Verma came and commented indicating sexual advances.

I cannot for the reasons of modesty bring on papers the filthy language he uses for me. Yesterday in the presence of my staff and other members he asked me to come alone to check the shortcomings of the male toilet when nobody is there and I will follow you soon.

I am to request you to safeguard my honour and take necessary action against him. I will explain the earlier instances of harassment as and when the matter will be investigated.

This matter has also been brought to the notice of the Medical Superintendent in earlier and in the afternoon of 07.07.2011 also.

Yours faithfully, Signed/-

( Anita Suresh)

Assistant Director

ESI Hospital, Manesar.’”

To say the least, para 10 then states that, “As per the complaint dated 08th July, 2011 of the petitioner, the respondent no. 3 made comments indicating sexual advances against the petitioner who was sitting with her colleagues on the first floor of the building on 7th July, 2011. The second incident mentioned in the complaint is that the respondent told the petitioner to come alone in the male toilet to check the shortcomings in the presence of the staff and other members.”

More significantly, para 11 then discloses that, “The Committee examined the petitioner who could not recollect the names of any of the persons present at the time of the aforesaid incidents. The petitioner was shown the relevant papers relating to the staff members present on that day but still she could not recollect the names. The petitioner stated that she confided the incidents to Rashmi Kapoor (O.S.) on the same day after the incident. The Committee examined Rashmi Kapoor who stated that she was not present at the time of incident. However, she stated that the petitioner told her that the attitude of respondent No. 3 towards the petitioner was not good. She further stated that the petitioner told her that respondent No. 3 made two inappropriate comments against her. However, these two comments were not stated by the petitioner in her statement to the Committee.

What’s more, para 12 then points out that, “The Committee examined Lakhan (Supervisor Housekeeping) who stated that the petitioner was matching the goods with the list and he did not witness any incident on 07th July, 2011 as alleged by the petitioner.” Also, para 13 then reveals that, “The Committee examined Rajender Yadav (SSO) who was present at the time of incident and he stated that there was no altercation between the petitioner and respondent No. 3.” All this certainly serves to weaken the petitioner’s claims and the serious charges which she leveled against the respondent No. 3.

Going forward, para 14 then further discloses that, “The Committee examined Prasanna (Staff Nurse) who stated that the petitioner had normal relations with respondent No. 3 who never commented on her in her presence.” Para 15 then also makes it clear that, “The Committee examined Staff Nurses Hema (Nursing Orderly), Pradeep Kataria (Nursing Orderly), Jai Bhagwan (Nursing Orderly) and Kalpana (Dietician) who did not witness any incident on 07th July, 2011.”

Not stopping here, it is then brought out in para 16 that, “The Committee examined respondent No. 3 who denied all the allegations of sexual harassment made by the petitioner. He stated that he brought the absence of soap in the male toilet to the notice of the petitioner. He further stated that his remarks were misinterpreted and taken totally out of context. He further stated that the petitioner made complaint against him due to a grudge which was the result of certain official work disposed by him in petitioner’s absence.”

To put things in perspective, para 17 then enunciates that, “On careful consideration of the record of the inquiry proceedings, this Court is of the view that the complaint dated 08th July, 2011 of the petitioner appears to be false. The complaint dated 08th July, 2011 contains two incidents out of which the first incident was in the presence of the staff and other members. During the inquiry proceedings, the petitioner could not give the name of any person present at the time of the incident. The petitioner was shown the record of the staff persons present on duty on the date of the incident but still she could not recollect the names of any colleague/staff member. It is not believable that the petitioner would not remember the names of any colleague/staff member. The Committee examined all the persons who were on duty on that day but no persons supported the allegations of the petitioner. The petitioner has not mentioned the alleged comments of respondent No. 3 in the complaint on the ground of modesty. The petitioner did not even disclose the alleged comments before the Committee. Nor reason or justification was been given by the petitioner for not disclosing the same before the Committee. The entire complaint of the petitioner appears to be false and has been filed with some ulterior motive.”

It cannot be lost on us that delving deeper, para 18 then brings to light that, “The record produced by the respondent No. 5 contains the service record of the petitioner. The petitioner joined ESI Corporation as an Insurance Inspector on 24th September, 1997. On 15th February, 1998, the petitioner was issued a charge sheet for major penalty proceeding for negligently surveying two firms ignoring vital information and suppressing material information while submitting the survey reports. Vide order dated 23rd October, 2001, the Insurance Commissioner took the view that the petitioner had only put one year of service in the Corporation and no malafide intention was proved and therefore, a lenient view was taken and the penalty of ‘Censure’ was imposed upon her. On 03rd March, 2006, the petitioner was issued a charge sheet for major penalty proceeding by Regional Office, Delhi on the allegations that during her posting in Legal Branch as an Insurance Inspector for the period from 22nd March, 2004 to 12th July, 2004, the petitioner had exhibited gross misconduct as she failed to follow the reasonable order of her superiors and exhibited lack of devotion towards duty. Vide order dated 22nd September, 2009, the Insurance Commissioner observed that the conduct of the petitioner was unbecoming of a Corporation employee and imposed the penalty of reduction pay by one stage for one year. The petitioner filed an appeal which was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 27th October, 2010 and thereafter, she preferred a revision petition which was also rejected. This rejection order was further challenged by the petitioner before this Court in W.P. (C) 8529/2011 which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 24th November, 2011. On 13th July, 2011, the Medical Superintendent of ESIC, Hospital, Manesar, Haryana, Dr. Archana Rani gave a written memorandum to the petitioner who was posted in the hospital as an Assistant Director to show cause as to why the action should not be taken against her for insubordination and gross misconduct. The above mentioned incidents show that the petitioner did not have a clean service record.”

Most importantly, it is then held in para 19 that, “There is no merit in this writ petition which is dismissed with cost of Rs. 50,000/- to be deposited by the petitioner with the Delhi High Court Advocates Welfare Trust within four weeks.” Thus we see that all the tall claims made by the petitioner falls flat and fails to impress the Delhi High Court as she could not produce anything substantial to back her tall claims against the respondent No. 3! This alone explains why it is then ruled in the next para 20 that, “Respondent No. 2 is at liberty to initiate appropriate action against the petitioner for filing false complaint against the respondent No. 3 in accordance with law.”

To conclude, the Delhi High Court has acted most wisely by deciding to not allow the petitioner to go scot free. She willingly decided to defame the respondent No. 3 without any concrete ground in front of the whole society. So she had to be taken to task for it! This alone explains why the Delhi High Court imposed Rs 50,000 cost on petitioner for false sexual harassment plea. Very rightly so! Not just this, she should be jailed also for at least six months or an year so that the right message goes across to all women that they dare not misuse the sexual harassment laws against men whenever they want at their own whims and fancies! We all saw how recently even the incumbent CJI Ranjan Gogoi was not spared when a subordinate women employee levelled grave charges but failed to prove anything in front of the in-house Committee set up by the Supreme Court under the chairmanship of Justice Sharad A Bobde and so palapably the CJI Ranjan Gogoi had to be exonerated! Law must apply to erring women also now! This is what the Delhi High Court has rightly sought to do here! No denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.