Day: October 22, 2019

Azad Hind Fauj/Indian National Army and Freedom Movement of India

ESTABLISHMENT OF AZAD HIND FAUJ 

Indians remember this 21 October as Great Day and it is celebrated with full gaiety in many parts of the country as on this date in 1942, the Indian National Army (INA/ Azad Hind Fauj) was formed by two stalwarts and Indians Sri Rash Behari Bose and Sri Mohan Singh (in 1942) in Southeast Asia during World War II. Its main objective was to secure Indian independence from British rule. To attain the same Azad Hind Fauj/INA formed an alliance with the Empire of Japan in the latter’s campaign in the Southeast Asian theatre of WWII ( name given to the campaigns of the Pacific War in Burma, Ceylon, India, Thailand, the Philippines, Indochina, Malaya and Singapore). 
The first INA collapsed and was disbanded in December 1942 after differences between the INA leadership and the Japanese military over its role in Japan’s war in Asia. It is pertinent to mention that the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters in October, 1942 set up the Fujiwara Kikan, or the F-kikan, in Bangkok, headed by the Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, chief of intelligence of the 15th army. As INA member, Mohan Singh had good relation with the members of Fujiwara Kikan, but he was soon disillusioned with the Japanese Army’s behaviour. It is believed that they wanted to use the Indian National Army only as a part of Japanese army to fulfil their own objectives. In meantime, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Japan in 1943 and INA was invigorated. More than 60,000 soldiers of Indian origin were associated with Azad Hind Fauj/Indian National Army who were prisoners of war in those days and because of initiative of Sri Mohan Singh they joined in INA/Azad Hind Fauj to fight against the British. Out of them about 26,000 soldiers sacrificed their lives so their sacrifice must be saluted. 

SUCCESS STORY OF AZAD HIND FAUZ

The INA/Azad Hind Fauj first success was capturing of Moirang of Manipur. On 18 April 1944, the suicide squads led by Col. Shaukat Malik broke through the British defence and captured Moirang. After Moirang, INA penetrated the Kohima road, creating a threat to the British positions in both Silchar (presently in Assam) and Kohima (now capital of Nagaland state). Col. Gulzara Singh’s column had entered 250 miles into India. Anyway rest is history as Azad Hind Fauj/INA could not succeed to come up to Delhi. 
But the INA’s activities influenced the decision to leave India by the British is reflected by the views of Mr. Clement Richard Attlee, who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1945 to 1951. Mr. Attlee cited several reasons, the most important of which were the INA activities of Subhas Chandra Bose, which weakened the very foundation of the British Empire in India, and the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny which made the British realise that the support of the Indian armed forces could no longer be relied upon. In the book written by Indian army scholar, General G D Bakshi, mentioned that in 1956, Mr. Clement Attlee had come to India and stayed in Kolkata (then Calcutta) as a guest of Sri P.B. Chakraborthy then Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and also serving as acting Governor of West Bengal. During the course of discussion, Sri Chakraborthy asked about the contribution of Mahatma Gandhi and Subhas Chandra in independence movement. This may be quoted from the book itself, ‘Bose An Indian Samurai: Netaji and the INA A Military Assessment’, “Toward the end of our discussion I (means Sri Chakraborthy) asked Mr. Attlee what was the extent of Gandhi’s influence upon the British decision to quit India. Hearing this question, Attlee’s lips became twisted in a sarcastic smile as he slowly chewed out the word, m-i-n-i-m-a-l!” Regarding the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny it may be mentioned that it took place in the context of the Indian National Army trials (INA trials), which are also known as the Red Fort trials, took place between November 1945 and May 1946. In the first trials, INA persons were Colonel Prem Sahgal, Colonel Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, and Major General Shah Nawaz Khan. And in the second trials the INA officials were Abdul Rashid, Shinghara Singh, Fateh Khan and Captain Munawar Khan Awan. Most of the INA soldiers were set free after cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowance. 
No Indians can forget Azad Hind Fauj/INA’s contribution in freedom movement. While I was in abroad even many Pakistanis and Bangladesh persons told about Subhas Chandra and INA/ Azad Hind Fauj.

Dr Shankar Chatterjee
Former Professor & Head (CPME),
NIRD & PR (Govt. of India), 
Hyderabad-500091 , India
Email <shankarjagu@gmail.com>


University Bound To Provide Answer Sheets Under RTI: Madras HC

In a remarkable decision, the Madras High Court very recently on October 14, 2019 in The Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University, Represented by its Registrar vs 1. The Tamil Nadu State Information Commission Represented by its Assistant Registrar 2. Pavan Kumar Gandhi 3. Paras Jain 4. Kumar Shanu (R-3 & R-4 impleaded via order of Court dated 14.10.2019 made in WMP No. 29201 of 2019) in WP No. 16108 of 2019 and WMP No. 15866 of 2019 has very rightly and commendably held that evaluated answer sheets are ‘information’ under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and Universities are bound to provide them to the Respondent-students. This latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment was pronounced in response to a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records in proceedings No. SA4393/D/2018 dated 17.12.2018 passed by the first respondent and quash the same. This historic judgment was delivered by Justice SM Subramaniam while disposing of a petition filed by the Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University (Petitioner), through Advocate VMG Ramakkannan, lambasting the order of the Tamil Nadu State Information Commission, whereby the Petitioner that is ‘The Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University’ was directed to supply the copies of answer-sheets sought by the Respondent-students under the RTI Act. 

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment wherein it is observed first and foremost that, “The writ on hand is to quash the order dated 17.12.2018 issued by the first respondent in proceedings No. SA4393/D/2018 dated 17.12.2018.” It is then pointed out in para 2 that, “The writ petitioner is the Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University.”
What we then see being pointed out in para 3 is this: “The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-University states that the second respondent is the student of the writ petitioner-Law University. The second respondent filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005, to furnish copies of the answer scripts, which were not furnished and consequently, the second respondent approached the Tamil Nadu State Information Commission, who in turn passed an order on 17.12.2018, directing the writ petitioner-Law University to supply the copies of the answer scripts sought for by the second respondent under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005.”
While presenting the version of Law University, it is then pointed out in para 4 that, “Challenging the said order, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner states that the writ petitioner-Law University has got its own Rules and Regulations for the purpose of furnishing copies of the answer scripts. The writ petitioner-Law University has to follow the procedures and under these circumstances, they have rejected the claim of the second respondent for furnishing copies of the answer scripts sought for by him.”
While continuing in the same vein, it is then stated in para 5 that, “The learned counsel for the writ petitioner-Law University states that the writ petitioner-Law University is ready and willing to furnish copies of answer scripts on payment of charges prescribed under the Rules and Regulations of the Law University. The said reply was communicated to the second respondent also. Under these circumstances, it is contended that the writ petitioner-Law University has not refused to provide copies of the answer scripts, contrarily, they have insisted the second respondent that the procedures contemplated under the University Regulations are to be followed. Thus, the writ petitioner-Law University has not rejected the claim of the second respondent, but they have insisted him to follow the procedures prescribed under the Rules and Regulations of the University.”
On the contrary, para 6 then states that, “The second respondent, appearing in person, opposed the contentions of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner-Law University, by stating that he submitted an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. However, the writ petitioner-Law University by reply dated 23.01.2018 states that, the University Regulations are to be followed and the answer scripts will not be supplied under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. However, the fact remains that the writ petitioner-Law University expressed their willingness to supply the answer scripts in the event of following the procedures contemplated under the Rules and Regulations of the University.”
Furthermore, it is then mentioned in para 7 that, “The first respondent Tamil Nadu State Information Commission, citing the judgment of the Supreme Court, passed an order directing the writ petitioner-Law University to furnish the copy of the answer scripts to the second respondent under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005.”
To be sure, it is then conceded in para 8 that, “As far as the application submitted by the second respondent under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 to the writ petitioner-Law University is concerned, it is not in dispute that the Right to Information Act is applicable. Accordingly, the second respondent is entitled to get informations under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005, unless such informations are prohibited specifically under Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.” 
To put things in perspective, it is then noted in para 9 that, “Shri Paras Jain and Shri Kumar Shanu filed an impleading petition in WMP No. 29201 of 2019 and Ms. V. Chethana, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the impleading petitioners, solicited the attention of this Court that the Supreme Court has settled the issue in respect of furnishing of the answer scripts to the students, who all are submitting their applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005.”
While citing the relevant case law, it is then illustrated in para 10 that, “In the Case of CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION (CBSE) AND ANOTHER Vs. ADITYA BANDOPADHYAY & OTHERS [(2011) 8 SCC 497], the Apex Court held that “if CBSE was required to re-evaluate the answer-books or grant inspection of answer-books or grant certified copies thereof, it would interfere with its effective and efficient functioning, and will also require huge additional staff and infrastructure. It was submitted that the entire examination system and evaluation by CBSE is done in a scientific and systemic manner designed to ensure and safeguard the high academic standards and at each level utmost care was taken to achieve the object of excellence, keeping in view the interests of the students”.”
More pertinently, it is then rightly underscored in para 11 that, “In the judgment, cited supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed in paragraph-23 that “when a candidate participates in an examination and writes his answers in an answer book and submits it to the examining body for evaluation and declaration of the result, the answer-book is a document or record. When the answer-book is evaluated by an examiner appointed by the examining body, the evaluated answer-book becomes a record containing the ‘opinion’ of the examiner. Therefore, the evaluated answer-book is also an ‘information’ under the Right to Information Act”.”
What’s more, para 12 then further narrates that, “The Apex Court of India in an unequivocal terms held that “evaluated answer is an information under the Right to Information Act”. Thus, there is no option for the writ petitioner-Law University but to supply the evaluated answer scripts to the second respondent under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. When the evaluated answer books are construed as an information, the same cannot be denied and therefore, the second respondent is entitled to get the evaluated answer scripts as per the application submitted by him under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005.”
Be it noted, para 13 then holds that, “It is relevant to extract paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment, cited supra, which are extracted as under:-
“26. The examining bodies (Universities, Examination Boards, CBSE, etc.) are neither intelligence nor security organisations and therefore the exemption under Section 24 will not apply to them. The disclosure of information with reference to answer books does not also involve infringement of any copyright and therefore Section 9 will not apply. Resultantly, unless the examining bodies are able to demonstrate that the evaluated answer books fall under any of the categories of exempted “information” enumerated in clauses (a) to (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 8, they will be bound to provide access to the information and any applicant can either inspect the document/record, take notes, extracts or obtain certified copies thereof.
27. The examining bodies contend that the evaluated answer books are exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, as they are “information” held in its fiduciary relationship. They fairly conceded that evaluated answer books will not fall under any other exemptions in sub-section (1) of Section 8. Every examinee will have the right to access, his evaluated answer books, by either inspecting them or take certified copies thereof, unless the evaluated answer books are found to be exempted under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act.”” 
While citing a recent and relevant case law, it is then elucidated in para 14 that, “In the case of Institute of Companies Secretaries of India (ICSI) vs. Paras Jain [decided on 11.04.2019 in Civil appeal No. 5665 of 2014] (the impleaded respondent in the present writ petition), the Apex Court held that “the avenue for seeking certified copies as well as inspection is provided both in the Right to Information Act as well as the statutory guidelines of the appellant”.” 
As it turned out, para 24 then enumerates that, “Under these circumstances, the writ petitioner-Law University is bound to follow the Act as well as the Rules scrupulously, while dealing with the applications submitted under the provisions of the Right to Information Act and therefore, there is no infirmity, as such, in respect of the reasonings furnished in the order impugned by the first respondent. The order of the first respondent is in consonance with the spirit of the Act and therefore, the writ petitioner-Law University is bound to follow the procedures contemplated under the Act and the Rules at the time of dealing with the applications, if any, submitted under the Right to Information Act, by the information seekers.” 
Needless to say, it is then made absolutely clear in para 25 that, “The very object of the Right to Information Act, 2005, stipulates that democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed. Undoubtedly, the purpose and object of the Act, is noble and to achieve the constitutional philosophy and goals. The principles of equality can be achieved only if there is a transparency in public administration. The accountability in the public administration is of paramount importance, as ‘We, the People of our Great Nation’ are sandwiched between corrupt and non-corrupt. Identification of corrupt and non-corrupt may be difficult in the event of non-transparency in public administration.”
It goes without saying what is stated clearly, correctly and convincingly in para 26 that, “Irregularities in public administration cannot be sorted out if there is no transparency in the public administration. Thus, the Right to Information Act, is a Noble Legislation, which ensures transparency in the public administration, which would be undoubtedly helpful to the citizen of our Great Nation to make the public servants accountable and responsible regarding the administrative actions.”
As a corollary, it is then further very rightly held in para 27 that, “In this context, this Court would like to emphasise that the Law University, being a Public Institution, is bound to implement the provisions of the Right to Information Act, scrupulously in its letter and spirit. The moot question is that why should any public authority shy for providing public informations to the information seekers. Undoubtedly, confidential files are protected under the provisions of the Act itself and therefore, the officials should not shy about providing all informations to the public domain, enabling the citizen to understand the manner in which the Public Institutions are administered.”
It cannot be lost on us that it is then very rightly harped upon in para 28 that, “After all, ‘We, The People of India’ solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Therefore, ‘We, The People of India’ enacted the Right to Information Act, through its Parliament, then the instrumentality of the State or the Public Institutions cannot take a stand that they will adopt their own procedure for furnishing the informations under the Right to Information Act. When the Parliament enacted the law in order to develop transparency in public administration, undoubtedly, the other procedures or regulations formulated by any other institutions, cannot prevail over the Act of Parliament and those Rules and Regulations of such individual institutions can never override the purpose and object of the Right to Information Act, 2005.”
Of course, it is then pointed out in para 29 that, “The second respondent, in person, articulated his points by stating that large number of such applications are kept pending, by citing the pendency of the present writ petition. Further, the second respondent states that all such information seekers are waiting for the answer scripts and other informations sought for in their respective applications.”
To put it succinctly, it is then envisaged in para 30 that, “Under these circumstances, the writ petitioner-Law University has not established any acceptable ground for the purpose of assailing the order impugned. Per contra, the order impugned is well reasoned and candid. Thus, the second respondent is entitled to receive the answer scripts as sought for in his application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. All such similar applications are also to be disposed of by the writ petitioner-Law University, as expeditiously as possible, without causing any undue delay, as the students would be anxious in seeing their answer scripts and on account of the pendency of the writ petition, their applications are kept pending.”
Coming to the concluding paras, para 31 holds that, “This being the factum, the writ petitioner-Law University is directed to dispose of all the RTI applications filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005, as expeditiously as possible, by following the procedures contemplated under the RTI Act as well as the Rules in force. In respect of the application submitted by the second respondent, the answer script had already been furnished to him and no further directions are required in this regard.” Lastly, it is then held in the last para 32 that, “Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.”
In conclusion, it is very rightly held by the Madras High Court in this notable case that an evaluated answer sheet is an information as defined under the RTI Act and so a university cannot deny access to students. This is more so true because the information sought by students does not fall under the exempted category for national security or copyright infringement. We thus see that Justice SM Subramaniam of Madras High Court dismisses a plea made by the Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University challenging the Tamil Nadu State Information Commissioner’s order allowing students to get copies of answer scripts through RTI. Justice Subramaniam directed the University to supply the answer scripts to students who wanted them and rejected the University’s contention that it is governed by its own rules and maintained that the RTI Act overrides the University’s statute. Very rightly so! This is a commendable judgment which will certainly address the genuine grievances of students and make them see for themselves whether justice has been done with them or not actually in evaluating the answer scripts!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Whistle Blowing Protection Should Be Extended To Judges: UK Supreme Court

In a latest development with far reaching consequences not for India but for England, the Supreme Court of UK has gone all guns blazing by categorically and courageously pronouncing in Gilham (Appellant) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent) [2019] UKSC 44 on appeal from [2017] EWCA Civ 2220 and delivered on October 16, 2019 wherein it was explicitly held that the whistle-blowing protection envisaged under Employment Rights Act should be extended to the holders of judicial office. It was held that the exclusion of Judges from the whistle-blowing protection in Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act is in breach of their rights under Article 14 read with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Very rightly so! 

To start with, this latest, landmark and extremely laudable and unanimous judgment delivered by Lady Hale who is President of UK Supreme Court for herself, Lord Kerr, Lord Carnwath, Lady Arden and Sir Declan Morgan sets the ball rolling in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment wherein it is observed that, “This case is about the employment status of district judges, but it could apply to the holder of any judicial office. The issue is whether a district judge qualifies as a “worker” or a “person in Crown employment” for the purpose of the protection given to whistle-blowers under Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“The 1996 Act”). If a district judge does not on the face of it qualify for whistle-blower protection, the further question is whether this is discrimination against her in the enjoyment of her right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. And if it is, what is the remedy?”
While defining worker, para 2 then states that, “In section 230(3) of the 1996 Act, a “worker” is defined as
“an individual who has entered into or works under (or where the employment has ceased, worked under) – (a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual.””
To be sure, para 3 then states that, “The appellant does not claim that a judge works under a contract of employment within limb (a) of that definition, but contends that she does fall within limb (b) of the definition.”
The history of the case
To recapitulate, it is then enumerated in para 4 that, “The appellant was appointed a district judge by the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, with effect from 6 February 2006. Under section 6 of the County Courts Act 1984, as it then stood, district judges were appointed by the Lord Chancellor. As it now stands, they are appointed by Her Majesty the Queen on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor. In October 2005, the appellant had been sent a letter offering her appointment which talked in terms of her accepting that offer. The letter itself contained several stipulations as to the duration of her appointment, her salary, her pension on retirement, and other matters. Enclosed with the letter was a memorandum entitled “District Judges – Memorandum on conditions of employment and terms of service”. This was a detailed document, which included terms as to sitting days, sick pay, maternity, paternity and adoption leave, training, the prohibition of legal practice, relations with the press and media, outside activities and much more. The memorandum made it clear that the salary was taxed under Schedule E to the Income Tax Act and that the judge was an employed earner for the purpose of national insurance contributions. Although described as a “lifetime” appointment, a judge is required to vacate office on her 70th birthday (unless extended) and can resign before that date. The appellant’s Instrument of Appointment, signed by the Lord Chancellor on 27 January 2006, simply talked in terms of his approving her to sit at each of the country courts on the Wales and Chester circuit.”
Truth be told, para 5 then specifies that, “In fact, she first sat at the Crewe County Court and in 2009 transferred to the Warrington County Court. In 2010, the Cheshire courts were transferred to the Northern Circuit and major cost cutting reforms were announced. In 2011, the Runcorn County Court was closed and the business transferred to Warrington, as were some tribunal sittings. The appellant raised a number of concerns relating to the cuts, in particular about the lack of appropriate and secure court room accommodation, the severely increased workload placed upon the district judges, and administrative failures. She raised these with the local leadership judges and senior managers in Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals service and eventually in a formal grievance.”
To be sure, it is then disclosed in para 6 that, “She claims that her complaints fell within the definition of “qualifying disclosures” under section 43B of the 1996 Act, in particular as tending to show a failure to comply with legal obligations that miscarriages of justice were likely, or that the health and safety of any individual had been, is being or is likely to be endangered. The disclosures were made to an employer or other responsible person within the meaning of section 43C of the 1996 Act and thus they were “protected discloures” within the meaning of section 43A.”
As things stand, para 7 then lays bare that, “Under section 47B(1) of the 1996 Act, a worker has the right “not to be subjected to any detriment by any act or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure”. The appellant claims that she was subjected to a number of detriments as a result of her complaints a significant delay in investigating her grievance; being seriously bullied, ignored and undermined by her fellow judges and court staff, being informed that her workload and concerns were simply a “personal working style choice”; and inadequate steps to support her in returning to work; she also claims that a severe degradation in her health, resulting in psychiatric injury and a disability under the Equality Act 2010, was such a detriment. The appellant was signed off work due to stress from the end of January 2013 but has recently returned.”
Importantly, it is then pointed out in para 8 that, “In February 2015 the appellant made a two-part claim in the Employment Tribunal. Both parts of her claim depended, upon her being a “worker” within the meaning of section 230(3) of the 1996 Act (or having the same protection as such a worker). One part of her claim was for disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, as a result of failure to make reasonable adjustments to cater for her disability. This claim is derived from European Union Law. It is therefore accepted that, as a result of the decision of this Court in O’ Brien v Ministry of Justice (formerly Department for Constitutional Affairs) [2013] UKSC 6 [2013] 1 WLR 522, in the light of the guidance given by the Court of Justice of the European Union in ((Case C-393 10) [2012] ICR 955), a judge is a “worker” for the purpose of European Union law and national law has to be interpreted in conformity with that. That case concerned discrimination against part-time workers, but the same result was reached by the Court of Appeal for Northern Ireland in Perceval-Price v Development [2000] IRLR 380, that tribunal judges were “workers” for the purpose of discrimination on grounds of sex. Hence the disability discrimination claim will continue in any event.”
Furthermore, it is then pointed out in para 9 that, “The other part of her claim was under the “whistle-blowing” provisions in Part IVA of the 1996 Act, inserted by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. These provisions are not derived from European Union law and accordingly the definition of “worker” does not have to be read so as to conform to the requirements of EU law. This means that a judge may have a different status in employment law depending upon whether or not the employment right in question is derived from EU law.”
More importantly, it is then explicitly and elegantly laid down in para 44 that, “Bearing in mind, therefore, the parallel seen in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza between section 3(1) and conforming interpretation in EU law, its strictures against attaching decisive importance to the precise adjustment needed to the language of the provisions, and the ease with which this court interpreted identical language to include judges as limb (b) workers in O’ Brien. I can reach no other conclusion than that the Employment Rights Act should be read and given effect so as to extend its whistle-blowing protection to the holders of judicial office.”
Most importantly, it is then held eloquently and effectively in para 45 that, “The relevant provisions of the Employment Rights Act extend to both England and Wales and Scotland (section 244) but not Northern Ireland. However, the equivalent provisions of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (as amended by the Public Interest Disclosure (Northern Ireland) Order 1998) are to the same effect; article 3(3) defines “worker” in the same times as section 230(3); articles 67A, 67B, 67C define protected disclosures, qualifying disclosures and those to whom such disclosures may be made in the same way as in Part IVA of the 1996 Act and articles 70B and 71(1A) provide that a maker of a protected disclosure shall not be subjected to any detriment for doing so and for complaints to an employment tribunal. Those provisions too should be read and given effect so as to extend the protection given to whistle-blowers to the holders of judicial office.”
Lastly, it is then held in para 46 that, “I would therefore allow this appeal and remit the case to the Employment Tribunal on the basis that the appellant is entitled to claim the protection of Part IVA of the 1996 Act.”
On a concluding note, it may well be said that the UK Supreme Court has very rightly minced just no words in reaching the palpable conclusion that whistle blowing protection should be extended to Judges. It rightly deduced that, “To give the judiciary such protection might be thought to enhance their independence by reducing the risk that they might be tempted to “go public” with their concerns, because of the fear that there was no other avenue available to them, and thus unwillingly be drawn into what might be seen as a political debate.” No doubt, judiciary is the bedrock of democracy and Judges are the most important pillars of judiciary and so it has been very rightly held by the UK Supreme Court that whistle blowing protection should be extended to the holders of judicial office! 
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.