Doctors Are Frontline Warriors Against Coronavirus: Tripura HC

It is most heartening and most refreshing to learn that the Tripura High Court just recently on July 30, 2020 in a notable judgment titled Karnajit De vs. The State of Tripura in AB 87/2020 made no bones in making an important observation in simple and straight language that, “Doctors are the first line defence of the country in the fight against the corona virus”. It directed the Government to restore the confidence of the Doctors and para-medical staff and all concerned who are sacrificing their lives to fight against the pandemic. Very rightly so!

To be sure, Justice Arindam Lodh of Tripura High Court made this important observation while considering an anticipatory bail plea filed by a person accused of being part of a protest by a group of patients against a doctor. The Judge directed the Investigating Officer to record statement of the doctor and to conduct a Test Identification Parade. Karnajit De who is Additional Government Advocate under the Government of Tripura was charged under Section 323/353/506/34 IPC and Section 3(2) (i) of Epidemic Diseases Amendment Act, 2000 read with Section 3 of the Tripura Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Institution (Prevention of Violence & Damage Property) Act, 2013 for allegedly harassing a woman doctor.

To start with, Justice Arindam Lodh sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in the opening para that, “Heard Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. Samrat Ghosh, learned Addl. PP appearing for the State-respondent through video conferencing.” It is then observed that, “Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri Karnajit De who has approached this Court with an application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for granting anticipatory bail to him in connection with NCC Police Station Case No. 2020 NCC 106 under Section 323/353/506/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(i) of Epidemic Diseases Amendment Act, 2020 read with Section 3 of the Tripura Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Institution (Prevention of Violence & Damage Property) Act, 2013.”

While elaborating in detail, it is then pointed out that, “Mr. Datta, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention at the complaint lodged by the Director of Health Services, Government of Tripura, stating inter alia that one Dr. Sangita Chakraborty, who was serving as District Health Officer, West Tripura, and was discharging her duties as incharge of distribution of COVID-19 patients in the two centres on 24.07.2020, Saturday, at around 7.00 P.M. five post delivery mothers along with their new born babies, who were tested COVID-19 positive, were sent to the Bhagat Singh CO)VID Care Centre, soon after their deliveries to ensure maximum safety and much needed seclusion for the mother and the new born babies under the strict surveillance of Dr. Sangita Chakraborty. It is further stated that when the said patients and the accompanying health staffs reached near B Block of the said centre, some of the previously admitted older inmate patients started protesting indiscriminately demanding that they would not allow entry of any new patients in the centre. It is further stated in the complaint that when the situation had worsened, Dr. Chakraborty realizing the seriousness of the developments, immediately reached the place of occurrence and maintaining the desired composure form of a public servant, tried to convince the unruly protestors and repeatedly insisted to behave responsibly. However, the protestors furiously reciprocated and started abusing Dr. Chakraborty in utterly filthy languages and also threw some sexually coloured remarks. They even went further and started jointly spitting on the face of Dr. Sangita Chakraborty and one of them climbed upstairs from where he took some water in his mouth and showered gargled water upon Dr. Chakraborty, who was then somehow saved by the timely interference of her staff but not before receiving some minor injuries. Some of the protestors even went further and threatened her and her family with dire consequences once they are out of their quarantine, which has left the esteemed doctor and her family in a state of terror and helplessness.”

Most significantly, it is then rightly made clear in no unambiguous terms that, “Needless to say, Doctors are in the frontline of the battle against Coronavirus pandemic, which has now affected lakhs of people and claimed many lives in the country with further reports that para-medical staff and Doctors getting affected by COVID, the focus has now shifted to those brave souls. Our law makers in their own wisdom and after well thought consideration have described the Doctor, para-medical staff, their associates and the police forces as the frontline warriors for their sincere and devoted dedication and constant fight against the deadly disease engulfed in the entire country. Further, they are the “first line defence of the country” in the fight against Coronavirus. It is even reported that many Doctors and nurses have been complaining of fatigue, dehydration and headache due to grueling schedule as they are to work non-stop for seven to eight hours in one go, without any break. They have always taken all kinds of risk not only on their own shoulders but also upon their family members and even to their kids and their old aged parents.”

Equally significant if not more is what is then stated now that, “Coming to the present case, the Director of Health Services, Government of Tripura had lodged a serious complaint against some of the patients, who not only had made the Doctors and other staff vulnerable to the infection which will deprive many patients from their valuable service. They created serious obstacles in treating the COVID patients, who are the mothers of the new born babies and suffering from COVID infections and thus prevented the lady Doctor and her staffs to discharge their official duties smoothly and freely. In my opinion, this kind of acts and commission are not only detrimental to the sentiment, safety and security of the Doctors, the “frontline warriors” of the nation, but also detrimental to the interest of the entire society of our nation as well as of this state. It is not at all tolerable and should not be tolerated for a single moment, and the real offenders are to be booked and punished in accordance with law.”

As it turned out, it is then further held that, “I have given my anxious thought to the submission of Mr. Datta, learned counsel that the petitioner in this petition is an advocate and holding the post of Addl. Government Advocate. According to me, the petitioner being an Advocate is engaged and associated with a Noble profession, and, who, as a representative of the law makers of the State, should be more responsible and dutiful towards the cause of the Doctor and society as a whole. His acts and commissions shall be the example to others. Till now, this Court does not find any specific accusation against the petitioner. However, both the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the lis have apprehended his implication in connection with the offence.”

Furthermore, it is then also held that, “Keeping in view the object of bringing the Ordinance 2020 and the seriousness of the complaint as lodged by the Director of Health Services, Government of Tripura, I direct the Investigating Officer to record confessional statement of the victim Dr. Sangita Chakraborty and her supporting staff under Section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. within 24 hours, however, at the convenience of the said Doctor and her other associates. The Investigating Officer is further directed to arrange for T.I. parade, if necessary, to identify the real offenders. Learned Addl. P.P. is requested to produce the case diary on 05.08.2020 to find out the reasonable apprehension and accusation, if any, against the petitioner.”

To put things in perspective, it is then also directed that, “A copy of this order may be communicated to the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala for compliance of the order forthwith. A copy may also be forwarded to the learned counsel of the petitioner and learned Addl. P.P. for immediate forwarding the copy of the order to the investigating officer to act in terms of the above order.”

To put it succinctly, it is then also clarified that, “In the meantime, the police authorities are given liberty to proceed in accordance with law to protect and restore the confidence of the Doctors and para-medical staff and all concerned who are sacrificing their lives to fight against the dreaded Coronavirus.”

Finally, it is then held that, “List the matter on 05.08.2020. A copy of this order may also be supplied to the learned counsel for the parties through e-mail or Whatsapp duly authenticated by the Registrar (Judicial) which shall serve all practical purposes.”

In essence, this extremely laudable, landmark and latest judgment minces no words to highlight the pivotal role played by doctor in society by terming them as “frontline warriors against coronavirus”. It also very rightly labels the doctors as “first line defence of the country”. It also very rightly advocates that there has to be zero tolerance of any kind of violence against doctors! This is what makes this judgment all so special!

Needless to say, it is the bounden duty of all the governments in our country – by the States and also by the Centre to ensure that doctors are always protected from violence of any kind in any form and those who try to perpetrate violence are promptly identified and strictly punished in accordance with law! Lawyers too must always adore, admire and appreciate the pivotal role played by doctors in society which mostly they do also! No denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

MP HC Asks Person Accused Of Outraging Modesty Of Neighbour To Request Her To Tie The Rakhi

In a first of its kind, the Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court just recently on 30 July, 2020 in a latest case titled Vikram Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh in Case No. – MCRC-23350-2020 released a person who was apprehended for outraging the modesty of a woman on bail. The unique condition that was imposed for releasing him on bail was that he visits the house of the complainant and requests her to tie the Rakhi band to him “with the promise to protect her to the best of his ability for all times to come”! This is what gave a lot of prominence to this case. The case was heard through video conferencing.

To start with, this notable judgment authored by Justice Rohit Arya of Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing that, “This is the first application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., for grant of bail filed on behalf of the applicant. The applicant is in custody since 02/06/2020 in connection with crime No. 133/2020 registered at Police Station Bhatpachlana, District – Ujjain for the offence punishable under Sections 452, 354(A), 354, 323 and 506 of IPC.”

To put things in perspective, it is then pointed out in this judgment that, “As per the prosecution story, on 20/04/2020 at about 2 : 30 am, the applicant as a neighbor has entered the house of the complainant and caught hold of hand of the complainant attempting to outrage her modesty. Accordingly, case has been registered. Investigation is complete. Challan has been filed.”

On the contrary, the judgment then mention the applicant’s version stating that, “Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the crime. Investigation is complete. Challan has been filed. He is no more required for further custodial interrogation. The applicant is in custody since 02/06/2020. It is further submitted that as a matter of fact, the applicant had asked the husband of the complainant to return back the outstanding loan amount against him, which was advanced by the applicant during the lockdown period. The complainant’s husband had taken exception thereto and as a sequel to the demand, filed the instant false case against the present applicant. Besides, the applicant is a married person and cannot think of entering the house of the neighbour to outrage the modesty of a women/complainant. The family is on the verge of starvation due to his jail incarceration. Further jail incarceration shall jeopardise the life of the family members. Due to prevailing Covid-19 situation, trial is not likely to conclude early in the near future. Under such circumstances, the applicant deserves to be enlarged on bail on such terms and conditions, Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper.”

As a corollary, what then ensues is stated thus: “Per contra, learned Panel Lawyer opposes the bail application supporting the order impugned. It is submitted that even if, this Court is inclined to grant bail to the applicant, certain stringent conditions are imposed.”

Most significantly, it is then pointed out further in this judgment that, “Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, without commenting upon the rival contention so advanced, but regard being had to the fact that the applicant has already suffered jail incarceration for more than two months, he is no more required for further custodial interrogation, therefore, he is held entitled for enlargement on bail. Consequently, the application of the applicant filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed. It is directed that the applicant be released on bail, on furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with one solvent surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court, on the condition that he shall remain present before the Court concerned during trial and also comply with the conditions enumerated under Section 437(3) of Cr.P.C., with following further conditions:

(i) the applicant along with his wife shall visit the house of the complainant with Rakhi thread/band on 03 August, 2020 at 11:00 am with a box of sweets and request the complainant to tie the Rakhi band to him with the promise to protect her to the best of his ability for all times to come. He shall also tender Rs. 11,000/- (Rs. Eleven Thousand Only) to the complainant as a customary ritual usually offered by the brothers to sisters on such occasion and shall also seek her blessings. The applicant shall also tender Rs. 5,000/- to the son of the complainant-Vishal for purchase of clothes and sweets.

The applicant shall obtain photographs and receipts of payment made to the complainant and her son, and the same shall be filed through the counsel for placing the same on record of this case before this Registry.

The aforesaid deposit of amount shall not influence the pending trial, but is only for enlargement of the applicant on bail.

(ii) the applicant shall furnish a written undertaking with his complete residential details that he shall abide by the terms and conditions of various circulars and orders issued by the Government of India and the State Government as well as the local administration from time to time in the matter of maintaining social distancing, physical distancing, hygiene etc., to avoid proliferation of Novel Corona virus (COVID-19);

(iii) the applicant shall install Aarogya Sethu App (if not already installed) in his mobile phone;

(iv) the applicant shall not tamper with the evidence whatsoever in any manner or induce or threat any person acquainted with the facts of the case;

(v) the applicant shall cooperate during trial and will not seek unnecessary adjournments during trial;

(vi) the applicant shall not leave India or the area without previous permission of the trial Court/Investigating Officer, as the case may be;

(vii) the concerned jail authorities are directed that before releasing the applicant, the medical examination of the applicant be conducted through the jail doctor and if it is prima facie found that he is having any symptoms of COVID-19, then the consequential follow up action including the isolation/quarantine or any further test required be undertaken immediately. If not, the applicant shall be released on bail in terms of the conditions imposed in this order and shall also be given pass or permit for movement to reach his place of residence;

Going ahead, it is then also pointed out in this judgment that, “In the event of violation of any of the terms and conditions of the order by the applicant, the prosecution is at liberty to seek cancellation of the bail granted to the applicant. Learned Panel Lawyer is directed to send an e-copy of this order to all the concerned including the concerned Station House Officer of the police station for information and necessary action. Registry is directed to send an e-copy of this order to the Court concerned for necessary compliance.”

Finally and before concluding, it is then held in the last para that, “It is made clear that this e-copy order be treated as Certified copy in terms of the advisories issued by the High Court from time to time.”

To conclude, it may be very rightly recalled that earlier the Madhya Pradesh High Court had directed few accused to register themselves as “COVID-19 Warriors” and work in the “COVID-19 Disaster Management”, as per directions of the concerned District Magistrate, as a pre-condition for bail. Similarly there have been some other such unique cases also. This latest judgment by Justice Rohit Arya of Madhya Pradesh High Court of releasing an accused on bail on condition of offering the woman to tie him rakhi is certainly unique and gives an opportunity to the accused to reform himself on a very light punishment due to which it is rightly in the headlines also!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Merely Because DNA Report Does Not Establish Paternity

In a well-balanced, well-analysed, well-worded and well-reasoned judgment delivered by a woman Judge named Justice Bharati Dangre of the Bombay High Court in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Vaibhav Bhanudas Ubale Vs The State of Maharashtra in LD VC Dist Bail Application No. 34 of 2020 delivered just recently on July 24, 2020 has very rightly held that merely because the DNA report of a child born after a gang rape does not establish paternity of the accused, it does not mean that the accused can be released on bail. She thus rejected the bail application filed by one Vaibhav Ubale who is accused of raping a minor girl along with two others. A heinous and ghastly offence like gang rape cannot be taken lightly under any circumstances!

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 where it is first and foremost observed that, “The applicant has been arrested in relation to FIR No. 194 of 2018 for the offences punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 3, 4, 5(G), 5(J)(II), 6, 8 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short “POCSO Act”). On investigation, charge-sheet vide no. 60 of 2019 has been filed in the Court of District and Special Judge, Pune on 25^th September 2019. The accused has been charged under Section 376(d) of IPC along with two other accused persons and also the relevant provisions of the POCSO Act.”

As it turned out, it is then mentioned in this same para 1 ahead about the applicant’s defence that, “The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant has been roped into the said offence without any rhyme and reason. The counsel placed heavy reliance on the DNA report of the child born out of the alleged act of sexual assault which do not trace the applicant as the father of the baby girl. The DNA report according to the learned counsel, sufficiently absolve the applicant of the act of sexual assault on the prosecutrix and since the charge-sheet is now filed, according to the applicant, a case is made out for grant of bail.”

To put things in perspective, it is then mentioned in para 2 that, “With the assistance of the learned counsel for the applicant, I have perused the charge-sheet which has been uploaded and also placed on record in physical form. The charge-sheet consists of a statement of the prosecutrix dated 9^th November 2018. The said statement is elaborate one and runs into 4 pages. The said statement is recorded after the prosecutrix delivered a baby girl on 6^th November 2018 and since her age at the time of the pregnancy was found to be below 18 years, the Koregaon Park Police station official had made inquiries with her mother. The statement was given by the prosecutrix in presence of her mother and member of the Women Vigilance Committee, Gulshan Arif Shaikh.”

While dwelling on the background and facts, it is then enunciated in para 3 that, “The prosecutrix had narrated her woes and stated that she and her mother were residing separately from her father on account of the frequent fights between the couple. Her mother was incurring the expenditure of the household by doing petty household work in the nearby area. The prosecutrix was pursuing her education in Morris High School Wadgaon Sheri when she was acquainted with one girl Shraddha. She happened to meet her again till both took admission in the same college in XI standard. She also became acquainted with another friend Apurva and it is these two girls who have stated in their statement to the police making reference to the date on which the incident took place.”

While continuing in the same vein and delving deeper, it is then stated in para 4 that, “When the prosecutrix was undergoing her 12^th Board examination in February-March 2018 and while her last paper was of subject Geography and the prosecutrix with her two friends were studying together at Shraddha’s house, shew as introduced to the applicant who was residing in the same locality. On the 3^rd day, when she was introduced to the applicant, her friends took her to his house. For some reason, the other two female friends left her alone in the company of the applicant and the applicant took advantage of the situation. His two male friends in a pre-planned manner arrived in his house with some drinking and eating stuff. The applicant offered the prosecutrix some drink like Thumbs up, which contained some substance which made her feel sleepy and dizzy. The applicant asked the prosecutrix to rest in the bed-room while her friends returned. It is then alleged that the applicant and his two friends committed rape on her. The prosecutrix had narrated the entire incident in great detail which include the specification about the location of the flat of the applicant and the clandestine manner in which the three friends arrived in his flat. Pertinent to note that this description completely matches with the spot panchnama which forms part of the charge-sheet.”

Be it noted, it is then observed in para 5 that, “Fearing the outcome of the act, the prosecutrix did not reveal the incident or the fact that she was pregnant, to her mother. It was only when she had pain in her stomach on 5.12.2018, her mother took her to the hospital and it was revealed to her that the prosecutrix is pregnant. When the police had arrived, the prosecutrix stated that the mother and the daughter were hesitant to report the incident to police and register an offence. However, one of the police personnel which she has described as ‘Sheikh’ tutored her to give a particular statement and on his instructions, she gave her first statement on 6.11.2018 where she implicated one Sony Tapkir and reported of an incident where she accompanied him in a car and where he established physical relation with her. According to the victim’s statement, she gave the earlier statement on the dictate of Shri Shaikh and even told her mother of the same incident. However, subsequently, she gave a detailed statement on 9.11.2018 in form of a supplementary statement on the basis of which FIR has been filed and charge-sheet has also been presented to the Special Court. The statement of two friends of the prosecutrix, support her version to the extent that they went to flat of the applicant but what happened inside the flat is not known to them. The prosecutrix was below 18 yrs of age at the time when the incident took place. She delivered a baby girl which has been forwarded to an orphanage and is leading her life there. The charge-sheet contain sufficient material against the applicant.”

Finally and perhaps most significantly, it is then held in para 6 that, “The case against the applicant is serious one of committing gang rape by three persons and taking advantage of a situation of a poor helpless victim girl. The applicant has indulged into an act of rape. The mere fact that the DNA report do not support the paternity is not a ground to release the applicant at this stage. There is every likelihood that he will pressurize the victim girl once being released on bail. The fact that he is a young boy itself is not sufficient to release him on bail, in light of the material collected by the investigating agency against him. No case for his release on bail is made out. The application is rejected.”

In conclusion, it must well be said that Justice Bharati Dangre of Bombay High Court has very rightly rejected the bail application of the applicant. Not just this, she has also very rightly given right reasons for doing so. She has rightly ruled that merely because DNA report of a child born after gang rape does not establish paternity of the accused, it cannot be construed to mean that the accused can be released on bail as a matter of right!

It is imperative to state here that in heinous crimes like gang rape, bail should not be given at the drop of a hat! A Judge must always in such cases of gang rape exercise his/her mind to the fullest and only then after weighing all the options should an opinion be formed as it will have a direct bearing on the case and the rape victim would be directly affected by it! Justice Bharati Dangre in this leading case too has also very rightly voiced her serious apprehensions about the applicant misusing his position once out on bail and harassing the victim girl. We see so many cases where the accused after getting bail have even burnt alive the rape victim and so in such cases there should be no question of extending bail to the accused as that could directly endanger the life of the rape victim as also her family! There can be no denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Use Of Social Media By Army Personnel Enables Enemies To Gain Edge

While dismissing a petition challenging the ban on army officers using social media, the Delhi High Court in Lt Col PK Choudhary Vs Union of India & Ors. in W.P.(C) No. 4181/2020 delivered via video conferencing on August 5, 2020 has observed in no uncertain terms that the scope of judicial review over matters concerning defence and security is limited. We thus see that the Delhi High Court declined to interfere with the government conclusion that use of social media by army personnel enables enemies to gain edge. Very rightly so!

To start with, this extremely laudable, latest and landmark judgment authored by Mr Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw for himself and Ms Justice Asha Menon first and foremost sets the ball rolling in para 1 by observing that, “The petitioner, a Lieutenant Colonel with the Indian Army, has filed this petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents (i) Union of India, (ii) Director General of Military Intelligence, and (iii) Chief of the Army Staff to withdraw their policy dated 6^th June, 2020 to the extent that it bans the petitioner and other members of the Indian Army from using social networking platforms like Facebook and Instagram and to the extent it orders the petitioner and other members of the Indian Army to delete their accounts from social networking platforms like Facebook and Instagram; declaration is also sought that the respondent no. 2 Director General of Military Intelligence is not empowered under the Constitution of India or under any other law, to modify, amend or abrogate the fundamental rights of the petitioner and other members of the Armed Forces.”

While elaborating further, it is then observed in para 2 that, “The petition came up before us first on 14^th July, 2020. It was found that though the petitioner had pleaded that on 9^th July, 2020, the policy aforesaid was circulated to the members of the Indian Army but the policy had not been produced before the Court. It was the plea and contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner, as a responsible officer, to maintain confidentiality, had not annexed the policy, which is for restricted circulation, to the petition or reproduced the contents thereof in the petition. Being of the view that the counsels should be heard only after we have had an occasion to peruse the policy and if the documents prescribing the policy did not record the reasons therefor, the documents containing the reasons for the policy, we directed the counsel for respondents, appearing on advance notice on 14^th July, 2020 to circulate in a sealed cover the policy and/or the documents containing the reasons therefor and deferred the hearing to 21^st July, 2020.”

To put things in perspective, it is then pointed out in para 17 that, “We find it to be a fit case to apply the law as discussed in the paragraph before the preceding paragraph. Even if there is any error in the respondents issuing the impugned policy and direction, without complying with the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of the Army Act, considering that the issue has an element of urgency and concerns the safety and security of the entire country, we do not deem it necessary to, for the grievance of the petitioner only, render an adjudication on the questions urged and which may require us to refer to the documents and materials shown to us in confidence. What has also weighed in our mind is, that any interpretation given by us in the facts of the present case, of Section 21 of the Army Act, Defence Regulations and army orders, may be prejudicial to the personnel of the armed forces in a case with better facts. The counsel for the petitioner also has in response to the question posed to him not been able to give any explanation, why we should not in our discretion refuse to adjudicate the question urged of violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner of speech and expression without in accordance with law. In fact, save for stating that Facebook and Twitter are more convenient, no answer was forthcoming to, why the filial and other social needs of the petitioner cannot be fulfilled by other means of communication cited by the ASG, which are still available to the petitioner. It was suggested that the petitioner cannot explore other people whose contacts are not known to him. In this context we may record that we find the petitioner, on Facebook and Twitter, following and being followed by a large number of persons from other fields and making comments on their posts/tweets and qua which the ASG said, is breach of earlier advisories/Regulations.”

While citing the relevant case laws, it is then envisaged in para 18 that, “Supreme Court, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India (2004) 2 SCC 476 was concerned with writ petitions seeking disclosure of information relating to purported safety violations and defects in various nuclear installations and power plants across the country. It was held that (i) the jurisdiction of the Courts in such matters is very limited; (ii) the Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review in such matters unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fide, dishonesty or corrupt practices; (iii) the order can be set aside if it is held to be beyond the limits for which the power has been conferred upon the authorities by the legislature or is based on the grounds extraneous to the legislation and if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction required thereunder, no such case had been made out in the facts of that case; (iv) the State must have the prerogative of preventing evidence being given on matters that would be contrary to public interest and, (v) when any claim of privilege is made by the State in respect of any document, the question whether the documents belong to the privileged class, is first to be decided by the Court; the Court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question; the claim of immunity and privilege has to be based on public interest. Again, in State of N.C.T. of Delhi Vs. Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181, it was held that (a) the present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those classes of cases which relate to deployment of troops, entering into international treaty etc.; the distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness of the Court to assert their power to scrutinize the factual basis upon which discretionary powers have been exercised; (b) the administrative action is subject to control by judicial review on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety; (c) if the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous; (d) if a power is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated; and, (e) judicial review can be limited in the case of national security. Again, in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 409, it was held that (i) the decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness on a particular case is for the government and not for the Courts; the government alone have access to the necessary information and in any event the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security; (ii) those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires and it is undesirable that such matter should be made the subject matter of evidence in a Court of law or otherwise discussed in public; (iii) what is in the interest of national security is not a question of law – it is a matter of policy and it is not for the Court to decide whether something is in interest of State or not; and, (iv) once the State is of the stand that the issue involves national security, the Court shall not disclose the reasons to the affected party. The same was followed in Digi Cable Network (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 451.”

While explaining the reasons behind denying the petitioner what he wanted, it is then stated in para 22 that, “It is also in the light of the aforesaid judgments that we have herein observed that we do not deem it appropriate to exercise the discretion vested in us as aforesaid in exercise of powers under Article 226, to not entertain the petition and not adjudicate the issues raised. Had we, on perusal of the impugned policy which itself is a restricted document or the supporting material thereof found the same to be suffering from the vice of non-application of mind or being not based on any material on record or being without proper deliberations, we would have certainly proceeded to answer the legal issue raised by the petitioner, of the ban being imposed on the petitioner and others similarly placed as the petitioner without complying with Article 33 of the Constitution and Section 21 of the Army Act. However, once we are satisfied on the aforesaid parameters and find other means of communication to be still available to the petitioner and the ban being with respect to certain social networking websites only and more so, once we have found the petitioner himself to have been posting tweets which according to the ASG are in violation of the policy earlier in force qua use of social media, we do not deem it apposite to at the instance of the petitioner to go into the questions urged. Rather, we do not appreciate the pleadings of the petitioner as a senior officer in the Army, of army personnel being treated as slaves and the government not trusting its army.”

Most significantly, it is then held in para 23 that, “We may also notice that warfare and inter-country rivalries and animosities today are not confined to accession of territory and destruction of installations and infrastructure of enemy countries but also extend to influencing and affecting the economies and political stability of enemy country including by inciting civil unrest and disturbance and influencing the political will of the citizens of the enemy country. In such a scenario, if the government, after complete assessment, has concluded that permitting of certain social networking websites by personnel of its defence forces is enabling the enemy countries to gain an edge, the Courts would be loath to interfere.”

To summarise, the Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw and Justice Asha Menon made it clear by this notable judgment that the Government has the power to ban use of social media by army personnel when it feels that this will give enemies an edge as we see here also! The Delhi High Court also took a serious note of the submission of the Centre that army officers were posting pictures and details of their posting locations in social media which can easily convey a full picture to an expert espionage eye. Thus we see that the Delhi High Court clearly and convincingly ruled while dismissing petitioner’s claim that no case for interference is made out! Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh

Begging Before Someone To Stand As Surety

In a well-balanced, well-reasoned, well-analysed and well-articulated judgment, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Abhishek Kumar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh in Cr.MP(M) No. 1017 of 2020 delivered on July 30, 2020 has made it absolutely clear that even accused has a right to live with dignity. It also made it very clear that begging or pestering before someone to stand as a surety comes at the cost of pride and so the Courts while granting bail should give a choice to the accused to either furnish surety bonds or give a cash deposit. Very rightly so!

To start with, Justice Anoop Chitkara of Himachal Pradesh High Court who authored this latest, landmark and laudable judgment sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “The petitioner, a permanent resident of West Bengal, who is under incarceration for more than six months for committing a white-collar crime, has come up before this Court, seeking regular bail.”

While elaborating on the FIR lodged, it is then pointed out in para 2 that, “Based on a complaint, the police arrested the petitioner on 10^th January 2020, in FIR No. 68 of 2019, dated 25.08.2019, registered under Sections 420, 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), in Police Station Nirmand, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, disclosing cognizable and non-bailable offences.”

In hindsight, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “Earlier, the petitioner had filed a petition under Section 439 CrPC before the concerned Sessions Court. However, vide order dated 23.3.2020, Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar, HP, dismissed the petition, primarily because the amount involved is enormous and there is possibility of tampering the evidence.”

For the sake of clarity, it is then pointed out in para 4 that, “I have read the status report(s) and heard counsel for the parties, as well as Ld. Amicus Curiae.”

More seriously, while dwelling on the facts of the case, it is then noted in para 5 that, “Briefly, the allegations against the petitioner are that he made phone calls from various numbers to the complainant, befooled him to share one-time passwords (OTPs) received by him, and subsequently withdrew Rs. 9,87,000/- from his bank accounts.” Also, while mentioning about his previous criminal history, it is then stated in para 6 that, “As per status report, the petitioner has a similar case registered against him.”

Be it noted, it is then observed in para 15 that, “While deciding bail, the Courts cannot discuss the evidence threadbare. The difference between the order of bail and a final verdict is similar to a sketch and a painting. However, some sketches would be detailed and paintings with a few strokes.”

Interestingly enough, it is then laid bare in para 16 that, “The Police have recovered an amount of Rs. 78,000/- and after that, the accused is in judicial custody for the last more than six months.”

Crucially, it is then also made clear in para 17 that, “Any detailed discussions about the evidence may prejudice the case of the prosecution or the accused. The nature of the offence also does not restrict bail. Suffice it to say that due to the reasons mentioned above, this Court believes that further incarceration of the accused during the trial is neither warranted nor will achieve any significant purpose.”

Needless to say, it is then enunciated in para 18 that, “Without commenting on the merits of the case, the fact that the investigation is almost complete and the accused is in jail for a considerable period, coupled with the on going situation due to the Covid-19 pandemic, would make out a case for bail.”

To be sure, it is then stipulated in para 19 that, “The possibility of the accused influencing the course of the investigation, tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses, and the likelihood of fleeing justice, can be taken care of by imposing elaborative and stringent conditions.”

Quite ostensibly, it is then rightly observed in para 20 that, “Given the above reasoning, the Court is granting bail to the petitioner, subject to strict terms and conditions, which shall be over and above and irrespective of the contents of the form of bail bonds in chapter XXXIII of CrPC, 1973.”

While explaining the drawbacks of bonds and simultaneously dwelling on the benefits of monetary bail, it is then envisaged in para 24 that, “It is beyond cavil that the sole purpose of a bond is to ensure presence of accused to attend the trial. In rapidly changing times, people travel more, covering long distances. It exposes them to the risk of being arraigned as accused in locations far away from native places. With unique identity details, monetary bail is even better. It would also address the unethical system of unscrupulous stock sureties, throwing them out of questionable practices.”

It would be pertinent to note that it is then palpably made clear in para 25 that, “Even the Legislature was aware of the menace of stock sureties and with a view to curb it, the Parliament, vide amendment of 2005, inserted S. 441-A CrPC, 1973 which read as follows:

441-A. Declaration by sureties. – Every person standing surety to an accused person for his release on bail, shall make a declaration before the Court as to the number of persons to whom he has stood surety including the accused, giving therein all the relevant particulars.”

While applauding the legislature, it is then brought out in para 26 that, “In its farsightedness, the legislature kept provision for the situations when an accused does not find any surety or none is ready to stand surety for him, by incorporating S. 445 of CrPC, 1973, which reads as under:

S. 445. Deposit instead of recognizance. – When any person is required by any Court or officer to execute a bond with or without sureties, such Court or officer may, except in the case of a bond for good behaviour, permit him to deposit a sum of money or Government promissory notes to such amount as the Court or officer may fix in lieu of executing such bond.”

While continuing in the same vein to further enhance the argument to do away with the sureties bond, it is then stated in para 27 that, “The world is passing through the 4^th technological revolution, with future unfolding before us and entering the internet of things. The database of AADHAR, PAN, and Passports ensures individuals’ identity, obsoleting the identification through sureties.”

Going forward, it is then brought out in para 28 that, “Siddhant Maniktala, in his paper ‘Relevance of sureties in criminal jurisprudence when every person in India has an identity’, (Supremo Amicus, Volume 17), writes, Aadhaar may replace surety bond as a means of getting bail because his identity has been established and with the personal data secured with the UIDAI, it will not be difficult to track down the accused in case of his fleeing from justice. It seems much important and a much crucial reform to liberalise bail laws in India. After the introduction of Aadhar, solely generated by UIDAI, (Unique Identification Authority of India) which is a unique identification proof of an individual, the need of surety for granting bail becomes debatable.”

More crucially, it is then rightly underscored in para 29 that, “The right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of India’s Constitution includes the right to live with dignity. Begging or pestering before someone to stand as a surety, comes at the cost of pride.”

No doubt, it is then rightly maintained in para 38 that, “The purpose of a cash bond is not to enrich the State’s coffers but to secure the accused’s presence. An Advocate is an officer of the Court and a vigilant watcher of the interest of her client. Owing allegiance to the Constitution of India and being a professional, it’s her onerous duty to apprise the accused of the existence of the provision of a cash deposit in the statute.”

Truth be told, it is then conceded in para 39 that, “We are already late in encouraging deposits in place of sureties. Cash surety improves the possibility of the accused’s attendance because she is aware that her money is safe and accruing interest on ED. It is further likely to motivate her not to default even once, in contrast to the handing over of cash to stock sureties, with hardly any assurance of its refund.”

Most crucially, it is then very rightly underscored in para 40 that, “Given the advent of online identification, the pragmatic approach is that while granting bail with sureties, the Court should give a choice to the accused to either furnish surety bonds or give a fixed deposit, with a further option to switch over to another, impliedly informing the accused of the existence of her right under S. 445 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Choosing between sureties and deposits, accused is the Queen and let her be.”

Equally significant if not more is what is then stated in para 43 that, “The Court has a formidable task of performing the tight rope locomotion by embarking on determination of the cash surety in consonance with the accused’s monetary status. It should not be such as to precipitate the misery on the poor accused and deprives her of personal liberty despite being admitted to bail.”

In conclusion, the long and short of this noteworthy judgment is that the surety system of securing bail comes at a great cost of pride of the accused who has to beg before someone to make him/her ready to stand as surety. A more feasible and far better option would be to allow accused to furnish cash deposits for securing bail! Also, it should be left on the accused as to what option he/she wants to exercise to secure bail! Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Right To Property Is A Constitutional As Well As Human Right

In a well-balanced, well-reasoned, well-analysed and well-articulated judgment, a two Judge Bench of Supreme Court comprising of Justice Indu Malhotra and Justice Indira Banerjee in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust vs State of Maharashtra in Civil Appeal No. 6156 of 2013 delivered on August 7, 2020 reiterated that the right to property is still a constitutional and a human right. This was held so while allowing an appeal filed by Hari Krishna Mandir Trust in the matter of a land dispute with the Pune Municipal Corporation. Very rightly so!

To start with, this latest, landmark and laudable judgment authored by Justice Indira Banerjee for herself and Justice Indu Malhotra sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 15.09.2008 passed by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court dismissing Writ Petition No. 904 of 2008 filed by the appellant, challenging an order dated 3.5.2006, whereby the State Government refused to sanction modification of a Scheme under the provisions of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as “the Regional and Town Planning Act”.”

While discussing the facts of the case, it is then enunciated in para 2 that, “One Thorat family was the owner of Plot No. 1092 at Bhamburda in Pune. By a registered deed of conveyance dated 21.12.1956 one Mrs. Krishnabhai Gopal Rao Thorat sold the northern part of the plot admeasuring 4910 sq.m. jointly to Swami Dilip Kumar Roy, one of the most eminent disciples of Sri Aurobindo, and Smt. Indira Devi, daughter disciple of Swami Dilip Kumar Roy. The names of Swami Dilip Kumar Roy and Smt. Indira Devi were duly recorded in the relevant revenue records in 1959.”

Interestingly enough, it is then disclosed in para 3 that, “Swami Dilip Kumar Roy had moved to Pune to propagate the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo and established the Hare Krishna Mandir with his daughter disciple Smt. Indira Devi, on the land purchased from Mrs. Krishnabai Gopal Rao Thorat.”

To be sure, it is then disclosed in para 4 that, “According to the appellants, by an order dated 20.8.1970 of the Pune Municipal Corporation, Plot No. 473 which was originally numbered Survey No. 1092, was divided. Final Plot No. 473B was sub divided into 4 plots being plot Nos. 473 B1 comprising an area of 1025 square meters, 473 B2 comprising an area of 603.00 square meters, 473 B3 comprising an area of 2838 square meters and 473 B4, a private road admeasuring 414.14 square meters.”

Furthermore, it is then revealed in para 5 that, “Plot No. 473 B1 was owned by Mrs. Kanta Nanda, Plot No. 473 B2 by Mr. Premal Malhotra and Plot No. 473 B3 by Swami Dilip Kumar Roy and Smt. Indira Devi. Plot No. 473 B4, which was a vacant plot of land, was shown as an Internal Private Road measuring 444.14 Sq. mtr., in the possession of Swami Dilip Roy and Smt. Indira Devi and the holders of Plot Nos. 473 B1 and 473 B2, namely Mrs. Kanta Nanda and Mr. Premal Malhotra. It is not in dispute that the Pune Municipal Corporation was not mentioned in the order dated 20.8.1970.”

While continuing in the same vein, it is then stated in para 6 that, “On 20.8.1970 the City Survey Officer directed issuance of separate property cards in view of a proposed Development Scheme under the Regional and Town Planning Act which included Final Plot No. 473, and an Arbitrator was appointed. The Arbitrator made an Award dated 16.5.1972 directing that the area and ownership of the plots were to be as per entries in the property register.”

Going ahead, it cannot be overlooked that it is then explicitly mentioned in para 92 that, “From the records of the case, particularly the order dated 20.8.1970 of sub division of plot number 473B and the award of the arbitrator, it is patently clear that the name of Pune Municipal Commissioner was at no point of time reflected as holder of the private road. There is no whisper as to how the road came to be shown in possession of Pune Municipal Commissioner nor of the procedure adopted for effecting changes, if any, in the property records.”

Interestingly enough, it is then further revealed in para 93 that, “On perusal of the documents, there can be no doubt at all that the road in question measuring 444.14 sqm. Never belonged to the Pune Municipal Corporation. In the property records, there was no private road. There were three plots 473B1, B2, B3 and 473B4 shown as vacant land held by the owners of all the three adjacent plots.”

Most significantly, it is very rightly underscored in para 96 that, “The right to property may not be a fundamental right any longer, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A and a human right as observed by this Court in Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 644 (para 42). In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no person is to be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The appellant trust cannot be deprived of its property save in accordance with law.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench very rightly makes it a point to put across in a forthright manner in para 98 that, “It has been established beyond any iota of doubt that the private road admeasuring 414 sq. meter area had never been acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation. The right to property includes any proprietary interest hereditary interest in the right of management of a religion endowment, as well as anything acquired by inheritance. However, laudable be the purpose, the Executive cannot deprive a person of his property without specific legal authority, which can be established in a court of law.”

As it turned out, the Bench then makes it clear in para 99 that, “In case of dispossession except under the authority of law, the owner might obtain restoration of possession by a proceeding for Mandamus against the Government as held by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 415. Admittedly, no compensation has been offered or paid to the appellant Trust. As observed by this Court in K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Anr. V. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 even though the right to claim compensation or the obligation of the State to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property is not expressly provided in Article 300A of the Constitution, it is inbuilt in the Article. The State seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say that no compensation shall be paid. The Regional and Town Planning Act also does not contemplate deprivation of a land holder of his land, without compensation. Statutory authorities are bound to pay adequate compensation.”

More crucially, the Bench then also makes it amply clear in para 107 that, “In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, in the light of admissions, on the part of the respondent authorities that the private road measuring 414 sq. was private property never acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation or the State Government, the respondents had a public duty under Section 91 to appropriately modify the scheme and to show the private road as property of its legitimate owners, as per the property records in existence, and or in the award of the Arbitrator. In our considered opinion, the Bombay High Court erred in law in dismissing the Writ Petition with the observation that the land in question had vested under Section 88 of the Regional and Town Planning Act.”

Equally significant is what is then stated in para 115 and para 116. Para 115 states that, “In the absence of any proceedings for acquisition or for purchase, no land belonging to the Appellant Trust could have vested in the State.” Para 116 further states that, “The High Court also erred in its finding that the modification proposed involved substantial alteration by deletion of a public road and was therefore impermissible. The modification only involved deletion of the name of Pune Municipal Corporation as holder of the private road. The finding that deletion of a public road is a substantial alteration is, for the reasons already discussed above, completely baseless.”

Be it noted, it is then observed in para 117 that, “The appeal is therefore allowed, and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside.”

Finally, it is then observed in the last para 118 that, “In exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice between the parties, we direct the Respondent authorities to act in terms of the Award dated 16^th May, 1972 and delete the name of the Pune Municipal Corporation as owner of the private road in the records pertaining to the Scheme and carry out such other consequential alterations as may be necessary under Section 91 of the Regional and Town Planning Act. The appellant trust shall within a fortnight from the date of this order, give an undertaking to the Planning Authority not to obstruct access of adjacent plot owners through the private road in question. The necessary alteration or modification under Section 91, as directed above, shall be carried above, shall be carried out within six weeks from the date of furnishing of the undertaking by the appellant, as directed above.”

In essence, the key takeaway from this latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment is that the two Judge Bench of Apex Court comprising of Justice Indu Malhotra and Justice Indira Banerjee has once again very firmly reiterated that right to property is a constitutional as well as human right. It is also made clear that the Executive has no right to deprive a person of his/her property without specific legal authority. There can be no denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Considerable Unexplained Delay By Drug Authorities

In a recent, remarkable and righteous decision titled Medipol Pharmaceutical India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research in Civil Appeal No. 2903 of 2020 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 26349 of 2019) delivered on August 5, 2020 by a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Justice RF Nariman and Justice Navin Sinha have observed categorically and convincingly that considerable unexplained delay on the part of drug authorities to test a sample can render any penalty under Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, based upon the said analysis of the sample as void. The Court was considering an appeal filed by Medipol Pharmaceutical India Pvt. Ltd. which was blacklisted. The writ petition filed by this Medipol company before the Punjab and Haryana High Court was dismissed. But the Apex Court found the State order of blacklisting the company as arbitrary and therefore it set aside this blacklisting order and made it clear that while exercising its power to blacklist a company, the State has to act fairly and rationally without in any way being arbitrary. Very rightly so!

To start with, this latest, landmark and laudable judgment authored by Justice RF Nariman for himself and Justice Navin Sinha first and foremost after granting leave then goes on to observe in para 2 that, “Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is important to first set out a few basic facts:

i) A notice inviting quotations was issued on 06.07.2015 by the Respondents herein for Clotrimazole Cream 1% 15 gm tube, the quantity being required for the first year and second year, being:

DEMAND QUANTITY REQUIRED

1^st YEAR 3400 tubes

2^nd YEAR 3400 tubes

ii) To this N.I.Q., the Appellant submitted its quotation on 09.07.2015, in which it was specified that the shelf life of the said cream would be only 2 years.

iii) After rates were negotiated and re-negotiated, a supply order was issued on 04.11.2015 in which it was clearly stated:

“8. Not more than 1/6^th of the shelf life would have expired when drug pharmaceuticals are received in medical store PGI, Chandigarh.”

iv) In accordance with the supply order, the first instalment of 1700 tubes of Clotrimazole Cream was supplied on 18.01.2016, there being no complaint whatsoever in respect of the said supply. However, when the second instalment of 1700 tubes of the self-same Cream was supplied to the Respondent on 08.04.2016, various complaints were made. The first Respondent drew samples on 29.11.2017, which samples were sent for testing to the Government Analyst under Section 25(1) of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940.

v) The first test report dated 27.03.2018 specifically stated that the sample was received on 26.12.2017. This report, which is dated a few days before the shelf life of the Cream expired, found that the sample was 61.96% w/w as against an acceptable standard of 95-105%.

vi) As a result thereof, two show cause notices were issued on 13.04.2018 and 30.5.2018 by the State Drugs Controller and Drug Inspector respectively to the Appellant in which the Appellant was asked to explain why its licence should not be suspended or cancelled under Rule 85(2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 made under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, which relates to licence to manufacture this product.

vii) The Appellant replied to the show cause notices on 26.04.2018 and 01.06.2018. However, a third show cause notice was issued on 26.09.2018 by the Respondent in which the question as to blacklisting arose for the first time.

viii) The reply of the Appellant to this show cause notice dated 04.10.2018 specifically requested the authorities not to take any action until a final report of the appellate lab, which was pending, was received.

ix) However, without waiting for this report, on 21.01.2019, the Appellant was blacklisted for a period of 2 years. A perusal of this report would show that there are no reasons given for the same. Finally, the appellate lab test report of the Central Drugs Laboratory, Kolkata, dated 19.08.2019 tested a sample that was received on 11.02.2019, that is, long after the expiry date of the Cream, in April, 2018. Even this sample, when tested, yielded a result of 92.01% which is way above the 61.96% that was found in the first test report.

x) A post-decisional hearing, based on this report, was given to the Appellant, and it was then found that the blacklisting order was in order inasmuch as on 18.09.2019 the Drug Committee, which consisted of a Chairman, two Members, two Special Invitees, one Director and one Convenor, then expressed their views on the arguments of the Appellant stating, inter alia, that on testing, the subject drug was found to be only 61.96%, which is markedly below the prescribed standard limit of 95-105%.

xi) As against the decision then taken, the Appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 17.09.2019. After extracting the appellate lab test report, the Court found that being 3% below 95%, which is the prescribed standard, there was no good ground to interfere with the impugned order of blacklisting.”

As a corollary, it is then stated in para 3 that, “What is clear from the narration of the facts stated above is that the Drug Inspector drew samples on 29.11.2017 which was long after supplies had been made to the Respondent on 08.04.2016 and complaints received. From the date of drawal of smaples on 29.11.2017 till the date on which the samples were received by the Government Analyst on 26.12.2017, there is yet another delay of almost one month. Also, owing to no fault of the Appellant, the sample that could be sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory, Kolkata, under Section 25(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, was received by the aforesaid Laboratory only on 11.02.2019, long after the expiry date of the goods in question, which was in April, 2018. Even this sample, when tested yielded a result of 92.01%, which is only roughly 3% below the required minimum standard. What is important to note is that the Government Analyst’s report was shown to be completely wrong. Finally, to cap it all, after a post-decisional hearing given to the Appellant, the seven-member Committee opined that there was no reason to recall the blacklisting order based on the result of the first laboratory test report, completely ignoring the appellate test report.”

To state the obvious, it is then stated in para 4 that, “On these facts, we find that the impugned decision reflected in the minutes dated 18.09.2019 is wholly perverse inasmuch as it is based only upon the first laboratory test report.”

To put things in perspective, para 5 then envisages that, “The High Court, instead of striking down this decision in judicial review proceedings, went into the appellate laboratory test report itself and stated that as it was 3% below the prescribed percentage of 95%, the blacklisting order ought not to be interfered with.”

As it turned out, the Bench then minces no words to state unambiguously in para 6 that, “The High Court ought not to have gone into the appellate laboratory test report by itself. It ought to have struck down the impugned decision on the ground that it relied upon something irrelevant, namely, the first laboratory test report and ignored the appellate report. The High Court ought also to have appreciated that the appellate laboratory report was at complete variance with the first laboratory test report – the variation being a huge figure of 30%. This was despite the fact that the appellate laboratory test report tested a sample of the Appellant’s product long after its shelf life had expired.”

Be it noted, it is then stipulated in para 12 that, “Though the aforesaid judgments pertain to criminal prosecutions under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Insecticides Act, yet, they lay down that a valuable right is granted to a person who is sought to be penalized under these Acts to have a sample tested by the Government Analyst that is found against such person, to be tested by a superior or appellate authority, namely, the Central Drugs Laboratory. These judgments lay down that if owing to delay which is predominantly attributable to the State or any of its entities, owing to which an article which deteriorates with time is tested as not containing the requisite standard, any prosecution or penalty inflictable by virtue of such sample being tested, cannot then be sustained. We have seen that on the facts of this case, the sample drawn and analyzed by the Government Analyst was delayed for a considerable period resulting in the sample being drawn towards the end of its shelf life. Even insofar as the samples sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory, there was a considerable delay which resulted in the sample being sent and tested 8 months beyond the shelf life of the product in this case. It is thus clear that the valuable right granted by Section 25 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act kicks in on the facts of this case, which would necessarily render any penalty based upon the said analysis of the sample as void.”

Finally and far most importantly, it is then held in para 15 that, “We have seen in the present case that the post-decisional hearing proved to be an eyewash as the seven-member Committee did not even refer to the findings of the appellate report, which showed that the Government Analyst’s report was wholly incorrect, 61.96% being widely off the mark. Given the fact that there is considerable unexplained delay on the part of the Drug authorities and the Respondent resulting in the first and second samples being tested late – the second sample being tested 8 months after its shelf life had expired – it is clear that the order of blacklisting dated 21.02.2019, as confirmed by the order dated 18.09.2019, is infirm and is therefore, set aside. Concomitantly, the impugned High Court judgment is also set aside.”

To conclude, the two Judge Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Justice RF Nariman and Justice Navin Sinha have very rightly held that considerable unexplained delay on the part of drug authorities to test a sample can render any penalty under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, based upon the said analysis of the sample, as void. It has also remarkably put forth very cogent and convincing reasons for holding so as we have already noted above. The State must always adhere to what the Apex Court has held so rightly in this notable case and act fairly and rationally without in any way being arbitrary. Thus we see that the blacklisting order was so very rightly set aside here!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

MBA Degree Not Equivalent To PG Degree/Diploma In Human Resource Management

Just recently, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs Kavinder and Others in Civil Appeal No. 232 of 2020 delivered on July 21, 2020 has observed that Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree is not equivalent to a post graduate degree or diploma in Social Work, Labour Welfare, Industrial Relations or Personnel Management. What can be surmised from this is what the top court held so clearly and convincingly in this very case that, “Tribunal was manifestly in error in holding that the candidate was qualified merely because he studied two subjects as a part of his MBA degree programme.” Very rightly so!

To start with, Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud who authored this noteworthy judgment for himself, Justice Indu Malhotra and Justice KM Joseph of the Supreme Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “The appeal arises from a judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dated 29 November 2016. The High Court has, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, affirmed a judgment and order of the Central Administrative Tribunal at its Principal Bench at New Delhi, by which the first respondent was held to be qualified for appointment to the post of Labour Welfare Superintendent.”

While elaborating on the posts advertised, it is then stipulated in para 2 that, “An advertisement was issued for inviting applications for various posts in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi on a competitive basis. Among the posts that were advertised was that of a Labour Welfare Superintendent in the Municipal Corporation.. The qualification and experience required for the post were prescribed as follows:-

“Essential Qualifications:

(1) Degree of a recognized University or Equivalent.

(2) Experience in the field in responsible capacity of Labour Welfare/Industrial Relations/Personnel Management and/or in allied fields.””

To put things in perspective, it is then envisaged in para 3 that, “The selection process was conducted by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board by way of written examinations. Even after the candidate had appeared for the examinations, the Board or the appellant retained the authority to cancel their candidature during the recruitment process, if she/he failed to meet the said eligibility criteria. The first respondent applied for the post and appeared in the examination conducted by the Board. He was provisionally short-listed for the Part II examination upon the declaration of the results of the Part I objective examination. He was, however, declared not to be eligible for selection.”

As a corollary, what followed next is then stated in para 4 that, “Aggrieved by his non-selection, the first respondent moved the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) contending that he fulfilled the eligibility requirements. The Tribunal, by its judgment and order dated 20 May 2016, came to the conclusion that the first respondent fulfilled the conditions of eligibility. The first respondent holds a B.Sc. degree from Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak and thus, satisfied the first condition of eligibility. With regard to the second condition, the Tribunal noted that the first respondent did not claim to have a degree or diploma in Social Work or Labour Welfare, but that as a student of the MBA degree programme of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, he had studied certain subjects which had a bearing on the eligibility requirements. Accepting the contention of the first respondent, the Tribunal held that he had studied Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations in the course of the MBA degree programme. It was on this basis that the first respondent was held to be eligible and having passed the competitive examination, a discretion was issued for his appointment to the post. This order of the Tribunal has been affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi while rejecting a writ petition instituted by the appellant.”

To be sure, it is then enunciated in para 5 is that, “The issue which falls for determination in the appeal is whether the first respondent fulfills the requirements of eligibility. The advertisement issued by the appellant specifies that the essential qualifications would consist of (i) a degree of a recognized University or equivalent; (ii) a post graduate degree/diploma in Social Work, Labour Welfare, Industrial Relations or Personnel Management or in any other allied subject of a recognized University/Institution or equivalent.”

After hearing both the sides, the Bench then, more significantly, goes on to add in para 8 that, “While assessing merits of the rival contentions, we must at the outset have due regard to the basis which has been adopted by the first respondent in support of his contention that he fulfills the eligibility requirements. The categoric position of the first respondent is that during the course of the MBA degree programme, he had studied the subjects of Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations and Labour Legislation. Having regard to this position, the issue which falls for determination is whether this would lead the Court to the conclusion that the first respondent fulfills the eligibility requirements. The eligibility requirements stipulated in the advertisement are that the candidate must have a post graduate degree or diploma in (i) Social Work; or (ii) Labour Welfare; or (iii) Industrial Relations; or (iv) Personnel Management; or (v) in any other allied subject of a recognized University/institution or equivalent.”

Most significantly, it is then made absolutely clear in para 9 that, “The first respondent completed the MBA degree programme from Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak. The mark sheets which have been relied upon by the first respondent indicate that during the course of the second semester, he studied Human Resource Management as a subject. In the fourth semester, the first respondent had a course in Industrial Relations and Labour Legislation. Studying these two subjects would not lead to the conclusion that the first respondent holds a post graduate degree or diploma in the disciplines which have been specifically spelt out in the advertisement or in any allied subject. The MBA degree cannot be regarded as allied to a post graduate or diploma in Social Work, Labour Welfare, Industrial Relations or Personnel Management. The recruitment was being made to the service of the appellant. The advertisement did not specifically provide how equivalence was to be established between a postgraduate degree/diploma in the subjects specified in the advertisement and a post graduate degree/diploma in an allied subject. The appellant as an employer was best suited to judge whether the degree of the first respondent was in an allied subject. Unless this assessment was perverse or contrary to the requirement prescribed, the Tribunal had no reason to interfere. We are of the view that the Tribunal was manifestly in error in holding that the first respondent was qualified merely because he studied two subjects as a part of his MBA degree programme, namely, Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations and Labour Legislation. The High Court has simply affirmed the view of the Tribunal.”

Finally, we then see that it is held in the last para 10 that, “For the above reasons, we are of the view that the findings which have been arrived at by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court are erroneous. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 29 November 2016. In consequence, OA No 1492 of 2013 filed by the first respondent before the Central Administrative Tribunal shall stand dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.”

In conclusion, the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has made it amply clear in this latest, landmark and laudable judgment that the Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree is not equivalent to a post graduate degree or diploma in Social Work, Labour Welfare, Industrial Relations or Personnel Management. It also minced just no words to convey in simple, suave and straight language that, ““Tribunal was manifestly in error in holding that the candidate was qualified merely because he studied two subjects as a part of his MBA degree programme.” Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Reading

“The odd thing about people who had many books was how they always wanted more”. A good book is an ocean the more you drown the more you wanted to drown, and those who had never been to a sea will never understand how it feels when the prepossessing waves touch your feet, when that heavenly wind blows through your hairs, how it feels when clouds come floating into the sky, no longer to carry rain or usher storm, but to add color to the sunset sky.

It’s rain, a rain whose every drop first touches your face then slides down through your body and you came to know how it feels when to be touched by someone you love. Those raindrops drenched you completely and you feel a keen wind cutting down your spine. Those raindrops are like the dancers who are trying to play with the most heavenly figurine sculpted by nature.

The above-inscribed words may sound good to you if yes then good you are a reader and you should certainly start with something romantic or soothing. If not then perhaps this genre is not your cup of tea but something must be there which may fascinate you and want you to read more.

Perhaps the fantasies or maybe some sort of murder mystery or something technical or maybe something like science fiction or it could be anything else. There are a lot of virtues of reading a book.

A growing body of research shows that reading changes your mind. Using MRI scans, researchers verified Trusted Source that decoding requires a complicated network of brain pathways and signals. When the reading skill matures, these networks should often get greater and more advanced. In a report performed in 2013, the researchers used interactive MRI scans to assess the impact of reading a novel on the brain. Participants of the research read the book “Pompeii” for 9 days. When the suspense built up in the plot, more and more regions of the brain became lit up with action.

And speaking about detecting discomfort, research Trusted Source has found that people who read romantic fiction — stories that examine the inner lives about characters — have a heightened capacity to consider the emotions and values of others. Experts term this capacity a “theory of mind,” a collection of skills that are important for creating, managing, and sustaining social relationships. Although this sensation is not likely to be caused by a single session of reading literary literature, research Trusted Source reveals that long-term literature readers seem to have a better-developed mind hypothesis.

In 2009, a group of researchers in demanding health science programs in the United States measured the effects of yoga, humor, and reading on student stress levels. The study found that 30 minutes of reading decreased blood pressure, heart rate, and psychological distress feelings almost as effectively as did meditation and laughter. The study concludes, “Since time constraints are one of the most frequently cited reasons for high-stress levels reported by health science students, it is easy to incorporate 30 minutes of one of these techniques into their schedule without diverting much time from their studies.”

So if you a reader, it’s great and if not please try something out. Happy reading!

“Disabled”, “Physically Handicapped” & Mentally Retarded Offend Human Dignity

It has to be conceded with considerable generosity that the Supreme Court of Pakistan has just recently on July 14, 2020 has very rightly and remarkably in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Malik Ubaidullah vs Government of Punjab etc in Civil Petition No. 140-L of 2015 (on appeal from the order of Lahore High Court dated 02.12.2014, passed in ICA No. 336/2013) directed the Government of Pakistan and its agencies to desist forthwith from using the words like “disabled”, “physically handicapped” and “mentally retarded” for persons with different abilities. The more socially acceptable term is persons with disabilities or persons with different abilities. Thus we see that even in Pakistan there is a paradigm shift in the way the Pakistan Supreme Court has went on to rule in this particular case! This is certainly welcome as the whole world has now started to recognize that the use of such words like “disabled”, “physically handicapped” and “mentally retarded” constitute an affront to them and they must be avoided always!

To start with, we see that in this noteworthy judgment authored by Syed Mansoor Ali Shah for himself, Justice Manzoor Ahmad Malik and Justice Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed of Pakistan’s Supreme Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “The Petitioner applied for the post of Senior Elementary School Educator Arabic (“SESE[Arabic]”) on the disability quota (“Disability Quota”) in pursuance to the advertisement put out by the Education Department, Local Government, Multan. According to the advertisement, in addition to the other posts, a total of 81 posts of SESE [Arabic] were advertised with 42 posts in female category and 39 posts in the male category at the Girls and Boys schools, respectively. Thereafter, only one Mst. Asma Qasim was appointed against the said post under the Disability Quota and the petitioner failed to secure a position. Admittedly, Mst. Asma Qasim with 62.78 Marks topped the merit list for the post of SESE [Arabic] under the Disability Quota and the petitioner with 43.53 Marks could not be offered a post. Aggrieved of not being offered a place, the petitioner challenged the selection process under Disability Quota before the High Court by invoking its constitutional jurisdiction. His writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 28.10.2013 and so did his appeal before the High Court (ICA) vide impugned order dated 01.12.2014.”

While proceeding ahead, it is then stated in para 2 that, “After hearing the parties and having gone through the record, the legal question that arises in this case is the manner of allocation of 2% Disability Quota for employment under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance 1981 (“Ordinance”). (The Federal Law is now a Provincial Law after the Disabled Persons (Employment & Rehabilitation (Amendment) Act, 2012, however, as this case pertains to a period before 2012, therefore, the Federal Law would apply in the present case). The Ordinance requires that 2% of the total number of persons employed by an establishment at any time shall be “disabled persons”. (As described in the statute. The more socially acceptable term is persons with disabilities or persons with different abilities.).” In order to fully understand the allocation mechanism of the Disability Quota under the Ordinance, it would be useful to first understand and the concept of Disability and the importance of role of employment in the lives of persons with disabilities (“PWDs”) as compared to persons without disabilities.”

While dwelling on the concept of disability, it is then expounded in para 3 that, “Disability means lacking one or more physical powers, such as the ability to walk or to coordinate one’s movements, as from the effects of a disease or accident, or through mental impairment. (Collins Dictionary – complete and unabridged, 12^th edition 2014). According to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities (“CRPD” or “Convention”) ratified by Pakistan in 2011, persons with disabilities include those who have long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”

To put things in perspective, it is then brought out in para 7 that, “According to International Labour Organization (ILO) an estimated 386 million of the world’s working-age are PWDs. The unemployment among the PWDs is as high as 80 percent in some countries. Often employers assume that persons with disabilities are unable to work. In Pakistan, estimates of the number of persons living with disabilities vary between 3.3 million and 27 million. (Moving from the margin – Mainstreaming persons with disabilities in Pakistan. British Council & The Economist Intelligence Unit – 2014).”

While underscoring the pivotal role of employment in people’s lives, it is then envisaged in para 8 that, “Employment is equally important to all people, without it, social inclusion and economic independence are unlikely to be achieved. Among the crucial social functions that employment can facilitate are financial independence and social inclusion. It has also been found to improve social status, provide social support and enable workers to make a contribution, thereby leading to an increase in self-worth. Employment has the potential to improve a person’s financial situation, open up opportunities for social contact, build (new) friendships and increase people’s self-esteem. By contrast, unemployment can cause not only poverty and social exclusion but also result in a lower sense of self-worth. The effects of unemployment on physical health like symptoms of somatization disorder, depression and anxiety were significantly greater in unemployed than employed individuals. The situation for people with disabilities may have consequences of a greater extent as they tend to be looked upon as dependents of their families and relatives and are not expected to be gainfully employed or independent. Work has been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, central to all human societies.”

Honestly speaking, the Bench then graciously concedes in para 9 that, “One of the major difficulties faced by persons with disabilities is that employers have the erroneous assumption that these people will probably underperform in most areas of their duties – something which is actually not the case. Another plausible issue is that when the majority of workplaces are not made accessible to people with disabilities, employers will feel that they will have to make an unwarranted investment to provide facilities for people with disabilities, and some do not believe in the employment potential of such people.”

Significantly, it is then held in para 17 that, “In the present case the posts advertised for SESE (Arabic) were 81 which allows for one post in the Disability Quota, while if the Disability Quota is worked out on the total sanctioned strength of the posts of SESE [Arabic] it comes to 5 posts (see chart above) and 4 more PWDs could have been appointed against the said posts against the advertisement in question. Filling the Disability Quota on the basis of advertised posts is, therefore, detrimental to the interest and welfare of the persons with disabilities; is against the letter of the law and offends their fundamental right to life and livelihood and their right to dignity.”

More significantly, it is then stated in para 18 that, “Summarizing the above, we hold that: (i) the 2% (and now 3%) [After the Disabled Persons (Employment & Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Act, 2012] Disability Quota is to be calculated on the basis of the total sanctioned posts of the establishment. (ii) In order to ensure fair and equitable representation of persons with disabilities (PWDs) in every tier of the establishment, the total Disability Quota is to be further apportioned and allocated amongst different categories of posts in the establishment. The determination of different categories is on the basis of their distinct qualifications, selection criteria and separate merit list. (iii) In case the sanctioned strength of a post is less than 50, it will be for the establishment to allocate seat(s) from the overall Disability Quota against such a post. (iv) if a particular post is not fit for a PWD, the establishment may shift the Disability Quota and adjust it against another post in the establishment so that the overall Disability Quota is not disturbed and maintained at all times. (v) The advertisement for any category of post must clearly provide the total Disability Quota for that category of posts and the number of seats vacant under the said Disability Quota at the time of the advertisement.”

Most significantly, it is then held in para 19 without mincing any words that, “It is also observed that words like “disabled”, “physically handicapped” and “mentally retarded” deeply bruise and offend human dignity of persons with different abilities. The Federal Government and the Provincial Governments are directed to discontinue the use of these words in official correspondence, directives, notifications and circulars and shift to “persons with disabilities” or “persons with different abilities”. The view taken by the Lahore High Court in Barrister Asfandayar Khan case [Barrister Asfandayar Khan Tareen, etc. v. Govt of the Punjab, etc. (PLD 2018 Lahore 300)] is approved and must be given effect to.”

In essence, this recent, remarkable and righteous judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan vociferously coming out in open for the rights of persons with disabilities and persons with different abilities is quite refreshing and revolutionary in the sense that it directed the Government of Pakistan and its agencies to desist forthwith from using the words like “disabled”, “physically handicapped” and “mentally retarded” for persons with different abilities and instead use the more socially acceptable term that is persons with disabilities or persons with different abilities. There is no reason as to why this should not be complied with not just in Pakistan but also in each and every corner of the world! Persons with disabilities or persons with different abilities must be encouraged and admired so that they are motivated to further do better and there has to be zero tolerance for any sort of discrimination against them on any ground whatsoever! Only then can we call ourselves “civilized”! There can be no denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Not Admit ‘General Category’ Candidate To ‘Sponsored Category’ Vacancy

In a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled “Nipun Sharma vs Post Graduation Institute of Medical Education and Research, Sector 12 Chandigarh through its Director” in Civil Writ Petition No. 10684 of 2020 (O&M) delivered just recently on August 14, 2020, the Punjab and Haryana High Court unequivocally upheld the Medical College’s righteous decision to not admit the ‘general category’ candidate to ‘sponsored category’ vacancy. The two Judge Bench of Punjab and Harayana High Court comprising of Justice Rajeev Sharma and Justice Harinder Singh Sidhu were hearing this case. Justice Harinder Singh Sidhu authored the judgment for himself and Justice Rajeev Sharma.

To start with, it is first and foremost pointed out in para 1 that, “This writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ, order or direction for reading down condition 7(3)(g) as contained in the Prospectus for Session July, 2020 issued by respondent – PGIMER for admission to DM/M.Ch. Courses, wherein it has been provided that no request for change of category applied for shall be entertained after submission of application to the extent that in case no eligible candidate is available under the ‘Sponsored Category’, then eligible candidate if available, under ‘General Category’ be considered and granted admission to the course of Master of Surgery (M.Ch.) (Plastic Surgery) on fulfilling the requisite eligibility conditions.”

What follows next is stated in para 2 that, “Further prayer has been made for setting aside the action of respondent in not considering the candidature of petitioner for said course against vacant seat available under ‘Sponsored Category’ in view of fact that petitioner had applied for direct category.”

To put it succinctly, para 3 then states that, “It is also prayed that the NOC/Sponsorship Certificate (Annexure-P6) issued in favour of petitioner by Department of Health and Family Welfare, Himachal Pradesh be accepted.”

In hindsight, while dwelling on the petitioner’s past academic background, it is then put forth in para 4 that, “The petitioner secured admission in MBBS Course at Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital at Shimla (2006-2012) and served in rural area after appointment in 2013 for a total period of 2 ½ years. He was selected for Post Graduate Course in General Surgery in 2017 as a sponsored candidate (2017 to 2019) in PGIMER, Chandigarh and secured 2^nd rank in Post Graduation final examination. After completing his Post Graduation successfully with the respondent institution he joined back as a Medical Officer in Deendayal Upadhyay Zonal Hospital, Shimla. Thereafter, the petitioner with an aim to study further and super specialize in the field of Plastic Surgery decided to get admission in the Master of Surgery (M.Ch.) (Plastic Surgery).”

To be sure, it is then envisaged in para 5 that, “As per the Prospectus for the Session July 2020 in the PGIMER for securing admission in Post Graduation or Super Speciality Course i.e. M.Ch., two categories have been provided i.e. (a) General category and (b) Sponsored Category. In ‘General Category’, a candidate can apply directly i.e. without seeking permission of any State authority directly whereas in the ‘Sponsored Category’ only that candidate can apply, who is sponsored by the State Government with which he or she is employed. The sponsorship so made by the State Government is also in the nature of a No Objection Certificate whereby a candidate is authorized by the State Government to do a Super Specialty Course with an undertaking to serve the State Government for a specified period.”

Coming to the chief grievance of the petitioner, it is henceforth stated in para 11 that, “Thus the grievance of the petitioner is that despite there being no other eligible candidate available till date, the candidature of the petitioner, who applied under the ‘General Category’, is not being considered under the ‘Sponsored Category’. In case, the respondent-institution accepts the candidature of the petitioner then not only the petitioner would secure admission in the super specialty course of M.Ch. (Plastic Surgery) but the vacant seat will also get utilized and would not be left vacant.”

As a corollary, it is then further stated in para 12 that, “It was also pleaded by the petitioner that two candidates Dr. Lucky Kumar and Dr. Ashok Garg, who hail from Himachal Pradesh had applied for admission in M.Ch. in Cardiology and Neonatology respectively with respondent. Those candidate also secured their NOC cum Sponsorship certificate after the declaration of the result. They have been granted admission and their NOC cum Sponsorship certificate has been duly accepted. Thus the petitioner has been discriminated against.”

What cannot be left unnoticed is what is then stated in para 14 that, “It has been stated that as per clause 7 (3)(g) of the Prospectus:

“No request for a change of category applied for shall be entertained after the submission of the application”.

Since, Petitioner applied under ‘General Category’, therefore his request for grant of admission on the vacant seat under ‘Sponsored Category’ cannot be considered.”

Having said this, it is then observed in para 20 that, “The examination for admission to the M.Ch. Plastic surgery course was held on 21.06.2020. The result was declared on 26.05.2020. On 30.06.2020 the institute vide notice dated 30.06.2020 uploaded a tentative list of selected candidates wherein petitioner was shown at Waiting list No. 1 in the Direct Category. The petitioner was given the NOC/Sponsorship Certificate on 08.07.2020. Clearly as per condition 7(3)(g) of the Prospectus the request for change of category from ‘General’ to ‘Sponsored’ could not be entertained at a stage when even the result have been declared in view of Clause 7(3)(g) of the Prospectus.”

While adding further weight to its ruling, the Bench then observes in para 21 that, “It has been consistently held in different Full Bench decisions of this Court that prospectus has a force of law and is to be strictly followed. Reference can be made to Amardeep Singh Sahota v. State of Punjab 1993 (4) S.C.T. 328, Raj Singh v. Maharishi Dayanand University 1994 (2) S.C.T. 766, Sachin Gaur v. Punjabi University 1996 (1) S.C.T. 837, Rahul Prabhakar v. Punjab Technical University, Jalandhar 1997 (3) S.C.T. 526, Indu Gupta v. Director of Sports, Punjab 1999 (4) S.C.T. 113 and Rupinder Singh v. The Punjab State Board of Technical Education & Industrial Training, Chandigarh 2001 (2) S.C.T. 726.”

To put things in perspective, it is then noted in para 23 that, “This being the settled legal position the respondent-institution is right in strictly adhering to condition 7(3)(g) of the Prospectus and not entertaining the request of the petitioner for change of category after the last date of application and granting him admission against the vacant seat in the sponsored category.”

As it ostensibly turned out, the Bench then also clearly and convincingly holds in para 24 that, “The contention of the Ld. Counsel that provision 7(3)(g) be read down to the extent that in case no eligible candidate is available under the ‘Sponsored Category’, then eligible candidate, if available, under ‘General Category’ be considered and granted admission to the course of Master of Surgery (M.Ch.) (Plastic Surgery) on fulfilling the requisite eligible conditions also is not tenable.”

No wonder, it is then rightly held in para 27 that, “The respondent-institution in its reply has given valid reasons as to why such a provision has been incorporated and any deviation from it would create an untenable and uncertain situation.” Finally, it is then held in the last para 28 that, “Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.”

In conclusion, the two Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of Justice Rajeev Sharma and Justice Harinder Singh Sidhu in this notable judgment has clearly and convincingly for cogent reasons explained above has rightly rejected the contention of the petitioner! The arguments forwarded by the petitioner were found to be not tenable by the Chandigarh High Court. The Court also made it amply clear that the respondent-institution is right in strictly adhering to condition 7(3)(g) of the Prospectus and not entertaining the request of the petitioner for change of category after the last date of application and granting him admission against the vacant seat in the sponsored category! Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Daughters Have Coparcenary Rights Even If Their Father Was Not Alive

In a most significant judgment with far reaching implications that will immensely benefit Hindu daughters, the Apex Court in Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. Diary No. 32601 of 2018 along with some other Special Leave Petition (SLP) just recently on August 11, 2020 has held in no uncertain terms that a daughter will have a share after the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, irrespective of whether her father was alive or not at the time of amendment. This is certainly a significant step towards the attainment of gender equality in our country for which the Apex Court Bench which decided this extremely landmark and laudable judgment deserves full credit! Till this laudable judgment was delivered we saw how despite several amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 there was none such provision that gave unconditional rights to women pertaining to her father’s property!

To start with, Justice Arun Mishra who authored this notable judgment for himself and Justice Abdul Nazeer and Justice MR Shah first and foremost set the ball rolling by observing in para 1 that, “The question concerning the interpretation of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short, ‘the Act of 1956’) as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (in short, ‘the Act of 2005’) has been referred to a larger Bench in view of the conflicting verdicts rendered in two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 36 and Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar & Ors., (2018) 3 SCC 343. In other connected matters, the question involved is similar; as such, they have also been referred for hearing along.”

Be it noted, it is then enunciated in para 116 that, “The intendment of amended Section 6 is to ensure that daughters are not deprived of their rights of obtaining share on becoming coparcener and claiming a partition of the coparcenary property by setting up the frivolous defence of oral partition and/or recorded in the unregistered memorandum of partition. The Court has to keep in mind the possibility that a plea of oral partition may be set up, fraudulently or in collusion, or based on unregistered memorandum of partition which may also be created at any point of time. Such a partition is not recognized under Section 6(5).”

What’s more, it is then observed in para 126 that, “The protection of rights of daughters as coparcener is envisaged in the substituted Section 6 of the Act of 1956 recognises the partition brought about by a decree of a court or effected by a registered instrument. The partition so effected before 20.12.2004 is saved.”

More significantly, the Bench then minces no words to state in suave, simple and straight language in para 127 while highlighting the dire need to protect daughter’s interests in property that, “A special definition of partition has been carved out in the explanation. The intendment of the provisions is not to jeopardize the interest of the daughter and to take care of sham or frivolous transaction set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her right as coparcener and prevent nullifying the benefit flowing from the provisions as substituted. The statutory provisions made in section 6(5) change the entire complexion as to partition. However, under the law that prevailed earlier, an oral partition was recognised. In view of change of provisions of section 6, the intendment of legislature is clear and such a plea of oral partition is not to be readily accepted. The provisions of section 6(5) are required to be interpreted to cast a heavy burden of proof upon proponent of oral partition before it is accepted such as separate occupation of portions, appropriation of the income, and consequent entry in the revenue records and invariably to be supported by other contemporaneous public documents admissible in evidence, may be accepted most reluctantly while exercising all safeguards. The intendment of Section 6 of the Act is only to accept the genuine partitions that might have taken place under the prevailing law, and are not set up as a false defence and only oral ipse dixit is to be rejected outrightly. The object of preventing, setting up of false or frivolous defence to set at naught the benefit emanating from amended provisions, has to be given full effect. Otherwise, it would become very easy to deprive the daughter of her rights as a coparcener. When such a defence is taken, the Court has to be very extremely careful in accepting the same, and only if very cogent, impeccable, and contemporaneous documentary evidence in shape of public documents in support are available, such a plea may be entertained, not otherwise. We reiterate that the plea of an oral partition or memorandum of partition, unregistered one can be manufactured at any point in time, without any contemporaneous public document needs rejection at all costs. We say so for exceptionally good cases where partition is proved conclusively and we caution the courts that the finding is not to be based on the preponderance of probabilities in view of provisions of gender justice and the rigor of very heavy burden of proof which meet intendment of Explanation to Section 6(5). It has to be remembered that courts cannot defeat the objects of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act. The exception is carved out by us as earlier execution of a registered document for partition was not necessary, and the Court was rarely approached for the sake of family prestige. It was approached as a last resort when parties were not able to settle their family dispute amicably. We take note of the fact that even before 1956, partition in other modes than envisaged under Section 6(5) had taken place.”

Most significantly, the Bench then cogently, convincingly and clearly holds in para 129 that, “Resultantly, we answer the reference as under:

(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and abilities.

(ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20^th day of December, 2004.

(iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.

(iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class-I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.

(v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been effected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.”

No less significant is what is then stated finally in the last para 130 that, “We understand that on this question, suits/appeals are pending before different High Courts and subordinate courts. The matters have already been delayed due to legal imbroglio caused by conflicting decisions. The daughters cannot be deprived of their right of equality conferred upon them by Section 6. Hence, we request that the pending matters be decided, as far as possible, within six months. In view of the aforesaid discussion and answer, we overrule the views to the contrary expressed in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju & Ors. The opinion expressed in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar is partly overruled to the extent it is contrary to this decision.”

No doubt, this latest, landmark and laudable judgment by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court must be applauded, admired and appreciated in no uncertain terms as it places daughter on an equal footing with son in property matters which is a revolutionary move that will ensure that a daughter’s rights are not smothered under any circumstances by anyone as they like as per their own whims and fancies! But what is even more crucial is that society’s patriarchal mindset favouring only son must also change at the earliest and simultaneously the litigation processes in courts must be simplified, made inexpensive so that the poor women too can get their due and time-bound so that women does not suffer the ordeal of running from pillar to post first in lower courts, then in higher courts and then ultimately in the highest court! More awareness programme must be launched by Centre and State Governments to ensure that women are made aware of their legal rights as have been marked by the Apex Court in this landmark judgment! Only then can daughters gain immensely by this extremely laudable and landmark judgment which they must as no society can progress where women remains backwards and stands deprived of her basic legal rights!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Not Open To Trial Courts Awarding Life Imprisonment

It is quite refreshing and quite reassuring to see that in a recent, remarkable and righteous decision titled “Savitri vs. State of Haryana and others” in Case No. – CRWP-5238-2020 (O&M) delivered on August 19, 2020, a two Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of Justice Dr S Muralidhar and Justice Avneesh Jhingan has reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that the trial courts have no power to order a life sentence to run till natural life or to hold that no remission will be granted. Known for his brilliant, bold and balanced judgments even while as Judge of Delhi High Court – Justice Dr S Muralidhar who authored and headed this notable judgment for himself and Justice Avneesh Jhingan reiterated that this power is solely with the High Court and Supreme Court only in view of the judgment delivered in the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the V Sriharan case. Very rightly so!

To start with, this notable judgment sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “This is a petition challenging the order dated 5^th June, 2020 of the Divisional Commissioner, Hissar, (‘Divisional Commissioner’) rejecting the Petitioner’s application for temporary release/parole, on the grounds that the trial Court i.e. the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar, has by an order dated 16^th October 2018 awarded her a sentence of imprisonment for life i.e. whole of her natural life, without any remission, consequent to her conviction for the offences under Sections 302, 343 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code in FIR No. 429 of 2014 registered at Police Station Barwala.”

On the one hand, para 2 states that, “It has been argued by Mr. Arjun Sheoran, learned counsel for the Petitioner, that the reasons given in the impugned order dated 5^th June, 2020 of the Divisional Commissioner are contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan (2016) 1 SCC 1. In other words, he submitted that the trial Court could not have directed that the Petitioner would not be entitled to any remission and further that her request for temporary release/parole could not have been refused on that ground. He pointed out that the Petitioner had recently lost her husband and her two sons had abandoned her. He referred to the photographs enclosed with the petition to show that the Petitioner’s house needed urgent repairs for which reason she had sought parole for four weeks.”

As opposed to this, it is then stated in para 3 that, “On the other hand, Mr. Ankur Mittal, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana, to begin with, pointed out that the Petitioner sought parole for a period of four weeks on the ground that her house needed repairs and this request was referable to Section 3 (1) (d) of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988 (‘Act’) read with Rule 8 (iii) of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release), Rules, 2007 (‘Rules’). He further pointed out that in terms of Rule 4 of the Rules, the Petitioner shall be entitled to apply for parole only after completing one year of imprisonment after conviction and has earned her first annual good conduct remission (AGCR) under the Act. According to Mr. Mittal since the sentence awarded by the trial Court specifically states that the Petitioner should serve life sentence for her entire natural life, without remission, the question of her being eligible for AGCR would not arise and consequently, she would be ineligible to be considered for parole. In this context he referred to a recent judgment dated 3^rd July, 2020 of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in Sanjay Kumar Valmiki v. State [W.P. (Crl.) 2049 and 682 of 2019], and submitted that the Divisional Commissioner cannot be stated to have committed any error as long as the order on sentence passed by the trial Court, and which is under appeal before this Court, stood.”

As we see, para 4 then reveals that, “On the last date of hearing, Mr. Sheoran, learned counsel for the Petitioner had sought time to place on record copy of an order passed by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Ambala granting parole to one of the co-convicts in a connected FIR.”

Of course, it is then brought out in para 5 that, “The Petitioner has, along with an application CRM-W-731-2020, placed on record a copy of an order dated 7^th January, 2020 passed by Superintendent, Central Jail, Ambala granting parole/temporary release to co-convict Pawan in a connected FIR No. 430 dated 19^th November, 2020, registered at Police Station, Barwala, Hisar. It has been pointed out that Pawan too had been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life without remission till natural death and yet, in his case, not only was parole granted, but in fact, now stands extended as a result of the orders of the High Powered Committee (‘HPC’).”

Be it noted, para 6 then states that, “The above submissions have been considered. To begin with, the applicable statutory provision and the Rules may be referred to. Sections 3 (1) (d) and 10 (2) (d) of the Act which are relevant for the present purpose read as under:

“3. Temporary release of prisoners on certain grounds. – (1) The State Government may, in consultation with the District Magistrate or any other officer appointed in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed, release temporarily for a period specified in sub-section (2), any prisoner, if the State Government is satisfied that –

……………

(d) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient cause.”

“10. Power to make rules. The State Government may, by notification make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for –

…………….

(d) the conditions on which and the manner in which prisoners may be released temporarily under this Act.”

7. Rules 4 and 8 (iii) of the Rules, which are also relevant, read thus:

“4. Eligibility. Section 10(2)(d). – (1) A prisoner shall be entitled to apply for parole only after he has completed one year of his imprisonment after conviction and has earned his first annual good conduct remission under the Act.”

“8. Sufficient cause. Sections 3(1)(d) and 10(2)(d). – Under Section 3(1)(d) “sufficient cause” may be considered from amongst the following reasons, namely:-

………………

(iii) house repairs/new construction of house owned by the convict parole for house repair shall be granted only once, in three years;””

To put things in perspective, para 8 then envisages that, “It is thus seen that in terms of Rule 4 and 8 (iii) of the Rules read with Section 3 (1) (d) of the Act the earning of the first AGCR, apart from completing one year of imprisonment post conviction, is a must. It is also correct that the sentence awarded to the Petitioner by the trial Court in the instant case is one of “rigorous imprisonment for life, without any remission.” She has been, along with her co-convicts, “sentenced to imprisonment for life of their natural death (sic)” meaning thereby that she should remain in prison for the rest of her natural life. The Divisional Commissioner who passed the impugned order rejecting the Petitioner’s request for parole, was, therefore, constrained to apply Rule 4 in light of the sentence awarded by the trial Court.”

As it turned out, the Bench then points out in para 9 that, “The question whether the trial Court could have passed such a sentence would undoubtedly be one of the questions that would arise for consideration in the Petitioner’s criminal appeal against her conviction and sentence which is pending before this Court. However, it is unlikely that the said appeal, which would have to be heard with the connected appeals of her co-convicts, can be taken up for hearing in the near future. Further, this would mean that till such question is decided, the authorities would be precluded from considering any of her applications for release on parole. It would be unreasonable, in the circumstances, for the examination of this question to be postponed to the hearing of the appeal, particularly since, as will be seen hereafter, the legal position in this regard is clear.”

More significantly, the Bench then makes it amply clear in para 10 that, “The legal position with regard to the power of the trial Courts to award sentences with riders has been made explicit in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in V. Sriharan (supra) in paras 103 to 105, in the following words:

“103. That apart, in most of such cases where death penalty or life imprisonment is the punishment imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the concerned convict will get an opportunity to get such verdict tested by filing further appeal by way of Special Leave to this Court. By way of abundant caution and as per the prescribed law of the Code and the criminal jurisprudence, we can assert that after the initial finding of guilt of such specified grave offences and the imposition of penalty either death or life imprisonment when comes under the scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High Court, it is only the High Court which derives the power under the Penal Code, which prescribes the capital and alternate punishment, to alter the said punishment with one either for the entirety of the convict’s life or for any specific period of more than 14 years, say 20, 30 or so on depending upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise of judicial conscience befitting such offence found proved to have been committed.

104. We, therefore, reiterate that, the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other Court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict’s life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior Court.

105. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda [(2008) 13 SCC 767] that a special category of sentence; instead of Death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in Sangeet and Anr. v. State of Haryana, 2013 (2) SCC 452 that the deprival of remission power of the Appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law and we specifically overrule the same.” (emphasis supplied).”

Most significantly, it is then laid down in para 11 that, “Thus, after the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Sriharan (supra), it is not open to a court inferior to the High Court and Supreme Court, while awarding a sentence of life imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code to further provide for any specific term of incarceration, or till the end of a convict’s life, or to direct that there shall be no remission, as an alternate to the death penalty. That power is available only with the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the trial Court, in the instant case, while awarding the Petitioner the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life could not have added the riders that it should be for the rest of her natural life or that she would not be entitled to any remission.”

To state the obvious, it is then stated in para 14 that, “Therefore, in terms of the law explained by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Sriharan (supra), the trial Court in its order dated 16^th October 2018 awarding the sentence to the Petitioner of rigorous imprisonment for life was in error in adding the rider that it would be for the remainder of her natural life and without any remission.”

Furthermore, it is then enunciated in para 15 that, “With this being the clear legal position, the impugned order dated 5^th June 2020 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar rejecting the Petitioner’s application for parole on the above grounds is legally unsustainable and is hereby, set aside. The Petitioner’s application for parole is remitted to the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar to consider afresh the Petitioner’s application for parole in accordance with law. The further ground pointed out by the Petitioner that Pawan, a convict in the related FIR, has been granted parole will be taken note of by the Divisional Commissioner while passing an order afresh on the Petitioner’s application for parole. The fresh order be passed not later than 31^st August, 2020 and communicated to the Petitioner forthwith and in any event not later than 2^nd September 2020. If aggrieved by such order, it will be open to the Petitioner to seek appropriate remedies available to her in accordance with law. The petition is disposed of in the above terms.”

Before parting, to cap it all, it is then finally held in the last para 16 that, “The Court is informed that notwithstanding the clear legal position explained in V. Sriharan (supra), the trial Courts have been adding riders to orders on sentence passed by them similar to what the trial Court did in this case. Accordingly, the Court directs that a soft copy of this judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Sriharan (supra) be circulated by the Chandigarh Judicial Academy through email to all the judicial officers as well as the Jail authorities in the State of Punjab and Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh.”

To conclude, the sum and substance of this latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment is that the trial courts have no power to order a life sentence to run till natural life or to hold that no remission will be granted. In other words, the two Judges Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of Justice Dr S Muralidhar and Justice Avneesh Jhingan have made it explicitly clear that it is just not open to trial courts awarding life imprisonment to further specify the term of incarceration as remainder of natural life or to rule out remission completely! Very rightly so! There can be no denying it!

Sanjeev Sirohi

GDC, Jindrah in collaboration with Jammu and Kashmir Forest department organised plantation drive

GDC, Jindrah in collaboration with Jammu and Kashmir Forest department has organised plantation drive . The NSS Unit of the college directed by Prof Raj Shree Dhar , Principal of the college along with NSS volunteers has organised plantation drive in the new college premises on 21/8/2020 . The plantation drive carried out by Ajay Choudhary block officer Jindrah, Prof Dr. Sunil Dutt Sharma Head of the Department NSS, Sh. Sham Singh, Shadi Lal, Sh Nityanand, Sh Darshan Lal, Sh Anil Sharna. NSS volunteers includes Ms Chakshu Sharma and Ms Monika Jamwal.

The Army has initiated a tree plantation drive here, involving students of local schools and colleges, as part of ‘Green Earth – Clean Earth’ campaign, a defence spokesperson said.

students of local schools and colleges were also incorporated in the drive and were motivated to plant trees to save the environment.

In order to ensure that the saplings survive, their ownership is being entrusted to the individuals planting them.

Bilingual Education

Communication is the most important tool for anyone to share his/her thoughts, ideas or any information from one person to another. The process of communication occurs between every living organisms. Be it animals, plants or insects, every living organism do communication. For humans though, communication plays a very important role because humans are the most social among every living organism.

The most basic tool for communication of humans is by using language. Language is the system of communication in speech and writing that is used by the people of a particular country. There are many languages like English, French, Dutch, Japanese, Korean, Irish, Turkish and many more. These languages are used by the people to communicate with the people of another country.

India also have many different languages according to the different states and regions. Some of them are Gujarati, Punjabi, Marathi, Bengali, Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam etc. These languages are used by the people of a particular state.

Now, if a person is aware of only one language, he/she can communicate with the people knowing that language only. He/she won’t be able to communicate with the people knowing some other languages. This is why it is important to have knowledge of at least 2 languages. This is known as bilingual education.

Bilingual education is the process of teaching students using two languages. Educators usually teach students in their native language in conjunction with a second language utilizing differing levels of the native and second language depending on the requirements specified in lesson plans and teaching models. This makes the students able to read, write and understand 2 languages at a same time.

Pros and Cons:

Every coin has 2 faces. The process of bilingual education also have some postive and negative points:

Pros:

Having a ‘secret’ language when around monolingual people.

Being able to learn new languages easier (depends which languages you already know)

Depending on the languages you know, you may be able to understand what another language (but you wouldn’t be able to speak it).

It looks good on one’s job/university applications and resumes.

Makes getting on good terms with foreigners/etc. easier as if you speak the language they are most comfortable with, they will be thankful.

Increases your interest and knowledge of culture as during learning the languages, you also learn about the cultures.

Cons:

Sometimes bilingual students may get languages mixed up.

Bilingual students may get confused sometimes about it’s vocabulary, accents or anything like that.

The students may not have a perfect command on any of the language while the student studying only one language may have a perfect command on his language.

But overall, bilingual education is better. This is why most schools have policy of bilingual education.

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