Punjab & Haryana HC Issues Slew Of Directions To Curb Drug Abuse In State

To begin with, it is most heartening to note that in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment which shall certainly go a long way in curbing drug abuse in the state, the Punjab and Haryana High Court on January 22, 2019 has issued a slew of directions. This commendable and noteworthy judgment titled 1. Baljinder Singh v State of Punjab in CRA-D-917-DB-2011 2. Ms. Khushi Khan v State of Punjab in CRA-D-923-DB-2011 was authored by Justice Rajiv Sharma for himself and Justice Harinder Singh Sidhu. It is a no-brainer that these directions were certainly the crying need of the hour also and it is most heartening to note that we finally see them also being issued by a two Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which will help greatly in curbing drug abuse in the state.    
                                Truth be told, the 2 Judge Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court was hearing two appeals, one filed by Baljinder Singh and another by Khushi Khan who had challenged their being convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. They were both sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 12 years and were directed to pay a fine of Rs 2 lakhs each. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, however, set aside their conviction but took serious note of the problem of drug abuse which has gripped the State.
                                     To start with, it is first and foremost noted in para 1 that, “Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both these appeals, therefore these are taken up together and disposed of by a common judgment.” It is then observed in para 2 that, “These appeals have been instituted against the judgment and order dated 08.09.2011 rendered by the learned Judge, Special Court, Patiala, in Sessions Case No. 11T/17.11.2009/11 whereby the appellants were charged with and tried for offences punishable under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “NDPS Act” for the sake of brevity). The appellants were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 12 years and to pay a fine of Rs 2 lacs each and in default of payment of fine, they were ordered to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years, for the offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.”
                                       As it turned out, it is then disclosed in para 3 that, “The case of the prosecution in a nutshell is that on 19.08.2009 ASI Rakesh Kumar along with other police officials in connection with patrolling duty were present at Sirhind bye-pass, Rajpura. Lachhman Singh son of Sarwan Singh came on the spot. When Rakesh Kumar was talking with Lachhman Singh, a Qualis bearing registration no. PB-13-D-7000 was seen coming from Ambala side. On seeing the police party, the driver of the vehicle tried to reverse the vehicle. On suspicion, the vehicle was stopped. One lady was sitting with the driver. On enquiry the driver and passenger disclosed their identities. ASI Rakesh Kumar suspected them to be carrying some contraband in the bags lying in the vehicle. He wanted to search them. He apprised the accused of their right to get the search conducted in the presence of Magistrate or gazette Police Officer. However accused reposed confidence in him. Joint consent statement of accused was reduced into writing. On search 7 bags containing poppy husk were receovered. Two samples of 250 grams each from each bag were separated and the residual poppy husk of each bag weighed 34 kgs. All the sample parcels and bulk parcels were sealed with the seals bearing impression ‘RK’. Specimen seal was prepared and the seal after use was handed over to HC Malwinder Singh. The case property was taken into possession. Ruqa was sent to the police station, on the basis of which FIR was registered. The case property was deposited in the Malkhana. On receipt of chemical report and after completing all the codal formalities, challan was put up in Court against the accused.”
                               While acquitting the appellant, it is then observed in para 45 that, “Accordingly the appeals are allowed and judgment and order dated 08.09.2011 are set aside. The appellants are acquitted. The appellant Baljinder Singh is on bail. His bail bonds and surety bonds are discharged. The appellant Khushi Khan is in custody. Registry is directed to prepare her release warrants immediately.”
                        While expressing its grave concern on the rapidly expanding drug abuse, it is very rightly observed in para 36 that, “The drug abuse is very serious issue. The drug abuse has broken the social fabric and has destroyed number of families. The main concern of the Court is that Charas, Heroin and artificial drugs should not be available in the State at all. It is intriguing to note that the students i.e. boys and girls are getting the prohibited drugs but the police is not in a position to catch hold of kingpins and peddlers. The focus of the entire police force should also be to catch hold of kingpins and peddlers. The focus of the entire police force should also be to catch hold of kingpins and to bring them to justice. The kingpins should also be booked under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 to uproot this menace from the society.”    
                          Not stopping here, it is then added in para 43 that, “According to National Policy on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the drug addiction is increasingly becoming an area of concern as traditional moorings, effective social taboos, emphasis on self-restraint and pervasive control and discipline of the joint family and community are eroding with industrialization and urbanization. Both traditional and semi-synthetic drugs are abused. Intravenous drug use and HIV/AIDS driven by such use have added a new dimension to the problem, especially in the Northeastern states of the country. The Policy has also addressed the issue of sale of drugs to schools children. It is highlighted in the policy that Local police shall pay special attention to areas surrounding schools and colleges in their efforts to tackle drug peddlers. Schools and colleges shall be encouraged to conduct surveys. The issue of street peddlers has also been discussed in paragraph no. 52 quoted hereinabove. According to this paragraph, the peddlers sell drugs to addicts and often carry a small quantity of drugs at a time. Many of them are also addicts themselves and peddle drugs to earn for meeting their own requirement of drugs. Peddlers are the 10 final link in the chain from manufacturer to addicts and hence an effective strategy is required to handle them.” It is then further illustrated in para 44 that, “The issue of smuggling of drugs in prisons has also been discussed in the Policy. Prison staff is required to be sensitized and trained in detecting and apprehending drugs. Prisons shall be equipped with sniffer dogs to check the visitors and packages for drugs. All addicts within the prison are to be registered and compulsorily sent for drug de-addiction etc.”
                                  Finally and perhaps most importantly, it is then held in para 46 that, “However before parting with the judgment, we issue following mandatory directions to the State of Punjab to eradicate the menace of drugs in the State of Punjab including on the analogy of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case WPCRL No. 2401 of 2017, in the case of Aasha vs. State Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and another:-
1.  The State Government is directed to launch special awareness drives to make the people aware of the ill-effects of drugs on the society. The Deputy Commissioner of the district shall be the Nodal Officer to make the citizens aware of the ill-effects of the drugs and controlling the same. The State Government shall make sufficient provisions for awareness drives through electronic media, print media, internet, radio television etc.
2.  The State Government is directed to provide latest kits to the Investigating Officers to investigate the matters under the Opium Act, NDPS Act and other allied Acts and also to hold refresher course periodically to apprise the police personnel the procedure to be adopted while conducting investigation under the NDPS Act. The State of Punjab is directed to issue direction to the police department that complainant should not be I.O. to obviate bias.
3.  The State Government through the Director General of Police is directed to register cases against the kingpins under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 at the time of lodging the FIR under the NDPS Act and Opium Act and also, if necessary, by attaching their properties provisionally relating to supply of poppy straw, coca plant and coca leaves, prepared opium, opium poppy and opium, opium by cultivator, cannabis plant and cannabis, manufactured drugs and preparation and psychotropic substances including artificial drugs etc.
4.  Since the drugs menace has attained alarming proportion, the State Government is directed to establish Rehabilitation Centers in each district of the State within a period of six months from today. The rehabilitation centers shall provide all the basic necessities to the inmates including boarding, lodging, counseling etc.
5.  The State Government is directed to appoint one Psychiatrist for counselling in each Rehabilitation Center. The Counsellor appointed in rehabilitation center shall also visit all the schools falling in his jurisdiction advising the students about the ill-effects of drugs.  
6.  All the educational institutions i.e. government run, government aided, private schools, minority institutions, are directed to appoint the senior-most teacher as the Nodal Officer to counsel the students on every Friday of the month about the ill-effects of drugs. In case, he finds any drugs abuse or symptoms, he shall be at liberty to summon the parents of students. The parents will be sensitized against the drugs abuse in parent-teacher meetings.
7.  The State Government is directed to ensure to post one plain-clothes policeman from 8 AM to 6 PM around all the educational institutions to nab the drugs peddlers and kingpins. The local intelligence units are directed to keep a close watch on the shops including Dhabas, tuck shops, Khokas, tea stalls to ensure that the owners thereof are not permitted to indulge in the sale of drugs etc.
8.  The Drugs Inspector while raiding the factories, industries, medical shops shall be accompanied by a person not below the rank of the Assistant Commissioner of Police including the Gazetted Officer from the Food and Supplies Department.
9.  The Assistant Commissioner of Police of the concerned district shall personally monitor all the cases registered under the Opium Act and the NDPS Act, 1985 to plug the loopholes during the course of enquiry and investigation to increase the conviction rate.
10. The Executive Magistrates and the Gazetted officers throughout the State shall be informed about their duties to be discharged under the NDPS Act more particularly, under Section 50 and the latest law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and by this Court from time to time.
11. The Police Officers shall ensure that no minor is served any drugs, alcoholic beverages in any medical shops, bars, restaurants and through vend. No vend shall supply/sell the liquor to any minor. In the eventuality of liquor being supplied/sold to a minor, the licence issued for bar/vend shall be cancelled after putting them to notice. This direction shall be complied with by the police force as well as by the Excise Department. The concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police shall visit every medical shop at least within 24 hours to check the supply of drugs to any minor.
12.  The Director General of Police, State of Punjab, is directed to revamp, restructure, strengthen special task force.
13.  The District Narcotics Cells constituted by the State of Punjab shall immediately undertake the following tasks:-
i)   Each Anti Narcotics Cell is directed to identify such area in the district in which there are complaints of sale of drugs or where the drug addicts are found operating based on these information, the local police shall immediately take necessary steps to bust/apprehend such peddlers who are active in drugs trafficking.
ii)   As a further action, such potential suppliers shall also be identified by Anti Narcotics Cell as well as local police and action as per law should be taken against them.
iii) The Anti Narcotic Cell shall take action against the abettors and conspirators, aiding the sale of drugs as per Section 29 of the NDPS Act.
iv) Each Police station throughout State of Punjab shall prepare database/record of all individuals, who were previously involved in NDPS Act cases or have pending cases registered against them under NDPS Act and requisite surveillance will be undertaken qua on them so that substantive as well as preventive actions can be taken against them.
v) The Director, Education is directed to provide the list of vulnerable Government schools, Government aided Schools, Public Schools and Minority Schools for monitoring and curbing availability and peddling the drugs and narcotics substances among school going children to the police authorities. Local Police shall take proactive and ensure Zero Tolerance on this issue. All out efforts shall be made to identify such elements and in case any peddler is identified, immediate action shall be taken against him.
vi) The Anti Narcotic Cell shall take action against unscrupulous elements who are involved in sale of Pharmaceutical product without prescription which is to be used as a narcotics substance.
vii) There shall be regular training for capacity building and improving the investigating as well as intelligence collection skills of the investigating officer with regard to detection and investigation of NDPS Act related cases.
viii) The emphasis shall also be on the public schools. The Director Higher Education and Director School Education shall also visit the public schools. The free access shall be given to the Management to the School to the high ranking officers.
14. The State Government is directed to increase public awareness in the society. The Police shall be sensitized qua street peddlers. The Police shall be trained to deal with peddlers.
15. The State Government is directed to develop special, mobile, anti-peddling squads of police with jurisdiction of all over the cities and adjoining areas.
16. The State Government through the Secretary, Education is directed to include a mandatory and comprehensive chapter on drug abuse and illicit trafficking and its socio-economic cost to self, society and the country in the syllabus for 10+1 and 10+2 students.  
17. The local police is directed to pay special attention to areas surrounding schools including Government schools, Government aided Schools, Public Schools and Minority Schools, colleges, Universities and coaching Centres in their efforts to tackle drug peddlers.
18. The School Management, Principals and Teachers shall be encouraged sensitized to look out for peddlers in their vicinity and report them to police immediately.
19. All the schools throughout of State Government including Government, Government aided, minority institutions, public schools, Universities, colleges, Polytechnic colleges and Coaching Centres are directed to constitute anti-drug clubs to promote a drug free life among its members and also in the institution.
20. The State Government is also directed to sensitize the Prison staff in detecting and seizing drugs in prisons.
21. The Prisons shall be equipped with sniffer dogs to check the visitors and packages for drugs in the entry and exiting points. All the addicts within the prison including open jail shall be registered and compulsorily sent for de-addiction.
22. Every prisoner entering in the prison shall be tested for addiction and shall be de-addicted if he is found to be addicted.
23. All the prisoners who are arrested in crimes before their production in a court by an arresting agency shall be examined by the doctor and Doctor shall record their history or symptoms, if any of drug abuse. Wherever an arrested person shows signs of addiction, the police should take him to a doctor or a hospital to determine, if he is an addict, and if so, take measures to treat him.
24. There should be coordination amongst the school authorities, police authorities and hospitals/rehabilitation centres.
25. The State is directed to strictly enforce Section 71 of the NDPS Act.”
                             To be brutally honest, this is one of the “rarest of rare judgment” by any Court till now in which one has read so many learned, landmark and laudable directions. These must be strictly and swiftly implemented in letter and spirit. There is no reason why drug abuse cannot be checked and curbed to a great extent if not entirely if these historic and commendable directions are swiftly and strictly implemented! It brooks no delay!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh. 

Court Has to Confine Itself To The Four Corners Of Disobeyed Order While Exercising Contempt Jurisdiction: SC

To start with, in a significant observation, the Supreme Court just recently on February 6, 2019 in a latest case titled Er. K. Arumugam v. V. Balakrishnan & Ors in Civil Appeal No. 1510 of 2019 (arising out of SLP(C) No. 30317 of 2017) has firmly reiterated that while exercising the contempt jurisdiction, the court has to confine itself to the four corners of the order alleged to have been disobeyed. This latest, landmark and laudable judgment authored by Justice R Banumathi for herself and Justice R Subhash Reddy made this noteworthy observation in an appeal while challenging a Madras High Court order in a contempt case, which passed directions beyond the order allegedly disobeyed. It clearly and convincingly held that, “In the contempt jurisdiction, the court has to confine itself to the four corners of the order alleged to have been disobeyed.”
Supreme Court of India
                               As it turned out, the Bench while first and foremost granting leave then proceeds on to observe in para 2 that, “This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 23.08.2017 passed by the High Court of Madras in Contempt Appeal No. 2 of 2017 affirming the order passed by the learned Single judge dated 13.02.2017 in and by which the appellant-TWAD Board was directed to pay Rs. 600/- per sq. ft. to the first respondent for the land which the appellant-Board entered possession in 1991 with the consent of the first respondent.”
                                       Elaborating further, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “During the year 1991-1992, land to an extent of 86.5 cents in Survey No. 271/2A SE – “Dry Land” in Walajabad Village was entered upon by the appellant – Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board (TWAD Board) with the consent of the first respondent – land owner for the construction of Head works and Staff quarters. In the year 1993, the appellant-Board constructed the Head works for supply of drinking water and residential Staff quarters. Accepting the recommendation of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kancheepuram made in the year 1991, by an order dated 30.03.2015, the District Collector Kancheepuram fixed the value of the land at the rate of Rs. 260/- per cent and the total value of the land was arrived at Rs. 22,490/-. Giving incentive of 12% for every year up to 2012, the value of the land was fixed at Rs. 2,43,001/-. A demand draft of Rs. 2,43,001/- had been sent to the first respondent by the appellant-Board vide its letter dated 14.05.2015 vide its letter dated 14.05.2015 which the first respondent refused to receive and the same was returned.”
                                      Now coming to the next para 4, it then goes on to state that, “On 31.01.2016, the first respondent filed Writ Petition No. 3874 of 2016 and on the third day of filing of the petition i.e. on 03.02.2016, the High Court disposed of the said writ petition with direction to the appellant-Board to submit a report to the District Collector and to ensure that a fair and reasonable compensation be sanctioned to the first respondent at an early date not later than two months. The said order reads as under:-
“6. In the light of the above, there will be a direction to the 3rd respondent to submit his report/response to the 4th respondent as requested in the letter of the 4th respondent dated 23.09.2015, within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On receipt of such response shall place appropriate proposal for the consideration of the 2nd respondent within a period of three weeks thereafter. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent shall consider the matter and ensure that fair and reasonable compensation is sanctioned to the petitioner and paid at the earliest, not later than two months from the date on which the proposal is submitted by the 4th respondent. The authorities are well advised to adhere the time schedule fixed by this Court, failing which, it would amount to disobedience of the order, warranting action under the Contempt of Courts Act”.”
                         As a consequence, it is then observed in para 5 that, “In compliance of the above direction, the Managing Director of the appellant-Board had sent a letter dated 03.03.2016 to the District Collector, Kancheepuram stating that the District Collector, Kancheepuram is the authority to fix the land value and requested him to fix a fair and reasonable value of the land as ordered by the High Court. A State Level Committee meeting attended by High Level Officers had been convened on 25.04.2016. As seen from the Minutes of the Meeting, the entire matter has been thoroughly discussed and considered. It was decided in the said meeting that the case neither comes under the ambit of the Land Acquisition Act nor under ‘Private Negotiation’ and only the District Collector is fully competent to fix the value of the land in such cases.” It is then pointed out in this same para 5 that, “Accordingly, it was decided to remit the matter to the District Collector to determine the value of the land and communicate the same to the Managing Director, TWAD Board so that a fair and reasonable compensation is sanctioned to the first respondent and to ensure compliance of the order of the High Court.”
                                Needless to say, it is then brought out in para 6 that, “The District Collector accordingly held a detailed enquiry and examined various aspects of the matter and also took into consideration the prevailing guideline value as on 01.04.2012. After elaborate consideration, the District Collector vide proceeding dated 23.05.2016 fixed the land value at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. which was the guideline value as on 01.04.2012 and the said order reads as under:-
“7. During the Private Negotiation meeting conducted on 09.04.2012, it was decided to go for value as per the prevailing guideline value as on 01.04.2012. The Sub-Registrar, Walajabad recommended and reported that the guideline value was at the rate Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. for the land in S. No. 271/2A5E in his letter no. 114/2012, dt 16.04.2012. Accordingly, the District Collector, Kancheepuram in his proceedings dt. 19.05.2012 has fixed the land value at Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. which was the guideline value as on 01.04.2012 and the total value of the land was arrived at Rs. 75,42,800/-.”
The District Collector also observed that the land value at Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. is fixed and the same may be paid with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 19.05.2012 till date of payment. The District Collector opined that land value fixed at Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. as on 01.04.2012 is a fair and reasonable value considering the classification of the land at the time when Board entered upon the land. Based on the land value fixed by the District Collector, calculating the amount at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. along with interest, TWAD Board calculated the total amount of compensation at Rs. 1,11,80,723/- as under:-
Land area                         ……        86 ½ cent or 37714 Sq. ft.
Cost of land at the          ……         Rs. 75,42,800/-
rate of Rs. 200/-
per sq. ft.   
Interest @ the rate of    …….        Rs. 36,37,923/-        
12% per annum from
19.05.2012 to 25.05.2016 –
4 years and 7 days
Total                                ……..        Rs. 1,11,80,723/-
The first respondent received the said amount of Rs. 1,11,80,723/- with protest on 31.05.2016 and issued a receipt for the said amount.”   
                                     To put things in perspective, para 7 then goes on to reveal that, “The first respondent did not challenge the rate fixed by the District Collector at Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. in a manner known to law. On the other hand, the first respondent filed Contempt Petition No. 2626 of 2016 in W.P. No. 3874 of 2016 on 28.09.2016 alleging disobedience of the order passed by the High Court on 03.02.2016. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-Board submitted that when the contempt petition came up before the learned Single Judge on 25.11.2016, though no orders were passed, some instructions appeared to have been given to the TWAD Board. It was submitted that apprehending that she might be hauled up for contempt of court, the District Collector vide order dated 30.11.2016 fixed the value of the land at the rate of Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. When the contempt petition came up for hearing on 13.02.2017, going beyond the order passed in Writ Petition No. 3874/2016, the learned Single Judge fixed the value of the land at Rs. 600/- per sq. ft. and directed the balance amount to be paid to the first respondent at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. ft. The order passed by the High Court reads as under:-
“6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to fix a reasonable amount of compensation and accordingly, the same is fixed at Rs. 600/- per sq. ft. has been paid on 25.05.2016 together with interest, the balance amount payable per square feet is Rs. 400/-. However, the interest for the differential amount shall be calculated only at the rate of Rs. 300/- per sq. ft. from 19.05.2012 till 25.05.2016. The above direction shall be complied with by the respondents within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On receipt of the amount, the erstwhile owner shall execute a sale deed in favour of the TWAD Board and the expenses be borne by the TWAD Board”………..”
                                     Be it noted, it is then pointed out in para 8 that, “Being aggrieved by the above order passed in the contempt proceedings, the appellant-Board preferred appeal before the Division Bench. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the impugned order.” Para 9 then further points out that, “We have heard learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-Board and learned senior counsel for the first respondent and perused the impugned order and materials on record.”
                       More importantly, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “The question falling for consideration in this appeal is, in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, whether the learned Single Judge was right in travelling beyond the four corners of the order in W.P. No. 3874 of 2016 dated 03.02.2016 and directing the appellant-Board to pay the compensation at the rate of Rs. 600/- per sq. ft.”
                        To put it succinctly, it is then noted in para 11 that, “In Writ Petition No. 3874/2016, the High Court passed the order dated 03.02.2016 with direction to the authorities to ensure a fair and reasonable compensation be sanctioned to the first respondent and paid at the earliest. Immediately after the order of the High Court, the Managing Director, TWAD Board wrote a letter dated 03.03.2016 requesting the District Collector, Kancheepuram to fix a fair and reasonable value of the land. Thereafter, the State Level Committee meeting attended by the High Level Officers had been convened and the matter was considered and discussed at length. The State High Level Committee felt that the case would neither fall under the ambit of Land Acquisition Act nor under ‘Private Negotiation’ and therefore, the Committee felt that it has no role to play and that the District Collector is competent to fix the value of the land and the State Level Committee remitted the matter to the District Collector to fix the value of the land and communicate the value determined by him to the Managing Director, TWAD Board so that a fair and reasonable compensation is sanctioned to the first respondent within the time limit fixed by the High Court in the order passed in Writ Petition No. 3874/2016.”
                                It cannot be lost on us that it is then pointed out in para 12 that, “A party can be proceeded for disobedience of the order of the court only when there is willful disobedience and non-compliance of the order passed by the court. On perusal of the order dated 03.02.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 3874/2016, it is seen that in the said order, court has only directed the authorities to ensure fair and reasonable compensation be sanctioned to the first respondent and be paid at the earliest. The officers quickly acted in order to comply with the direction of the High Court. When the direction was only to consider the case of the first respondent foe ensuring fair and reasonable compensation and having regard to the swift action taken by the appellant and other officials, in our view, there was no disobedience of the order of the court, much less willful disobedience to invoke contempt jurisdiction.”
                                   More pertinently, it is then disclosed in para 13 that, “After the State Level Committee remitted the matter to the District Collector, the District Collector conducted a detailed enquiry and took into consideration the prevailing guideline value as on 01.04.2012. After examining the report of the Sub-Registrar, Walajabad and taking into consideration the guideline value, by proceeding dated 23.05.2016 the District Collector fixed the land value at Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. which was the guideline value as on 01.04.2012. As pointed out earlier, the total value of the land was arrived at Rs. 75,42,800/- and the interest at the rate of 12% totalling Rs. 1,11,80,723/- was paid to the first respondent which the first respondent received under protest. In compliance of the order of the High Court, the District Collector passed the order fixing the land value at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. as on 01.04.2012 (though the land came to be in occupation of TWAD Board way back in 1991). The first respondent has not challenged the said compensation fixed at the rate of Rs. 200/- sq. ft. as on 01.04.2012 in the manner known to law. In compliance of the order of the High Court, when the amount has been paid to the first respondent, in our considered view, there was no disobedience or non-compliance of the order of the court to entertain the contempt petition.”
                                It must be highlighted here now that in para 14, while citing the relevant case law, it is pointed out exclusively, eruditely and explicitly that, “In Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retired) (2008) 14 SCC 392, the Supreme Court held that whether contempt has been committed or not is a matter of mechanical application of mind. In a given case, it has to be tested having regard to the subject matter of the proceeding in which it is made and the nexus between the alleged contumacious act. In the Writ Petition No. 3874/2016, the High Court only directed TWAD Board and its officials to ensure just and reasonable compensation be paid to the first respondent which has been duly complied with by the Board by paying the compensation fixing the land value at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. ft. as on 01.04.2012 as per guideline value. In compliance with the order passed by the High Court, when the compensation has been paid to the first respondent, there was no question of disobedience of the order of the court to maintain the contempt petition. Without appreciating that the order of the High Court has been duly complied with, the learned Single Judge erred in entertaining the contempt petition. Apart from entertaining the contempt petition, the learned Single Judge further fell in error in issuing positive direction to the authorities to pay further compensation at the rate of Rs. 600/- per sq. ft., which, in our considered view, is arbitrary and unsustainable.”
                                 Broadly speaking, it is then pointed out in para 15 that, “The learned senior counsel Mr. Ramamoorthy appearing for the Board submitted that when the contempt petition came up for hearing on 25.11.2016, the learned Single Judge issued oral instructions to the TWAD Board and the appellant Board was compelled to take further steps in fixing the higher land value. It is stated that though no orders were passed by the learned Single Judge on 25.11.2016, oral directions were issued by the learned Single Judge. The same is reflected in the proceeding of the District Collector dated 30.11.2016 as seen from the following:-
“….. Thereafter, the land owner filed the contempt of court petition in No. 2626/2016 before the Chennai High Court. When the aforesaid case was on trial, on 25.11.2016, as per the instructions given by the honourable Judge, today (30.11.2016) the Superintending Engineer of the TWAD Board and the District Registrar, Kanchipuram, in the meeting held by them, it is informed to the land owner as follows……”
Though much reliance was placed upon the proceedings of the District Collector dated 30.11.2016, we are constrained to observe that the said proceeding of the District Collector dated 30.11.2016 fixing the land value at the rate of Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. as on 30.11.2016 was passed under the fear of contempt of court which, in our view, is liable to be quashed. In any event, when the entry into land was way back in 1990-91, the first respondent cannot claim that compensation be paid to him on the value of the land fixed in the year 2016 as of 30.11.2016.”  
                   What’s more, it is then emphatically observed in para 16 that, “The learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent placed reliance upon the statement of the learned Additional Advocate General who represented the Board in the Contempt Petition No. 2626/2016 who has stated “…..that the court should confirm itself to order compensation at the rate of Rs. 500/- per sq. ft.” This contention does not merit acceptance. Be it noted that when the matter was heard by the learned Single Judge on 13.02.2017, no affidavit has been filed by any responsible officer that the compensation may be paid to the first respondent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per sq. ft. Since we are quashing the order of the District Collector dated 30.11.2016, in our considered view, the first respondent cannot fall back upon statement of the learned Additional Advocate General made in the court. The respondent cannot take advantage of such oral concession made by the learned Additional Advocate General.”
                                   Finally and perhaps most importantly, let us now turn to what the concluding paras 17 and 18 says. Most of all, para 17 which is the bedrock of this entire latest, landmark and laudable judgment sums up by stipulating that, “In the contempt jurisdiction, the court has to confine itself to the four corners of the order alleged to have been disobeyed. Observing that in the contempt jurisdiction, the court cannot travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been floated in Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and others v. M. George Ravishekaran and others (2014) 3 SCC 373, speaking for the Bench, Justice Ranjan Gogoi held as under:-
“19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicitly in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhaneswar Prasad Pani v. Tarak Nath Ganguly (2002) 5 SCC 352, V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju (2004) 13 SCC 610, Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. V. Gautam Goswami (2008) 5 SCC 339 and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV (2006) 1 SCC 613.” [underlining added]
Applying the above principles to the present case, it is clear that the Single Judge fell in error in entertaining the contempt petition and further erred in directing the TWAD Board to pay compensation at the rate of Rs. 600/- per sq. ft. which works out to more than Rs. 4,00,00,000/-. It is public money and having implications on the public exchequer, the public money cannot be allowed to be taken away by an individual by filing contempt petition thereby arm-twisting the authorities. The order passed by the learned Single Judge affirmed by the Division Bench is ex-facie erroneous and liable to be set aside.” Lastly, para 18 concludes by holding that, “In the result, the impugned order of the Division Bench in Contempt Petition No. 2/2017 and the order of the learned Single Judge in Contempt Petition No. 2626/2016 are set aside and the appeal is allowed.”
                                  No doubt, all the courts from top to bottom must abide by what the Apex Court has said so clearly and convincingly here! The Apex Court in this noteworthy judgment has left no one in doubt that, “Court has to confine itself to the four corners of disobeyed order while exercising contempt jurisdiction.” Very rightly said! There can be no denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Long Pendency Amounts To A Special Reason For Imposing Lesser Penalty In Corruption Case Involving Meager Bribe Amount: SC

To begin with, it has to be said right at the outset that in a rare departure from the past, the Supreme Court has just recently in a notable case titled Ambi  Ram v State of Uttarakhand in Criminal Appeal No. 1723 of 2009 dated February 5, 2019 has taken a lenient view in a corruption case involving meager bribe amount on the ground that long pendency amounts to a special reason for imposing lesser penalty. This landmark, latest and laudable judgment authored by Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre for himself and Justice Dinesh Maheshwari has reduced punishment imposed on a man who was convicted for receiving a bribe of Rs. 1200 in the year 1985 to ‘period already undergone’. It must be noted that the counsel for the accused vociferously contended in front of the Apex Court that he is now aged around 78 years and is suffering from heart ailment and deserves leniency and his contention was accepted also!
                                      First and foremost, the ball is set rolling in para 1 in which it is pointed out that, “The appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 14.05.2009 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No. 258 of 2001 (Old No. 1518/1991) whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the appellant herein.”
                                   To be sure, para 2 then illustrate that, “A few facts need mention to appreciate the short controversy involved in this appeal.” Starting from the scratch, para 3 then points out that, “The appellant was working as “Kanoongo/Patwari” at Didihat, Uttarakhand. He was prosecuted for commission of the offences punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC Act”) read with Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”).”
                              Needless to say, it is then brought out in para 4 that, “The charge against the appellant was that he assured one Gopal Singh that he would not arrest him nor would implicate him in one pending criminal case, if he pays him Rs. 1200/-.” What para 5 then brings out is that, “It was the case of the prosecution that the appellant while accepting the illegal gratification of Rs. 1200/- from Gopal Singh on 30.09.1985 was caught by S.P. (Vigilance) in a trap arranged for this purpose at the behest of Gopal Singh.”
                                    As it turned out, para 6 then reveals that, “The Sessions Judge, Pithoragarh, by order dated 05.08.1991, found the case of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 5(2) of the PC Act read with Section 161 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- under Section 5(2) of the PC Act and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years under Section 161 IPC. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.”
                                        To put things in perspective, it is then illustrated in para 7 that, “The appellant felt aggrieved by his conviction and sentence and filed an appeal in the High Court. By impugned order, the High Court partly allowed the appeal. The High Court maintained the conviction insofar as it pertains to the offence punishable under Section 5(2) of the PC Act but interfered in quantum of sentence awarded and accordingly reduced the jail sentence from four year to one year and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. So far as the offence punishable under Section 161 IPC is concerned, the High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence from three years to one year. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.”
                                      It is a no-brainer that the accused felt aggrieved by the punishment inflicted on him. So no prizes for guessing that he decided to go in for appeal. As has been pointed out in para 8 that, “The appellant (accused) felt aggrieved and has filed this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.”
                                  By the way, it is then pointed out in para 9 that, “Heard Mr. Arun K. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant (accused) and Mr. Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent (State).” It is then specifically brought out in para 10 that, “Learned counsel for the appellant (accused) has argued only one point. He did not question the legality of the conviction. All that he argued was that the jail sentence awarded to the appellant be reduced.”
                                        Going forward, para 11 then while referring to appellant pleading reduction of sentence points out that, “According to him, having regard to the fact that the appellant is now aged around 78 years and suffering from heart ailment and further the incident is of the year 1985 and, in the meantime, 34 years have elapsed and lastly the appellant has undergone around one month and 10 days imprisonment, this Court should exercise its powers under proviso to Section 5(2) of the PC Act and reduce the jail sentence from one year to what is undergone by the appellant, i.e., 1 month and 10 days as his total jail sentence and may, if considered proper, instead enhance the fine amount.”
                                  Of course, para 12 then states that, “Learned counsel for the respondent, in reply, supported the impugned order and contended that having regard to the factual circumstances, no case of further reduction in the sentence awarded by the High Court is made out and, therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.” The Bench then goes on to add in para 13 that, “Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal in part and reduce the sentence as indicated below.”
                              For esteemed readers exclusive benefit, it must be mentioned here that para 14 then states that, “Section 5(2) of the PC Act reads as under:
“(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine:
Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year”.”
                                     Truth be told, para 15 then makes it absolutely clear that, “Reading of Section 5(2) of the PC Act shows that it provides that any public servant, who commits criminal misconduct, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
                                   Be it noted, it is then clarified in para 16 that, “The proviso then empowers the Court to impose sentence of imprisonment of less than one year provided any special reasons are recorded in writing in support of imposing such reduce sentence of less than one year.”
                             More importantly, para 17 then makes it crystal clear that, “It is, therefore, clear that the Court is empowered to impose a sentence, which may vary from 1 year to 7 years with fine. However, in a particular case, the Court finds that there are some special reasons in favour of the accused then the Court is empowered to impose imprisonment of less than one year provided those special reasons are set out in writing in support of imposing sentence less than one year. So far as imposing of fine is concerned, it is mandatory while imposing any jail sentence. How much fine should be imposed depend upon the facts of each case.”
                                  No doubt, it is not at all easy for any Judge to award imprisonment of less than one year. This is all the more so because the Judge is then required to state the special reasons in writing in support of imposing sentence of less than one year. If the concerned Judge fails to give adequate reasons for reducing the sentence below the minimum level then he/she can only land himself/herself in trouble and in a piquant situation and this no sensible Judge would ever like to find himself/herself in!
                               It would be imperative to mention here that it is then pointed out in para 18 that, “In the case of K.P. Singh vs State (NCT) of Delhi, (2015) 15 SCC 497, this Court on somewhat similar facts considered the question as to what factors/circumstances should be taken into consideration for reducing the jail sentence.” It is then pointed out in para 19 that, “In his concurring opinion, Justice T.S. Thakur (as his Lordship then was and later CJI) in his distinctive style of writing in detail examined this question in the light of law laid down by this Court in earlier cases on the subject and held as under:
“10. Determining the adequacy of sentence to be awarded in a given case is not an easy task, just as evolving a uniform sentencing policy is a tough call. That is because the quantum of sentence that may be awarded depends upon a variety of factors including mitigating circumstances peculiar to a given case. The courts generally enjoy considerable amount of discretion in the matter of determining the quantum of sentence. In doing so, the courts are influenced in varying degrees by the reformative, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment, delay in the conclusion of the trial and legal proceedings, the age of the accused, his physical/health condition, the nature of the offence, the weapon used and in the cases of illegal gratification the amount of bribe, loss of job and family obligations of the accused are also some of the considerations that weigh heavily with the courts while determining the sentence to be awarded. The courts have not attempted to exhaustively enumerate the considerations that go into determination of the quantum of sentence nor have the courts attempted to lay down the weight that each one of these considerations carry. That is because any such exercise is neither easy nor advisable given the myriad situations in which the question may fall for determination. Broadly speaking, the courts have recognized the factors mentioned earlier as being relevant to the question of determining the sentence. The decisions of this Court on the subject are a legion. Reference to some only should, however, suffice.
19. Given the fact that the trial and appeal proceedings have in the case at hand continued for nearly 17 years by now causing immense trauma, mental incarnation (sic incarceration) and anguish to the appellant and also given the fact that the bribe amount was just about Rs 700 and that the appellant has already undergone 7 ½ months imprisonment against the statutory minimum of 6 months imprisonment, the reduction of the sentence as proposed by my esteemed Brother appears to be perfectly in order. I, therefore, concur with the view taken by his Lordship”.”     
                                    To say the least, while justifying its reduction of sentence with logical reasons, the Bench then very brilliantly and commendably observes in para 20 that, “Keeping in view the aforementioned statement of law laid down by this Court when we examine the facts of the case at hand, we find that Firstly, the incident is of the year 1985; Secondly, this case is pending for the last 34 years; Thirdly, the appellant has now reached to the age of 78 years; Fourthly, he is suffering from heart ailment, as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, and is also not keeping well; Fifthly, he has so far, during the trial and after suffering conviction, undergone total jail sentence of one month and 10 days; Sixthly, he has been on bail throughout for the last 34 years and did not indulge in any criminal activities nor breached any conditions of the bail granted to him; Seenthly, the bribe amount was Rs 1200/-; and lastly, in the last 34 years, he has suffered immense trauma, mental agony and anguish.”
                                     It cannot be lost on us that it is then pointed out in para 21 that, “The aforesaid 8 reasons which, in our view, are the special reasons satisfy the requirements of proviso to Section 5(2) of the PC Act. This Court, therefore, invoke the powers under proviso to Section 5(2) of the PC Act and accordingly alter the jail sentence imposed on the appellant by the two Courts below and reduce it to “what is already undergone by the appellant”, i.e., 1 month and 10 days.”
                                 Simply put, para 22 then further states that, “In other words, this Court alter the jail sentence of the appellant and award him “what is already undergone by him” and at the same time enhances the fine amount of Rs. 3000/- to Rs. 10,000/- to meet the ends of justice.” It is then clarified in para 23 that, “The appellant is, therefore, now not required to undergo any more jail sentence. However, in case he fails to deposit a fine amount of Rs. 10,000/- after adjusting the sum of Rs 3000/-, if already paid by the appellant, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.”  
                     Moving ahead, it is then held in para 24 that, “If the appellant deposits the fine amount of Rs. 10,000/- within 3 months from today, he will not be required to undergo any default jail sentence. If he has already deposited Rs. 3000/- then he will only deposit Rs. 7000/-.” Lastly, para 25 then concludes by stating that, “In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is partly allowed. The impugned order is modified to the extent indicated above.”
                                               To conclude, it is a landmark, latest and laudable judgment which clearly lays down  that long pendency certainly amounts to a special reason for imposing lesser penalty in corruption cases involving meager bribe amount! Besides this, it also convincingly cites eight cogent reasons for reducing the penalty which are valid and strong reasons for the same! Every Judge and every lawyer as also every person interested in reading about corruption cases must read this noteworthy judgment which is certainly commendable and classic!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Autonomy Of the Bar Cannot Be Taken Over By The Court: SC Quashes Madras HC Disciplinary Rules For Lawyers

It has to be said with consummate ease that in one of the most commendable, significant and noteworthy judgments delivered by the top court in the last couple of years, the Supreme Court has just recently on January 28, 2019 very rightly quashed Rules 14-A to 14-D of the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 holding most emphatically that they are ultra vires to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and usurps the power of the Bar Council in Disciplinary matters. The latest, landmark and laudable judgment by a two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court titled R. Muthukrishnan v The Registrar General Of The High Court Of Judicature At Madras in Writ Petition (C) No. 612 of 2016 authored by Justice Arun Mishra for himself and Justice Vineet Saran observed that the Advocates Act never intended to confer the disciplinary powers upon the High Court or Supreme Court except to the extent dealing with an appeal under Section 38 of the Act. There can be no denying or disputing it! 
                                        Starting from the scratch, the ball is set rolling in para 1 wherein it is first and foremost pointed out that, “The petitioner, who is an Advocate, has filed the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, questioning the vires of amended Rules 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D of the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 made by the High Court of Madras under section 34(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Advocates Act’).”
                                      To be sure, para 2 then brings out that, “The High Court has inserted Rule 14A in the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 empowering the High Court to debar an Advocate from practicing. The High Court has been empowered to take action under Rule 14B, where any misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is committed by an Advocate before the High Court then the High Court can debar him from appearing before the High Court and all subordinate courts. Under Rule 14-B(v) the Principal District Judge has been empowered to initiate action against the Advocate concerned and debar him from appearing before any court within such District. In case misconduct is committed before any subordinate court, the concerned court shall submit a report to the Principal District Judge and in that case, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to take appropriate action. The procedure to be followed has been provided in the newly inserted Rule 14-C and pending inquiry, there is power conferred by way of Rule 14-D to pass an interim order prohibiting the Advocate concerned from appearing before the High Court or the subordinate courts. The amended provisions of Rule 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D are extracted hereunder:
“14-A: Power to Debar:
(vii) An Advocate who is found to have accepted money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or
(viii) An Advocate who is found to have tampered with the Court record or Court order; or
(ix) An Advocate who browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or Judicial Officer; or
(x) An Advocate who is found to have sent or spread unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations/petitions against a Judicial Officer or a Judge to the Superior Court; or
(xi) An Advocate who actively participates in a procession inside the Court campus and/or involves in gherao inside the Court Hall or holds placard inside the Court Hall; or
(xii) An Advocate who appears in the Court under the influence of liquor;
shall be debarred from appearing before the High Court or Subordinate Courts permanently or for such period as the Court may think fit and the Registrar General shall thereupon report the said fact to the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu.
14-B: Power to take action:-
(iv) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is committed by an Advocate before the High Court, the High Court shall have the power to initiate action against the Advocate concerned and debar him from appearing before the High Court and all Subordinate Courts.
(v) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is committed by an Advocate before the Court of Principal District Judge, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiate action against the Advocate concerned and debar him from appearing before any Court within such District.
(vi) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is committed by an Advocate before any subordinate court, the Court concerned shall submit a report to the Principal District Court within whose jurisdiction it is situated and on receipt of such report, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiate action against the Advocate concerned and debar him from appearing before any Court within such District.
14-C: Procedure to be followed:-
The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge, as the case may be, shall before making an order under Rule 14-A, issue to such Advocate a summon returnable before it, requiring the Advocate to appear and show cause against the matters alleged in the summons and the summons shall if practicable, be served personally upon him.
14-D: Power to pass Interim Order:-
The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge may, before making the Final Order under Rule 14-C, pass an interim order prohibiting the Advocate concerned from appearing before the High Court or Subordinate Courts, as the case may be, in appropriate cases, as it may deem fit, pending inquiry”.”
                                    Going ahead, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “Rule 14-A provides that an Advocate who is found to have accepted money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or who has tampered with the court record or court order, or browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or judicial officer; or is responsible for sending or spreading unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations/petitions against a judicial officer or a Judge to the superior court, or actively participates in a procession inside the court campus and/or involves in gherao inside the court hall or holds placard inside the court hall or appears in the court under the influence of liquor, the courts have been empowered to pass an interim order of suspension pending enquiry, and ultimately to debar him from appearing in the High Court and all other subordinate courts, as the case may be.”        
                           More importantly, it is then very rightly brought out in para 4 that, “The aforesaid amended Rule 14-A to 14-D came into force with effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette on 25.5.2016. Petitioner has questioned the vires of amended Rules 14A to D on the ground of being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, as also Sections 3C, 34(1), 35 and 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act, as the power to debar for such misconduct has been conferred upon the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry and the High Court could not have framed such rules within ken of section 34(1) of the Advocates Act. The High Court could have framed rules as to the ‘conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto’. Debarment by way of disciplinary measure is outside the purview of section 34(1) of the Act. The Bar Council enrolls Advocates and the power to debar for misconduct lies with the Bar Council. The effort is to confer the unbridled power of control over the Advocates which is against the rule of law. Misconduct has been defined under section 35 of the Advocates Act. Reliance has been placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 409.” It was a lawyer named R Muthukrishnan who had filed a writ petition in the Apex Court challenging the vires of amended Rules 14-A to 14-D of the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 made by the High Court of Madras under Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961.
                                  What is more, it is then brought out in para 5 that, “The High Court of Judicature at Madras in its counter affidavit has pointed out that the rules are kept in abeyance for the time being and the Review Committee is yet to take a decision in the matter of reviewing the rules. In the reply filed the High Court has justified the amendment made to the rules on the ground that they have been framed in compliance with the directions issued by this Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106 in which this Court has directed the High Courts to frame rules under section 34 of the Advocates Act and to frame the rules for having Advocates-on-Record based on the pattern of this Court. It has been further pointed out that the conduct and appearance of an advocate inside the court premises are within the jurisdiction of a court to regulate. The High Court has relied upon the decision in Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC 650 in which vires of similar rule was upheld as such the rules framed debarring the advocates for misconduct in court are thus permissible.”       
                            Be it noted, it is then brought out in para 6 that, “The High Court has also relied upon the decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45 to contend that court has the power to debar advocates on being found guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from appearing before the courts. The High Court has referred to the decision in Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311”.
                        Of course, it is then further also brought out in para 7 that, “The High Court has contended that the rules have been framed within the framework of the directions issued by this Court and in exercise of the power conferred under section 34(1) of the Advocates Act. Pursuant to the directions issued in R.K. Anand’s case (supra), the matter was placed before the High Court’s Rule Committee on 17.3.2010. The Committee consisting of Judges, Members of the Bar Council and members of the Bar was formed, and the minutes were approved by the Full Court on 23.9.2010. Thereafter the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras on 2.9.2014 constituted a Committee consisting of two Judges, the Chairman of Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry, Advocate General of the High Court, President, Madras Bar Association, President, Madras High Court Advocates Association and the President of Women Lawyers’ Association to finalise the Rules.”
                                             Elaborating further, it is then pointed out in para 8 that, “The High Court has further contended in the reply that the Director, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs vide communication dated 31.5.2007 enclosed a copy of the ‘Guidelines’ and informed the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments to review and strengthen the security arrangements for the High Courts and District/subordinate courts in the country to avoid any untoward incident. The High Court has further contended that there have been numerous instances of abject misbehaviour by the advocates within the premises of the High Court of Madras in the year 2015. The advocates have rendered the functioning of the court utterly impossible by resorting to activities like holding protests and waving placards inside the court halls, raising slogans and marching down the corridors of the court. Some advocates had resorted to using hand-held microphones to disrupt the proceedings of the Madurai Bench and even invaded the chambers of the Judges. There were two incidents when there were bomb hoaxes where clock-like devices were smuggled into the court premises and placed in certain areas. The Judges of the High Court were feeling totally insecure. Even CISF had to be employed. Thus, there was an urgent need to maintain the safety and majesty of the court and rule of law. After various meetings, the Rules were framed and notified. Order 4 Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is similar to Rules which have been framed. In Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In re, (2017) 16 SCC 78, this Court had suspended the contemnor from practicing as an Advocate on Record for a period of one month.”
                                It cannot be lost on us that it is then observed in para 9 that, “In Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335, the court has observed that the Bar Council of India might require restructuring on the lines of other regulatory professional bodies, and had requested the Law Commission to prepare a report. An Advisory Committee was constituted by the Bar Council of India. A Sub-Committee on ‘Strikes, Boycotts & Abstaining from Court Works’ was also constituted. Law Commission had finalized and published Report No. 266 dated 23.3.2017 and has taken note of the rules framed by the Madras High Court. Court has a right to regulate the conduct of the advocates and the appearances inside the court. As such it is not a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction and a prayer has been made to dismiss the writ petition.” It is then noted in para 10 that, “The petitioner in person has urged that rules are ultra vires and impermissible to be framed within scope of section 34(1) of the Advocates Act. They take away the independence of the Bar and run contrary to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of India (supra).”
                      While strongly and strenuously espousing the High Court’s contention by its learned senior counsel Mohan Parasaran, it is then narrated about it in para 11 that, “Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the High Court, has contended that the rules have been framed within the ambit of section 34(1) and in tune with the directions issued by this court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (supra). He has also referred to various other decisions. It was submitted that under section 34 of the Advocates Act, the High Court is empowered to frmae rules to debar the advocate in case of unprofessional and/or unbecoming conduct of an advocate. Advocates have no right to go on strike or give a call of boycott, not even on a token strike, as has been observed in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra). It was also observed that the court may now have to frame specific rules debarring advocates, guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from appearing before the courts. Advocates appear in court subject to such conditions as are laid down by the court, and practice outside court shall be subject to the conditions laid down by the Bar Council of India. He has also relied upon Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 in which the validity of Rule 11 of the Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala came up for consideration. Learned senior counsel has also referred to the provisions contained in Order IV Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 framed by this Court with respect to debarring an Advocate on Record who is guilty of misconduct or of conduct unbecoming of an Advocate-on-Record, an order may be passed to remove his name from the register of Advocates on Record either permanently or for such period as the court may think fit. This Court has punished an advocate on record and has debarred him for a period of one month in the case of Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate (supra). The High Court has framed the rules to preserve the dignity of the court and protect rule of law. Considering the prevailing situation, it was necessary to bring order in the premises of the High Court. Thus framing of rules became necessary. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Council have failed to fulfil the duties enjoined upon them. Therefore, it became incumbent upon the High Court to act as observed in Mahipal Singh Rana (supra) by this Court.”
                         Simply put, para 12 then brings out that, “This Court has issued a notice on the petition on 9.10.2017 and on 4.9.2018. The Court observed that prima facie the rules framed by the High Court appear to be encroaching on the disciplinary power of the Bar Council. As the time was prayed by the High Court to submit the report of the Review Committee, time was granted. In spite of the same, the Review Committee has not considered the matter, considering the importance of the matter and the stand taken justifying the rules. We have heard the same on merits and have also taken into consideration the detailed written submissions filed on behalf of the High Court.”
                                 To put it succinctly, para 13 then makes it amply clear that, “The Advocates Act has been enacted pursuant to the recommendations of the All India Bar Committee made in 1953 after taking into account the recommendations of the Law Commission on the subject of the reforms of judicial administration. The main features of the Bill for the enactment of the Act include the creation of autonomous Bar Council, one for the whole of India and one for each State. The Act has been enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to the legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of the Bar Council and an All India Bar.”
                                 Also, there can be no gainsaying the irrefutable fact as stated in para 14 that, “The legal profession cannot be equated with any other traditional professions. It is not commercial in nature and is a noble one considering the nature of duties to be performed and its impact on the society. The independence of the Bar and autonomy of the Bar Council has been ensured statutorily in order to preserve the very democracy itself and to ensure that judiciary remains strong. Where Bar has not performed the duty independently and has become a sycophant that ultimately results in the denigrating of the judicial system and judiciary itself. There cannot be existence of a strong judicial system without an independent Bar.”
                          No doubt, it is then rightly underscored in para 70 that, “The debarment cannot be ordered by the High Court until and unless advocate is prosecuted under the Contempt of Courts Act. It cannot be resorted to by undertaking disciplinary proceedings as contemplated under the Rules 14-A to 14-D as amended in 2016. That is a clear usurpation of the power of the Bar Council and is wholly impermissible in view of the decision of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India (supra) that has been followed in all the subsequent decisions as already discussed. There is no doubt about it that the incidents pointed out were grim and stern action was required against the erring advocates as they belied the entire nobility of the lawyer’s profession.”  
                            It is then conceded in para 71 that, “It is also true that the disciplinary committee of the Bar Councils, as observed by this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana and Mohit Chowdhary (supra), has failed to deliver the good. It is seen that the disciplinary control of the Bar Council is not as effective as it should be. The cases are kept pending for a long time, then after one year they stand transferred to the Bar Council of India, as provided under the Advocates Act and thereafter again the matters are kept pending for years together. It is high time that the Bar Council, as well as the various State Bar Councils, should take stock of the situation and improve the functioning of the disciplinary side. It is absolutely necessary to maintain the independence of the Bar and if the cleaning process is not done by the Bar itself, its independence is in danger. The corrupt, unwanted, unethical element has no place in bar. If nobility of the profession is destroyed, Bar can never remain independent. Independence is constituted by the observance of certain ideals and if those ideals are lost, the independence would only remain on paper, not in real sense.”
                             Alarmingly, it is then observed in para 72 that, “The situation is really frustrating if the repository of the faith in the Bar fails to discharge their statutory duties effectively, no doubt about it that the same can be and has to be supervised by the Courts. The obligatory duties of Bar Council have found statutory expression in Advocates Act and the rules framed thereunder with respect to disciplinary control and cannot be permitted to become statutory mockery, such as non-performance or delayed performance of such duties is impermissible. The Bar Council is duty bound to protect Bar itself by taking steps against black sheeps and cannot bely expectation of Bar in general and spoil its image. The very purpose of disciplinary control by Bar Council cannot be permitted to be frustrated. In such an exigency, in a case where the Bar Council is not taking appropriate action against the advocate, it would be open to the High Court to entertain the writ petition and to issue appropriate directions to the Bar Council to take action in accordance with the law in the discharge of duties enjoined upon it.”
                                 But let us not forget that a caveat is then added in this same para 72 and it is then made amply clear that, “But at the same time, the High Court and even this Court cannot take upon itself the disciplinary control as envisaged under the Advocates Act. No doubt about it that the Court has the duty to maintain its decorum within the Court premises, but that can be achieved by taking appropriate steps under Contempt of Courts Act in accordance with law as permitted under the decisions of this Court and even by rule making power under Section 34 of the Advocates Act. An advocate can be debarred from practicing in the Court until and unless he purges himself of contempt.”
                                What is even more alarming is that it is then further observed in para 73 that, “It has been seen from time to time that various attacks have been made on the judicial system. It has become very common to the members of the Bar to go to the press/media to criticize the judges in person and to commit sheer contempt by attributing political colours to the judgments. It is nothing less than an act of contempt of gravest form. Whenever any political matter comes to the Court and is decided, either way, political insinuations are attributed by unscrupulous persons/advocates. Such acts are nothing, but an act of denigrating the judiciary itself and destroys the faith of the common man which he reposes in the judicial system. In case of genuine grievance against any judge, the appropriate process is to lodge a complaint to the concerned higher authorities who can take care of the situation and it is impermissible to malign the system itself by attributing political motives and by making false allegations against the judicial system and its functionaries Judges who are attacked are not supposed to go to press or media to ventilate their point of view.”
                                Striking a note of caution, the Bench then observes in para 74 that, “Contempt of court is a weapon which has to be used sparingly as more is power, same requires more responsibility but it does not mean that the court has fear of taking action and its repercussions. The hallmark of the court is to provide equal and even handed justice and to give an opportunity to each of the system to ensure that it improves upon. Unfortunately, some advocates feel that they are above the Bar Council due to its inaction and they are the only champion of the causes. The hunger for cheap publicity is increasing which is not permitted by the noble ideals cherished by the great doyens of the bar, they have set by their conduct what should be in fact the professional etiquettes and ethics which are not capable of being defined in a narrow compass. The statutory rules prohibit advocates from advertising and in fact to cater to the press/media, distorted versions of the court proceedings is sheer misconduct and contempt of court which has become very common. It is making it more difficult to render justice in a fair, impartial and fearless manner though the situation is demoralizing that something has to be done by all concerned to revamp the image of Bar. It is not open to wash dirty linen in public and enter in accusation/debates, which tactics are being adopted by unscrupulous elements to influence the judgments and even to deny justice with ulterior motives. It is for the Bar Council and the senior members of the Bar who have never forgotten their responsibility to rise to the occasion to maintain the independence of the Bar which is so supreme and is absolutely necessary for the welfare of this country and the vibrant democracy.”
                                Going forward, it is then enunciated clearly and convincingly in para 75 that, “The separation of powers made by the forefathers, who framed the Constitution, ensured independent functioning. It is unfortunate that without any rationale basis the independence of the system is being sought to be protected by those who should keep aloof from it. Independence of each system is to come from within. If things are permitted to be settled by resorting to the unscrupulous means and institution is maligned by creating pressure of any kind, the very independence of the system would be endangered. Cases cannot be decided by media trial. Bar and Bench in order to protect independence have their own inbuilt machinery for redressal of grievance if any and they are supposed to settle their grievances in accordance therewith only. No outside interference is permissible. Considering the nobility, independence, dignity which is enjoined and the faith which is reposed by the common man of the country in the judiciary, it is absolutely necessary that there is no maligning of the system. Mutual respect and reverence are the only way out.”
                                  Continuing in the same vein, Justice Arun Mishra who authored this judgment for himself and Justice Vineet Saran then in this very same para 75 very rightly and commendably points out that, “A lot of sacrifices are made to serve the judiciary for which one cannot regret as it is with a purpose and to serve judiciary is not less than call of military service. For the protection of democratic values and to ensure that the rule of law prevails in the country, no one can be permitted to destroy the independence of the system from within or from outside. We have to watch on Bar independence. Let each of us ensure our own institution is not jeopardized by the blame game and make an endeavor to improve upon its own functioning and independence and how individually and collectively we can deliver the good to the citizen of this great country and deal with every tear in the eye of poor and down-trodden as per constitutional obligation enjoined on us.”    
                                  Needless to say, it is then fervently hoped in para 76 that, “Soul searching is absolutely necessary and the blame game and maligning must stop forthwith. Confidence and reverence and positive thinking is the only way. It is pious hope that the Bar Council would improve upon the function of its disciplinary committees so as to make the system more accountable, publish performance audit on the disciplinary side of various bar councils. The same should be made public. The Bar Council of India under its supervisory control can implement good ideas as always done by it and would not lag behind in cleaning process so badly required. It is to make the profession more noble and it is absolutely necessary to remove the black sheeps from the profession to preserve the rich ideals of Bar on which it struggled for the values of freedom.” In this same para, it is then further clarified that, “It is basically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the statutory duty of Bar to make it more noble and also to protect the Judges and the legal system, not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction and the system which is important pillar of democracy.”
                           Finally and perhaps most importantly, let us now deal with the concluding paras 77 and 78. Para 77 while giving a rap on the knuckles of the High Court minces no words in holding that, “We have no hesitation to hold that the High Court has overstretched and exceeded its power even in the situation which was so grim which appears to have compelled it to take such a measure. In fact, its powers are much more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal with such situation. Court need not look for Bar Council to act. It can take action, punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconduct done in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but the autonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over by the Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintain the decorum of Court. In case power is given to the Court even if complaints lodged by a lawyer to the higher administrative authorities as to the behaviour of the Judges may be correct then also he may be punished by initiating disciplinary proceedings as permitted to be done in impugned Rules 14A to D that would be making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would not be conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism of judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers’ fearlessness in court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the virtues which cannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned authorities as observed by this Court in Vinay Chandra Misra (supra), which right cannot be totally curtailed, however, making such allegation publicly tantamounts to contempt of court and may also be a professional misconduct that can be taken care of either by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act and by the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The misconduct as specified in Rule 14-A may also in appropriate cases tantamount to contempt of court and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction.”
                    Lastly, para 78 envisages that, “Resultantly, we have no hesitation to strike down impugned Rules 14-A to 14-D as framed in May, 2016 by the High Court of Madras as they are ultra vires to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and are hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.”
                           All said and done, it has to be said in all fairness that this latest, landmark and laudable judgment by the Supreme Court has sought to send out a loud and clear message to all the High Courts and even the top court itself that autonomy of the Bar cannot be taken away by the Courts. It has clearly and convincingly quashed all the disciplinary rules enacted by Madras High Court for lawyers as has been explained above! All courts from top to bottom must comply with it unconditionally and uniformly! For the judicial system to work smoothly, it is imperative that there is a fearless and independent Bar with full autonomy to function and to take action against members who break rules and this has been underscored also very rightly in this commendable and noteworthy judgment! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.      

Casual Act Of Possession Over Property Does Not Confer ‘Possessory Title’: SC

While clearly and convincingly holding that possessory title over property cannot be claimed merely on the basis of ‘casual possession’, the Supreme Court in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Poona Ram v. Moti Ram (D) Th. LRs & Ors. In Civil Appeal No. 4527 of 2009 authored by Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar for himself and Justice NV Ramana on January 29, 2019 observed that a casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. Very rightly so! Who can deny it?
                                First and foremost, the ball is set rolling in para 1 wherein it is observed that, “The judgment dated 28.08.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Civil Second Appeal No. 97 of 1984 and the concurrent judgment dated 10.10.2006 in Civil Review Petition No. 18 of 2006, dismissing the same, are called in question in this appeal by the unsuccessful defendants.”
                                      To recapitulate, it is then pointed out in para 2 that, “The brief facts leading to this appeal are as under:
     A suit came to be filed for declaration of title and for possession by Respondent No. 1 herein. Undisputedly, the plaintiff  Moti Ram had no document of title to prove his possession, but claimed possessory title based on prior possession for a number of years. However, according to the plaintiff, he had been wrongly dispossessed by defendants on 30.04.1972 which was within the 12 years preceding the filing of the present suit. The Trial Court decreed the suit and the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court dismissed the said suit on the ground that the defendants had proved their title and possession over the suit property.”
                                       Going forward, it is then eloquently mentioned in para 3 that, “As mentioned supra, the plaintiff did not have any title deed with respect to the suit property. He based his claim mainly on his alleged long possession over the property, and claimed that there was nobody with better title over it than him. Per contra, the defendants relied on two sale deeds, viz., Ex. A-6 dated 06.02.1956, executed by the original owner Khoom Singh in favour of Purkha Ram, and Ex. A-2 dated 21.06.1966, executed by Purkha Ram in favour of the appellant/Defendant No. 1. It was also not disputed that the plaintiff did not have possession as on the date of filing of the suit, inasmuch as he has alleged that he was wrongly dispossessed by the defendant on 30.04.1972 prior to filing the suit.”
                                   To be sure, it is then revealed in para 4 that, “The only questions to be decided in this appeal are whether the plaintiff had better title over the suit property and whether he was in settled possession of the property, which required dispossession in accordance with law.”
                         As it turned out, para 5 while elaborating on what the appellant contended states specifically that, “Ms. Christi Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/Defendant No. 1 taking us through the material on record, contends that there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the property at any point of time, much less for a longer time lawfully. There is no material to show that the plaintiff has possessory title over the suit property. Additionally, she argues that the sale deeds mentioned supra relied upon by the defendants would clearly reveal that the defendants were in possession of the property as owner thereof, from the date of purchase of the suit property.”
                                      It cannot be lost on us that it is then unfolded in para 6 that, “Undisputedly and as duly admitted by both parties, the property in question originally belonged to Jagirdar Khoom Singh of Barmer. The property in question is part of a larger property under the Jagirdari system, a few parts of which were rented out or sold. After the system of Jagirdari was abolished, these jagirs were resumed in the year 1955-56. While a few persons continued in illegal possession, others had purchased parts of the land from the Jagirdar, and the remaining land vested in the State Government and municipalities. After the resumption of the jagir, it seems that the Barmer Municipality established a planned and well-managed colony named Nehru Nagar on the said land. Ex. 12, Ex. 13 and Ex. 14 are the survey maps of the Municipality. A perusal of Ex. 12 (first survey) reveals that Moti Ram was in possession of the land, the plot to the east of which was possessed by Nawala Harijan and in the east of Nawala Harijan’s plot, possession of Purkha Ram (to recall, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants) on the site has been indicated. Further, the possession of Purkha Ram has also been indicated on a plot to the south of the land duly possessed by Moti Ram. Thus, it is clear that the plots of land owned by Khoom Singh, in possession of these persons, were not uniformly situated. However, after the Municipality took over possession, it seems that orderly formation of the plots was undertaken. Though there was some confusion raised by the plaintiff with regard to the boundaries of the property in question, the First Appellate Court being the final court of fact, on due appreciation of the entire material on record, gave a definite finding that the Trial Court was not justified in decreeing the suit, and observed that Purkha Ram was in possession of the property in question even prior to 1966, and had sold the same through registered sale deed in June 1966 vide Ex. A-2. This sale deed shows the measurement of the land, which corresponds to the plots in question approximately. The judgment of the First Appellate Court reveals that the Municipality had let out only three plots to the Jagirdar, and those three plots together measured 32 x 66 hands (unit of measurement). Thus, each plot measured 32 x 22 hands. These were numbered as Plot No. 4, Plot No. 5 and Plot No. 7. The disputed site is Plot No. 7.”   
                                   Truth be told, para 7 then goes on to disclose that, “The official record (survey map), Ex. 14, which relates to the plot in question, i.e., Plot No. 7, reveals that it was owned by Poona Ram, who is Defendant No. 1 and the appellant herein. It is also relevant to note that sanction for constructing the house was given to Purkha Ram in the year 1957. Obviously, such sanction would have been accorded only on the basis of title and possession of the property.”
                                     To put things in perspective, para 8 then goes on to elucidate while explaining the concept behind suit based on possessory title that, “Section 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 contemplates a suit for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title, if brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Such a suit is known in law as a suit based on possessory title as distinguishable from proprietary title. It cannot be disputed and is by now well settled that ‘settled possession’ or effective possession of a person without title entitles him to protect his possession as if he were a true owner.”    
                                  It would be pertinent to now mention here that para 9 then goes on to illustrate specifying that, “The law in India, as it has developed, accords with jurisprudential thought as propounded by luminaries like Salmond. Salmond on Jurisprudence (12 Edn. at paras 59-60) states:-
    “These two concepts of ownership and possession, therefore, may be used to distinguish between the de facto possessor of an object and its de jure owner, between the man who actually has it and the man who ought to have it. They serve also to contract the position of one whose rights are ultimate, permanent and residual with that of one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.
x                        x                     x                      x                        x
In English law possession is a good title of right against any one who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.
Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit)”.”
                                 Back home, it is then worthily recalled in para 10 about the relevant past noteworthy judgments that, “As far back as 1924, in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. V. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge observed that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. Later, in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. V. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, this Court ruled that when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section 6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of six months has passed, questions of title can be raised by the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, such a right is only restricted to possession in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (corresponding to the present Section 6) but does not bar a suit on prior permission within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.”
                                           Now turning to para 11, it goes on to then add further that, “It was also observed by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd (supra) that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. In such a case, the defendant must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a possession prior to the plaintiffs and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time.”
                                     Not stopping here, it is then pointed out in para 12 that, “In the case of Rame Gowda (dead) by Lrs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by Lrs. and another, (2004) 1 SCC 769, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while discussing the Indian law on the subject, observed as under:-
   “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner”.”
                                In essence, it is then summarized in para 13 laying down that, “The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.”
                                        Having said this, let us now see what para 14 enunciates. It enunciates that, “As mentioned supra, Purkha Ram had purchased three plots from Jagirdar Khoom Singh. In sale deed Ex. A-6, three plots have been mentioned as plots of three houses. One of these, being Plot No. 7, was sold by Purkha Ram to the appellant, one plot being Plot No. 4 was sold to Teja Ram and the third plot being Plot No. 5 was retained by Purkha Ram.” 
                             It would be pertinent to mention here that para 15 then stipulates that, “In order to prove possession of the property, the plaintiff relied upon the rent note Ex. 1, which shows that the plot in question was let out by the plaintiff to one Joga Ram in the year 1967. On 12.05.1967, a fire broke out and the entire fodder stored on the plot got burnt. Thereafter, the plot was kept vacant. DW-7, who has been referred to in order to establish spreading of the fire, stated that the fire started due to sparks coming from a railway engine. But there was no railway line adjacent to the disputed land which could have caused a fire. Even otherwise, the rent note Ex. 1 does not refer to the plot in question, and its boundaries have also not been mentioned. Merely on doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession.”       
                           While strongly rebutting the tall claims of the plaintiff, it is then pointed out in para 16 that, “The plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 makes much of the old body of a motor vehicle belonging to him lying on the property. Ex. 2 clearly reveals that one part of the motor vehicle was lying on the disputed property and another part was lying on the plot of the plaintiff. The said body of the motor vehicle is about 3 to 4 feet in length only and the same was lying on the boundary of the disputed property. But the plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 claims possession of the entire plot based on such fact. Absolutely no material is found to show that the plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 was in actual possession, much less continuous possession, of the property for a longer period which may be called settled possession or established possession. As mentioned supra, mere casual possession, that too relying on a motor vehicle body lying on a part of the property, would not prove settled possession of the plaintiff.”          
                     To say the least, it is then clarified in para 17 that, “The plaintiff has to prove his case to the satisfaction of the Court. He cannot succeed on the weakness of the case of the defendant. Even otherwise, there is no confusion at all regarding the identity of the property in question and on the basis of material on record, the First Appellate Court has correctly ruled that the appellant/Defendant No. 1 has proved his title and possession over the suit property since the date of his purchase of the property. Prior to the purchase, his predecessor-in-interest was in possession of the same.”
                                      After considering the position of law and facts of the case, it is then spelt out in para 18 that, “Having regard to the position of law and facts of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the judgment of the First Appellate Court, which has come down very heavily on the procedure adopted by the trial Judge in deciding the matter, more particularly when no fault can be found on facts with the judgment of the First Appellate Court.”
                                   In this same para 18, it is then also spelt out that, “Generally, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court when such findings are based on the evidence on record, and are not perverse or against the material on record.”
                                    More importantly, it is then held in para 19 that, “The conclusion arrived at by the High Court and the reasons assigned for the same are not correct inasmuch as there is absolutely no material in favour of the case of the plaintiff to show possessory title. In order to claim possessory title, the plaintiff will have to prove his own case, and also will have to show that he has better title than any other person. Since there is no documentary proof that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property, that too for a long period, he cannot be allowed to succeed based on minor discrepancies in the evidence of the defendants. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.”
                           Finally, we see that in the last para 20, it is then held that, “The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 28.08.2006 and its review stands set aside and the judgment of the First Appellate Court is restored. Consequently, suit stands dismissed.” No doubt, this latest, landmark and laudable judgment leaves no room of doubt for anyone to reach the foregone conclusion that casual act of possession over property does not confer possessory title. We all must also always bear it in mind along with other salient points highlighted so brilliantly in this significant and laudable judgment!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.  

Sri Krishna Arts and Science College

Sri Krishna Arts and Science College

Legal Article Mere Allegations Of Harassment Without Proximate Positive Action Not Sufficient For Conviction U/S 306 IPC: SC

It has to be said right at the outset that in a landmark, latest and laudable judgment titled Rajesh v State of Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 8867 of 2016)  by a two Judge Bench of Supreme Court comprising of Justice L Nageshwara Rao who authored the judgment for himself and Justice MR Shah and delivered on January 18, 2019, the Supreme Court very clearly and convincingly reiterated that conviction under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (Abetment of Suicide) is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. The Bench was considering an appeal in this case against the High Court judgment that had confirmed the conviction of Rajesh for abetting suicide of his brother-in-law, Arvind. It may be recalled that in his suicide note, Arvind had disclosed that false allegations of demand of dowry were made against him and that a Panchayat was also conducted in which he was slapped by the accused. He took the extreme step of committing suicide as he was unable to withstand the harassment and had said in the suicide note that his in-laws including the accused are responsible for his death.  
                                  To start with, this landmark judgment begins by first and foremost pointing out in para 1 that, “The Appellant was convicted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) and sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment. The appeal filed by the Appellant was dismissed by the High Court. Hence, this appeal.”
                                   To recapitulate, the ball is then set rolling in para 2 wherein it is pointed out that, “According to the complaint filed by Bharat Singh (PW-1), his son Arvind was married to Manju, daughter of Laxmi Narayan on 07.11.2000. Indera is the sister-in-law of Arvind and the Appellant Rajesh is his brother-in-law. Arvind committed suicide on 23.02.2002 by consuming Sulfas tablets. On 01.03.2002 when Bharat Singh and other family members entered into the room of Arvind to sprinkle Gangajal, they found a suicide note on the bed of the deceased. It was stated that Arvind committed suicide due to the behavior of the Appellant, Laxmi Narayan and Indera who made false allegations against deceased regarding demand of dowry. A Panchayat was held in the village at the instance of the accused during which the Appellant slapped the deceased. The Appellant and his sister Indera used to threaten the deceased on telephone at the instance of their father Laxmi Narayan.”
                                 Elaborating further, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “In the suicide note, the deceased Arvind stated that false allegations of demand of dowry were made against him and that a Panchayat was also conducted in which there was an attempt to assault him. There were continuous threats from his father-in-law (Laxmi Narayan), his brother-in-law (Appellant) and the sister-in-law (Indera) that his family members will also be implicated in a criminal case. Unable to withstand the harassment, the deceased took the extreme step of committing suicide and held his father-in-law, the Appellant and his sister-in-law responsible for his death.”
                                 Going forward, para 4 then goes on to further elucidate that, “On completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed under Section 306 IPC. 12 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and Manju, wife of the deceased was examined as DW-1. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court held the Appellant, his father and sister guilty of committing the offence under Section 306 IPC. The Appellant and his father Laxmi Narayan were sentenced to imprisonment of five years. Accused Indera was sentenced to three years imprisonment on being convicted for committing an offence under Section 306 IPC. The Trial Court took note of the Panchayat that was held in September 2001 which was five months prior to 23.02.2002 on which date Arvind committed suicide. Reference was also made to the evidence of PW-1 (Bharat Singh) who stated that he and his son Arvind (deceased) had forgotten about the Panchayat episode in view of the apology tendered by the accused. However, the Trial Court observed that continuous threats held out by the accused to implicate the deceased and his family members in a false dowry case assume importance. The Trial Court also relied upon the suicide note to hold the accused guilty of the offence of abetment to suicide. The version of the defence that Arvind Committed suicide due to his depression, due to unemployment and lack of income, was rejected.”     
                                    Not stopping here, para 5 then goes on to further elaborate stating that, “The appeal filed by the Appellant was dismissed by the High Court. The conviction and sentence of Laxmi Narayan and Indera were set aside by the High Court by the same judgment. The High Court referred to the suicide note Exhibit ‘PA’ to conclude that there was no error committed by the Trial Court in convicting the Appellant. The High Court also relied upon the evidence of PW-1 and PW-5 who spoke about the convening of the Panchayat by the accused in September, 2001 during which false allegations were made against the deceased. The High Court upheld the conviction of the Appellant while acquitting his father and sister, only on the ground that the Appellant slapped Arvind during the Panchayat which was conducted in September, 2001.”
                       Be it noted, para 6 then goes on to illustrate that, “It is no doubt true that Arvind committed suicide on 23.02.2002. He left a suicide note which was found by his family members on 01.03.2002. There is also no dispute that Arvind blamed his father-in-law (Laxmi Narayan), his sister-in-law (Indera) and the Appellant for harassment and threats that he would be implicated in a false case of demand of dowry. Admittedly, a Panchayat was held in September, 2001 during which the accused leveled allegations of demand of dowry by Arvind. More than five months thereafter, Arvind committed suicide on 23.02.2002. In the meanwhile, according to the prosecution, Arvind was being threatened by the accused through telephone conversations. The point that arises for our consideration is whether the Appellant can be held guilty for committing an offence under Section 306 IPC in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
                                        It would be pertinent to mention here that para 8 then goes on to add stating that, “Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. (See Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707).”
                                    More importantly, it is very rightly held in para 11 that, “We are of the opinion that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction of the Appellant under Section 306 IPC. There is no proximity between the Panchayat held in September 2001 and the suicide committed by Arvind on 23.02.2002. The incident of slapping by the Appellant in September, 2001 cannot be the sole ground to hold him responsible for instigating the deceased to commit suicide. As the allegations against all the three accused are similar, the High Court ought not to have convicted the Appellant after acquitting the other two accused.”
                                      Most importantly, it is then held in para 12 that, “We are not in agreement with the findings of the Trial Court that the deceased (Arvind) committed suicide in view of the continuous threats by the accused regarding his being implicated in a false case of demand of dowry. The evidence does not disclose that the Appellant instigated the deceased to commit suicide. There was neither a provocation nor encouragement by the Appellant to the deceased to commit an act of suicide. Therefore, the Appellant cannot be held guilty of abetting the suicide by the deceased.” Very rightly so!
                                Finally, the last para 13 then concludes by stating that, “For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence of the Appellant is set aside. His bail bonds stands discharged.” There can be no denying or disputing it! The Apex Court has given valid and compelling reasons for holding so as we have already discussed above!
                                 It also rightly cited the case of Praveen Pradhan v State of Uttaranchal (2012) 9 SCC 734 in para 10 wherein it was held that, “Words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation.” The accused neither provoked nor encouraged the deceased to commit an act of suicide then how could he be held liable for the same? This was what the Apex Court also very rightly concluded in this landmark, latest and laudable judgment for which it has to be richly commended!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Rape And Murder Of 8 Year Old Girl: SC Commutes Death Sentence To 25 Years Imprisonment Without Remission

It has to be said right at the beginning that in a landmark, latest and laudable judgment with far reaching consequences, the Supreme Court on January 18, 2019 in Nand Kishore v State of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 94 of 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7645 of 2013) has commuted to life imprisonment the death sentence which was earlier confirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court of a convicted for the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. It must be noted that this notable judgment which was authored by Justice R Subhash Reddy for himself, Justice Sharad A Bobde and Justice L Nageswara Rao took a balanced and reasonable view after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case. This alone explains why death penalty was not confirmed rather was commuted to that of life imprisonment with actual imprisonment of 25 years  without remission.
                                         While craving for the exclusive indulgence of esteemed readers, it must be informed here that the Bench of Apex Court observed right at the outset in para 2 that, “This criminal appeal is filed by the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 798 of 2013 filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, aggrieved by the judgment dated 25.06.2013. By the aforesaid judgment, while dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant herein convicted for the offence under Sections 302, 363, 366 and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the High Court answered the reference in affirmative by confirming the death sentence awarded to the appellant.”
                            To recapitulate, para 3 then starting from the scratch brings out that, “Necessary facts, in brief, giving rise to this appeal are that the deceased, a minor girl aged about 8 years, had gone to attend the ‘Mela’ along with her younger brother namely Chhunu (PW-4) on 03.02.2013. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant who is aged about 50 years then, took away the deceased from the ‘Mela’ and committed rape and murdered her. Narendra (PW-2) informed the police stating that his daughter, who had gone to attend the ‘Mela’, has not returned home. Upon such complaint, case was registered and investigation commenced. In the course of investigation one Amit Mourya (PW-1) informed the Investigating Officer that when he was coming to his shop from residence, he saw a dog running away with a leg of a child in its mouth and on being chased, the dog dropped the leg and ran away. Further, it was the case of the prosecution that in the process of investigation, Investigating Officer found a headless body of the deceased in the bushes near the ‘Dushera Maidan’, Bhopal. It is alleged that the left leg of the deceased was found at a distance of 100 ft and both legs were fractured. Further, it is noticed that there were severe injuries on the private parts of the deceased inflicted by the appellant due to which the intestine had come out. During the process of investigation the statement of the appellant was recorded under Ex. P8 and the blood stained cloths and articles he used for the offence were recovered from his house. After completing the investigation, the appellant was chargesheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i) and 302 of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.”
                                     Needless to say, it is then brought out in para 4 that, “The trial court, after appreciation of the evidence on record, which is mainly circumstantial, came to the conclusion that the appellant has committed rape on the minor girl and murdered her and further, by recording a finding that the crime committed by the appellant is heinous and barbaric, falls within the category of ‘rarest of rare’ cases, imposed the death sentence. The appellant is also convicted and sentenced for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i) of the IPC. In view of the award of death sentence, the trial court has made a reference to the High Court for confirmation, as contemplated under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC). Questioning the conviction recorded and sentence imposed, the accused has filed appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 798 of 2013 and the High Court has disposed of, by common judgment, Criminal Reference No. 05/2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 798/2013. The High Court, by judgment dated 25.06.2013, while dismissing the appeal of the appellant, has affirmed the reference confirming the death sentence awarded to the appellant.” The Bench then observes in para 5 that, “We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant, Sri Sanjay R. Hegde and also learned counsel appearing for the State Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi.”
                                        What must be noted here is that the learned senior counsel for the appellant Sanjay R Hegde while pooh-poohing the manner in which the trial court and the high court imposed death sentence on the appellant called for it to be modified as we see has been pointed out also in para 6 which states that, “In this appeal, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that there is no acceptable and convincing evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant is convicted by the trial court based on the circumstantial evidence which is not enough to record guilt of the accused. It is submitted that from the evidence on record, the prosecution has also failed to prove concept of ‘last seen’. It is further submitted that the trial court as well as High Court has committed error in imposing the death sentence upon the appellant without examining mitigating circumstances. It is submitted that the sentence imposed is illegal and contrary to the legislative mandate under Sections 235(2) and 354(3) of the Cr.PC. It is contended that without examining relevant considerations of legislative policy discernible from Sections 354(3) and 235(2) of the Cr.PC, only by recording a finding that the incident is barbaric, the trial court and the appellate court have recorded that the case of the prosecution falls under ‘rarest of rare’ cases and imposed death sentence. It is submitted that all the mitigating circumstances which exist were to be considered. The penalty of death imposed is required to be modified.”       
                                        What is more, it is then pointed out further in para 7 that, “To support his contention, learned counsel has referred to certain cases decided by this Court in identical circumstances. It is specifically submitted that relevant aspects, like, the socio-economic background of the appellant, lack of criminal antecedents, possibility of reform, are not considered. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that the local Bar Association, Bhopal had refused to represent the appellant, as such, the appellant was not represented by counsel before the trial court until the date of the framing of the charge. On request made by the appellant on the day of framing of charge, for grant of legal aid, trial court has requested one Mr. Katyayani to appear and the same day charges were framed and the trial was preceded with.”
                             It is beyond a shadow of doubt that the local Bar Association of Bhopal by refusing to represent the appellant has done no good to the victim who was brutally raped and murdered! It only served to arouse sympathy among the Judges of the Apex Court who decided this case as the accused was not represented by any lawyer in lower court! This only worked to the advantage of the accused!
                                    Of course, every accused has a right to be defended by a lawyer no matter how heinous the crime may be and this among other reasons only served to save the appellant from being pushed to the gallows! Let us not be oblivious of the irrefutable and basic principle of law that, “One of the cardinal principles of the criminal justice system in India is that an accused is deemed innocent until proven guilty.”  The Apex Court too has time and again sent a loud and clear message that every accused has a right to be represented by an advocate of his choice and this is reiterated in Section 303 of Cr.PC also and no accused under any circumstances should be condemned unheard as the doctrine of audi alteram partem very clearly enunciates which literally means “hear the other side”!
                                 To be sure, no accused should be judged without a fair hearing in which the accused too are given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against them. How can this be possible if they are denied access to lawyer who is supposed to represent them? All lawyers who are in the legal profession must always bear it in mind!
                        Anyway, coming back to the case itself, it is then finally and most importantly rightly pointed out in para 14 that, “The learned counsel appearing for the State has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case Mukesh & Anr. V. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors (2017) 6 SCC 1 [known as Nirbhaya case] in support of her case and submitted that applying the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the case falls in the ‘rarest of rare’ cases attracting death penalty. With reference to above said arguments of learned counsel for the State, it is to be noticed that the case of Mukesh (supra) is distinguishable on the facts from the case on hand. It is to be noticed that Mukesh (supra) is a case of gang-rape and murder of the victim and an attempt to murder of the male victim. It was the specific case of the prosecution that the crimes were carried out pursuant to a conspiracy and the accused were convicted under Section 120-B of the IPC apart from other offences. Further, as a fact, it was found in the aforesaid case that the accused-Mukesh had been involved in other criminal activity on the same night. Further, it is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid case, there was a dying declaration, eye witness to the incident etc. So far as the present case is concerned, it solely rests on circumstantial evidence. It is the specific case of the appellant that he was denied the proper legal assistance in the matter and he is a manhole worker. The appellant was aged about 50 years. Further, in this case there is no finding recorded by the courts below to the effect that there is no possibility of reformation of the appellant. We are of the view that the reasons assigned by the trial court as confirmed by the High Court, do not constitute special reasons within the meaning of Section 354(3) of the Cr.PC to impose death penalty on the accused. Taking into account the evidence on record and the totality of the circumstances of the case, and by applying the test on the touchstone of case law discussed above, we are of the view that the case on hand will not fall within the ‘rarest of rare’ cases. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the death sentence imposed by the trial court, as confirmed by the High Court, requires modification. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in part; while confirming the conviction recorded by the trial court, as confirmed by the appellate court, we modify the sentence to that of life imprisonment with actual period of 25 years, without any benefit of remission. It is further made clear that sentences imposed for all offences shall run concurrently.”
                              All said and done, this landmark, latest and laudable judgment clearly and convincingly has sent a loud and clear message that death sentence should not be inflicted at the drop of a hat! There must be very serious and compelling reasons and the case must fall within the ‘rarest of rare’ cases! If there are chances of accused reforming himself/herself then death penalty should not be imposed. All courts from top to bottom must abide by what has been laid down by the Apex Court in this landmark case!  
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

A Judicial Officer Is Not An Ordinary Government Servant And Must Be Above Suspicion: Allahabad High Court

It must be noted right at the outset that in a noteworthy judgment titled Sadhna Chaudhary v State of U.P. and others in Writ Petition No. 170 (S/B) of 2006 by a two-Judge Bench of Allahabad High Court comprising of Chief Justice Govind Mathur and Justice Shabihul Hasnain and delivered on 12 December 2018 has upheld the dismissal of a judicial officer on grounds of misconduct, on the basis of two orders passed by her in land acquisition cases. This has certainly sent shockwaves across Uttar Pradesh especially in judicial circles. The legal battle is still not over as she (the petitioner) still has the right to challenge this in the Apex Court which is the highest court in India! But certainly it is a big setback for her!
                         First and foremost, it is pointed out in para 1 that, “Heard Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for State of U.P. as well as Sri Upendra Nath Mishra for High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, opposite party no. 2.” The ball is then really set rolling in para 2 wherein it is pointed out that, “Present petition has been filed by a judicial officer against the order passed by the Appointments Department of the State Government dated 17.01.2006, by which the petitioner was dismissed from service on the recommendation of the Full Court of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.” Para 3 then brings out that, “Petitioner was working as Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad when the impugned order was passed. Petitioner has prayed that a direction be issued for not giving effect to the dismissal order dated 17.01.2006 and thereafter allow her to discharge her duties as before.”
                                While striking a note of caution, it is then underscored in para 4 that, “Great caution is required in this case because it is a matter of a high ranking judicial officer and her career, which is at stake. It will therefore be necessary to first lay down the facts of the case before dealing with the arguments and law on the subject.”
                           Delving deeper, para 5 then very clearly and convincingly points out that, “The petitioner had initially joined the services as Additional Munsif in the year 1972. She was later on promoted as Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the year 1983. She was subsequently promoted to the Higher Judicial Cadre in the year 1987. While she was posted as 2nd Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, the petitioner had decided a Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006 (Lile Singh v. State & 35 others) on 10.2.2003 and while deciding the said Land Acquisition Reference, the petitioner had relied on the rates of a compromise deed but she awarded solatium, additional amount and interest etc. over and above the said agreed rates. This rate was over and above the rate at which two other claimants had entered into the  compromise deed. This compromise deed was relied by the petitioner as the exemplar in Rs. 284 per square yard was the rate agreed between the parties which was inclusive of all such benefits i.e. solatium, interest and additional amount. The petitioner relying on the same should instead of stucking to the same, enhanced the rate of Rs 74.40 per square yard determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to Rs 264/- per square yard i.e. Rs 20/- less than compromise rate and thereafter she allowed, addition of solatium, additional compensation and interest etc. which actually made the landing cost as Rs. 720/- per square yard. Thus the aforesaid enhancement was appear to be disproportionate and against judicial propriety and norms. It was also not justified on her part to rely on the rates of compromise deed and take it as market rate because it was barred under Section 11(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and thereafter allowing additional amount over and above that agreed rate which was completely incomprehensible.”   
                                    While continuing in the same vein, it is then added in para 6 that, “Similarly while being posted as Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Ghaziabad, the petitioner had decided another Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001 (Umesh Chandra v. State & 66 others) on 07.11.2003. While deciding the said reference, the petitioner had illegally disregarded all the exemplars filed by the defendants including her own award dated 16.08.1988, passed in another case only five months prior to acquisition for the land acquired in the same village and in the same area and under the same Scheme in which she herself had awarded only Rs. 108 per square yard. Thus while ignoring the aforesaid relevant material available on record, the petitioner has enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs. 100/- per square yard to Rs. 160/- per square yard. The aforesaid enhancement also appears to be disproportionate and the said reference appears to be decided against the judicial norms. In the meantime, this Court while deciding a First Appeal filed by Agra Development Authority against an order of land Acquisition Reference, passed a judgment and order dated 5.3.2004. In this judgment some far reaching observations were made with regard to the manner in which Land Acquisition References were being decided in the State of U.P. Further a direction was issued to the Registrar of the High Court to place the copy of the judgment before the Administrative Committee of the High Court for taking appropriate action against the concerned judicial officers, who appear to be in collusion with the claimants/beneficiaries.”
                                  Going forward, it is then added in para 7 that, “In compliance of the aforesaid judgment, a Committee was constituted by the High Court for looking into the matter, which submitted its report on 19.9.2004, where after the Administrative Committee resolved to initiate disciplinary proceeding against certain judicial officers including the petitioner, whose actions were prima facie found to be suspicious.”
                                 To be sure, it is then revealed in para 8 that, “A charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 25.10.2004 containing two separate charges in the aforementioned two separate cases about recklessly deciding the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References of Lile Singh (supra) and Umesh Chand (supra) and awarding additional amount including additional compensation, solatium and interest etc. in violation of all judicial norms and propriety, which led to the inference that the same was actuated by extraneous considerations and which indicates towards a failure of maintenance of absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty. This amounted to misconduct and, therefore, the petitioner was asked to submit a detailed reply to the said charges.”
                                 Not stopping here, it is then elucidated in detail in para 9 that, “The petitioner submitted her reply on 4.1.2005 followed by supplementary reply dated 19.5.2005 and 21.6.2005 wherein she tried to explain her conduct and the manner in which the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References were decided by her. Thereafter the enquiry proceedings were held after following the principles of natural justice and giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Finally an enquiry report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 9.9.2005 in which a conclusive finding was given by the two Hon’ble Judges appointed as enquiry committee, that errors in both the aforesaid orders passed by the petitioner while deciding two Land Acquisition References are not mere error in the judgment but they are such blunders, which according to the Enquiry Judges was ‘shocking’. Since the said blunders were not attributable to mere errors of judgment which can be corrected in Appeal or in Revision, but were evidently deliberate, therefore, the Enquiry officer had proved both the charges against the petitioner.”
                       It is then elaborated further in the same para 9 that, “Consequent to the above enquiry report the matter was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice with regard to determination of question of quantum of punishment. When the aforesaid enquiry report dated 9.9.2005 was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, the matter was directed to be placed before the Administrative Committee by the Hon’ble Chief Justice vide order dated 12.9.2005. Thereafter the office had put up a report dated 17.09.2005 that as per an earlier resolution of the Administrative Committee dated 28.02.1997, it would be appropriate to first call for comments of the delinquent officer to the show cause notice which may be given to her regarding the aforesaid enquiry report, with the approval of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. Thus a show cause notice was served on the petitioner on 26.09.2005, whereby the copy of the enquiry report was furnished to her and objections to the same were invited from the petitioner, who submitted her detailed reply on 22/24.10.2005. The same was placed before the Administrative Committee on 29.11.2005. The Administrative Committee, after duly considering the enquiry report dated 9.9.2005, the comments of the delinquent officer dated 22/24.10.2005, along with the office note dated 17.09.2005, resolved that the enquiry report dated 9.9.2005 of the two Hon’ble Judges be accepted and thereafter the matter was referred to the Full Court for consideration of quantum of punishment.”
                                   As things stand, it is then disclosed in para 10 that, “When the aforesaid matter came up for consideration before the Full Court in its meeting dated 17.12.2005, it was resolved by the Full Court that the enquiry report be accepted and that the officer be given punishment of dismissal from service. The aforesaid resolution/decision of the Full Court was thereafter communicated to the State Government and on that basis, the order of dismissal was passed by the Appointments Department of the State Government on 17.01.2006, which has been assailed by the petitioner in the instant writ petition.”  
                          Needless to say, para 11 while presenting the petitioners version goes on to enunciate that, “Petitioner while challenging the impugned punishment order has mainly contended that with regard to the alleged errors in deciding the first Land Acquisition Reference i.e. Lile Singh v. State, the grant of solatium, additional amount and interest is a benefit provided by the statute to the person, whose land was acquired and the same cannot be refused by the Tribunal only on the ground that the financial burden shall increase on the Acquiring Body. Similarly with regard to the alleged errors in deciding the second charge pertaining to the Land Acquisition Reference of Umesh Chandra v. State, it was submitted that her own award passed in the case of Surendra v. State decided on 24.3.1993 was not followed by her, mainly because the said case was affected by different Notification issued under Section 4(1) and the acquisition was for the same scheme.”
                              Going ahead, para 12 then further goes on to add that, “The petitioner has contended that writ petitions were filed against the two orders passed by the petitioner in the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References and both the said writ petitions filed by the Acquiring Body were subsequently dismissed by this Hon’ble Court vide judgment and orders dated 20.5.2015 and 21.5.2015 and, therefore, the award passed by the Hon’ble High Court and hence her stand is vindicated and she cannot be said to have committed any mistake in passing the two orders, as the amount decided by her in the Land Acquisition References was not changed in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. Since her decision stood affirmed even by the High Court, therefore, no punishment can be justified for passing the orders in the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References.” Finally, in para 13 also the petitioners version is described and it states that, “The petitioner has lastly prayed for parity of treatment while claiming similarity with the case of Sanjay Kumar Goel v. State of U.P. decided on 31.5.2011 wherein the petitioner was exonerated.”
                              Having said this, it is time to now discuss on what point of view the High Court submits on this. Starting from the scratch, it is first and foremost observed in para 14 that, “Per contra, the submission of the High Court is that in such matters, it is not the final decision of the judicial officer, which is relevant but what is relevant is the ‘decision making process’ and if the decision making process is in violation of all judicial norms and propriety, which is not supported by consistent judicial approach and if the decision making process of a judicial officer is actuated by extraneous consideration, ulterior motives, recklessness and improper considerations, then even if the final decision may be upheld by superior courts but the decision making process being arbitrary and irrational, cannot allow the judicial officer to escape from his responsibility.”
                                Of course, para 15 then further states that, “It was further submitted that in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to give any suitable reply to the main contention of the Charge No. 1 as to why she had placed reliance at the first place on a compromise deed entered between the two persons for fixing the rate of land for determining the market value, though there is a statutory bar under Section 11(2) & (3) of the Land Acquisition Act that rate of land fixed through agreement cannot be a criteria for determining the market value of adjoining land acquired through same or similar notification. Similarly no suitable explanation could be given by the petitioner that when she had relied on the agreement deed, which contained the rate of Rs 284/- per square yard and this amount included 30% solatium, additional compensation and interest, then why the charged officer awarded a sum of Rs. 264/- per square yard (while deducting only Rs 20 therefrom) and then awarded addition of solatium, additional compensation and interest over and above the said agreed amount. This ultimately resulted in the landing cost of Rs. 720/- per square yard as against Rs. 284/- per square yard given to the claimants of the adjoining villages even under the “compromise agreement”. Thus a total enhancement in compensation by the order passed by the changed officer came to be more than 47 crores which was about 10 times more than the compensation of SLAO. No suitable explanation could be given by the petitioner for allowing the aforesaid wind fall gain to the claimants which was absolutely ‘shocking’.”
                                Furthermore, it is then pointed out in para 15 that, “Similarly with respect to the second charge, the petitioner could not explain as to why she had ignored/disregarded the sale deed executed barely 19 days before Section 4 Notification and that too of a small piece of land, which was the best exemplar. This exemplar was actually relied upon by the SLAO, while determining the rate of compensation at Rs. 100/- per square yard. It cannot be presumed by any stretch of imagination that when in the sale deed executed barely 19 days before Section 4 Notification, the rate of land was 90 per square yard, on the basis of which the SLAO had determined the compensation at Rs. 100/- per square yard, the same could have been enhanced to Rs. 160/- per square yard. This clearly demonstrates that the enhancement of compensation in this case also was actuated evidently by extraneous considerations, which gave wind wall gains to the claimants, which was most shocking and unexplainable, especially when the charged officer/petitioner neither followed her own award given five months back in the case of Surendra v. State nor accepted the sale deed executed barely 19 days before Section 4 Notification, which was rightly relied upon by the SLAO in reaching to the amount of compensation.”
                                 What’s more, it is then explicitly laid down in para 16 that, “It was further submitted that though the writ petitions filed by acquiring body i.e. NOIDA authorities against the orders passed in several Land Acquisition References were collectively decided by this Court vide judgment and orders dated 20.5.2015 and 21.5.2015. However, in the said judgments, it was never considered as to what was “the decision making process” which was adopted by the petitioner and as to how the same was grossly arbitrary, reckless and bereft of judicial propriety. This Court while collectively deciding several First Appeals filed against several orders in Land Acquisition References had, while relying on several judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court land acquisition matters laid down broad principles which should be followed in land acquisition matters, however while passing the aforesaid two orders, but individual approaches of the individual judicial officers and their individual decision making processes in reaching to the respective conclusions was never looked into by this Court and, therefore, the aforesaid judgments dated 20.5.2015 and 21.5.2015 cannot be said to be the conclusive findings of the High Court on the decision making process of the petitioner, as no such finding is recorded in the same.”  
                                  To fortify and buttress its stand, the High Court then cites decided case by Apex Court as pointed out in para 17 which states that, “In this regard, it was contended on behalf of High Court that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, reported in 1993 (2) SCC 56 has held in paras 28 and 29 that “the officer, who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers if acts negligently or recklessly or attempts to confer undue favour on a person or takes decision which is actuated by corrupt motive, then he is not acting as a judge”.”
                                   It is further pointed out in this same para 17 that, “The Hon’ble Apex Court returned a conclusive finding that in such matters, the Courts are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the final orders with reference to the ultimate decision, because an error in judgment, can be corrected in appeal or revision, but the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action against the officer concerned if there is evident violation of the Conduct Rules and if the decision making process is found to be reckless and arbitrary and actuated by corrupt motives. Thereafter the Hon’ble Apex Court has mentioned certain cases/occasions as an example, in which disciplinary actions can be taken against the judicial and quasi judicial offers in the discharge of their judicial functions.”
                       It cannot be lost on us that it is then noted in para 18 that, “The aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) by the Hon’ble three Judges Bench was distinguished by another judgment of the two Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of Junjarao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, reported in 1999 (7) SC 409, wherein paras 40 to 44 of the same, the initiation of disciplinary proceeding against judicial/quasi-judicial authorities was not appreciated if it is based on their discharge of judicial/quasi-judicial functions. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a latest judgment of Union of India v. Duli Chand, reported in 2006 (5) SCC 680 upheld the Hon’ble three Judges decision of K.K. Dhawan’s case (supra) and overruled the decision of Nagarkar’s case. Therefore as per the settled position of law, the legality and correctness of the decision making process and the conduct of the officers in discharge of his duties has to be considered in the matter of disciplinary proceeding initiated against him and the final decision passed by the officer has no relevance. On this basis, it was submitted on behalf of High Court that since the decision making process adopted by the petitioner while deciding both the Land Acquisition References are bereft of judicial propriety, settled judicial norms and are actuated by extraneous considerations, therefore, it amounts to misconduct, for which the petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service. The finding given by the Enquiry Officer about the wind fall gain made available to the claimants by the petitioner were absolutely shocking and since the same were not mere errors of judgment, but they are evident blunders deliberately by the petitioner, therefore, the Enquiry Officer had rightly concluded from the decision making process of the two orders of the petitioner that it was the result of extraneous considerations and the same was not mere error of the judgment therefore both the charges were rightly proved.”
                       More pertinently, it is then observed in para 19 that, “The Apex Court in catena of judgments including the case of Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, reported in 1999 (5) SCC 762, para-11 and Mihir Kumar Hajara Chaudhary v Life Insurance Corporation, reported in 2017 (9) SCC 404, para 30, has held that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to the departmental enquiry and the Enquiry Officer upon analysis of document/material should give its conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of material available on record. The scope of judicial review in matters regarding disciplinary enquiry is very limited and findings arrived at in a disciplinary enquiry are interfered with only when there are no material for the said conclusion, which is not the case in hand and therefore, there is no justification for any interference in the matter.”
                                   Simply put, para 20 then goes on to add further stating that, “It is a settled position of law as laid down in the case of R. Ravi Chandran Ayer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharyaji & others, reported in 1995 (5) SC 457, paras 21 to 23 and Newal Singh v. State of U.P., reported in 2003 (8) SCC 117, para-2 that a judicial officer, against whom the charges of acting against judicial norms and propriety have been proved in a departmental enquiry. A judicial officer is not an ordinary Government Servant and must be above suspicion. The conduct of the judicial officer must be beyond doubt as a Judge must be a person of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, fairness and should be impervious to corrupt or venial influences.”
                             Interestingly enough, it is then noted in para 21 that, “Furthermore by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, ‘control’ over subordinate judiciary is vested in the High Court and the said control is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation and is to subserve a basic feature of the Constitution i.e. independence of Judiciary. The Scheme envisaged in the Constitution makes the High Court, the sole authority, which have administrative and disciplinary control and jurisdiction over the employees and officers of subordinate Courts.”
                              No wonder, it is then pointed out in this same para that, “The Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2011 (10) SCC 1 (paras 129 to 134 & para-218) has held that the High Court retains the subordinate Judiciary, which includes the power to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, place them under suspension during enquiries and to impose appropriate punishment on them, therefore, highest credence has to be given to the decision taken by the Full Court of the Hon’ble High Court in service matters of its officers and employees under Article 235 of the Constitution of India.”
                                  While pooh-poohing the grounds on which the petitioner relied while claiming parity, it was then observed by the High Court Bench in para 22 that, “So far as reliance placed by the petitioner on a judgment and order dated 31.05.2011 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Writ Petition No. 425 (S/B) of 2016 i.e. Sanjay Kumar Goel v. State of U.P. & others is concerned, with which parity of treatment was claimed by the petitioner it may be noticed that the petitioner has tried to draw parity with the petitioner of the aforesaid writ petition by suggesting that the said officer was similarly situated and the aforesaid case was also a case of dismissal passed against a judicial officer for deciding Land Acquisition Reference under similar circumstance and since he was acquitted in the said case, therefore, parity should be given to the petitioner as well, however, it is noteworthy that the mere fact that a judicial official punished with the order of dismissal was exonerated by this Hon’ble Court in a land acquisition matter by allowing his writ petition, cannot justify that the same treatment should be given to all judicial officers so punished. In that case, the land acquisition proceedings were initiated by Ghaziabad Development Authority whereas NOIDA was the acquiring body while in the case of the petitioner the Scheme was different, the authority was different and even the exemplars were different. The entire circumstances of the ‘decision making process’ of that case were absolutely different than the case in hand, therefore no parity can be drawn between the two and hence the reliance placed by the petitioner on the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Sanjay Kumar Goel (supra) was absolutely misconceived.”
                                 It would be imperative to mention here that it is then conceded in para 23 that, “Even from a perusal of the records of the enquiry produced by the High Court Registry it is quite evident that the reply to the show cause notice dated 26.09.2005, the detailed comments/reply of the petitioner dated 22/24.10.2005 submitted against the same have already been duly considered by the Administrative Committee and the Full Court and only thereafter the punishment order of dismissal was recommended on 17.12.2005 on the resolution dated 29.11.2005 of the Administrative Committee. The appointing authority, while considering the recommendation of the Full Court and applying its independent mind, has thereafter passed the impugned punishment order dated 17.01.2006. We do not find that there is any infirmity or illegality in the aforesaid punishment order.”
                                  Finally and most importantly, let us now discuss the concluding paras. Para 24 envisages that, “In view of what has been stated herein above, we are of the concerned opinion that no case is made out in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner has utterly failed in justifying her conduct in discharging her judicial functions and in deciding the two Land Acquisition References, in the most reckless and arbitrary manner, which were bereft of all judicial propriety and since it amounted to misconduct under the Conduct Rules, therefore, the finding of the Enquiry Officer in proving the aforesaid two charges cannot be negated.” Lastly, para 25 then concludes by holding that, “The instant writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.”
                                   All said and done, while the petitioner has certainly lost the legal battle in the High Court of Allahabad but she still has the option to further pursue her legal battle in the Supreme Court. The jury is still out on what the petitioner decides to do and what the outcome is finally! But certainly she has suffered a major setback but we must remember that it is not the final setback for her as all doors are still not closed on her! The Allahabad High Court certainly has sought to send out a loud and clear message that, “A judicial officer is not an ordinary government servant and must be above suspicion.” There can be no denying this! But it would be premature to treat this as final verdict! She can still be acquitted by the Apex Court if her lawyers can prove that she been treated harshly! Let’s wait and see what unfolds in the coming days on this because only time will tell what happens and whether the Allahabad High Court will stand vindicated or the petitioner!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh. 

SC Imposes Rs 5 Crore Penalty On A Medical College For Playing Fraud On It; Orders Prosecution Of Its Dean

It must be said with consummate ease that in a landmark, latest and laudable judgment titled Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University & Another v. Union of India & Others in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1001 of 2017 with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 731 of 2018 which was delivered on January 17, 2019 by a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court and authored by Justice L Nageswara Rao for himself, Justice Sharad A Bobde and Justice R Subhash Reddy, the Supreme Court has imposed a whooping penalty of Rs 5 crore on a medical college for playing fraud on it. It also ordered prosecution of its dean. While clearly barring the R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre from making admissions for the 1st year MBBS course for the next two years, the three-Judge Bench of Apex Court has also ordered prosecution of college dean SS Kushwaha under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The Apex Court also directed the college to pay compensation of Rs. 1 lakh to each student admitted in the college for the academic year, apart from the refund amount payable to them.
                    To start with, para 1 of this judgment first and foremost brings out that, “Permission was granted for the establishment of Petitioner No. 2-R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre (hereinafter referred to as “the College”) by Respondent No. 1 on the recommendation of Respondent No. 2-herein- Medical Council of India, with an intake capacity of 150 MBBS seats annually for the academic year 2014-15. An inspection was conducted on 23rd and 24th of February, 2015 for grant of renewal for admitting the 2nd Bath of 150 MBBS students for the academic year 2015-16. The Medical Council of India (MCI) recommended to the Central Government to reject the permission for admission of the 2nd Batch of 150 MBBS students for the academic year 2015-16 in view of the deficiencies found in the Assessment Report. A review/reassessment was done by the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 at the request of the Central Government. The Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 reconsidered the matter and recommended to the Central Government not to renew the permission for the 2nd Batch of MBBS students for the academic session 2015-16. There was a further recommendation that the College should be debarred from making admissions for the next two academic sessions. The Central Government accepted the recommendation made by Respondent No. 2 and rejected the request for renewal. Yet another review/reassessment was done by the Central Government pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in SLP (C) No. 19543 of 2015 vide order dated 8th September, 2015. A Committee was constituted to afford an opportunity of hearing to the College. The College was denied permission to admit the 2nd Batch of the MBBS students for the year 2015-16 by an order of Respondent No. 1 dated 28th September, 2015. The High Court of Delhi quashed the said order dated 28th September, 2015 and directed the Central Government to examine the matter afresh vide its order dated 29th December, 2015 in Writ Petition (C) No. 9663 of 2015. The Central Government reiterated its decision by an order dated 1st January, 2016 to not grant permission to the College to admit the 2nd Batch of MBBS students. One more inspection was ordered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 11th May, 2016 in Writ Petition (C) No. 21223 of 2015. Respondent No. 2 filed SLP (C) No. 14729 of 2016 challenging the order dated 11th May, 2016 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.  On 15th July, 2016, this Court directed that a fresh inspection should be conducted. The order dated 15th July, 2016 was modified by this Court on 9th September, 2016 by which the Oversight Committee was requested to consider the matter pertaining to the admission of students in the College for the year 2016-17.”
                                To be sure, it is then added in para 2 that, “By an order dated 27th September, 2016, the Oversight Committee accorded approval to the College for admission of students for the year 2016-17. The Oversight Committee directed the College to rectify the deficiencies and submit a compliance report to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare by 27th September, 2016. The College was informed that a bank guarantee of Rs. Two Crores in favour of Respondent No. 2 has to be furnished by 27th September, 2016. It was stated that non-compliance of the conditions imposed by the Oversight Committee would result in the College getting debarred from fresh intake for two years commencing 2017-18. The 2nd Batch of 150 students for the academic year 2016-17 were admitted pursuant to the conditional permission for renewal granted by the Central Government.”
                               Truth be told, it is then brought out in para 3 that, “A joint verification inspection was conducted on 5th and 6th January, 2017 for renewal of permission to the 3rd Batch of MBBS students for the academic year 2017-18. Finding gross deficiencies in the infrastructure, clinical material, teaching faculty and other physical facilities in the College, the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 concluded that the undertaking given by the College on 28th September, 2016 was breached. The Committee decided to recommend to the Central Government to debar the College from admitting students for the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The Central Government accepted the recommendations made by Respondent No. 2 and by an order dated 31st May, 2017 debarred the College from making admissions for the years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed Writ Petition  (C) No. 8100 of 2017 filed by the College questioning the legality of order of the Central Government dated 31st May, 2017. The College was permitted to provisionally admit 150 students. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 21st July, 2017 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 2 filed SLP (C) No. 20400 of 2017 before this Court. The re-inspection as directed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was confirmed by this Court by an order dated 14th August, 2017. It was made clear in the said order that the admission of students shall be completely provisional, being dependent on the result of the inspection. It was further mentioned that the admission of students shall be liable to be cancelled if the College fails in the inspection and the students will not be entitled to claim any equity. The students were directed to be informed by the Counselling committee about the said condition. An inspection was scheduled to be conducted on 14th & 15th September, 2017 for renewal of the 4th Batch of students in College for the MBBS course. According to Respondent No. 2, the said inspection had to be aborted midway as the assessors were manhandled and physically forced to leave the College. At the request made by the College, another inspection was conducted on the 25th & 26th September, 2017. The Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 considered the Assessment Report at its meeting held on 26th September, 2017 and decided that admissions of the 4th Batch of 150 MBBS students for the year 2017-18 should be cancelled in view of the following deficiencies found in the inspection conducted on 25th & 26th September, 2017:
I.                 Bed Occupancy at 10 a.m. on day of assessment was 01.07% (i.e. 7 out of 410).
II.              There were no Major Surgical operation on day of assessment.
III.          There was NIL Normal Delivery or LSCS on day of assessment.
IV.          Data of Clinical material like Casualty attendance, Discharges, Major & Minor Operations, Radiological Investigations as provided by the Institute are inflated.
V.             ICUs: There was NIL patient in NICU/PICU & only 1 patient each in ICCU, MICU, SICU on day of assessment.
VI.          Blood Bank: NIL Unit was dispensed on day of assessment.
VII.      Deficiency of faculty is 15.65% as detailed in the report.
VIII.   Shortage of residents is 40% as detailed in the report.
IX.          Diet order was not recorded in the register on day of assessment.
X.              MRD is partly manual.
XI.          Facilities in Central Research Laboratory are not adequate. There are NIL ongoing or completed research projects.
XII.       RHTC: Cold Chain equipment are not available. Survey / MCH / Immunization / Family Welfare registers are not available. No activities under National Health Programmes are carried out.
XIII.   UHCC: Cold Chain equipment are not available. Survey / MCH / Immunization / Family Welfare Registers are not available.”
                                    Bluntly put: How can all this be dismissed lightly? How can all this be overlooked? How can all this be justified on any ground? How can all this justify mild action? How can all this not justify most strict action?
                        No wonder that the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 rightly decided to act tough as pointed out in para 4 which states that, “The Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 further decided that Regulation 8(3)(1)(b) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999 (“the MCI Regulations) should be invoked in view of the deficiencies found in the bed occupancy and residents. The said decision of Respondent No. 2 was approved by the Oversight Committee.”
                       Be it noted, it is also clarified in para 4 as to what Regulation 8(3)(1)(b) entails. It is as follows:-
“Regulation 8(3)(1)- The permission to establish a medical college and admit students may be granted initially for a period of one year and may be renewed on yearly basis subject to verification of the achievements of annual targets. It shall be the responsibility of the person to apply to the Medical Counil of India for purpose of renewal [as per latest time schedule] prior to the expiry of the initial permission. This process of renewal of permission will continue till such time the establishment of the medical college and expansion of the hospital facilities are completed and a formal recognition of the medical college is granted. Further admissions shall not be made at any stage unless the requirements of the Council are fulfilled. The Central Government may at any stage convey the deficiencies to the applicant and provide him an opportunity and time to rectify the deficiencies.
   (b) Colleges in the stage of III & IV renewal (i.e. Admission of fourth & fifth batch): [If it is observed during any inspection of the Institute that the deficiency of teaching faculty and/or Residents is more than 20% and/or bed occupancy is < 65%, compliance of rectification of deficiencies from such an institute will not be considered for renewal of permission in that Academic year.]”
                                    Needless to say, it is then divulged in para 5 that, “Respondent No. 2 directed the College to discharge all the students admitted for the academic year 2017-18 by its letter dated 29th September, 2017. The Principal Secretary (Medical Division Department), Government of Madhya Pradesh- Respondent No.3-herein was requested to cancel the admission of students made in the College for the academic year 2017-18.”
                   While elaborating in detail, it is then pointed out in para 6 that, “The communications dated 29th September, 2017 to the College and the Respondent No. 3 are subject matter of challenge in this Writ Petition. The College sought a further direction that a fresh inspection should be conducted strictly in accordance with the Assessor’s Guide. While issuing notice on 23rd October, 2017, this Court stayed the operation of the communication dated 29th September, 2017. On 24th October, 2017 it was clarified that the students admitted as per the order dated 14th August, 2017 in SLP (Civil) No. 20400 of 2017 shall be permitted to continue with their studies. Thereafter, on a consideration of the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection dated 25th & 26th September, 2017 and the submissions made on behalf of both sides, this Court by an order dated 14th December, 2017 directed the admission of the students to be cancelled. This Court took note of the order dated 14th August, 2017 which made the admission of students subject to the result of the inspection. As the students were found not to be complicit and not having any role to play in non-compliance of the requisite standards by the College, this Court considered it expedient to direct the students to be accommodated in other colleges. By referring to the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection done on 25th & 26th September, 2017, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted that the College was indulging in fraud by showing persons who were not sick as patients only for the purpose of showing compliance of the minimum requirements. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the College refuted the said contention and argued that all the patients were genuine. As this Court was in no position to determine the truth or otherwise of the allegations, an enquiry was directed to be conducted into the correctness of the statistics, reports and material placed before this Court by the College along with the Writ Petition. For the said purpose, a committee was constituted by this Court. A senior officer deputed by the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), was directed to head the Committee which would have two doctors of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) as its members. It is relevant to note that in the said order dated 14th December, 2017 it was made clear that the College may have to face prosecution under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) if the allegations made by Respondent No. 2 were found to be correct. The decision to constitute a committee by this Court was arrived at after a thorough examination of the voluminous material placed on record by the College. The material was constituted of several photographs showing patients occupying the beds and their case sheets. A bare perusal of the photographs did not convince us that the patients were genuine. After a close scrutiny of the case sheets, we had serious doubts about the necessity for admission of persons suffering from minor ailments as in-patients.”
                                 By the way, it is then pointed out in para 7 that, “The students who were admitted in the College for the year 2017-18 were directed to be adjusted in the other private medical colleges in the State of Madhya Pradesh for the academic year 2018-19 by an order passed by this Court on 3rd July, 2018. The students were directed to pay the fees to the colleges to which they are admitted. It was mentioned in the said order dated 3rd July, 2018 that the entitlement of the students for refund of the fee paid for admission to the College shall be adjudicated at the final hearing of the Writ Petition.”
                                 As it turned out, para 8 then specifies that, “The Committee appointed by this Court on 14th December, 2017 submitted its Report on 12th July, 2018. It was mentioned in the Report inter alia, that the Committee visited the College on 29th January, 2018 around 11.30 a.m. and found that the patient waiting area for OPD Registration was totally empty. After visiting several wards in the hospital, the Committee found that the attendance of patients was abysmally low and the patients shown to be admitted in OPDs/wards were not in conformity with the actual number of patients. It was further stated in the Report that a scrutiny of the medical case files of the in-patients showed that their admission was not necessary. The case duty rosters for duty doctors as well as nurses were not available in the wards and the junior doctors on duty were not able to identify and confirm who had written the case notes/progress notes on the case files.”
                           More importantly, para 9 while dwelling on the conclusions of the Committee observes unambiguously that, “The Committee collected the medical sheets of 435 patients who were shown to have been admitted in the hospital on the date of the inspection conducted on 25th & 26th September, 2017. The hard disk that was obtained from the hospital for verification of the details of patients who were admitted prior to 7th January, 2018 was examined by the CBI. It was found that the hard disk was empty and did not contain any data. The conclusion of the Committee after a detailed enquiry revealed the following:  
“i. The petitioner college has claimed that 6 doctors namely, Dr. Ritesh Kumawat, Dr. MR Gaikwad, Dr. SB Petkar, Dr. Deepak Kaladagi, Dr. Jeetendra Gupta and Dr. Ram Ballabh Thakur couldn’t attend the MCI inspection on 25.09.2017 as they were summoned by Court/Police in connection with a motor accident case. However, such claim were found to be incorrect.
ii. All of the six doctors namely, Dr. Ritesh Kumawat, Dr. MR Gaikwad, Dr. SB Petkar, Dr. Deepak Kaladagi, Dr. Jeetendra Gupta, Dr. Ram Ballabh Thakur, when examined, denied having received any notice from police regarding the motor accident.
iii. Out of the 10 doctors (Sr. Residents/ Jr. Residents) who were not counted by the assessors on the strength of the petitioner college as faculty on the ground that they were not residing in the college hostel, 9 doctors could be contacted. Examination of those 9 doctors revealed:
·      07 doctors confirmed during enquiry that they were not staying in the hostel in the college campus and they themselves had conveyed the MCI assessors in this regard. It is mandatory to stay in hostel as per Assessor’s Guide issued by MCI for academic year 2018-19.
·      The other two resident doctors, i.e. Dr. Meenal Parmar and Dr. Arpita Mishra, stated that they were staying in the hostel but were not considered on the strength of the college by the MCI assessors.
iv. Out of the 8 resident doctors whih petitioner college had claimed to be on night duty and so couldn’t appear before MCI assessors by 11 AM, enquiry revealed that:
·      Out of the above mentioned 8 resident doctors, 6 resident doctors stated that they were not on payroll of the petitioner college on the day of inspection i.e. 25.09.2017. Even 4 of those doctors had stated that they never joined the hospital.
·      1 doctor (Dr. Ritesh Kumawat) stated that he was not present on the day of the inspection, i.e. 25.09.2017.
·      And another doctor Dr. Devyani Patel was present on 25.09.2017 but she was rightly excluded by the MCI assessors as she couldn’t make her presence by 12 noon (which was mandated as per Assessor’s Guide).
v. The 3 doctors namely Dr. Priyank Jain, Dr. Manoj Sahu and Dr. Amit Jain, who were not treated as Sr. Resident doctors by the MCI assessors doesn’t seem to be justifiable considering the fact that all three of them were treated as Sr. Resident Doctors on earlier inspection on 05.01.2017.
vi. Two tutors who have been shown as present in the assessment by the college had not attended the assessment proceedings on 25.09.2017.  
vii. Due to vague and incomplete type of the addresses mentioned in the record of the petitioner college, most of the patients could not be located as merely the names of the colonies and sub areas have been found to be mentioned on the patient case sheets. In the identified 21 patients, 8 are the employees/students of various RKDF institutions.
viii. On the basis of the medical analysis of the case sheets of the patients most doctors from AIIMS are of the similar view that it is doubtful that all these patients were actually admitted and that too for such a long duration.
ix. Most of the doctors are also of the opinion that the range of cases shown to be admitted was grossly inadequate for training of students.
x. The doctors were also of the opinion that in most of the case sheets prescriptions, operative notes, etc. appears to have been written by the same person in a very unprofessional manner. Also histopathological reports are very sketchy and incomplete.
xi. Dr. S.C. Sharma, Professor and HoD, ENT Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. As per his opinion most of the patients appear to be fictitious.
xii. Dr. H.L. Nag, Professor, Orthopedics, AIIMS has examined 52 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Orthopedics Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. He held that majority of those cases could have been managed without hospital admissions.
xiii. Dr. Naval Kishore Vikram, Professor General Medicine AIIMS has examined 97 medical patients of General Medicine and 12 patients of TB & Chest Department who were shown to be on bed on 25/26.09.2017. He has concluded that it appears doubtful that those patients were actually admitted in the hospital. Most of the patients appear to be over treated by various medications, particularly antibiotics. He also held that most of the cases had limited number of diagnosis which is grossly inadequate for training of medical students.
xiv. Dr. Pankaj Hari, Professor Paediatrics Department, AIIMS has examined 62 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Paediatrics Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. He concluded that the admitted cases have limited diagnosis which is quite inadequate for training of students in a medical college. He also raised doubt over the authenticity of those medical files.
xv. Dr. Vinod K. Khetan, Professor, Department of Dermatology and Venerelogy, AIIMS, examined 10 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Dermatology department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. He raised serious doubts over the authenticity of patient being actually admitted. He also opined that the range of cases admitted and their work up is grossly inadequate for the training of students.
xvi. Dr. Namrata Sharma, Professor, Deptt. Of Opthalmic Sciences, AIIMS has concluded that in out of total 17 cases, admission of the 02 patients was required whereas in all other cases patient could have been managed under day care OPD.
xvii. Dr. Mamta Sood, Professor, Deptt. Of Psychiatry, AIIMS examined 08 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Psychiatry Department of petitioner’s college on 25th/26.09.2017. Though she mostly agreed that the treatment shown to be given to the patients was appropriate, but she opined that they didn’t require to be admitted.
xviii. Dr. Ongikla Bhutia, Professor, Division of Oral Maxillofacil Surgery, AIIMS examined 11 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. The doctor opined that the diagnosis appeared repetitive. Neither pre-operative radiography nor post operative radiography were found on record. Consent for the surgery was also found to be absent in some cases.
xix. Dr. Deepika Deka, Professor, Deptt. Of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, AIIMS had examined 56 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Obstetrics and Gynaecology Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. She raised doubt whether actual surgery was performed or not. She also raised doubt over the genuineness shown for those patients.
xx. Dr. Subodh Kumar, Professor, Deptt. Of Surgical Disciplines, AIIMS examined 96 medical sheets of the patients on bed on 25/26.09.2017. He raised serious doubt over the genuineness of patients actually admitted. He also held that spectrum of cases shown to be admitted was grossly inadequate for training of students”.”
                         To put things in perspective, para 10 then enumerates that, “When the matter was listed on 5th December, 2018, Shri Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the College, submitted that the College intends to submit an apology for the lapses on their part. He requested us to give a quietus to this matter. He submitted that there are students presently studying in the institution who would be affected by any adverse order passed against the College.” In other words, Vivek Tankha who was the learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the College left no stone unturned to convince the Court that a quietus should be given to this matter as the College intended to tender an apology and the students studying there would be adversely affected! But the Bench was not quite convinced by it.
                           It would be imperative to mention here that para 11 while rebutting all untenable defences of College also took it to task for misleading it while also appreciating the line of action taken by MCI and observed that, “It has been brought to our notice by the Respondent No. 2- MCI that during the inspection conducted on 23rd & 24th February, 2015 for the purpose of granting admission for the academic year 2014-15, it was found that there were patients who were fake and others who had been admitted without any significant illness. The MCI was constrained to invoke Regulation 8(3)(1)(a) and Regulation 8(3)(1)(d) of the MCI Regulation in view of the College submitting forged/fake documents for the purpose of showing compliance with the minimum requirements. A complaint was made by Dr. A.K. Banerjee, Ex-Associate Professor of Surgery of the College on 25th March, 2015 alleging that more than 50% of the doctors who were shown as full-time Faculty Members were full-time private practitioners. Dr. Paresh Ruparel who was shown as a Professor of Surgery in the College was working as a surgeon at V.S. Hospital affiliated to MHL Medical College, Ahmedabad and was also running a private hospital. Dr Ruparel was referred to Ethics Committee and he was suitably dealt with for misdemeanor.”
                                Continuing in the same vein, it is then further added by the Apex Court Bench in the same para 11 that, “Without delving deep into the details of the Report submitted by the Committee, it is clear that the College is guilty of practicing fraud on this Court. The conduct of the College administration in indulging in manipulations and hoodwinking the authorities to project compliance of the requisite minimum standards for admission of students does not deserve to be condoned. The impunity with which the College has manufactured records to convince us that they were being unnecessarily hounded by the MCI in spite of their compliance with the required standards is deprecated. The brazen attempt by the College in taking this Court for a ride by placing on record maneuvered documents to obtain a favourable order is a clear-cut act of deceit. The justification given by the College regarding the absence of certain residents has turned out to be a concocted story. Had we not initiated an enquiry by the Committee of Experts, the fraud played by the College on this Court would not have come to light. It is trite that every litigant has to approach the Court with clean hands. A litigant who indulges in suppression of facts and misrepresentation is not entitled for any relief. The conduct of the College in this case to mislead this Court for the purpose of getting a favourable order is reprehensible and the College deserves to be dealt with suitably.”    
                           Of course, it is then elaborated in para 13 that, “In the affidavit filed along with the Writ Petition, Mr. S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre stated that the contents in the Writ Petition are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. According to the College, the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection conducted on 25th and 26th September, 2017 was unfair as the justification for the absence of six members of the faculty was not accepted. The averment in the Writ Petition is to the effect that the said six doctors who had received summons from the Sub-inspector of Police, Bairagarh were at the police station at 11 a.m. on 25th September, 2017 in connection with the complaint relating to a motor accident case. The Committee enquired into the correctness of the claim made by the College regarding the absence of the six faculty members. Mr. Mohan Sharma, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police of Bairagarh Police Station stated that there was no such notice issued for summoning the six doctors to the police station. On further enquiry, the six doctors namely Dr. Ritesh Kumawat, Dr. MR Gaikwad, SB Petkar, Dr. Deepak Kaladagi, Dr. Jeetendra Gupta and Dr. Ram Ballabh Thakur denied having received any notice from the police station. Dr. Ritesh Kumawat further denied having filed any complaint regarding the motor accident. On the basis of the above findings of the Committee, it is clear that a false statement has been made by the College on the basis of a fabricated document. It was averred in the Writ Petition by the College that there were 365 patients in the hospital at the time of inspection on 25th September, 2017 but the inspection team recorded that they were only seven patients available. In support of their submission, reliance was placed on the computerized data of the Medical Records Department. The hard disk that was collected by the Committee to study the details of the patients who were admitted in the hospital prior to January, 2018 turned out to be empty and no data could be retrieved. The assertion made by the College regarding the genuineness of the patients in the hospital turned out to be false in the enquiry conducted by the Committee. The Committee had serious doubts whether the patients were actually admitted. Most of the case sheets, prescriptions, operative notes, etc. appeared to be written by the same person in a very unprofessional manner. The histopathological reports were found to be sketchy and incomplete. On a thorough examination of the case sheets, the experts from AIIMS opined that admission of the patients was unnecessary in a number of cases. In view of the fake and incomplete addresses mentioned in the records of the hospital, most of the patients could not be located. Only 21 patients were identified and 8 out of these turned out to be employees/students of the College. All this goes to show that the College has indulged in large scale malpractices in showing compliance of the minimum required standards to obtain permission for admission of students. The College further tried to mislead this Court that it is compliant in all respects, to get permission for the admission of students.”
                             While sparing no punches in lambasting the College for misleading the Court, it is then clearly and categorically held in para 14 that, “The brazen manner in which the College has indulged in relying upon manipulated records to mislead this Court for the purpose of getting favourable order deserves to be dealt with in a serious manner. We find that this is a fit case where Mr. S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the College must be held liable for prosecution under Section 193 IPC.”
                 It is then rightly reiterated in para 15 that, “There have been instances of errant medical colleges making admissions to the medical courses without obtaining the requisite permission. This Court came down heavily on such deviant colleges by imposing penalties for the illegalities committed by them in the matter of admission and for putting the students’ future in jeopardy. [(2015) 4 SCC 580 45.6 – Medical Council of India v. M.G.R. Educational & Research Institute University and (2016) 11 SCC 530 31, 31.2 & 31.4 – Medical Council of India v. Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS)] We have noticed a disturbing trend of some medical colleges in projecting fake faculty and patients for obtaining permission for admission of students. The Committee exposes the evil design of the College in resorting to deceitful methods to cheat the authorities concerned and this Court to secure permission for admission of students. Apart from the prosecution of the Dean, the College is liable to be suitably punished for committing perjury.”  
                                 It would be instructive to note that while not being convinced of the apology tendered by the College through its learned senior lawyer Vivek Tankha, the Apex Court Bench then noted in para 16 that, “We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the apology offered on behalf of the College. The College has been habitually indulging in foul play which is clear from the course of events in 2015 when faculty members were found to have been working elsewhere and running hospitals. The bravado shown by the College in an attempt to cheat the MCI, the Government and this Court has to be condemned. The Committee constituted by this Court is due to the vehemence with which the Counsels appearing for the College were trying to convince us that they are fully compliant with all the requirements. ‘Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology is shown of pentinence and hence it is liable to be rejected. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the Court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward’. [TN Godavarman Thirumalpad (102) v. Ashok Khot and Anr. (2006) 5 SCC 1 at Para 31]”
                                     It is then clarified in para 17 that, “The students who were admitted in the 1st Year MBBS Course in the College for the academic year 2017-18 were duly cautioned and informed that their admission was purely provisional and they cannot claim any equity if the College was later on found to be deficient. They have been directed to be admitted in other colleges for the years 2018-19. In the process, students have lost a precious academic year. However, they are entitled for the refund of the fee collected from them for admission to the College.”
                            Finally and most importantly, it is then concluded in para 18 that, “For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following order:
(i)             Mr. S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre i.e. Petitioner No. 2- herein is liable for prosecution under Section 193 IP. The Secretary General of this Court is directed to depute an Officer to initiate the prosecution in a competent Court having jurisdiction at Delhi.
(ii)          The College is barred from making admissions for the 1st Year MBBS course for the next two years i.e. 2018-19 and 2019-2020.
(iii)       A penalty of Rs. Five crores is imposed on the College for playing fraud on this Court. The amount may be paid to the account of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
(iv)       The students are entitled to receive the refund of fee paid by them for admission to the College for the academic year 2017-19. In addition, the College is directed to pay a compensation of Rs. One Lakh to the said students.”
Lastly, in para 19, it is held that, “The Writ Petition is dismissed accordingly.
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 731 OF 2018:     
    The Writ Petition is hereby dismissed in terms of the above judgment.”
                               In the ultimate analysis, it has to be said in all fairness that this latest, landmark and laudable judgment has sought to send a very loud and clear message to all Colleges that if they dare to break all rules and regulations and hope to get away easily by just tendering an apology, then they are themselves responsible for inviting trouble and are heading themselves into trouble for which no one but they themselves will be solely liable and held accountable and punished! They will be left with just no option but to shell out a huge penalty as we see in this high profile case where the concerned College is ordered to not just pay Rs 5 crore penalty but also to refund the fees paid by the students to the College for the academic year 2017-19 and in addition pay a compensation of Rs one lakh to the said students. All arguments and apologies tendered by the College through its learned Counsel Vivek Tankha just simply failed to cut ice with the three-Judge Bench of Apex Court who delivered this most latest and laudable judgment which has made headlines in all newspapers and all news channels! No doubt, all Colleges must always from now onwards bear this in mind and shed the false myth that they could easily take the system for granted and get away by just tendering an apology! The earlier this is done, the better it shall be for them to ensure that they too don’t end up with egg on their face as we see here!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Top 30 COMMERCE COLLEGES of India 2019 EduINDEX Ranking

INDIA’S BEST COMMERCE COLLEGES 2019
1. Shri Ram College of Commerce
2. Hindu College
3. Lady Shri Ram College for Women
4. Hansraj College
5. Department of Commerce, Christ (Deemed to be University)
6. Loyola College
7. Kirori Mal College
8. Madras Christian College
9. St. Joseph’s College of Commerce
10. Mithibai College of Arts
11. Atma Ram Sanatan Dharma College
12. KJ Somaiya College of Arts and Commerce
13. Daulat Ram College
14. Stella Maris College
15. Gargi College
16. Kristu Jayanti College
17. Deen Dayal Upadhyaya College
18. Goswami Ganesh Dutta Sanatan Dharma (GGDSD) College, Sector 32
19. Goenka College of Commerce and Business Administration
20. Sri Guru Gobind Singh College of Commerce
21. Presidency College
22. Mount Carmel College
23. Shivaji College
24. Maharaja Agrasen College (MAC)
25. Women’s Christian College
26. Sacred Heart College
27. Kishinchand Chellaram (KC) College of Arts, Science and Commerce
28. Symbiosis College Of Arts and Commerce
29. JD Birla Institute
30. Seshadripuram College

Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University

Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University

Offences Under Section 307 IPC Can’t Be Quashed On The Basis Of Settlement Between Parties: SC

To begin with, it has to be appreciated, applauded and admired that after a long spell of time we finally see that the Supreme Court which is the top court of India has finally in the latest landmark case titled State

of Madhya Pradesh v Kalyan Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 2019 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5632 of 2014] which was pronounced on January 4, 2019 has finally set all doubts to rest on the nagging question of whether offences under Section 307 of IPC can be quashed on the basis of settlement between parties. In this landmark judgment by a two Judge Bench of Apex Court and which was authored by Justice MR Shah for himself and Justice DY Chandrachud, it has been clearly and convincingly held that under Section 307 of the IPC (Attempt to Murder) cannot be quashed, even when there is any settlement between the complainant and the accused, as it is a non-compoundable offence. Also, in this landmark judgment, the Apex Court Bench comprising of Justice Chandrachud and Justice Shah were considering appeal filed by the state against the High Court order quashing criminal proceedings pending against the present accused under Sections 307, 294 read Section 34 of the IPC.

                           Without mincing any words, the Supreme Court took to task the Madhya Pradesh High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused on the ground of compromise between the parties. The Apex Court Bench very categorically and clearly held that, “We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that the original complainant and the accused have settled the dispute.” Very rightly so!
                                Starting from the scratch, in para 1 of this landmark and laudable judgment, it is observed that, “Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 29.7.2018 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 6075 of 2013, by which the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the present Respondent herein by Crime No. 23 of 2013 for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and Sections 34 of the IPC registered at the Police Station Maharajpur, District Gwalior, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.”
                              Going into the nitty-gritty of the present case, it is then pointed out in para 2 that, “That the respondent No. 5 herein-the original Complainant one Birbal Sharma filed a complaint against Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein-the original Accused for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC. That the said complaint was registered as Crime No. 23 of 2013 at the Police Station Maharajpur, District Gwalior. It appears that the original Accused filed an application for bail which came to be rejected by the learned Sessions Court and, thereafter, the original Accused approached the High Court by filing the Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 6075 of 2013 under Section 482 of the Cr.PC and requested to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground that the accused and the original Complainant have settled the dispute amicably. That the original Complainant submitted his affidavit stating that he has amicably settled the subject-matter of the crime with the original Accused and that he has no objection for dropping the criminal proceedings. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC has quashed the criminal proceedings against the original Accused which were for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that the original Complainant and Accused have settled the dispute and the original Complainant does not want to prosecute the accused and therefore, there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the said application was opposed by the State observing that the offences alleged against the accused are non-compoundable offences and therefore, even if there is any settlement between the Complainant and the Accused, the complainant cannot be quashed. However, despite the above, the High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the original Accused on the ground that there is a settlement between the Complainant and the original Accused and the original Complainant does not want to prosecute the accused further.”
                                 Be it noted, it is then observed in para 2.1 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.”
                                Going ahead, it is then observed in para 3 that, “We have heard Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh, Ms. Malini Poduval, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original Accused and perused the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.”
                  More importantly, para 3.1 then clarifies that, “It is required to be noted that the original Accused was facing the criminal proceedings under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It is not in dispute that as per Section 20 of the Cr.PC offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC are non-compoundable. It is also required to be noted that the allegations in the complaint for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC are, as such, very serious. It is alleged that the accused fired twice on the complainant by a country-made pistol. From the material on record, it appears that one of the accused persons was reported to be a hard core criminal having criminal antecedents. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the accused was facing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC and that the offences under these sections are not non-compoundable offences and looking to the serious allegations against the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that the original Complainant and the accused have settled the dispute. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Gulab Das and Ors. V. State of M.P. (2011) 12 SCALE 625 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, this Court has specifically observed and held that, despite any settlement between the Complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other, the criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be quashed, as the offence under Section 307 is a non-compoundable offence. Under the circumstance, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the original Accused for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.”
                           Finally, it is then held in para 4 that, “In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 6075 of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the criminal proceedings being Crime No. 23 of 2013 under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the IPC registered at Police Station Maharajpur, District Gwalior be proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own merits.”
                               All said and done, it is a commendable judgment which makes it absolutely clear that offences under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of settlement between the parties. Attempt to murder as entailed in Section 307 of the IPC is a very serious offence and so there can be no question of any compromise on it under any circumstances! This is exactly what the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down also so succinctly in this landmark case. Any dilution in this under any circumstances is completely unacceptable. This must always be ensured by all the courts from top to bottom always as has very rightly been held also in this landmark and laudable case!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Supreme Court’s Recent Observations On Criminals And Death Penalty

It has to be stated right at the outset that in a landmark judgment titled Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v State of Maharashtra in Review Petition (Criminal) Nos. 306-307 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 145-146 of 2011 delivered on December 12, 2018 which is certainly going to be a trendsetter in the time to come, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice Madan B Lokur while authoring this landmark judgment for himself, Justice S Abdul Nazeer and Justice Deepak Gupta clearly and convincingly held that criminals are also entitled to life of dignity and probability of reformation/rehabilitation to be seriously and earnestly considered before awarding death sentence. We thus see that pertinent issues are discussed on ‘sentencing’ which shall be discussed indepth now in the coming paragraphs. It will help us better understand and appreciate the intricacies of law!
                                    To be sure, this landmark and laudable judgment begins at the outset by first and foremost stating explicitly in para 1 that, “ ‘Sentenced to death’ – these few words would have a chilling effect on anyone, including a hardened criminal. Our society demands such a sentence on grounds of its deterrent effect, although there is no conclusive study on its deterrent impact. Our society also demands death sentence as retribution for a ghastly crime having been committed, although again there is no conclusive study whether retribution by itself satisfies society. On the other hand, there are views that suggest that punishment for a crime must be looked at with a more humanitarian lens and the causes for driving a person to commit a heinous crime must be explored. There is also a view that it must be determined whether it is possible to reform, rehabilitate and socially reintegrate into society even a hardened criminal along with those representing the victims of the crime.” Absolutely right! What wrong has the top court said? Nothing wrong!
                                      While buttressing its stand as spelt out in para 1 and going ahead, it is then observed in para 2 that, “These conflicting views make it very difficult for courts to take a decision and without expert evidence on the subject, courts are ill-equipped to form an objective opinion. But, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 has thrown its weight behind a humanitarian approach and mandated consideration of the probability of reform or rehabilitation of the criminal and required the prosecution to prove that it was not possible for the convict to be reformed or rehabilitated. However, the Constitution Bench left open a corridor of uncertainty thereby permitting, in the rarest of rare cases, the pronouncement of a sentence of death. It is this paradigm that confronts us in these petitions.”  
                            Background
                                  Going forward, para 3 then elucidates the background of this landmark case. It says that, “The appellant is convicted for the rape and murder of a girl aged 3 years. The offence was committed in the intervening night of 2nd and 3rd March, 2007. On the basis of circumstantial evidence led by the prosecution, the appellant was found guilty of and convicted for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f), 377 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by the Sessions Judge, Amravati in Sessions Trial No. 183 of 2007 by a judgment dated 6th September, 2008.”
                                      Needless to say, it is then primarily pointed out in para 4 that, “With regard to the sentence to be awarded, the Trial Judge heard the prosecution and the appellant on 6th September, 2008 and again on 6th September, 2008 and again on 8th September, 2008 on which date he passed a preliminary order. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge passed an order on 10th September, 2008 awarding the sentence of death to the appellant.” Para 6 then brings out that, “On an overall view of the circumstances of the case, the Sessions Judge concluded that any alternative option of punishment is unquestionably foreclosed and therefore the only sentence that could be awarded to the appellant is of capital punishment.”
                                   Be it noted, para 7 then further goes on to mention that, “The appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Bombay High Court being Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 2008. This was heard along with Criminal Confirmation Case No. 3 of 2008. Both these were taken up for consideration and the conviction was upheld and capital punishment awarded to the appellant was confirmed by the High Court by a judgment and order dated 26th March, 2009.”
                                        It cannot be lost on us that it is then very rightly pointed out in para 29 that, “The result of the above discussion is that ordinarily, it would not be advisable to award capital punishment in a case of circumstantial evidence. But there is no hard and fast rule that death sentence should not be awarded in a case of circumstantial evidence. The precautions that must be taken by all the courts in cases of circumstantial evidence is this: if the court has some doubt, on the circumstantial evidence on record, that the accused might not have committed the offence, then a case for acquittal would be made out; if the court has no doubt, on the circumstantial evidence, that the accused is guilty, then of course a conviction must follow. If the court is inclined to award the death penalty then there must be some exceptional circumstances warranting the imposition of the extreme penalty. Even in such cases, the court must follow the dictum laid down in Bachan Singh that it is not only the crime, but also the criminal that must be kept in mind and any alternative option of punishment is unquestionably foreclosed. The reason for the second precaution is that the death sentence upon execution, is irrevocable and irretrievable.”
                                     No doubt, it is also then elegantly pointed out in para 30 that, “Insofar as the present case is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant did not lay much stress on commuting the death sentence to one of life imprisonment only on the basis of the circumstantial evidence on record. Therefore, we need not examine the nature of the crime and other factors or detain ourselves in this regard. We have referred to the various decisions cited by learned counsel only for completeness of the record and to reaffirm the view that ordinarily death sentence should not be awarded in a conviction based on circumstantial evidence.”  
Reform, rehabilitation and re-integration into society
                        Simply put, it is then underscored in para 31 that, “The discussion on the reform or rehabilitation of a convict begins with the acknowledgement in Bachan Singh that the probability that a convict can be reformed and rehabilitated is a valid consideration for deciding whether he should be awarded capital punishment or life imprisonment. This Court has also accepted the view that it is for the State to prove by evidence that the convict is not capable of being reformed and rehabilitated and should, therefore, be awarded the death sentence.” It is then acknowledged in para 32 that, “This view has been accepted universally in all the decisions that were cited before us by learned counsel for the appellant.”
                                       Truth be told, para 45 then makes it abundantly clear that, “The law laid down by various decisions of this Court clearly and unequivocally mandates that the probability (not possibility or improbability or impossibility) that a convict can be reformed and rehabilitated in society must be seriously and earnestly considered by the courts before awarding the death sentence. This is one of the mandates of the “special reasons” requirement of Section 354(3) of the Cr.P.C. and ought not to be taken lightly since it involves snuffing out the life of a person. To effectuate this mandate, it is the obligation on the prosecution to prove to the court, through evidence, that the probability is that the convict cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. This can be achieved by bringing on record, inter alia, material about his conduct in jail, his conduct outside jail if he has been on bail for some time, medical evidence about his mental make-up, contact with his family and so on. Similarly, the convict can produce evidence on these issues as well.”
                                   Having said this, it is then very rightly brought out in para 47 that, “Consideration of the reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of the convict into society cannot be over-emphasised. Until Bachan Singh, the emphasis given by the courts was primarily on the nature of the crime, its brutality and severity. Bachan Singh placed the sentencing process into perspective and introduced the necessity of considering the reformation or rehabilitation of the convict. Despite the view expressed by the Constitution Bench, there have been several instances, some of which have been pointed out in Bariyar and in Sangeet v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452 where there is a tendency to give primacy to the crime and consider the criminal in a somewhat secondary manner. As observed in Sangeet “In the sentencing process, both the crime and the criminal are equally important.” Therefore, we should not forget that the criminal, however ruthless he might be, is nevertheless a human being and is entitled to a life of dignity notwithstanding his crime. Therefore, it is for the prosecution and the courts to determine whether such a person, notwithstanding his crime, can be reformed and rehabilitated. To obtain and analyse this information is certainly not an easy task but must nevertheless be undertaken. The process of rehabilitation is also not a simple one since it involves social re-integration of the convict into society. Of course, notwithstanding any information made available and its analysis by experts coupled with the evidence on record, there could be instances where the social re-integration of the convict may not be possible. If that should happen, the option of a long duration of imprisonment is permissible.”
                                 Continuing in the same vein, para 48 then states clearly that, “In other words, directing imprisonment for a period greater than 14 years (say 20 or 25 years) could unquestionably foreclose the imposition of a sentence of death, being an alternative option to capital punishment.” Very rightly so! There can be no denying it!
                        For esteemed readers exclusive indulgence, it would be imperative to now mention what para 73 says. It explicitly states that, “It is therefore quite clear from the various decisions placed before us that the mere pendency of one or more criminal cases against a convict cannot be a factor for consideration while awarding a sentence. Not only is it statutorily impermissible (except in some cases) but even otherwise it violates the fundamental presumption of innocence – a human right – that everyone is entitled to.”     
                                        As it turned out, we see that it is then observed in para 74 that, “Insofar as the present case is concerned, it has come on record that there are two cases pending against the appellant for similar offences. Both these were pending trial. Notwithstanding this, the Trial Judge took this into account as a circumstance against the appellant. It would have been, in our opinion, far more appropriate for the Sessions Judge to have waited, if he thought it necessary to take the pendency of these cases into consideration, for the trials to be concluded. For ought we know, the two cases might have been foisted upon the appellant and he might have otherwise been proved not guilty.”
                                 Quite remarkably, it is then elucidated in para 75 that, “We may generally mention, in conclusion, that there is really no reason for the Trial Judge to be in haste in awarding a sentence in a case where he might be considering death penalty on the ground that any other alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. The convict would in any case remain in custody for a fairly long time since the minimum punishment awarded would be imprisonment for life. Therefore, a Trial Judge can take his time and sentence the convict after giving adequate opportunity for the prosecution as well as for the defence to produce material as postulated in Bachan Singh so that the possibility of awarding life sentence is open to the Trial Judge as against the death sentence. It must be appreciated that a sentence of death should be awarded only in rarest of rare cases, only if an alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed and only after full consideration of all factors keeping in mind that a sentence of death is irrevocable and irretrievable upon execution. It should always be remembered that while the crime is important, the criminal is equally important insofar as the sentencing process is concerned. In other words, courts must “make assurance double sure.” [Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Act IV, Scene I]”
                                            Finally and most importantly, let us now discuss the concluding paras. Para 79 stipulates that, “Insofar as the present petition is concerned, the purposes of sentencing, the Sessions Judge, the High Court as well as this Court did not take into consideration the probability of reformation, rehabilitation and social re-integration of the appellant into society. Indeed, no material or evidence was placed before the courts to arrive at any conclusion in this regard one way or the other and for whatever it is worth on the facts of this case. The prosecution was remiss in not producing the available DNA evidence and the failure to produce material evidence must lead to an adverse presumption against the prosecution and in favour of the appellant for the purpose of sentencing. The Trial Court was also in error in taking into consideration, for the purposes of sentencing, the pendency of two similar cases against the appellant which it could not, in law, consider. However, we also cannot overlook subsequent developments with regard to the two (actually three) similar cases against the appellant.” Lastly, para 80 then concludes by holding that, “For all these reasons, we are of opinion that it would be more appropriate looking to the crimes committed by the appellant and the material on record including his overall personality and subsequent events, to commute the sentence of death awarded to the appellant but direct that he should not be released from custody for the rest of his normal life. We order accordingly.”
                              All said and done, it is a very progressive and humane judgment which accords the highest priority to even the right of criminal to lead a life of dignity and respect. It also lays down that the probability of reformation/rehabilitation to be seriously and earnestly considered before awarding death sentence. It is very rightly held that, “A trial Judge can take his time and sentence the convict after giving adequate opportunity for the prosecution as well as for the defence to produce material as postulated in Bachan Singh so that the possibility of awarding life sentence is open to the Trial Judge as against the death sentence.”
                                         The Apex Court also commendably said that there were views that punishment for a crime must be looked at with a more humanitarian lens and the causes for driving a person to commit a heinous crime must be explored and that it must be determined whether it is possible to reform, rehabilitate and socially reintegrate into society even a hardened criminal along with those representing the victims of the crime. Absolutely right! There can be no denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh

1984 Anti-Sikh Riots: Delhi HC Awards Life Term To Congress Leader Sajjan Kumar

To begin with, it has been a long and gruelling wait of 34 long years for the survivors of 1984 anti-Sikh riots to finally see one big leader Sajjan Kumar being sentenced to life term by Delhi High Court in a recent landmark judgment titled State Through CBI vs Sajjan Kumar & Ors in CRL.A. 1099/2013 reserved on 29th October 2018 and pronounced on 17th December 2018. This landmark and laudable judgment was authored by Justice Dr S Muralidhar of Delhi High court for himself and Justice Vinod Goel. But there is still a long way to go because many other big stalwarts of Congress party like Jagdish Tytler among others have always been under the scanner but have somehow managed to save themselves from the long arms of the law as the Akali leaders among others keep pointing out repeatedly!
                                     At the outset, this historic judgment begins by bringing out that, “In the summer of 1947, during partition, this country witnessed horrific mass crimes where several lakhs of civilians, including Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were massacred. A young poet, Amrita Pritam, who fled to this country with her two little children from Lahore was witness to the manifold tragedies during that perilous journey. She was moved to pen an ‘Ode to Waris Shah’ in which she spoke of the fertile land of Punjab having “sprouted poisonous weeds far and near” and where “Seeds of hatred have grown high, bloodshed is everywhere / Poisoned breeze in forest turned bamboo flutes into snakes / Their venom has turned the bright and rosy Punjab all blue.” The killings would continue in the streets of Delhi.
Thirty-seven years later, the country was again witness to another enormous human tragedy. Following the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, on the morning of 31st October 1984 by two of her Sikh bodyguards, a communal frenzy was unleashed. For four days between 1st and 4th November of that year, all over Delhi, 2,733 Sikhs were brutally murdered. Their houses were destroyed. In the rest of the country too thousands of Sikhs were killed.
A majority of the perpetrators of these horrific mass crimes, enjoyed political patronage and were aided by an indifferent law enforcement agency. The criminals escaped prosecution and punishment for over two decades. It took as many as ten Committees and Commissions for the investigation into the role of some of them to be entrusted in 2005 to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 21 years after the occurrence.
The present appeals arise as a result of the investigation by the CBI into the killings of five Sikhs in the Raj Nagar Part I area in Palam Colony in South West Delhi on 1st and 2nd November 1984 and the burning down of a Gurudwara in Raj Nagar Part II. Six accused, including Sajjan Kumar a Congress leader who was a Member of Parliament at that time, were sent up for trial some time in 2010. Three years later, the trial court convicted five of the accused: three of them for the offences of armed rioting and murder and two of them for the offence of armed rioting. Sajjan Kumar stood acquitted by the trial Court of all offences. The convicted accused as well as the CBI appealed to this Court.  
In the judgment that follows this Court has partly allowed CBI’s appeal and reversed the acquittal of Sajjan Kumar. This Court has convicted him for the offences of criminal conspiracy and abetment in the commission of the crimes of murder, promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of communal harmony, defiling and destruction of the Gurudwara by burning. Further while affirming the conviction and sentences awarded by the trial court to the other five accused, this Court has additionally convicted and sentenced them for the offence of criminal conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes.
The accused in this case have been brought to justice primarily on account of the courage and perseverance of three eyewitnesses. Jagdish Kaur whose husband, son and three cousins were the five killed; Jagsher Singh, another cousin of Jagdish Kaur, and Nirpreet Kaur who saw the Gurudwara being burnt down and her father being burnt alive by the raging mobs. It is only after the CBI entered the scene, that they were able to be assured and they spoke up. Admirably, they stuck firm to their truth at the trial.
This Court is of the view that the mass killings of Sikhs in Delhi and elsewhere in November 1984 were in fact ‘crimes against humanity’. They will continue to shock the collective conscience of society for a long time to come. While it is undeniable that it has taken over three decades to bring the accused in this case to justice, and that our criminal justice system stands severely tested in that process, it is essential, in a democracy governed by the rule of law to be able to call out those responsible for such mass crimes. It is important to assure those countless victims waiting patiently that despite the challenges, truth will prevail and justice will be done.”
                                      Having said this, let us now turn to what the opening para i.e. para 1 of this landmark judgment says. It says that, “These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 30th April 2013 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, North-east District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi (‘trial Court’) in SC No. 26/2010 arising out of FIR No. RC-SI-1/2005/S0024 registered at PS Delhi Cantonment acquitting Sajjan Kumar (Accused No. 1: ‘A-1’) of the offences of criminal conspiracy and abetment while, at the same time, convicting Balwan Khokar (‘A-2’), Mahender Yadav (‘A-3), Captain Bhagmal (Retd.) (‘A-4’), Girdhari Lal (‘A-5’), and Krishan Khokar (‘A-6’). The trial Court convicted A-2, A-4, and A-5 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, and 302 read with 149 IPC. A-3 and A-6 were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 147 and 148 IPC. By the order on sentence dated 9th May 2013, they have been sentenced in the following manner:
(i)                         For the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, A-2, A-4 and A-5 were sentenced to imprisonment for life along with payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment (‘RI’) for six months;
(ii)                      For the offence punishable under Section 147 IPC, all five convicted accused were sentenced to two years’ RI along with payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo RI for six months;
(iii)                   For the offence punishable under Section 148 IPC, all five convicted accused were sentenced to three years’ RI along with payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo RI for six months.”    
                                  Needless to say, para 2 brings out that, “The Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) has filed Crl. A. 1099/2013 challenging the complete acquittal of A-1 and the acquittal of the other accused for the other charges framed against them. The complainant, Jagdish Kaur (PW-1), had also preferred Crl. A. 850/2013 against the acquittal of A-1 which was subsequently withdrawn, with this Court granting her liberty to address arguments in Crl. A. 1099/2013.” Para 3 then states that, “The convicted accused, have filed separate appeals. Crl.A.861/2013 has been preferred by A-2, Crl.A.715/2013 by A-3, Crl.A.851/2013 by A-4, Crl.A.710/2014 by A-5 and Crl.A.753/2013 by A-6.”
       Charges framed against A-1
                           As it turned out, para 4 then elucidates that, “Four articles of charge were framed against A-1. First, he was charged with having committed the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 147, 148, 302, 395, 427, 436, 449, 153A, 295 and 505 IPC on account of entering into an agreement, on or about 31st October 1984, with A-2 to A-6 as well as Mala Singh, Santosh Rani @ Janta Hawaldarni, Ishwar Chand Gaur @ Chand Sharabi, Dharamveer Singh Solanki, Balidan Singh, Raj Kumar @ Rajaram (all since deceased), and other known and unknown persons including police personnel to commit the following acts:
(i)     Rioting,
(ii)    Rioting armed with deadly weapon,
(iii)    Murder,
(iv)    Mischief causing damage,
(v)   Mischief by fire with intent to destroy houses etc.,
(vi) House trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death,
(vii)   Dacoity,
(viii)  Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony,
(ix) Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of Sikh community, and
(x) Making statements conducing to public mischief.
                                                          Going forward, para 5 then says that, “Secondly, A-1 was charged with being a principal offender who abetted and instigated the aforementioned co-accused persons in the wake of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi to commit, in pursuance of the aforementioned conspiracy, offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 395, 427, 436, 449, 153A, 295 and 505 IPC and thereby having committed the offence punishable under Section 109 IPC read with the aforementioned provisions of the IPC.”
                                                   To be sure, para 6 then adds that, “Thirdly, A-1 was charged with having delivered fiery/provocative speeches to the mob gathered at Raj Nagar, Palam Colony, Delhi Cantonment on 1st/2nd November 1984 and having instigated and promoted violent enmity against the Sikh community and disturbed harmony between the two religious groups/communities of the locality in retaliation of the assassination of Smt.Indira Gandhi, giving rise to feelings of enmity, hatred, and ill will between members of the non-Sikh and Sikh communities which was prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony and disturbed public tranquility and was thereby guilty of committing the offence punishable under Section 153A IPC.”
                                                            In the same vein, it is then pointed out in para 7 that, “Fourthly, A-1 was charged with having publicly made a statement on 1st/2nd November 1984, to wit, by asking members of the Jat community to not leave any Sikh or any other person who had given shelter to Sikhs alive, inciting the mob gathered there by delivering fiery/provocative speeches and was thereby guilty of committing the offence punishable under Section 505 IPC.”
                          Charges framed against A-2 to A-6        
                                     Of course, para 8 then stipulates that, “Nine articles of charge were framed separately against the five other accused, viz. A-2 to A-6. Firstly, they were charged in a manner similar to A-1 with commission, on or about 31st October 1984, of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 147, 148, 302, 395, 427, 436, 449, 153A, 295 and 505 IPC.”
                                       Moving ahead, para 9 then goes on to state that, “Secondly, they were charged with having been members of an unlawful assembly on 1st/2nd November 1984 in Raj Nagar, Palam Colony, Delhi Cantonment using force and violence in pursuance of the common object to loot, damage, and burn the properties of the Sikh community as well as to kill members of the Sikh community residing in the area in retaliation to the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 147 IPC. Thirdly, they were charged with commission of the aforementioned acts while being members of an unlawful assembly armed with guns, jellies, iron rods/pipes, lathis, kerosene oil, etc. and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 148 IPC.”
                                               As we see, it is then next pointed out in para 10 that, “Fourthly, they were charged with having committed, while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly, the murders of Kehar Singh son of Dhyan Singh, Gurpreet Singh son of Kehar Singh, Raghuvinder Singh son of Gurcharan Singh, Narender Pal Singh son of Gurcharan Singh, and Kuldeep Singh son of Hardev Singh and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Fifthly, they were charged with committing mischief and causing loss and damage amounting to approximately Rs. 3,30,000/- while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 427 read with Section 149 IPC.”
                                                      Interestingly enough, para 11 then reveals that, “Sixthly, they were charged with committing mischief while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly by setting fire to a place of worship, viz. the Raj Nagar Gurudwara, as well as the dwelling houses H.No.RZ-1/129 & RZ-15, Shiv Mandir Marg, Raj Nagar, Palam Colony, New Delhi and were thereby guilty of the commission of the offence punishable under Section 436 read with Section 149 IPC. Seventhly, they were charged with having committed house trespass while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly by entering H.No.RZ-1/129 & RZ-15, Shiv Mandir Marg, Raj Nagar, Delhi Cantonment, which were the dwelling house of the five deceased persons, in order to commit the offence of murder which is punishable with death, and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 449 read with Section 149 IPC.”
                More importantly, para 12 then reveals that, “Eighthly, they were charged with having committed dacoity while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly in H.No.RZ-1/129 & RZ-15 which belonged to the deceased persons, and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC. Lastly, they were charged with destroying/damaging/defiling a place of worship, i.e. the Raj Nagar Gurudwara held sacred by the Sikh community, while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly with the common intention of insulting the Sikh religion and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 295 read with Section 149 IPC.”
                                         Summary Of Findings
                                   Most importantly, it is time now to focus on what the summary of findings are of the two Judge Bench of Delhi High Court in this landmark case. Para 368 states that, “The summary of conclusions arrived at by the Court is as under: –
(i)           There was an abject failure by the police to investigate the violence which broke out in the aftermath of the assassination of the then Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi is apparent from the several circumstances highlighted hereinabove. (Para 136)
(ii)       There was an utter failure to register FIRs with respect to the five deaths that form the subject matter of the present appeals. The failure to record any incident whatsoever in the DDR and the lack of mention of PW-1“s statement therein, amongst other circumstances, established the apathy of the Delhi Police and their active connivance in the brutal murders being perpetrated. (Paras 146 and 149)
(iii)   What happened in the aftermath of the assassination of the then Prime Minister was carnage of unbelievable proportions in which over 2,700 Sikhs were murdered in Delhi alone. The law and order machinery clearly broke down and it was literally a “free for all” situation which persisted. The aftershocks of those atrocities are still being felt. (Para 152)  
 (iv)    This was an extraordinary case where it was going to be impossible to proceed against A-1 in the normal scheme of things because there appeared to be ongoing large-scale efforts to suppress the cases against him by not even recording or registering them. Even if they were registered they were not investigated properly and even the investigations which saw any progress were not carried to the logical end of a charge sheet actually being filed. Even the defence does not dispute that as far as FIR No. 416/1984 is concerned, a closure report had been prepared and filed but was yet to be considered by the learned MM. (Para 159)
(v) The argument that the CBI deliberately suppressed the fact of the pendency of the closure report in FIR No. 416/1984 is born out of sheer desperation. Even if FIR No. 416/1984 was not closed as “untraced”, the fact remains that there was no progress whatsoever in the said FIR. (Para 160)
(vi) PW-1 comes across as a fearless and truthful witness. Till she was absolutely certain that her making statements will serve a purpose, she did not come forward to do so. Nothing in the deposition of PW1 points to either untruthfulness or unreliability. Her evidence deserves acceptance. (Paras 219 and 220)
(vii) PW-4 is also definitely a witness in support of the case of the prosecution. (Para 232)
(viii) PW-6 was one of the persons who had suffered tragedies and had no reason to falsely implicate anyone. (Para 242)
(ix) The failure to examine important witnesses including PWs 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 12 by the Riot Cell of the Delhi Police and also the non-examination of Daljit Kaur and Harbhajan Kaur establishes that the Riot Cell did not carry out any genuine investigation. PW-1 was justified in not joining such an investigation. (Paras 280 and 281)   
(x) The trial Court completely omitted to address the charge of conspiracy despite detailed arguments submitted by the CBI in that regard. There was a two-pronged strategy adopted by the attackers. First was to liquidate all Sikh males and the other was to destroy their residential houses leaving the women and children utterly destitute. The attack on the Raj Nagar Gurudwara was clearly a part of the communal agenda of the perpetrators. (Paras 288 and 294)
(xi) The mass killings of Sikhs between 1st and 4th November 1984 in Delhi and the rest of the country, engineered by political actors with the assistance of the law enforcement agencies, answer the description of crimes against humanity”. Cases like the present are to be viewed in the larger context of mass crimes that require a different approach and much can be learnt from similar experiences elsewhere. (Paras 367.1 and 367.10)
(xii) Common to the instances of mass crimes are the targeting of minorities and the attacks spearheaded by the dominant political actors facilitated by the law enforcement agencies. The criminals responsible for the mass crimes have enjoyed political patronage and managed to evade prosecution and punishment. Bringing such criminals to justice poses a serious challenge to our legal system. Decades pass by before they can be made answerable. This calls for strengthening the legal system. Neither “crimes against humanity” nor “genocide” is part of our domestic law of crime. This loophole needs to be addressed urgently. (Para 367.6)
(xiii) The acquittal of A-1 by the trial Court is set aside. He is convicted of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 302, 436, 295 and 153A(1)(a) and (b) IPC; for the offence punishable under Section 109 IPC of abetting the commission of the aforementioned offences; and for the offence of delivering provocative speeches instigating violence against Sikhs Crl.A. 1099/2013 & Connected Matters Page 201 of 203 punishable under Section 153A (1) (a)and (b) IPC. (Para 307)
(xiv) The convictions and sentences of A-2 to A-6 as ordered by the trial Court are affirmed. Additionally, each of them is convicted for the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 436, 295, and 153A (1) (a) and (b) IPC. (Paras 331, 356, 360 and 366)
                    Sentences
                               No less important is the sentencing part of this landmark judgment. Let us deal with it one by one. First and foremost, para 369 states that, “As far as A-1 is considered, he is sentenced as under:
(i)                         For the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with
(a)          Section 302 IPC, to imprisonment for life, i.e. the remainder of his natural life,
(b)         Section 436 IPC, to RI for 10 years and fine of Rs 1 lakh and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment (SI) for 1 year;
(c)           Section 153A(1)(a) and (b) IPC, to RI for three years; and
(d)         Section 295 IPC, to RI for two years.  
(ii)                      For the offence punishable under Section 109 read with Sections 302, 436, 153A, and 295 IPC to identical sentences as in (i) (a) to (d) above.
(iii)                   For the offence punishable under Section 153A(1)(a) and (b) IPC, to RI for three years.
All sentences shall run concurrently.
                                       Be it noted, it is then directed in para 370 that, “The bail and surety bonds furnished by A-1 stand cancelled and he shall surrender not later than 31st December 2018, failing which he shall forthwith be taken into custody to serve out the sentences awarded to him. A-1 shall not from this moment till his surrender leave the NCT of Delhi in the meanwhile and shall immediately provide to the CBI the address and mobile number(s) where he can be contacted.”                
                               All said and done, it is a landmark and laudable judgment but the victims of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots have had to wait for far too long more than 34 years which is most disgusting and disgraceful! Even now they have to fight a long legal battle in the Supreme Court! They must be given top priority and decided at the earliest! Nearly 3000 Sikhs being killed in Delhi alone and no one being hanged or even awarded life term until recently is a huge national shame for which both Centre and the judiciary are equally responsible for not doing enough to act swiftly and sternly against the powerful political offenders!
                          Before concluding, let me again remind esteemed readers what is so rightly pointed out in para 367.6 of this landmark judgment. It says that, “In India, the riots in early November 1984 in which in Delhi alone 2,733 Sikhs and nearly 3,350 all over the country were brutally murdered (these are official figures) was neither the first instance of a mass crime nor, tragically, the last. The mass killings in Punjab, Delhi and elsewhere during the country’s partition remains a collective painful memory as is the killings of innocent Sikhs in November 1984. There has been a familiar pattern of mass killings in Mumbai in 1993, in Gujarat in 2002, in Kandhamal, Odisha in 2008, in Muzaffarnagar in U.P. in 2013 to name a few. Common to these mass crimes were the targeting of minorities and the attacks spearheaded by the dominant political actors being facilitated by the law enforcement agencies. The criminals responsible for the mass crimes have enjoyed political patronage and managed to evade prosecution and punishment. Bringing such criminals to justice poses a serious challenge to our legal system. As these appeals themselves demonstrate, decades pass by before they can be made answerable. This calls for strengthening the legal system. Neither ‘crimes against humanity’ nor ‘genocide’ is part of our domestic law of crime. This loophole needs to be addressed urgently.” So this must be done at the earliest as has been very rightly pointed out by the Delhi High Court in this landmark judgment! There can be no denying it!
                                In conclusion, if there has to be respect for law in our country, the punishment for those indulging in such heinous crimes has to be swift and strict! Just because accused enjoys political patronage they should not be allowed to evade the due process of law as we have seen in many cases including  this one also for many decades because this would tantamount to making a mockery of our legal system and due process of law which cannot be permitted to happen in our country under any circumstances because doing so would lead our country to anarchy, dictatorship and lawlessness! No one who indulges in crime should ever be allowed to get away under any circumstances.
                                       It cannot be lost on us that in this 1984 anti-Sikh riots also there are many other big fishes who are still roaming free and they too must be brought to book and after following due process of law must be sent behind bars or to gallows which is the right place for them who mercilessly ensured the killings of thousands of Sikh men, women and even children without having any mercy on anyone! Can anyone deny this? Why have they been allowed to take law for granted? Why the killers were not sent to gallows promptly? Why even after killing of nearly 4000 Sikhs all over the country, no one has been hanged till now?
                                   Bluntly put: What image does this send of India in abroad? That one can get away with doing anything provided one has the right connections and the right political patronage! This must end now once and for all! No one should be allowed to get away after committing crime of any kind! Only then will our image in international forum get strengthened which will not just garner more investment in India from other countries but also strengthen India’s demand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council! Also, this will severely hamper hostile countries like Pakistan from easily misguiding young Sikh youths and they will also realize that in India no one who killed their near and dear ones are being spared or left scot free just because of their political connections! India must act tough now on killers and those who masterminded such mass killings must be now punished most swiftly and most strictly!  
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.