Tag: Education

Indian School of Mines

Indian School of Mines

CITY: Dhanbad

What started as an institution to impart mining education has graduated into a full-fledged technical institution of international acclaim offering a host of programmes like B. Tech., M. Tech., M. Sc. Tech., and MBA. In addition, the school offers M. Phil. and full as well as part-time Ph. D. programmes, while also awarding D.Sc. as the highest degree of academic achievement.
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCzOJDJZHoBttdHAjJsnN9w?sub_confirmation=1

Delhi Technological University

Delhi Technological University

CITY: New Delhi

With a history of over 65 years in providing technical education within a modern educational environment and strong academic staff, the Delhi Technical University (formerly the Delhi College of Engineering, is strongly identified with engineering education in India.
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCzOJDJZHoBttdHAjJsnN9w?sub_confirmation=1

Indian Institute of Technology

Indian Institute of Technology

CITY: Roorkee

IIT Roorkee is the oldest technical institution of Asia. Established in 1847, it was given University status in 1949 and, in 2001, was converted into an IIT. IIT Roorkee has 18 academic departments covering Engineering, Applied Sciences, Humanities & Social Sciences and Management programmes.
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCzOJDJZHoBttdHAjJsnN9w?sub_confirmation=1

Top 30 LAW COLLEGES 2019 EduINDEX Ranking

INDIA\’S BEST LAW COLLEGES 2019
1. National Law School of India University
2. The WB National University of Juridical Sciences
3. Symbiosis Society\’s Law College
4. ILS Law College
5. Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University
6. Amity Law School
7. Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University
8. Bharati Vidyapeeth\’s New Law College
9. Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia
10. Christ College of Law
11. Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow
12. Army Institute of Law
13. MS Ramaiah College of Law
14. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar College of Law
15. ICFAI Law School
16. Lloyd Law College
17. Institute of Law, Kurukshetra University
18. CMR Law School
19. KIIT School of Law
20. Indore Institute of Law
21. SDM Law College
22. V.M. Salgaocar College of Law
23. Faculty of Law , the ICFAI University (ICFAI Law School)
24. Bangalore Institute of Legal Studies
25. K.L.E. Society\’s Law College
26. School of Law, IMS Unison University
27. Manikchand Pahade Law College
28. ICFAI Law School
29. Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University
30. Bengal Law College

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCzOJDJZHoBttdHAjJsnN9w?sub_confirmation=1

Legal Article Mere Allegations Of Harassment Without Proximate Positive Action Not Sufficient For Conviction U/S 306 IPC: SC

It has to be said right at the outset that in a landmark, latest and laudable judgment titled Rajesh v State of Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 8867 of 2016)  by a two Judge Bench of Supreme Court comprising of Justice L Nageshwara Rao who authored the judgment for himself and Justice MR Shah and delivered on January 18, 2019, the Supreme Court very clearly and convincingly reiterated that conviction under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (Abetment of Suicide) is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. The Bench was considering an appeal in this case against the High Court judgment that had confirmed the conviction of Rajesh for abetting suicide of his brother-in-law, Arvind. It may be recalled that in his suicide note, Arvind had disclosed that false allegations of demand of dowry were made against him and that a Panchayat was also conducted in which he was slapped by the accused. He took the extreme step of committing suicide as he was unable to withstand the harassment and had said in the suicide note that his in-laws including the accused are responsible for his death.  
                                  To start with, this landmark judgment begins by first and foremost pointing out in para 1 that, “The Appellant was convicted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) and sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment. The appeal filed by the Appellant was dismissed by the High Court. Hence, this appeal.”
                                   To recapitulate, the ball is then set rolling in para 2 wherein it is pointed out that, “According to the complaint filed by Bharat Singh (PW-1), his son Arvind was married to Manju, daughter of Laxmi Narayan on 07.11.2000. Indera is the sister-in-law of Arvind and the Appellant Rajesh is his brother-in-law. Arvind committed suicide on 23.02.2002 by consuming Sulfas tablets. On 01.03.2002 when Bharat Singh and other family members entered into the room of Arvind to sprinkle Gangajal, they found a suicide note on the bed of the deceased. It was stated that Arvind committed suicide due to the behavior of the Appellant, Laxmi Narayan and Indera who made false allegations against deceased regarding demand of dowry. A Panchayat was held in the village at the instance of the accused during which the Appellant slapped the deceased. The Appellant and his sister Indera used to threaten the deceased on telephone at the instance of their father Laxmi Narayan.”
                                 Elaborating further, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “In the suicide note, the deceased Arvind stated that false allegations of demand of dowry were made against him and that a Panchayat was also conducted in which there was an attempt to assault him. There were continuous threats from his father-in-law (Laxmi Narayan), his brother-in-law (Appellant) and the sister-in-law (Indera) that his family members will also be implicated in a criminal case. Unable to withstand the harassment, the deceased took the extreme step of committing suicide and held his father-in-law, the Appellant and his sister-in-law responsible for his death.”
                                 Going forward, para 4 then goes on to further elucidate that, “On completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed under Section 306 IPC. 12 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution and Manju, wife of the deceased was examined as DW-1. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court held the Appellant, his father and sister guilty of committing the offence under Section 306 IPC. The Appellant and his father Laxmi Narayan were sentenced to imprisonment of five years. Accused Indera was sentenced to three years imprisonment on being convicted for committing an offence under Section 306 IPC. The Trial Court took note of the Panchayat that was held in September 2001 which was five months prior to 23.02.2002 on which date Arvind committed suicide. Reference was also made to the evidence of PW-1 (Bharat Singh) who stated that he and his son Arvind (deceased) had forgotten about the Panchayat episode in view of the apology tendered by the accused. However, the Trial Court observed that continuous threats held out by the accused to implicate the deceased and his family members in a false dowry case assume importance. The Trial Court also relied upon the suicide note to hold the accused guilty of the offence of abetment to suicide. The version of the defence that Arvind Committed suicide due to his depression, due to unemployment and lack of income, was rejected.”     
                                    Not stopping here, para 5 then goes on to further elaborate stating that, “The appeal filed by the Appellant was dismissed by the High Court. The conviction and sentence of Laxmi Narayan and Indera were set aside by the High Court by the same judgment. The High Court referred to the suicide note Exhibit ‘PA’ to conclude that there was no error committed by the Trial Court in convicting the Appellant. The High Court also relied upon the evidence of PW-1 and PW-5 who spoke about the convening of the Panchayat by the accused in September, 2001 during which false allegations were made against the deceased. The High Court upheld the conviction of the Appellant while acquitting his father and sister, only on the ground that the Appellant slapped Arvind during the Panchayat which was conducted in September, 2001.”
                       Be it noted, para 6 then goes on to illustrate that, “It is no doubt true that Arvind committed suicide on 23.02.2002. He left a suicide note which was found by his family members on 01.03.2002. There is also no dispute that Arvind blamed his father-in-law (Laxmi Narayan), his sister-in-law (Indera) and the Appellant for harassment and threats that he would be implicated in a false case of demand of dowry. Admittedly, a Panchayat was held in September, 2001 during which the accused leveled allegations of demand of dowry by Arvind. More than five months thereafter, Arvind committed suicide on 23.02.2002. In the meanwhile, according to the prosecution, Arvind was being threatened by the accused through telephone conversations. The point that arises for our consideration is whether the Appellant can be held guilty for committing an offence under Section 306 IPC in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
                                        It would be pertinent to mention here that para 8 then goes on to add stating that, “Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. (See Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707).”
                                    More importantly, it is very rightly held in para 11 that, “We are of the opinion that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction of the Appellant under Section 306 IPC. There is no proximity between the Panchayat held in September 2001 and the suicide committed by Arvind on 23.02.2002. The incident of slapping by the Appellant in September, 2001 cannot be the sole ground to hold him responsible for instigating the deceased to commit suicide. As the allegations against all the three accused are similar, the High Court ought not to have convicted the Appellant after acquitting the other two accused.”
                                      Most importantly, it is then held in para 12 that, “We are not in agreement with the findings of the Trial Court that the deceased (Arvind) committed suicide in view of the continuous threats by the accused regarding his being implicated in a false case of demand of dowry. The evidence does not disclose that the Appellant instigated the deceased to commit suicide. There was neither a provocation nor encouragement by the Appellant to the deceased to commit an act of suicide. Therefore, the Appellant cannot be held guilty of abetting the suicide by the deceased.” Very rightly so!
                                Finally, the last para 13 then concludes by stating that, “For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence of the Appellant is set aside. His bail bonds stands discharged.” There can be no denying or disputing it! The Apex Court has given valid and compelling reasons for holding so as we have already discussed above!
                                 It also rightly cited the case of Praveen Pradhan v State of Uttaranchal (2012) 9 SCC 734 in para 10 wherein it was held that, “Words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation.” The accused neither provoked nor encouraged the deceased to commit an act of suicide then how could he be held liable for the same? This was what the Apex Court also very rightly concluded in this landmark, latest and laudable judgment for which it has to be richly commended!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Rape And Murder Of 8 Year Old Girl: SC Commutes Death Sentence To 25 Years Imprisonment Without Remission

It has to be said right at the beginning that in a landmark, latest and laudable judgment with far reaching consequences, the Supreme Court on January 18, 2019 in Nand Kishore v State of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 94 of 2019 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7645 of 2013) has commuted to life imprisonment the death sentence which was earlier confirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court of a convicted for the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. It must be noted that this notable judgment which was authored by Justice R Subhash Reddy for himself, Justice Sharad A Bobde and Justice L Nageswara Rao took a balanced and reasonable view after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case. This alone explains why death penalty was not confirmed rather was commuted to that of life imprisonment with actual imprisonment of 25 years  without remission.
                                         While craving for the exclusive indulgence of esteemed readers, it must be informed here that the Bench of Apex Court observed right at the outset in para 2 that, “This criminal appeal is filed by the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 798 of 2013 filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, aggrieved by the judgment dated 25.06.2013. By the aforesaid judgment, while dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant herein convicted for the offence under Sections 302, 363, 366 and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the High Court answered the reference in affirmative by confirming the death sentence awarded to the appellant.”
                            To recapitulate, para 3 then starting from the scratch brings out that, “Necessary facts, in brief, giving rise to this appeal are that the deceased, a minor girl aged about 8 years, had gone to attend the ‘Mela’ along with her younger brother namely Chhunu (PW-4) on 03.02.2013. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant who is aged about 50 years then, took away the deceased from the ‘Mela’ and committed rape and murdered her. Narendra (PW-2) informed the police stating that his daughter, who had gone to attend the ‘Mela’, has not returned home. Upon such complaint, case was registered and investigation commenced. In the course of investigation one Amit Mourya (PW-1) informed the Investigating Officer that when he was coming to his shop from residence, he saw a dog running away with a leg of a child in its mouth and on being chased, the dog dropped the leg and ran away. Further, it was the case of the prosecution that in the process of investigation, Investigating Officer found a headless body of the deceased in the bushes near the ‘Dushera Maidan’, Bhopal. It is alleged that the left leg of the deceased was found at a distance of 100 ft and both legs were fractured. Further, it is noticed that there were severe injuries on the private parts of the deceased inflicted by the appellant due to which the intestine had come out. During the process of investigation the statement of the appellant was recorded under Ex. P8 and the blood stained cloths and articles he used for the offence were recovered from his house. After completing the investigation, the appellant was chargesheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i) and 302 of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.”
                                     Needless to say, it is then brought out in para 4 that, “The trial court, after appreciation of the evidence on record, which is mainly circumstantial, came to the conclusion that the appellant has committed rape on the minor girl and murdered her and further, by recording a finding that the crime committed by the appellant is heinous and barbaric, falls within the category of ‘rarest of rare’ cases, imposed the death sentence. The appellant is also convicted and sentenced for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i) of the IPC. In view of the award of death sentence, the trial court has made a reference to the High Court for confirmation, as contemplated under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC). Questioning the conviction recorded and sentence imposed, the accused has filed appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 798 of 2013 and the High Court has disposed of, by common judgment, Criminal Reference No. 05/2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 798/2013. The High Court, by judgment dated 25.06.2013, while dismissing the appeal of the appellant, has affirmed the reference confirming the death sentence awarded to the appellant.” The Bench then observes in para 5 that, “We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant, Sri Sanjay R. Hegde and also learned counsel appearing for the State Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi.”
                                        What must be noted here is that the learned senior counsel for the appellant Sanjay R Hegde while pooh-poohing the manner in which the trial court and the high court imposed death sentence on the appellant called for it to be modified as we see has been pointed out also in para 6 which states that, “In this appeal, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that there is no acceptable and convincing evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant is convicted by the trial court based on the circumstantial evidence which is not enough to record guilt of the accused. It is submitted that from the evidence on record, the prosecution has also failed to prove concept of ‘last seen’. It is further submitted that the trial court as well as High Court has committed error in imposing the death sentence upon the appellant without examining mitigating circumstances. It is submitted that the sentence imposed is illegal and contrary to the legislative mandate under Sections 235(2) and 354(3) of the Cr.PC. It is contended that without examining relevant considerations of legislative policy discernible from Sections 354(3) and 235(2) of the Cr.PC, only by recording a finding that the incident is barbaric, the trial court and the appellate court have recorded that the case of the prosecution falls under ‘rarest of rare’ cases and imposed death sentence. It is submitted that all the mitigating circumstances which exist were to be considered. The penalty of death imposed is required to be modified.”       
                                        What is more, it is then pointed out further in para 7 that, “To support his contention, learned counsel has referred to certain cases decided by this Court in identical circumstances. It is specifically submitted that relevant aspects, like, the socio-economic background of the appellant, lack of criminal antecedents, possibility of reform, are not considered. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that the local Bar Association, Bhopal had refused to represent the appellant, as such, the appellant was not represented by counsel before the trial court until the date of the framing of the charge. On request made by the appellant on the day of framing of charge, for grant of legal aid, trial court has requested one Mr. Katyayani to appear and the same day charges were framed and the trial was preceded with.”
                             It is beyond a shadow of doubt that the local Bar Association of Bhopal by refusing to represent the appellant has done no good to the victim who was brutally raped and murdered! It only served to arouse sympathy among the Judges of the Apex Court who decided this case as the accused was not represented by any lawyer in lower court! This only worked to the advantage of the accused!
                                    Of course, every accused has a right to be defended by a lawyer no matter how heinous the crime may be and this among other reasons only served to save the appellant from being pushed to the gallows! Let us not be oblivious of the irrefutable and basic principle of law that, “One of the cardinal principles of the criminal justice system in India is that an accused is deemed innocent until proven guilty.”  The Apex Court too has time and again sent a loud and clear message that every accused has a right to be represented by an advocate of his choice and this is reiterated in Section 303 of Cr.PC also and no accused under any circumstances should be condemned unheard as the doctrine of audi alteram partem very clearly enunciates which literally means “hear the other side”!
                                 To be sure, no accused should be judged without a fair hearing in which the accused too are given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against them. How can this be possible if they are denied access to lawyer who is supposed to represent them? All lawyers who are in the legal profession must always bear it in mind!
                        Anyway, coming back to the case itself, it is then finally and most importantly rightly pointed out in para 14 that, “The learned counsel appearing for the State has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case Mukesh & Anr. V. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors (2017) 6 SCC 1 [known as Nirbhaya case] in support of her case and submitted that applying the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the case falls in the ‘rarest of rare’ cases attracting death penalty. With reference to above said arguments of learned counsel for the State, it is to be noticed that the case of Mukesh (supra) is distinguishable on the facts from the case on hand. It is to be noticed that Mukesh (supra) is a case of gang-rape and murder of the victim and an attempt to murder of the male victim. It was the specific case of the prosecution that the crimes were carried out pursuant to a conspiracy and the accused were convicted under Section 120-B of the IPC apart from other offences. Further, as a fact, it was found in the aforesaid case that the accused-Mukesh had been involved in other criminal activity on the same night. Further, it is also to be noticed that in the aforesaid case, there was a dying declaration, eye witness to the incident etc. So far as the present case is concerned, it solely rests on circumstantial evidence. It is the specific case of the appellant that he was denied the proper legal assistance in the matter and he is a manhole worker. The appellant was aged about 50 years. Further, in this case there is no finding recorded by the courts below to the effect that there is no possibility of reformation of the appellant. We are of the view that the reasons assigned by the trial court as confirmed by the High Court, do not constitute special reasons within the meaning of Section 354(3) of the Cr.PC to impose death penalty on the accused. Taking into account the evidence on record and the totality of the circumstances of the case, and by applying the test on the touchstone of case law discussed above, we are of the view that the case on hand will not fall within the ‘rarest of rare’ cases. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the death sentence imposed by the trial court, as confirmed by the High Court, requires modification. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in part; while confirming the conviction recorded by the trial court, as confirmed by the appellate court, we modify the sentence to that of life imprisonment with actual period of 25 years, without any benefit of remission. It is further made clear that sentences imposed for all offences shall run concurrently.”
                              All said and done, this landmark, latest and laudable judgment clearly and convincingly has sent a loud and clear message that death sentence should not be inflicted at the drop of a hat! There must be very serious and compelling reasons and the case must fall within the ‘rarest of rare’ cases! If there are chances of accused reforming himself/herself then death penalty should not be imposed. All courts from top to bottom must abide by what has been laid down by the Apex Court in this landmark case!  
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

A Judicial Officer Is Not An Ordinary Government Servant And Must Be Above Suspicion: Allahabad High Court

It must be noted right at the outset that in a noteworthy judgment titled Sadhna Chaudhary v State of U.P. and others in Writ Petition No. 170 (S/B) of 2006 by a two-Judge Bench of Allahabad High Court comprising of Chief Justice Govind Mathur and Justice Shabihul Hasnain and delivered on 12 December 2018 has upheld the dismissal of a judicial officer on grounds of misconduct, on the basis of two orders passed by her in land acquisition cases. This has certainly sent shockwaves across Uttar Pradesh especially in judicial circles. The legal battle is still not over as she (the petitioner) still has the right to challenge this in the Apex Court which is the highest court in India! But certainly it is a big setback for her!
                         First and foremost, it is pointed out in para 1 that, “Heard Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Mahima Pahwa, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for State of U.P. as well as Sri Upendra Nath Mishra for High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, opposite party no. 2.” The ball is then really set rolling in para 2 wherein it is pointed out that, “Present petition has been filed by a judicial officer against the order passed by the Appointments Department of the State Government dated 17.01.2006, by which the petitioner was dismissed from service on the recommendation of the Full Court of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.” Para 3 then brings out that, “Petitioner was working as Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad when the impugned order was passed. Petitioner has prayed that a direction be issued for not giving effect to the dismissal order dated 17.01.2006 and thereafter allow her to discharge her duties as before.”
                                While striking a note of caution, it is then underscored in para 4 that, “Great caution is required in this case because it is a matter of a high ranking judicial officer and her career, which is at stake. It will therefore be necessary to first lay down the facts of the case before dealing with the arguments and law on the subject.”
                           Delving deeper, para 5 then very clearly and convincingly points out that, “The petitioner had initially joined the services as Additional Munsif in the year 1972. She was later on promoted as Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the year 1983. She was subsequently promoted to the Higher Judicial Cadre in the year 1987. While she was posted as 2nd Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, the petitioner had decided a Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006 (Lile Singh v. State & 35 others) on 10.2.2003 and while deciding the said Land Acquisition Reference, the petitioner had relied on the rates of a compromise deed but she awarded solatium, additional amount and interest etc. over and above the said agreed rates. This rate was over and above the rate at which two other claimants had entered into the  compromise deed. This compromise deed was relied by the petitioner as the exemplar in Rs. 284 per square yard was the rate agreed between the parties which was inclusive of all such benefits i.e. solatium, interest and additional amount. The petitioner relying on the same should instead of stucking to the same, enhanced the rate of Rs 74.40 per square yard determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to Rs 264/- per square yard i.e. Rs 20/- less than compromise rate and thereafter she allowed, addition of solatium, additional compensation and interest etc. which actually made the landing cost as Rs. 720/- per square yard. Thus the aforesaid enhancement was appear to be disproportionate and against judicial propriety and norms. It was also not justified on her part to rely on the rates of compromise deed and take it as market rate because it was barred under Section 11(3) of the Land Acquisition Act and thereafter allowing additional amount over and above that agreed rate which was completely incomprehensible.”   
                                    While continuing in the same vein, it is then added in para 6 that, “Similarly while being posted as Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Ghaziabad, the petitioner had decided another Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001 (Umesh Chandra v. State & 66 others) on 07.11.2003. While deciding the said reference, the petitioner had illegally disregarded all the exemplars filed by the defendants including her own award dated 16.08.1988, passed in another case only five months prior to acquisition for the land acquired in the same village and in the same area and under the same Scheme in which she herself had awarded only Rs. 108 per square yard. Thus while ignoring the aforesaid relevant material available on record, the petitioner has enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs. 100/- per square yard to Rs. 160/- per square yard. The aforesaid enhancement also appears to be disproportionate and the said reference appears to be decided against the judicial norms. In the meantime, this Court while deciding a First Appeal filed by Agra Development Authority against an order of land Acquisition Reference, passed a judgment and order dated 5.3.2004. In this judgment some far reaching observations were made with regard to the manner in which Land Acquisition References were being decided in the State of U.P. Further a direction was issued to the Registrar of the High Court to place the copy of the judgment before the Administrative Committee of the High Court for taking appropriate action against the concerned judicial officers, who appear to be in collusion with the claimants/beneficiaries.”
                                  Going forward, it is then added in para 7 that, “In compliance of the aforesaid judgment, a Committee was constituted by the High Court for looking into the matter, which submitted its report on 19.9.2004, where after the Administrative Committee resolved to initiate disciplinary proceeding against certain judicial officers including the petitioner, whose actions were prima facie found to be suspicious.”
                                 To be sure, it is then revealed in para 8 that, “A charge sheet was issued to the petitioner on 25.10.2004 containing two separate charges in the aforementioned two separate cases about recklessly deciding the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References of Lile Singh (supra) and Umesh Chand (supra) and awarding additional amount including additional compensation, solatium and interest etc. in violation of all judicial norms and propriety, which led to the inference that the same was actuated by extraneous considerations and which indicates towards a failure of maintenance of absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty. This amounted to misconduct and, therefore, the petitioner was asked to submit a detailed reply to the said charges.”
                                 Not stopping here, it is then elucidated in detail in para 9 that, “The petitioner submitted her reply on 4.1.2005 followed by supplementary reply dated 19.5.2005 and 21.6.2005 wherein she tried to explain her conduct and the manner in which the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References were decided by her. Thereafter the enquiry proceedings were held after following the principles of natural justice and giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Finally an enquiry report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 9.9.2005 in which a conclusive finding was given by the two Hon’ble Judges appointed as enquiry committee, that errors in both the aforesaid orders passed by the petitioner while deciding two Land Acquisition References are not mere error in the judgment but they are such blunders, which according to the Enquiry Judges was ‘shocking’. Since the said blunders were not attributable to mere errors of judgment which can be corrected in Appeal or in Revision, but were evidently deliberate, therefore, the Enquiry officer had proved both the charges against the petitioner.”
                       It is then elaborated further in the same para 9 that, “Consequent to the above enquiry report the matter was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice with regard to determination of question of quantum of punishment. When the aforesaid enquiry report dated 9.9.2005 was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, the matter was directed to be placed before the Administrative Committee by the Hon’ble Chief Justice vide order dated 12.9.2005. Thereafter the office had put up a report dated 17.09.2005 that as per an earlier resolution of the Administrative Committee dated 28.02.1997, it would be appropriate to first call for comments of the delinquent officer to the show cause notice which may be given to her regarding the aforesaid enquiry report, with the approval of the Hon’ble Chief Justice. Thus a show cause notice was served on the petitioner on 26.09.2005, whereby the copy of the enquiry report was furnished to her and objections to the same were invited from the petitioner, who submitted her detailed reply on 22/24.10.2005. The same was placed before the Administrative Committee on 29.11.2005. The Administrative Committee, after duly considering the enquiry report dated 9.9.2005, the comments of the delinquent officer dated 22/24.10.2005, along with the office note dated 17.09.2005, resolved that the enquiry report dated 9.9.2005 of the two Hon’ble Judges be accepted and thereafter the matter was referred to the Full Court for consideration of quantum of punishment.”
                                   As things stand, it is then disclosed in para 10 that, “When the aforesaid matter came up for consideration before the Full Court in its meeting dated 17.12.2005, it was resolved by the Full Court that the enquiry report be accepted and that the officer be given punishment of dismissal from service. The aforesaid resolution/decision of the Full Court was thereafter communicated to the State Government and on that basis, the order of dismissal was passed by the Appointments Department of the State Government on 17.01.2006, which has been assailed by the petitioner in the instant writ petition.”  
                          Needless to say, para 11 while presenting the petitioners version goes on to enunciate that, “Petitioner while challenging the impugned punishment order has mainly contended that with regard to the alleged errors in deciding the first Land Acquisition Reference i.e. Lile Singh v. State, the grant of solatium, additional amount and interest is a benefit provided by the statute to the person, whose land was acquired and the same cannot be refused by the Tribunal only on the ground that the financial burden shall increase on the Acquiring Body. Similarly with regard to the alleged errors in deciding the second charge pertaining to the Land Acquisition Reference of Umesh Chandra v. State, it was submitted that her own award passed in the case of Surendra v. State decided on 24.3.1993 was not followed by her, mainly because the said case was affected by different Notification issued under Section 4(1) and the acquisition was for the same scheme.”
                              Going ahead, para 12 then further goes on to add that, “The petitioner has contended that writ petitions were filed against the two orders passed by the petitioner in the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References and both the said writ petitions filed by the Acquiring Body were subsequently dismissed by this Hon’ble Court vide judgment and orders dated 20.5.2015 and 21.5.2015 and, therefore, the award passed by the Hon’ble High Court and hence her stand is vindicated and she cannot be said to have committed any mistake in passing the two orders, as the amount decided by her in the Land Acquisition References was not changed in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. Since her decision stood affirmed even by the High Court, therefore, no punishment can be justified for passing the orders in the aforesaid two Land Acquisition References.” Finally, in para 13 also the petitioners version is described and it states that, “The petitioner has lastly prayed for parity of treatment while claiming similarity with the case of Sanjay Kumar Goel v. State of U.P. decided on 31.5.2011 wherein the petitioner was exonerated.”
                              Having said this, it is time to now discuss on what point of view the High Court submits on this. Starting from the scratch, it is first and foremost observed in para 14 that, “Per contra, the submission of the High Court is that in such matters, it is not the final decision of the judicial officer, which is relevant but what is relevant is the ‘decision making process’ and if the decision making process is in violation of all judicial norms and propriety, which is not supported by consistent judicial approach and if the decision making process of a judicial officer is actuated by extraneous consideration, ulterior motives, recklessness and improper considerations, then even if the final decision may be upheld by superior courts but the decision making process being arbitrary and irrational, cannot allow the judicial officer to escape from his responsibility.”
                                Of course, para 15 then further states that, “It was further submitted that in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to give any suitable reply to the main contention of the Charge No. 1 as to why she had placed reliance at the first place on a compromise deed entered between the two persons for fixing the rate of land for determining the market value, though there is a statutory bar under Section 11(2) & (3) of the Land Acquisition Act that rate of land fixed through agreement cannot be a criteria for determining the market value of adjoining land acquired through same or similar notification. Similarly no suitable explanation could be given by the petitioner that when she had relied on the agreement deed, which contained the rate of Rs 284/- per square yard and this amount included 30% solatium, additional compensation and interest, then why the charged officer awarded a sum of Rs. 264/- per square yard (while deducting only Rs 20 therefrom) and then awarded addition of solatium, additional compensation and interest over and above the said agreed amount. This ultimately resulted in the landing cost of Rs. 720/- per square yard as against Rs. 284/- per square yard given to the claimants of the adjoining villages even under the “compromise agreement”. Thus a total enhancement in compensation by the order passed by the changed officer came to be more than 47 crores which was about 10 times more than the compensation of SLAO. No suitable explanation could be given by the petitioner for allowing the aforesaid wind fall gain to the claimants which was absolutely ‘shocking’.”
                                Furthermore, it is then pointed out in para 15 that, “Similarly with respect to the second charge, the petitioner could not explain as to why she had ignored/disregarded the sale deed executed barely 19 days before Section 4 Notification and that too of a small piece of land, which was the best exemplar. This exemplar was actually relied upon by the SLAO, while determining the rate of compensation at Rs. 100/- per square yard. It cannot be presumed by any stretch of imagination that when in the sale deed executed barely 19 days before Section 4 Notification, the rate of land was 90 per square yard, on the basis of which the SLAO had determined the compensation at Rs. 100/- per square yard, the same could have been enhanced to Rs. 160/- per square yard. This clearly demonstrates that the enhancement of compensation in this case also was actuated evidently by extraneous considerations, which gave wind wall gains to the claimants, which was most shocking and unexplainable, especially when the charged officer/petitioner neither followed her own award given five months back in the case of Surendra v. State nor accepted the sale deed executed barely 19 days before Section 4 Notification, which was rightly relied upon by the SLAO in reaching to the amount of compensation.”
                                 What’s more, it is then explicitly laid down in para 16 that, “It was further submitted that though the writ petitions filed by acquiring body i.e. NOIDA authorities against the orders passed in several Land Acquisition References were collectively decided by this Court vide judgment and orders dated 20.5.2015 and 21.5.2015. However, in the said judgments, it was never considered as to what was “the decision making process” which was adopted by the petitioner and as to how the same was grossly arbitrary, reckless and bereft of judicial propriety. This Court while collectively deciding several First Appeals filed against several orders in Land Acquisition References had, while relying on several judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court land acquisition matters laid down broad principles which should be followed in land acquisition matters, however while passing the aforesaid two orders, but individual approaches of the individual judicial officers and their individual decision making processes in reaching to the respective conclusions was never looked into by this Court and, therefore, the aforesaid judgments dated 20.5.2015 and 21.5.2015 cannot be said to be the conclusive findings of the High Court on the decision making process of the petitioner, as no such finding is recorded in the same.”  
                                  To fortify and buttress its stand, the High Court then cites decided case by Apex Court as pointed out in para 17 which states that, “In this regard, it was contended on behalf of High Court that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, reported in 1993 (2) SCC 56 has held in paras 28 and 29 that “the officer, who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers if acts negligently or recklessly or attempts to confer undue favour on a person or takes decision which is actuated by corrupt motive, then he is not acting as a judge”.”
                                   It is further pointed out in this same para 17 that, “The Hon’ble Apex Court returned a conclusive finding that in such matters, the Courts are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the final orders with reference to the ultimate decision, because an error in judgment, can be corrected in appeal or revision, but the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action against the officer concerned if there is evident violation of the Conduct Rules and if the decision making process is found to be reckless and arbitrary and actuated by corrupt motives. Thereafter the Hon’ble Apex Court has mentioned certain cases/occasions as an example, in which disciplinary actions can be taken against the judicial and quasi judicial offers in the discharge of their judicial functions.”
                       It cannot be lost on us that it is then noted in para 18 that, “The aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of K.K. Dhawan (supra) by the Hon’ble three Judges Bench was distinguished by another judgment of the two Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of Junjarao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, reported in 1999 (7) SC 409, wherein paras 40 to 44 of the same, the initiation of disciplinary proceeding against judicial/quasi-judicial authorities was not appreciated if it is based on their discharge of judicial/quasi-judicial functions. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a latest judgment of Union of India v. Duli Chand, reported in 2006 (5) SCC 680 upheld the Hon’ble three Judges decision of K.K. Dhawan’s case (supra) and overruled the decision of Nagarkar’s case. Therefore as per the settled position of law, the legality and correctness of the decision making process and the conduct of the officers in discharge of his duties has to be considered in the matter of disciplinary proceeding initiated against him and the final decision passed by the officer has no relevance. On this basis, it was submitted on behalf of High Court that since the decision making process adopted by the petitioner while deciding both the Land Acquisition References are bereft of judicial propriety, settled judicial norms and are actuated by extraneous considerations, therefore, it amounts to misconduct, for which the petitioner has rightly been dismissed from service. The finding given by the Enquiry Officer about the wind fall gain made available to the claimants by the petitioner were absolutely shocking and since the same were not mere errors of judgment, but they are evident blunders deliberately by the petitioner, therefore, the Enquiry Officer had rightly concluded from the decision making process of the two orders of the petitioner that it was the result of extraneous considerations and the same was not mere error of the judgment therefore both the charges were rightly proved.”
                       More pertinently, it is then observed in para 19 that, “The Apex Court in catena of judgments including the case of Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, reported in 1999 (5) SCC 762, para-11 and Mihir Kumar Hajara Chaudhary v Life Insurance Corporation, reported in 2017 (9) SCC 404, para 30, has held that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to the departmental enquiry and the Enquiry Officer upon analysis of document/material should give its conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of material available on record. The scope of judicial review in matters regarding disciplinary enquiry is very limited and findings arrived at in a disciplinary enquiry are interfered with only when there are no material for the said conclusion, which is not the case in hand and therefore, there is no justification for any interference in the matter.”
                                   Simply put, para 20 then goes on to add further stating that, “It is a settled position of law as laid down in the case of R. Ravi Chandran Ayer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharyaji & others, reported in 1995 (5) SC 457, paras 21 to 23 and Newal Singh v. State of U.P., reported in 2003 (8) SCC 117, para-2 that a judicial officer, against whom the charges of acting against judicial norms and propriety have been proved in a departmental enquiry. A judicial officer is not an ordinary Government Servant and must be above suspicion. The conduct of the judicial officer must be beyond doubt as a Judge must be a person of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, fairness and should be impervious to corrupt or venial influences.”
                             Interestingly enough, it is then noted in para 21 that, “Furthermore by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, ‘control’ over subordinate judiciary is vested in the High Court and the said control is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation and is to subserve a basic feature of the Constitution i.e. independence of Judiciary. The Scheme envisaged in the Constitution makes the High Court, the sole authority, which have administrative and disciplinary control and jurisdiction over the employees and officers of subordinate Courts.”
                              No wonder, it is then pointed out in this same para that, “The Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2011 (10) SCC 1 (paras 129 to 134 & para-218) has held that the High Court retains the subordinate Judiciary, which includes the power to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, place them under suspension during enquiries and to impose appropriate punishment on them, therefore, highest credence has to be given to the decision taken by the Full Court of the Hon’ble High Court in service matters of its officers and employees under Article 235 of the Constitution of India.”
                                  While pooh-poohing the grounds on which the petitioner relied while claiming parity, it was then observed by the High Court Bench in para 22 that, “So far as reliance placed by the petitioner on a judgment and order dated 31.05.2011 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Writ Petition No. 425 (S/B) of 2016 i.e. Sanjay Kumar Goel v. State of U.P. & others is concerned, with which parity of treatment was claimed by the petitioner it may be noticed that the petitioner has tried to draw parity with the petitioner of the aforesaid writ petition by suggesting that the said officer was similarly situated and the aforesaid case was also a case of dismissal passed against a judicial officer for deciding Land Acquisition Reference under similar circumstance and since he was acquitted in the said case, therefore, parity should be given to the petitioner as well, however, it is noteworthy that the mere fact that a judicial official punished with the order of dismissal was exonerated by this Hon’ble Court in a land acquisition matter by allowing his writ petition, cannot justify that the same treatment should be given to all judicial officers so punished. In that case, the land acquisition proceedings were initiated by Ghaziabad Development Authority whereas NOIDA was the acquiring body while in the case of the petitioner the Scheme was different, the authority was different and even the exemplars were different. The entire circumstances of the ‘decision making process’ of that case were absolutely different than the case in hand, therefore no parity can be drawn between the two and hence the reliance placed by the petitioner on the aforesaid judgment passed in the case of Sanjay Kumar Goel (supra) was absolutely misconceived.”
                                 It would be imperative to mention here that it is then conceded in para 23 that, “Even from a perusal of the records of the enquiry produced by the High Court Registry it is quite evident that the reply to the show cause notice dated 26.09.2005, the detailed comments/reply of the petitioner dated 22/24.10.2005 submitted against the same have already been duly considered by the Administrative Committee and the Full Court and only thereafter the punishment order of dismissal was recommended on 17.12.2005 on the resolution dated 29.11.2005 of the Administrative Committee. The appointing authority, while considering the recommendation of the Full Court and applying its independent mind, has thereafter passed the impugned punishment order dated 17.01.2006. We do not find that there is any infirmity or illegality in the aforesaid punishment order.”
                                  Finally and most importantly, let us now discuss the concluding paras. Para 24 envisages that, “In view of what has been stated herein above, we are of the concerned opinion that no case is made out in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner has utterly failed in justifying her conduct in discharging her judicial functions and in deciding the two Land Acquisition References, in the most reckless and arbitrary manner, which were bereft of all judicial propriety and since it amounted to misconduct under the Conduct Rules, therefore, the finding of the Enquiry Officer in proving the aforesaid two charges cannot be negated.” Lastly, para 25 then concludes by holding that, “The instant writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.”
                                   All said and done, while the petitioner has certainly lost the legal battle in the High Court of Allahabad but she still has the option to further pursue her legal battle in the Supreme Court. The jury is still out on what the petitioner decides to do and what the outcome is finally! But certainly she has suffered a major setback but we must remember that it is not the final setback for her as all doors are still not closed on her! The Allahabad High Court certainly has sought to send out a loud and clear message that, “A judicial officer is not an ordinary government servant and must be above suspicion.” There can be no denying this! But it would be premature to treat this as final verdict! She can still be acquitted by the Apex Court if her lawyers can prove that she been treated harshly! Let’s wait and see what unfolds in the coming days on this because only time will tell what happens and whether the Allahabad High Court will stand vindicated or the petitioner!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh. 

SC Imposes Rs 5 Crore Penalty On A Medical College For Playing Fraud On It; Orders Prosecution Of Its Dean

It must be said with consummate ease that in a landmark, latest and laudable judgment titled Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan University & Another v. Union of India & Others in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1001 of 2017 with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 731 of 2018 which was delivered on January 17, 2019 by a three-Judge Bench of Supreme Court and authored by Justice L Nageswara Rao for himself, Justice Sharad A Bobde and Justice R Subhash Reddy, the Supreme Court has imposed a whooping penalty of Rs 5 crore on a medical college for playing fraud on it. It also ordered prosecution of its dean. While clearly barring the R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre from making admissions for the 1st year MBBS course for the next two years, the three-Judge Bench of Apex Court has also ordered prosecution of college dean SS Kushwaha under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The Apex Court also directed the college to pay compensation of Rs. 1 lakh to each student admitted in the college for the academic year, apart from the refund amount payable to them.
                    To start with, para 1 of this judgment first and foremost brings out that, “Permission was granted for the establishment of Petitioner No. 2-R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre (hereinafter referred to as “the College”) by Respondent No. 1 on the recommendation of Respondent No. 2-herein- Medical Council of India, with an intake capacity of 150 MBBS seats annually for the academic year 2014-15. An inspection was conducted on 23rd and 24th of February, 2015 for grant of renewal for admitting the 2nd Bath of 150 MBBS students for the academic year 2015-16. The Medical Council of India (MCI) recommended to the Central Government to reject the permission for admission of the 2nd Batch of 150 MBBS students for the academic year 2015-16 in view of the deficiencies found in the Assessment Report. A review/reassessment was done by the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 at the request of the Central Government. The Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 reconsidered the matter and recommended to the Central Government not to renew the permission for the 2nd Batch of MBBS students for the academic session 2015-16. There was a further recommendation that the College should be debarred from making admissions for the next two academic sessions. The Central Government accepted the recommendation made by Respondent No. 2 and rejected the request for renewal. Yet another review/reassessment was done by the Central Government pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in SLP (C) No. 19543 of 2015 vide order dated 8th September, 2015. A Committee was constituted to afford an opportunity of hearing to the College. The College was denied permission to admit the 2nd Batch of the MBBS students for the year 2015-16 by an order of Respondent No. 1 dated 28th September, 2015. The High Court of Delhi quashed the said order dated 28th September, 2015 and directed the Central Government to examine the matter afresh vide its order dated 29th December, 2015 in Writ Petition (C) No. 9663 of 2015. The Central Government reiterated its decision by an order dated 1st January, 2016 to not grant permission to the College to admit the 2nd Batch of MBBS students. One more inspection was ordered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 11th May, 2016 in Writ Petition (C) No. 21223 of 2015. Respondent No. 2 filed SLP (C) No. 14729 of 2016 challenging the order dated 11th May, 2016 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.  On 15th July, 2016, this Court directed that a fresh inspection should be conducted. The order dated 15th July, 2016 was modified by this Court on 9th September, 2016 by which the Oversight Committee was requested to consider the matter pertaining to the admission of students in the College for the year 2016-17.”
                                To be sure, it is then added in para 2 that, “By an order dated 27th September, 2016, the Oversight Committee accorded approval to the College for admission of students for the year 2016-17. The Oversight Committee directed the College to rectify the deficiencies and submit a compliance report to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare by 27th September, 2016. The College was informed that a bank guarantee of Rs. Two Crores in favour of Respondent No. 2 has to be furnished by 27th September, 2016. It was stated that non-compliance of the conditions imposed by the Oversight Committee would result in the College getting debarred from fresh intake for two years commencing 2017-18. The 2nd Batch of 150 students for the academic year 2016-17 were admitted pursuant to the conditional permission for renewal granted by the Central Government.”
                               Truth be told, it is then brought out in para 3 that, “A joint verification inspection was conducted on 5th and 6th January, 2017 for renewal of permission to the 3rd Batch of MBBS students for the academic year 2017-18. Finding gross deficiencies in the infrastructure, clinical material, teaching faculty and other physical facilities in the College, the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 concluded that the undertaking given by the College on 28th September, 2016 was breached. The Committee decided to recommend to the Central Government to debar the College from admitting students for the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The Central Government accepted the recommendations made by Respondent No. 2 and by an order dated 31st May, 2017 debarred the College from making admissions for the years 2017-18 and 2018-19. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed Writ Petition  (C) No. 8100 of 2017 filed by the College questioning the legality of order of the Central Government dated 31st May, 2017. The College was permitted to provisionally admit 150 students. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 21st July, 2017 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent No. 2 filed SLP (C) No. 20400 of 2017 before this Court. The re-inspection as directed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was confirmed by this Court by an order dated 14th August, 2017. It was made clear in the said order that the admission of students shall be completely provisional, being dependent on the result of the inspection. It was further mentioned that the admission of students shall be liable to be cancelled if the College fails in the inspection and the students will not be entitled to claim any equity. The students were directed to be informed by the Counselling committee about the said condition. An inspection was scheduled to be conducted on 14th & 15th September, 2017 for renewal of the 4th Batch of students in College for the MBBS course. According to Respondent No. 2, the said inspection had to be aborted midway as the assessors were manhandled and physically forced to leave the College. At the request made by the College, another inspection was conducted on the 25th & 26th September, 2017. The Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 considered the Assessment Report at its meeting held on 26th September, 2017 and decided that admissions of the 4th Batch of 150 MBBS students for the year 2017-18 should be cancelled in view of the following deficiencies found in the inspection conducted on 25th & 26th September, 2017:
I.                 Bed Occupancy at 10 a.m. on day of assessment was 01.07% (i.e. 7 out of 410).
II.              There were no Major Surgical operation on day of assessment.
III.          There was NIL Normal Delivery or LSCS on day of assessment.
IV.          Data of Clinical material like Casualty attendance, Discharges, Major & Minor Operations, Radiological Investigations as provided by the Institute are inflated.
V.             ICUs: There was NIL patient in NICU/PICU & only 1 patient each in ICCU, MICU, SICU on day of assessment.
VI.          Blood Bank: NIL Unit was dispensed on day of assessment.
VII.      Deficiency of faculty is 15.65% as detailed in the report.
VIII.   Shortage of residents is 40% as detailed in the report.
IX.          Diet order was not recorded in the register on day of assessment.
X.              MRD is partly manual.
XI.          Facilities in Central Research Laboratory are not adequate. There are NIL ongoing or completed research projects.
XII.       RHTC: Cold Chain equipment are not available. Survey / MCH / Immunization / Family Welfare registers are not available. No activities under National Health Programmes are carried out.
XIII.   UHCC: Cold Chain equipment are not available. Survey / MCH / Immunization / Family Welfare Registers are not available.”
                                    Bluntly put: How can all this be dismissed lightly? How can all this be overlooked? How can all this be justified on any ground? How can all this justify mild action? How can all this not justify most strict action?
                        No wonder that the Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 rightly decided to act tough as pointed out in para 4 which states that, “The Executive Committee of Respondent No. 2 further decided that Regulation 8(3)(1)(b) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999 (“the MCI Regulations) should be invoked in view of the deficiencies found in the bed occupancy and residents. The said decision of Respondent No. 2 was approved by the Oversight Committee.”
                       Be it noted, it is also clarified in para 4 as to what Regulation 8(3)(1)(b) entails. It is as follows:-
“Regulation 8(3)(1)- The permission to establish a medical college and admit students may be granted initially for a period of one year and may be renewed on yearly basis subject to verification of the achievements of annual targets. It shall be the responsibility of the person to apply to the Medical Counil of India for purpose of renewal [as per latest time schedule] prior to the expiry of the initial permission. This process of renewal of permission will continue till such time the establishment of the medical college and expansion of the hospital facilities are completed and a formal recognition of the medical college is granted. Further admissions shall not be made at any stage unless the requirements of the Council are fulfilled. The Central Government may at any stage convey the deficiencies to the applicant and provide him an opportunity and time to rectify the deficiencies.
   (b) Colleges in the stage of III & IV renewal (i.e. Admission of fourth & fifth batch): [If it is observed during any inspection of the Institute that the deficiency of teaching faculty and/or Residents is more than 20% and/or bed occupancy is < 65%, compliance of rectification of deficiencies from such an institute will not be considered for renewal of permission in that Academic year.]”
                                    Needless to say, it is then divulged in para 5 that, “Respondent No. 2 directed the College to discharge all the students admitted for the academic year 2017-18 by its letter dated 29th September, 2017. The Principal Secretary (Medical Division Department), Government of Madhya Pradesh- Respondent No.3-herein was requested to cancel the admission of students made in the College for the academic year 2017-18.”
                   While elaborating in detail, it is then pointed out in para 6 that, “The communications dated 29th September, 2017 to the College and the Respondent No. 3 are subject matter of challenge in this Writ Petition. The College sought a further direction that a fresh inspection should be conducted strictly in accordance with the Assessor’s Guide. While issuing notice on 23rd October, 2017, this Court stayed the operation of the communication dated 29th September, 2017. On 24th October, 2017 it was clarified that the students admitted as per the order dated 14th August, 2017 in SLP (Civil) No. 20400 of 2017 shall be permitted to continue with their studies. Thereafter, on a consideration of the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection dated 25th & 26th September, 2017 and the submissions made on behalf of both sides, this Court by an order dated 14th December, 2017 directed the admission of the students to be cancelled. This Court took note of the order dated 14th August, 2017 which made the admission of students subject to the result of the inspection. As the students were found not to be complicit and not having any role to play in non-compliance of the requisite standards by the College, this Court considered it expedient to direct the students to be accommodated in other colleges. By referring to the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection done on 25th & 26th September, 2017, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted that the College was indulging in fraud by showing persons who were not sick as patients only for the purpose of showing compliance of the minimum requirements. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the College refuted the said contention and argued that all the patients were genuine. As this Court was in no position to determine the truth or otherwise of the allegations, an enquiry was directed to be conducted into the correctness of the statistics, reports and material placed before this Court by the College along with the Writ Petition. For the said purpose, a committee was constituted by this Court. A senior officer deputed by the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), was directed to head the Committee which would have two doctors of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) as its members. It is relevant to note that in the said order dated 14th December, 2017 it was made clear that the College may have to face prosecution under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) if the allegations made by Respondent No. 2 were found to be correct. The decision to constitute a committee by this Court was arrived at after a thorough examination of the voluminous material placed on record by the College. The material was constituted of several photographs showing patients occupying the beds and their case sheets. A bare perusal of the photographs did not convince us that the patients were genuine. After a close scrutiny of the case sheets, we had serious doubts about the necessity for admission of persons suffering from minor ailments as in-patients.”
                                 By the way, it is then pointed out in para 7 that, “The students who were admitted in the College for the year 2017-18 were directed to be adjusted in the other private medical colleges in the State of Madhya Pradesh for the academic year 2018-19 by an order passed by this Court on 3rd July, 2018. The students were directed to pay the fees to the colleges to which they are admitted. It was mentioned in the said order dated 3rd July, 2018 that the entitlement of the students for refund of the fee paid for admission to the College shall be adjudicated at the final hearing of the Writ Petition.”
                                 As it turned out, para 8 then specifies that, “The Committee appointed by this Court on 14th December, 2017 submitted its Report on 12th July, 2018. It was mentioned in the Report inter alia, that the Committee visited the College on 29th January, 2018 around 11.30 a.m. and found that the patient waiting area for OPD Registration was totally empty. After visiting several wards in the hospital, the Committee found that the attendance of patients was abysmally low and the patients shown to be admitted in OPDs/wards were not in conformity with the actual number of patients. It was further stated in the Report that a scrutiny of the medical case files of the in-patients showed that their admission was not necessary. The case duty rosters for duty doctors as well as nurses were not available in the wards and the junior doctors on duty were not able to identify and confirm who had written the case notes/progress notes on the case files.”
                           More importantly, para 9 while dwelling on the conclusions of the Committee observes unambiguously that, “The Committee collected the medical sheets of 435 patients who were shown to have been admitted in the hospital on the date of the inspection conducted on 25th & 26th September, 2017. The hard disk that was obtained from the hospital for verification of the details of patients who were admitted prior to 7th January, 2018 was examined by the CBI. It was found that the hard disk was empty and did not contain any data. The conclusion of the Committee after a detailed enquiry revealed the following:  
“i. The petitioner college has claimed that 6 doctors namely, Dr. Ritesh Kumawat, Dr. MR Gaikwad, Dr. SB Petkar, Dr. Deepak Kaladagi, Dr. Jeetendra Gupta and Dr. Ram Ballabh Thakur couldn’t attend the MCI inspection on 25.09.2017 as they were summoned by Court/Police in connection with a motor accident case. However, such claim were found to be incorrect.
ii. All of the six doctors namely, Dr. Ritesh Kumawat, Dr. MR Gaikwad, Dr. SB Petkar, Dr. Deepak Kaladagi, Dr. Jeetendra Gupta, Dr. Ram Ballabh Thakur, when examined, denied having received any notice from police regarding the motor accident.
iii. Out of the 10 doctors (Sr. Residents/ Jr. Residents) who were not counted by the assessors on the strength of the petitioner college as faculty on the ground that they were not residing in the college hostel, 9 doctors could be contacted. Examination of those 9 doctors revealed:
·      07 doctors confirmed during enquiry that they were not staying in the hostel in the college campus and they themselves had conveyed the MCI assessors in this regard. It is mandatory to stay in hostel as per Assessor’s Guide issued by MCI for academic year 2018-19.
·      The other two resident doctors, i.e. Dr. Meenal Parmar and Dr. Arpita Mishra, stated that they were staying in the hostel but were not considered on the strength of the college by the MCI assessors.
iv. Out of the 8 resident doctors whih petitioner college had claimed to be on night duty and so couldn’t appear before MCI assessors by 11 AM, enquiry revealed that:
·      Out of the above mentioned 8 resident doctors, 6 resident doctors stated that they were not on payroll of the petitioner college on the day of inspection i.e. 25.09.2017. Even 4 of those doctors had stated that they never joined the hospital.
·      1 doctor (Dr. Ritesh Kumawat) stated that he was not present on the day of the inspection, i.e. 25.09.2017.
·      And another doctor Dr. Devyani Patel was present on 25.09.2017 but she was rightly excluded by the MCI assessors as she couldn’t make her presence by 12 noon (which was mandated as per Assessor’s Guide).
v. The 3 doctors namely Dr. Priyank Jain, Dr. Manoj Sahu and Dr. Amit Jain, who were not treated as Sr. Resident doctors by the MCI assessors doesn’t seem to be justifiable considering the fact that all three of them were treated as Sr. Resident Doctors on earlier inspection on 05.01.2017.
vi. Two tutors who have been shown as present in the assessment by the college had not attended the assessment proceedings on 25.09.2017.  
vii. Due to vague and incomplete type of the addresses mentioned in the record of the petitioner college, most of the patients could not be located as merely the names of the colonies and sub areas have been found to be mentioned on the patient case sheets. In the identified 21 patients, 8 are the employees/students of various RKDF institutions.
viii. On the basis of the medical analysis of the case sheets of the patients most doctors from AIIMS are of the similar view that it is doubtful that all these patients were actually admitted and that too for such a long duration.
ix. Most of the doctors are also of the opinion that the range of cases shown to be admitted was grossly inadequate for training of students.
x. The doctors were also of the opinion that in most of the case sheets prescriptions, operative notes, etc. appears to have been written by the same person in a very unprofessional manner. Also histopathological reports are very sketchy and incomplete.
xi. Dr. S.C. Sharma, Professor and HoD, ENT Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. As per his opinion most of the patients appear to be fictitious.
xii. Dr. H.L. Nag, Professor, Orthopedics, AIIMS has examined 52 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Orthopedics Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. He held that majority of those cases could have been managed without hospital admissions.
xiii. Dr. Naval Kishore Vikram, Professor General Medicine AIIMS has examined 97 medical patients of General Medicine and 12 patients of TB & Chest Department who were shown to be on bed on 25/26.09.2017. He has concluded that it appears doubtful that those patients were actually admitted in the hospital. Most of the patients appear to be over treated by various medications, particularly antibiotics. He also held that most of the cases had limited number of diagnosis which is grossly inadequate for training of medical students.
xiv. Dr. Pankaj Hari, Professor Paediatrics Department, AIIMS has examined 62 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Paediatrics Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. He concluded that the admitted cases have limited diagnosis which is quite inadequate for training of students in a medical college. He also raised doubt over the authenticity of those medical files.
xv. Dr. Vinod K. Khetan, Professor, Department of Dermatology and Venerelogy, AIIMS, examined 10 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Dermatology department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. He raised serious doubts over the authenticity of patient being actually admitted. He also opined that the range of cases admitted and their work up is grossly inadequate for the training of students.
xvi. Dr. Namrata Sharma, Professor, Deptt. Of Opthalmic Sciences, AIIMS has concluded that in out of total 17 cases, admission of the 02 patients was required whereas in all other cases patient could have been managed under day care OPD.
xvii. Dr. Mamta Sood, Professor, Deptt. Of Psychiatry, AIIMS examined 08 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Psychiatry Department of petitioner’s college on 25th/26.09.2017. Though she mostly agreed that the treatment shown to be given to the patients was appropriate, but she opined that they didn’t require to be admitted.
xviii. Dr. Ongikla Bhutia, Professor, Division of Oral Maxillofacil Surgery, AIIMS examined 11 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. The doctor opined that the diagnosis appeared repetitive. Neither pre-operative radiography nor post operative radiography were found on record. Consent for the surgery was also found to be absent in some cases.
xix. Dr. Deepika Deka, Professor, Deptt. Of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, AIIMS had examined 56 medical sheets of the patients shown on bed in Obstetrics and Gynaecology Department of petitioner’s college on 25/26.09.2017. She raised doubt whether actual surgery was performed or not. She also raised doubt over the genuineness shown for those patients.
xx. Dr. Subodh Kumar, Professor, Deptt. Of Surgical Disciplines, AIIMS examined 96 medical sheets of the patients on bed on 25/26.09.2017. He raised serious doubt over the genuineness of patients actually admitted. He also held that spectrum of cases shown to be admitted was grossly inadequate for training of students”.”
                         To put things in perspective, para 10 then enumerates that, “When the matter was listed on 5th December, 2018, Shri Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the College, submitted that the College intends to submit an apology for the lapses on their part. He requested us to give a quietus to this matter. He submitted that there are students presently studying in the institution who would be affected by any adverse order passed against the College.” In other words, Vivek Tankha who was the learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the College left no stone unturned to convince the Court that a quietus should be given to this matter as the College intended to tender an apology and the students studying there would be adversely affected! But the Bench was not quite convinced by it.
                           It would be imperative to mention here that para 11 while rebutting all untenable defences of College also took it to task for misleading it while also appreciating the line of action taken by MCI and observed that, “It has been brought to our notice by the Respondent No. 2- MCI that during the inspection conducted on 23rd & 24th February, 2015 for the purpose of granting admission for the academic year 2014-15, it was found that there were patients who were fake and others who had been admitted without any significant illness. The MCI was constrained to invoke Regulation 8(3)(1)(a) and Regulation 8(3)(1)(d) of the MCI Regulation in view of the College submitting forged/fake documents for the purpose of showing compliance with the minimum requirements. A complaint was made by Dr. A.K. Banerjee, Ex-Associate Professor of Surgery of the College on 25th March, 2015 alleging that more than 50% of the doctors who were shown as full-time Faculty Members were full-time private practitioners. Dr. Paresh Ruparel who was shown as a Professor of Surgery in the College was working as a surgeon at V.S. Hospital affiliated to MHL Medical College, Ahmedabad and was also running a private hospital. Dr Ruparel was referred to Ethics Committee and he was suitably dealt with for misdemeanor.”
                                Continuing in the same vein, it is then further added by the Apex Court Bench in the same para 11 that, “Without delving deep into the details of the Report submitted by the Committee, it is clear that the College is guilty of practicing fraud on this Court. The conduct of the College administration in indulging in manipulations and hoodwinking the authorities to project compliance of the requisite minimum standards for admission of students does not deserve to be condoned. The impunity with which the College has manufactured records to convince us that they were being unnecessarily hounded by the MCI in spite of their compliance with the required standards is deprecated. The brazen attempt by the College in taking this Court for a ride by placing on record maneuvered documents to obtain a favourable order is a clear-cut act of deceit. The justification given by the College regarding the absence of certain residents has turned out to be a concocted story. Had we not initiated an enquiry by the Committee of Experts, the fraud played by the College on this Court would not have come to light. It is trite that every litigant has to approach the Court with clean hands. A litigant who indulges in suppression of facts and misrepresentation is not entitled for any relief. The conduct of the College in this case to mislead this Court for the purpose of getting a favourable order is reprehensible and the College deserves to be dealt with suitably.”    
                           Of course, it is then elaborated in para 13 that, “In the affidavit filed along with the Writ Petition, Mr. S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre stated that the contents in the Writ Petition are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. According to the College, the Assessment Report pursuant to the inspection conducted on 25th and 26th September, 2017 was unfair as the justification for the absence of six members of the faculty was not accepted. The averment in the Writ Petition is to the effect that the said six doctors who had received summons from the Sub-inspector of Police, Bairagarh were at the police station at 11 a.m. on 25th September, 2017 in connection with the complaint relating to a motor accident case. The Committee enquired into the correctness of the claim made by the College regarding the absence of the six faculty members. Mr. Mohan Sharma, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police of Bairagarh Police Station stated that there was no such notice issued for summoning the six doctors to the police station. On further enquiry, the six doctors namely Dr. Ritesh Kumawat, Dr. MR Gaikwad, SB Petkar, Dr. Deepak Kaladagi, Dr. Jeetendra Gupta and Dr. Ram Ballabh Thakur denied having received any notice from the police station. Dr. Ritesh Kumawat further denied having filed any complaint regarding the motor accident. On the basis of the above findings of the Committee, it is clear that a false statement has been made by the College on the basis of a fabricated document. It was averred in the Writ Petition by the College that there were 365 patients in the hospital at the time of inspection on 25th September, 2017 but the inspection team recorded that they were only seven patients available. In support of their submission, reliance was placed on the computerized data of the Medical Records Department. The hard disk that was collected by the Committee to study the details of the patients who were admitted in the hospital prior to January, 2018 turned out to be empty and no data could be retrieved. The assertion made by the College regarding the genuineness of the patients in the hospital turned out to be false in the enquiry conducted by the Committee. The Committee had serious doubts whether the patients were actually admitted. Most of the case sheets, prescriptions, operative notes, etc. appeared to be written by the same person in a very unprofessional manner. The histopathological reports were found to be sketchy and incomplete. On a thorough examination of the case sheets, the experts from AIIMS opined that admission of the patients was unnecessary in a number of cases. In view of the fake and incomplete addresses mentioned in the records of the hospital, most of the patients could not be located. Only 21 patients were identified and 8 out of these turned out to be employees/students of the College. All this goes to show that the College has indulged in large scale malpractices in showing compliance of the minimum required standards to obtain permission for admission of students. The College further tried to mislead this Court that it is compliant in all respects, to get permission for the admission of students.”
                             While sparing no punches in lambasting the College for misleading the Court, it is then clearly and categorically held in para 14 that, “The brazen manner in which the College has indulged in relying upon manipulated records to mislead this Court for the purpose of getting favourable order deserves to be dealt with in a serious manner. We find that this is a fit case where Mr. S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the College must be held liable for prosecution under Section 193 IPC.”
                 It is then rightly reiterated in para 15 that, “There have been instances of errant medical colleges making admissions to the medical courses without obtaining the requisite permission. This Court came down heavily on such deviant colleges by imposing penalties for the illegalities committed by them in the matter of admission and for putting the students’ future in jeopardy. [(2015) 4 SCC 580 45.6 – Medical Council of India v. M.G.R. Educational & Research Institute University and (2016) 11 SCC 530 31, 31.2 & 31.4 – Medical Council of India v. Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS)] We have noticed a disturbing trend of some medical colleges in projecting fake faculty and patients for obtaining permission for admission of students. The Committee exposes the evil design of the College in resorting to deceitful methods to cheat the authorities concerned and this Court to secure permission for admission of students. Apart from the prosecution of the Dean, the College is liable to be suitably punished for committing perjury.”  
                                 It would be instructive to note that while not being convinced of the apology tendered by the College through its learned senior lawyer Vivek Tankha, the Apex Court Bench then noted in para 16 that, “We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the apology offered on behalf of the College. The College has been habitually indulging in foul play which is clear from the course of events in 2015 when faculty members were found to have been working elsewhere and running hospitals. The bravado shown by the College in an attempt to cheat the MCI, the Government and this Court has to be condemned. The Committee constituted by this Court is due to the vehemence with which the Counsels appearing for the College were trying to convince us that they are fully compliant with all the requirements. ‘Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology is shown of pentinence and hence it is liable to be rejected. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the Court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward’. [TN Godavarman Thirumalpad (102) v. Ashok Khot and Anr. (2006) 5 SCC 1 at Para 31]”
                                     It is then clarified in para 17 that, “The students who were admitted in the 1st Year MBBS Course in the College for the academic year 2017-18 were duly cautioned and informed that their admission was purely provisional and they cannot claim any equity if the College was later on found to be deficient. They have been directed to be admitted in other colleges for the years 2018-19. In the process, students have lost a precious academic year. However, they are entitled for the refund of the fee collected from them for admission to the College.”
                            Finally and most importantly, it is then concluded in para 18 that, “For the aforementioned reasons, we pass the following order:
(i)             Mr. S.S. Kushwaha, Dean of the R.K.D.F. Medical College Hospital and Research Centre i.e. Petitioner No. 2- herein is liable for prosecution under Section 193 IP. The Secretary General of this Court is directed to depute an Officer to initiate the prosecution in a competent Court having jurisdiction at Delhi.
(ii)          The College is barred from making admissions for the 1st Year MBBS course for the next two years i.e. 2018-19 and 2019-2020.
(iii)       A penalty of Rs. Five crores is imposed on the College for playing fraud on this Court. The amount may be paid to the account of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
(iv)       The students are entitled to receive the refund of fee paid by them for admission to the College for the academic year 2017-19. In addition, the College is directed to pay a compensation of Rs. One Lakh to the said students.”
Lastly, in para 19, it is held that, “The Writ Petition is dismissed accordingly.
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 731 OF 2018:     
    The Writ Petition is hereby dismissed in terms of the above judgment.”
                               In the ultimate analysis, it has to be said in all fairness that this latest, landmark and laudable judgment has sought to send a very loud and clear message to all Colleges that if they dare to break all rules and regulations and hope to get away easily by just tendering an apology, then they are themselves responsible for inviting trouble and are heading themselves into trouble for which no one but they themselves will be solely liable and held accountable and punished! They will be left with just no option but to shell out a huge penalty as we see in this high profile case where the concerned College is ordered to not just pay Rs 5 crore penalty but also to refund the fees paid by the students to the College for the academic year 2017-19 and in addition pay a compensation of Rs one lakh to the said students. All arguments and apologies tendered by the College through its learned Counsel Vivek Tankha just simply failed to cut ice with the three-Judge Bench of Apex Court who delivered this most latest and laudable judgment which has made headlines in all newspapers and all news channels! No doubt, all Colleges must always from now onwards bear this in mind and shed the false myth that they could easily take the system for granted and get away by just tendering an apology! The earlier this is done, the better it shall be for them to ensure that they too don’t end up with egg on their face as we see here!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Top 30 Colleges for BBA in India 2019 EduINDEX Ranking

College of BBA in India 2019, EduINDEX Ranking

1. Anil Surendra Modi School of Commerce (ASMSOC), Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies University

2. Christ University

3. Presidency College

4. Loyola College

5. Mount Carmel College

6. KJ Somaiya College of Arts and Commerce

7. Amity School of Business

8. Symbiosis Institute of Computer Studies & Research (SICSR)

9. JD Birla Institute

10. S.R.M. Engineering College

 
11. Ethiraj College for Women 
12. Ness Wadia College
13. Maharaja Surajmal Institute Of Technology
14. Jagannath International Management School, Kalkaji
15. Kristu Jayanti College
16. Center for Management Studies, Jain University
17. Prestige Institute of Management Dewas
18. Goswami Ganesh Dutta Sanatan Dharma (GGDSD) College, Sector 32
19. M.S. Ramaiah College of Arts, Science and Commerce
20. Maris Stella College (Autonomous)
21. St. Xavier\’s College
22. ITS Mohan Nagar
23. DAV College
24. Doon Business School
25. Manav Rachna International Institute of Research and Studies
26. Sri Dharmasthala Manjunatheshwara College(Autonomous)
27. Chandigarh Business School of Administration
28. Institute of Business and Management, GLA University
29. St Aloysius College (Autonomous)
30. DAV Centenary College
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Top 30 College for BCA in India 2019 EduINDEX Ranking

Top Colleges of BCA

1. Symbiosis Institute of Computer Studies & Research (SICSR)
2. Department of Computer Science, Christ University
3. Loyola College
4. Amity Institute of Information Technology
5. Kristu Jayanti College
6. Women\’s Christian College
7. St. Joseph\’s College
8. Stella Maris College
9. Presidency College
10. DAV College
11. Department of Computer Science, St. Xavier\’s College
12. The Oxford College of Science
13. Goswami Ganesh Dutta S.D. College
14. Maharaja Surajmal Institute Of Technology
15. ITS UG Institute, Mohan Nagar
16. Sri Ramakrishna College of Arts and Science
17. Faculty of Computer Applications & Information Technology, GLS University
18. MIT Arts, Commerce & Science College
19. Sri Dharmasthala Manjunatheshwara College(Autonomous)
20. St Aloysius College (Autonomous)
21. Ness Wadia College
22. School of Computer Science & IT, Jain University
23. Ethiraj College for Women
24. St Joseph\’s College (Autonomous)
25. Dev Samaj College For Women
26. St. Mira\’s College for Girls
27. Mehr Chand Mahajan DAV College for Women
28. Amity Institute of Information Technology
29. Sri Ramakrishna College of Arts and Science for Women
30. Maharani Laxmi Ammanni (MLA) College For Women

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To 30 Hotel Management Colleges of India 2019 EduINDEX Ranking

INDIA\’S BEST HOTEL MANAGEMENT COLLEGES 2019
1. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering & Nutrition (IHM), Pusa
2. Welcomgroup Graduate School of Hotel Administration
3. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering Technology and Applied Nutrition (IHM)
4. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering Technology and Applied Nutrition (IHM)
5. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering Technology and Applied Nutrition (IHM)
6. Banarsidas Chandiwala Institute of Hotel Management & Catering Technology
7. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering Technology and Applied Nutrition (IHM)
8. Department of Hotel Management – Christ University
9. Army Institute of Hotel Management & Catering Technology (AIHMCT)
10. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering Technology and Applied Nutrition (IHM)
11. Institute of Hotel Management, Catering Technology and Applied Nutrition
12. Institute of Hotel Management Catering Technology & Applied Nutrition (IHM Gwalior)
13. Faculty of Hospitality Management And Catering Technology, M S Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences
14. School of Hospitality & Tourism Studies, D Y Patil University
15. Amity School of Hospitality
16. Institute of Hotel Management (IHM Gurdaspur)
17. AIMS Institutes
18. Amity School of Hospitality
19. Chitkara School of Hospitality
20. SRM Institute Of Hotel Management And Catering Technology
21. Chandigarh Institute of Hotel Management
22. School of Hotel Management & Catering Technology
23. Guru Nanak Institute of Hotel Management
24. Department of Hotel Management, T John College
25. MMICT & BM (Hotel Management)
26. The ICFAI University Sikkim
27. Oriental School of Hotel Management
28. All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society\’s College of Hotel Management & Catering Technology
29. International Institute of Hotel Management
30. Sri Krishna Arts and Science College

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