Tag: law and order news

Strictest Punishment Must Be Awarded For Marital Rape

 Without mincing any words and coming straight to the heart of the matter, let me say this from the bottom of my heart that I fully support the burgeoning demand for making marital rape an offence. A rape is a rape. It cannot be justified under any circumstances! A husband who is supposed to protect his wife and take care of her in all possible respects if himself starts raping his wife must be awarded the strictest punishment and our laws must be suitably amended to make the laws more stricter and most importantly must make marital rape an offence immediately so that it can be checked! The figure of marital rape exceeds all our wildest imagination but never come in the limelight because very few cases are reported and out of them also less than a handful are registered and here too wife is finally cajoled or compelled by her own family members to relent and move ahead to save the so called institution of marriage from being destroyed which our politicians keep citing as a pretext to not making marital rape an offence! This is utterly reprehensible!

                                                Just because a man has married a woman that by itself does not confer the legitimate right or unbridled license to man to have sex with woman against her wish by forcing her in anyway. By marriage woman becomes equal partner with men and not an object or property of man whom a man can ravish as and when he likes and in the manner he likes caring a damn for woman’s wishes and safety! Highlighting the sheer hypocrisy of the political establishment in this, Supreme Court advocate Karuna Nundy reacted on Twitter that if a 17-year-old’s husband rapes her, it is legal, but if a 17-year-old  makes loves to her boyfriend, it is rape and then he goes to adult jail!
                                             If a husband can be prosecuted for murdering his wife, why can’t he be charged with raping her? A crime after all is a crime and under no circumstances should it ever be condoned! By not punishing marital rape, are we not reminded of a “stone age” mentality? In some states ruled by BJP, you can go to jail for eating beef but you face no punishment at all for raping your wife as you have the legal license! No marriage can confer unfettered right on husband to rape her wife without her consent!
                                                I am ashamed to note that in our Indian society it is considered the right of a husband to rape her wife as many times as he likes and that too against her wishes as people feel that marriage confers the right on husband to do so! I had myself heard a senior lawyer saying on the 9 o’ clock news on television that, “When you sign up for marriage, you sign up for sex”. Nothing on earth can be more atrocious!
                                           When a woman signs for marriage, she signs up for equal partnership and not surrenders her body rights to her husband as is very absurdly assumed even by some of learned lawyers and eminent academicians in India and in many other countries of the world! Infact, I very strongly feel that a husband who breaks the sacred sanctity of marriage and dares to forcibly rape her wife must be awarded the strictest punishment and such abominable and heinous offence deserve no mercy of any kind!
                                                  It is most unfortunate that in India a woman is regarded as personal property of man who has been vested with the marital right to rape her whenever he likes and as many times as he want. Nothing on earth can be more unfortunate than this! Worse still, a woman has no remedy and if she dares to go to police station, she is laughed at by policemen who say that, “Why did you marry him if you don’t want to have sex with him?” Even government feels that the introduction of a law against marital rape will destroy marriage! This is most ridiculous and absurd, to say the least!
                                             This male dominated patriarchal medieval mindset must change if our nation is to progress! Our laws must be suitably amended and marital rape must be made a criminal offence which must contain more punishment than even rape because here a husband betrays the sacred trust created by the marriage and so must be punished most harshly! There can be no exception and zero tolerance has to be demonstrated towards not only rape but also marital rape!
                                              According to the United Nations Population Fund, one-third of men out of a sample size of 9,205 admitted to have forced a sexual act on their wife. The study was conducted in eight states in India. The report also came out with the fact that 75% of married women were subjected to marital rape. What is most despicable is that inspite of all this, the government refuses to act in favour of making marital rape an offence and our Parliamentarians brazenly declare that the concept of marital rape in India does not apply to India leaving woman rights of protection against marital rape in the lurch!             
 
                                                      It is in this context that we have to see and appreciate what a trial court in Delhi while emphasizing the need for a law to recognize marital rape as a crime said that lakhs of women are made to suffer by their husbands. Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) Kamini Lau observed that absence of a provision to deal with marital rape as an offence exposes “double standards and hypocrisy in law” which has failed to recognize such incidents actionable offences. Lau was at great pains to note that, “It is unfortunate that we are yet to recognize woman’s right to control marital intercourse as a core component of equality. The shortfall in law was gross violation of the acknowledgement of a women’s right of self-determination i.e. control on all matters relating to her body and criminalization of marital rape.”
                                            The court made the observations while rejecting the bail application of a Delhi resident, Praveen Arora who was accused of sodomising his wife. The wife alleged that her husband used to rape and commit unnatural sex with her. She further said that the man showed her adult videos and bit her. Denying bail to the man, the court said, “There appears to be something seriously wrong with the accused and our society …with sexual perversity pervading the system where lakhs of women suffer this kind of sexual violence and perversity in silence.”
                                                     The court also cited United Nations Report – ‘All Forms of Violence against Women’ – which said 52 states have explicitly outlawed marital rape. The ASJ Kamini Lau made a scathing attack on this marital rape not being punishable in India  by saying that, “Non-recognition of marital rape in our nation set upon the bedrock of equality is gross double standard and hypocrisy in law which is central to the subordination and subjugation of women…it is rape when a man forces himself sexually upon a woman whether he has a license by marriage law to do it or not. It is the need of hour to seriously recognize and address this problem.” There can be no denying what ASJ Lau has said rather I would say that it is high time and now marital rape must be made an offence, to say the least.   
                                                Throwing out Praveen Arora’s bail application, court said it could not allow him to get away with such “perverse actions”, which had caused “physical and psychological damage to the young girl who was married for only eight months on account of his abusive relationship. Activists and lawyers agree with Lau. Senior advocate Meenakshi Arora, who is best known as the lawyer who propelled forward the ground breaking Vishaka guidelines in the Supreme Court minced no words in stating that, “A lot of violence exists in marriages, mostly in the form of spousal rape. We need to criminalise this so that the victims have a name for what they go through, so they have somewhere to turn to when they’ve been wronged.”
                                           In March 2014, Parliament rejected the Verma Committee’s proposal to criminalise marital rape . A panel of lawmakers said the proposed marital rape law “has the potential of destroying the institution of marriage”. Women’s rights activist Kalpana Vishwanath believes the decision could be attributed to “patriarchal anxiety that stops people from taking it up as a serious issue.”
                                                  If a woman is destroyed by raping her, what purpose does the institution of marriage serve? What institution are we talking about? That institution which confers unbridled license to a husband to rape her wife? Utter nonsense and load of rubbish this is! It only encourages husband to take her wife for granted and care a damn for her feelings and crave only for his own enjoyment and pleasure thus reducing her wife to a mere object to be exploited at her husband’s own sweet will!
                                            While craving for my esteemed readers exclusive indulgence, let me tell them that the Verma Committee Report headed by former CJI late Justice JS Verma recommended strongly that the exception for marital law be removed. It also recommended that –
1.  The law ought to specify that –
(a)        A marital or other relationship between the perpetrator or victim is not a valid defence against the crimes of rape or sexual violation;
(b)        The relationship between the accused and the complainant is not relevant to the inquiry into whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity;
(c)        The fact that the accused and victim are married or in another intimate relationship may not be regarded as a mitigating factor justifying lower sentences for rape.
Eminent jurist Leila Seth, who was herself part of the three member panel constituting the Justice JS Verma Committee found the Minister of State for Home Affairs Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary comments in Parliament that, “It was not possible to amend the Indian Penal Code to remove marital rape from the definition of rape because of the cultural and religious values in India and society’s belief that marriage is sacred” absolutely strange. She rightly pointed out that, “Today, you will deny woman the right to consent for sex after marriage ; tomorrow you could even deny her the right to life under the pretext of defending culture.” She further said that, “Unfortunately, as a Committee, they could only make recommendations and implementing it was in the hands of the State. Parliament can and must change the law as per the Committee’s recommendations.”
                                      Most recently, marital rape the Pam Rajput Committee that recently submitted its report to the women and child development ministry, has recommended that as a pro-woman measure, marital rape should be considered an offence irrespective of the age of the wife and the relationship between the perpetrator and survivor. The recommendations will be discussed in an inter-ministerial consultation scheduled later. There is no reason why this landmark recommendation should be not accepted immediately and in its totality.
                                      Women and Child Development minister Maneka Gandhi too had voiced her support of the view that marital rape was a form of violence against women and was “unacceptable”. She had stated categorically that, “My opinion is that violence against women shouldn’t be limited to violence by strangers. Very often a marital rape is not always about a man’s need for sex ; it is only about his need for power and subjugation. In such case, it should be treated with seriousness”.  
 
 
                                    According to the United Nations Population Fund, marital rape is the most common form of violence against women in India. Two-thirds of married Indian women surveyed by the UN, aged 15 to 49, allege to have been beaten and said their husbands had forced them to have sex on numerous occasions . In 2011, the International Men and Gender Equality Survey has revealed that one in five has forced their wives or partner to have sex. This must end now ! To make this happen, those husbands who unabashedly rape their wife must be made to face the strictest punishment and should not be allowed to go away lightly or scot free without facing any punishment as most unfortunately we are seeing right now!
                                              There are 104 countries that have outlawed marital rape. Why are we among the few nations like Yemen, Iran, Libya and Sudan where marital rape is no offence and woman has no option but to submit to rape? The present legal system in India does not recognize rape as crime except when a man rapes his wife who is below 15 years of age! This is most outrageous and deserves to be discarded right now !
                                                Marital rape became a crime in every state in USA by 1993. Most states of USA penalize marital rape like any other crime with fines that could exceed $ 50,000 and prison terms varying between several years and life in prison without parole. Marital rape was made a crime in Britain in 1991. The 2003 Sexual Offences Act clarified the law, giving consent a legal definition in England and Wales. Under the law, the accused would face punishment of five years in prison.
                                                    Many other countries like Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, France, Israel, Poland, Turkey, Malaysia and, this year, Bolivia too have all criminalized marital rape. In Bhutan, marital rape is considered an offence but not a serious one. It is punishable with a minimum prison term of one year and a maximum term of three years!
 
                                                Why are we splitting hairs on making marital rape a punishable offence? Why can’t we go headlong with the proposal to make marital rape an offence? Domestic violence in any form is most reprehensible and completely unacceptable! I earnestly call upon Centre and our lawmakers to immediately implement the proposals of Justice Verma Committee report and make marital rape punishable in same manner as rape with no ifs and buts whatsoever! What an irony that when a man has sex with a married woman with her consent, he is punishable for adultery under Section 497 of the IPC for imprisonment that may extend to  five years but if a husband commits marital rape and breaks the blind trust that his wife poses on him, he is not at all punishable! This is utterly disgusting and can never under any circumstances be ever justified!    
                                                  Every man has the birth right to do what he wants to do with his own body except obviously the right to commit suicide and here too Centre has now decided to decriminalize it so that committing suicide also becomes the birth right of not only man but also every person including woman! But no man including husband has the right to rape a woman against her will and even marriage confers no such right. It is only with her consent that he has the right to have physical relationship with her and not without her consent ! Those who fear that disgruntled wives would misuse this provision like they say has been the case with Section 498A must remember that just because a law can be misused is no ground for not making a law! I do, however, agree that some safety clauses must also be inserted like if the complaint is found to be false or malafide, woman can be fined or jailed or both! This would go a long way in checking false complaints and in saving the time of courts and unnecessary harassment of innocent husbands!  Under no circumstances can marital rape be condoned and if it is not made even now the most heinous offence then we have to blame our ownself for condoning it! Shame on us! Shame on our law makers!   
               
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut -250001, UP. 

Lok Sabha passed the abortion amendment bill, a big step for women's right

All major religions across the world believe that life is a creation, so a person does not have the right to end someone’s life. Voluntary abortion is a punishable offense in India. The right to life is a fundamental right in the Constitution of India. 

Some people believe that reproduction and abortion are a woman’s personal choices and rights. On the other hand many people believe that the ultimate duty of the state is to protect life, not to take life. 
They consider full protection as an integral part of life and abortion as immoral. 
After a great long debate in England, the abortion law was first enacted in 1967 after protests and amendments were made from time to time. There, abortion is allowed only on specific and prescribed basis. In 1973, abortion was legalized by the Supreme Court of America on special grounds and circumstances.
Under the Medical Abortion Act, 1971 in India, abortions can be done up to 12 weeks on the basis of a doctor’s opinion and up to 20 weeks based on the opinion of two doctors, if the life of a pregnant woman and her mental or physical health are in deep danger . Rape can lead to miscarriage within 20 weeks of conception, including failure of pregnancy and birth control measures, or even in the case of a fetus abnormality. There has been a demand for this law amendment in India for a long time. 
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill, 2020 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on March 2, 2020 by Dr. Harsh Vardhan, Union Health Minister, was passed by the Lok Sabha after discussion on 17 March. There is a proposal for some amendment to increase the upper limit of abortion from 20 weeks to 24 weeks. The bill is in the interest of rape victims, family sexual harassment, sexual protection of minors and personal dignity and female self-respect. It is proposed in the Bill to decide whether a pregnancy can be terminated after 24 weeks in cases of fetal abnormality.
In some cases abnormal fetus or unwillingness are life-threatening situations to the fetus and woman, due to which the abortion will now be done on the prescribed procedure and on a certain basis. Hopefully, the Rajya Sabha will also pass it in the current session. This amendment bill is progressive, fulfills a long expectation and conforms to and empowers the dignity and autonomy of women.

Lok Sabha passed the abortion amendment bill, a big step for women's right

All major religions across the world believe that life is a creation, so a person does not have the right to end someone’s life. Voluntary abortion is a punishable offense in India. The right to life is a fundamental right in the Constitution of India. 

Some people believe that reproduction and abortion are a woman’s personal choices and rights. On the other hand many people believe that the ultimate duty of the state is to protect life, not to take life. 
They consider full protection as an integral part of life and abortion as immoral. 
After a great long debate in England, the abortion law was first enacted in 1967 after protests and amendments were made from time to time. There, abortion is allowed only on specific and prescribed basis. In 1973, abortion was legalized by the Supreme Court of America on special grounds and circumstances.
Under the Medical Abortion Act, 1971 in India, abortions can be done up to 12 weeks on the basis of a doctor’s opinion and up to 20 weeks based on the opinion of two doctors, if the life of a pregnant woman and her mental or physical health are in deep danger . Rape can lead to miscarriage within 20 weeks of conception, including failure of pregnancy and birth control measures, or even in the case of a fetus abnormality. There has been a demand for this law amendment in India for a long time. 
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill, 2020 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on March 2, 2020 by Dr. Harsh Vardhan, Union Health Minister, was passed by the Lok Sabha after discussion on 17 March. There is a proposal for some amendment to increase the upper limit of abortion from 20 weeks to 24 weeks. The bill is in the interest of rape victims, family sexual harassment, sexual protection of minors and personal dignity and female self-respect. It is proposed in the Bill to decide whether a pregnancy can be terminated after 24 weeks in cases of fetal abnormality.
In some cases abnormal fetus or unwillingness are life-threatening situations to the fetus and woman, due to which the abortion will now be done on the prescribed procedure and on a certain basis. Hopefully, the Rajya Sabha will also pass it in the current session. This amendment bill is progressive, fulfills a long expectation and conforms to and empowers the dignity and autonomy of women.

Unfortunate That The Properties Of Religious And Charitable Institutions Are Being Usurped By Criminals

It is most unfortunate, most alarming and most reprehensible that none other than the Allahabad High Court which is the biggest court in whole of Asia has observed most seriously in a latest, learned, laudable and landmark judgment titled Bharat Das @ Ram Newaz Singh v. State of U.P. in Bail No. 8577 of 2020 delivered on 5 February 2021 that, “It is unfortunate that the properties of religious and charitable institutions are being usurped by criminals. This serious observation was made while dismissing the bail application filed by a man accused of selling properties of a Math (Akhil Bhartiya Udasin Sangat Thakurji Virajman Thakurdwara Jhaaulal) on the basis of forged and fabricated documents in favour of the land mafias. How can criminals be ever allowed to usurp the properties of religious and charitable institutions? But this is happening in reality as has been acknowledged by none other than the Allahabad High Court!

To start with, the ball is set rolling first and foremost in para 1 of this brief, brilliant, blunt and bold judgment wherein it is stated that, “The present petition under Section 439 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking bail in FIR No.0584 of 2019, under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then elaborates on the facts of the case stating in para 2 that, “The complainant claims to be Mahant Sarvarakar (Jere-Intejaamkaar) of Akhil Bhartiya Udasin Sangat Thakurji Virajman Thakurdwara Jhaaulal (herein after referred to as ‘the Math’). He is responsible for taking care of and managing properties of the Math and securing interest of the Math. It is also said that the complainant has been declared successor of Mahant Parmeshwar Das in the year 2002 unanimously and a Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 11.01.2016 passed in Writ Petition (Consolidation) No.130 of 2011 has declared him to be the legal heir and successor of Mahant Parmeshwar Das. Copy of the order dated 11.01.2016 was also annexed with the complaint. It is also alleged in the complaint that many imposters claiming to be Mahant of the Math in connivance with the land mafias have sold several properties and land of the Math illegally without taking permission from the District Magistrate. It is further alleged that the present accused-applicant who is a convict and a dreaded criminal by imposting himself as Mahant of Math had been involved in selling the properties of the Math illegally and fraudulently to the land mafias.”
While elaborating further and continuing in a similar vein, the Bench then observes in para 3 that, “The Math has land in Gata Nos.436, 296, 427A, 426, 531, 1951Ka, 1953Ka, 1955Ka, 1960Ka Kalli Paschim, Pargana Bijnore, Tehsil Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow. This land is being transferred on the basis of forged and fabricated documents by a gang of land mafias to earn huge money. Ex-guru of the complainant Somvansh Das had died on 14.04.1980. However, an imposter got his will registered on 04.04.2003 in the office of Dy. Registrar, Lucknow in respect of Gata No.436 and on that basis, this imposter has transferred 3 Bigha land in favour I.K. Singh, 5 Bigha land in favour of Sanjay Tiwari, 1 Bigha 13 Biswa 13 Biswanshi land in favour of Prabhu Nath Tiwari. Forged will got registered by Bharat Singh and the accused-applicant in furtherance of criminal conspiracy and, thereafter accusedIshwar Kant Singh imposted himself as Mahant Parmeshwar Das and transferred the land of Gata No.436 in favour of Satendra Singh Sikarwar on 05.08.2004 for Rs.20,00,000/-. Thereafter, Bharat Singh and the present accused-applicant again transferred the land in Gata Nos.436 and 296 by imposting Ishwar Kant Singh as Parmeshwar Das on 23.11.2016 for a sale consideration of Rs.20,00,000/-. Anil Kumar Singh transferred this land for 3rd time in Gata No.436 on 20.01.2007 in favour of Smt. Manisha Chola and Rekha Gupta. Thereafter, the accused-applicant and Bharat Singh on the basis of forged and fabricated documents of the land in Gata Nos.296, 427A, 426 and 531 executed an agreement for Rs.12,00,000/- on 20.02.2007 in favour of Bharat Singh himself from the accused-applicant and on 16.03.2007 the land was transferred in Gata No.531 in favour of Alpana Gupta for a sale consideration of Rs.36,27,100/-. For the fifth time accused-Bharat Singh and the accused-applicant by imposting Indra Kant Singh as Parmeshwar Das transferred Gata Nos.436 and 296 in the year 2006 in favour of Raj Babu Rastogi. Thus, accused-Bharat Singh and the accused-applicant, Satyendra Kumar Sikarwar, Anil Kumar Singh, Gyaneshwar Singh, Kaushal Kumar, Santosh Singh, Kalpana Gupta, Raj Babu Rastogi had transferred the land of the Government in Gata No.436 and 296 on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. On the basis of forged will which got executed after 23 years from the death of Mahant Somvans Das, these accused have cheated Rs.1.5 Crores by selling the land of the Math on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. These accused had threatened the complainant of his life and had said that they would usurp entire property and land of the Math. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, the FIR in question has been lodged.” 
Of course, it is then observed in para 4 that, “It is alleged that the present accused-applicant is an imposter who is selling Math land in an illegal manner. Several instances of the cases pending against the accused-applicant have been given in the complaint and, it is alleged that the present accused-applicant has sold the land in Gata Nos.2119, 2118, 676, 2263 also.”
As a corollary, what follows next is then stated in para 5 that, “On the basis of aforesaid complaint, the FIR in question came to be registered against the accused-applicant and other named accused at FIR No.0585 of 2019 under Sections 34, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 427, 447, 504 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow.”
As we see, para 6 then enunciates that, “It is stated that the accused-applicant has been awarded life imprisonment in Sessions Trial No.46 of 1984 and has been found guilty for offence under Sections 307/34, 301/34, 304/34 IPC. It is further alleged that on 12.02.2007, the accused-applicant acted as an imposter of Mahant executed ikrarnama in favour of Bharat Singh and others. He has also been convicted in Sessions Trial No. 242 of 1979 for offences under Sections 364/149, 302/149, 307/149 IPC and was awarded life imprisonment. In the FIR, it is further alleged that the accused persons by using false and fabricated documents illegally bought and sold the property of the Math by threatening the complainant.”
To be sure, it is then stated in para 7 that, “An affidavit in support of the bail application has been filed by Baba Jeetu Das, son of Mahant Baba Bharat Das.”
It cannot be glossed over that it is put forth in para 9 that, “Learned counsel for the accused-applicant submits that the complainant has falsely claimed that Mahant Parmeshwar Das was Jere-Intejaamkaar of the Math and the informant is the chela of Mahant Parmeshwar Das. The fact of the matter is that the present accused-applicant succeeded as Jere-Intejaamkaar of the Math after demise of Mahant Ramji Das and an order dated 16.07.2005 was passed by Consolidation Officer, Sadar, Lucknow to this effect in Case No.88 of 2005. Present accused-applicant is jere-intejaamkaar of the properties of the land in question till date. Mahant Parmeshwar Das has executed a declaration deed duly registered in the Office of Sub Registrar on 07.09.2012 declaring that the complainant was a dishonest person and wanted to usurp land and properties of Math. The complainant was not the chela of Mahant Parmeshwar Das as claimed by him. Mahant Parmeshwar Das himself had moved an application against the complainant in Police Station Kotwali Chowk on 14.09.2012.”
While stating the factual position, it is then noted in para 10 that, “The correct facts are that Mahant Ramji Das was chela of Somvansh Das and the accused-applicant is chela of Mahant Ramji Das. Allegation against him that he had executed a forged will, is wholly incorrect. Learned counsel has also submitted that the land sold by him was for the purposes of maintaining the Math and for better management of the properties. It has been further submitted that the present complainant himself has a criminal history.”
Furthermore, it is then envisaged in para 11 that, “It is further submitted that in Civil Suit No.155 of 1994 vide judgment and order dated 24.10.1995 passed by Civil Judge by which the present accused-applicant has been declared as successor of Mahant Ramji Das and on the basis of the order dated 18.11.2004 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Sadar Lucknow, name of the accused-applicant has been mutated while deleting the name of Jere-Intejaamkaar, Mahant Baba Ramji Das. Settlement Officer had dismissed the appeal filed against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and, thereafter the revision was also dismissed by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) vide his order dated 26.04.2010.”
It is worth noting that it is then stated in para 12 that, “A Writ Petition No.130 (Consolidation) of 2011: Mahant Parmeshwar Das vs Additional Collector ‘Finance and Revenue’, Lucknow is pending in this Court. Counter affidavit was filed by the accused-applicant in 2014 but till date the rejoinder affidavit has not been filed and the writ petition is still pending.”
On the one hand, it is stated in para 13 that, “Learned counsel for the accused-applicant has submitted that in many cases mentioned against the accused-applicant, he has been either acquitted or he is not involved in the commission of the offence. He, therefore, has submitted that the accused-applicant himself is grabbing the property of Math and he wants to put the present accused-applicant aside and, therefore, false cases are being instituted against him. The accused-applicant has been in jail since 23.07.2020 and, therefore, he is liable to be enlarged on bail.”
On the contrary, it is then stated in para 14 that, “On the other hand, Mr. Rao Narendra Singh, learned AGA has submitted that it has come in the investigation of the offence that the present accused-applicant fraudulently after preparing forged and fabricated documents, had been selling the properties of the Math by imposting himself as Mahant of the Math whereas he has no right to sell the properties. The accused-applicant had been convicted for life by the III-Additional District Judge, Fatehpur in the year 1981. He is a history sheeter of District Fatehpur and several cases are registered against him.”
It cannot be lightly dismissed that it is then unearthed in para 15 that, “To avoid the police action, he came to the Math as Mahant and as soon as Mahant Ramji Das died, he declared himself as Mahant of the Math by forging the stamp of Gram Sabha Babutha Kala without there being any witness. The fact is that successor of Mahant Ramji Das Ji is his chela, Chacha Dayal Das Awasthi and the Court has declared him to be successor and Mahant of the Math. Present accused-applicant had killed Baba Dayal Das and declared himself to be the successor of Ramji Das. He has also killed Basraj Singh, the witness of the murder of Mahant Dayal Das Awasthi. Mangement of U.P. Udaseen Sampradaya Prabhandh Trust had extricated the present accused-applicant as Mahant on 06.03.2020.”
Damningly, the Bench then also makes it known in para 16 that, “The accused-applicant had presented several of his gang members as imposters of Baba Parmeshwar Das. 23 years after the death of Mahant Soman Das, the accused-applicant had got the forged will registered by imposter of Baba Soman Das.”
More damningly, the Bench then castigates in para 17 stating that, “Despite order passed by the High Court in the writ petition filed by Parmeshwar Das in which stay was granted regarding disposing of the land of the Math, the accused-applicant got registered a forged trust deed namely, Thakur Ji Maharaj Trust and showing his members as disciple (chela) and declared him as treasurer. He started transferring entire money of the Math. The accused had executed several sale-deeds fraudulently on the basis of forged and fabricated documents in favour of the land mafias and there are sufficient evidence against him for committing the offence.”
Most damningly, the Bench then discloses in para 18 bringing out that, “In the counter affidavit, it has been stated that so far following 15 cases have been found against the accused-applicant and investigation is on in respect of other cases:- 
(i) Case Crime No.198/1978, under Section 13 Gambling Act, Police Station Thariyaon, Fatehpur. 
(ii) Case Crime No.199/1978, under Section 25 Arms Act, Police Station Thariyaon, Fatehpur.
(iii) Case Crime No.112/1983, under Section 307 IPC, Police Station Thariyaon, Fathepur.
(iv) Case Crime No.185/1985 under Section 364/302 IPC, Police Station Thariyaon, Fatehpur. 
(v) Case Crime No.14/17, under Section 147, 148, 149, 302, 309 IPC, Police Station Thariyaon, Fatehpur. 
(vi) Case Crime No.346/99 under Sections 302/120B IPC, Police Station Munshiganj, Sultanpur.
(vii) Case Crime No.62/2000 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302 IPC, Police Station Munshiganj, Amethi. 
(viii) Case Crime No.544 of 2009, under Section 420 IPC, Police Station Mohanlalganj, Lucknow.
(ix) Case Crime No.162/2015 under Sections 452, 504, 506, 323 IPC, Police Station Chowk, Lucknow.
(x) Case Crime No.659/2018, under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 308, 506 IPC, 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, Police Station Thakurganj, Lucknow.
(xi) Case Crime No.25/2019, under Sections 147, 379 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow. 
(xii) Case Crime No.125/2019, under Sections 147, 379, 448 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow.
(xiii) Case Crime No.584/2019, under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow.
(xiv) Case Crime No.585/2019, under Sections 34/419, 420, 427, 447, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow.
(xv) Case Crime No.589/2019, under Sections 147, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506, 34 IPC, Police Station P.G.I., Lucknow.”
Most revealingly, after considering the submissions of the counsel for the accused-applicant as well as learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for the complainant as stated in para 19, it is then finally and far most crucially held in para 20 that, “It is unfortunate that the properties of religious and charitable institutions are being usurped by criminals. Looking at the long criminal history of the accused-applicant and his involvement in the commission of the offence i.e. selling property of the Math by the accused-applicant in active connivance with the land mafias without any authority or competence is serious offence and, therefore, this Court does not find any ground to release the accused-applicant on bail at this stage and this bail application is hereby rejected at this stage.” 
On a concluding note, it must be said that such instances of illegal land grabbing by mafias especially the properties of religious and charitable institutions are becoming more and more common and frequent which is certainly a cause of grave concern. Even the Allahabad High Court itself has noticed this most dangerous trend of religious and charitable institutions being usurped by criminals and mafias. How can all this be allowed to go on unchecked, uninhibited and unpunished? This alone explains why the Allahabad High Court refused to grant bail to the accused-applicant by rejecting the bail application! Very rightly so!
Sanjeev Sirohi

Disha Ravi granted bail, Court says no real evidence to prove the accusations

Yesterday, while granting bail to environmental activist Disha Ravi in ​​the toolkit case related to the farmers’ movement, the court said that creating a WhatsApp group and editing a toolkit is not a crime. Delhi’s Patiala House Court said on Tuesday, “You cannot put anyone in bars only for disagreeing with the government’s policies.” Late night, Disha was released from Tihar jail.

Additional Sessions Judge Dharmendra Rana strictly said that there is no evidence against Disha that she campaigned with the intention of bringing a bad name to India. There is no evidence that she hatched any conspiracy to spread violence. Many people have been arrested in cases of violence, but not a single one has been proved to have any connection with Disha. The court also said that just to maintain the pride government no one can be charged for treason. 
The court granted direction to bail on the condition of personal bond of one lakh and cooperation in investigation. They will also be prohibited from going out of the country during this period. 
The judge said that the police has no evidence to prove the connection between Disha and the Khalistan supporters of the Poetic Justice Foundation.
Similarly, no such evidence has been produced to prove that Disha is a supporter of separatist ideology and there is some kind of connection between her and the banned organization Sikh for Justice.
Disha Ravi, is an Indian youth climate change activist and a founder of Fridays For Future India. Her arrest on 13 February 2021 for an alleged involvement with an online toolkit related to Greta Thunberg and the 2020–2021 Indian farmers’ protests gained international attention.

Women have the right to register a complaint against harassment even after decades

Former Union Minister M.J. Akbar has received a setback in the criminal defamation suit against Priya Ramani, a journalist who accused of him sexual harassment, when Delhi Court acquitted Ramani on Wednesday. Dismissing Akbar’s plea, the court said that a woman who has been tortured has the right to register a complaint even after decades. The court said that women who raise their voice against such crimes cannot be punished. Akbar alleged that Ramani’s tweet during the #me_too campaign has defamed him.

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate(A.C.M.M.) Ravindrakumar Pandey dismissed the plea of ​​former Union Minister Akbar saying that no allegations against Ramani were proved. The court reserved the verdict on February 1. Apart from Ramani, Akbar was accused of harassment by around 20 women journalists.
Previously, Ramani accused Akbar during the Me too campaign.
ACMM, Ravindrakumar Pandey, added that this crime is shameful in the country of Ramayana-Mahabharata. He said crimes against women are shameful in a country where great texts like the Mahabharata and the Ramayana have been written, which teach women how to respect them.
Akbar rejected the allegations and had filed a complaint against Priya Ramani on October 15, 2018, for defaming him after she accused him for misconduct. However, on October 17, 2018, Akbar was accused of misconduct and had to resign as Union Minister.
No one’s reputation should be protected at the cost of women’s dignity-
The court said in the judgment that no one’s reputation can be saved at the cost of a woman’s life and dignity. Under Article 21 of the Constitution this has been guaranteed. At the same time under Article 14, the right to equality before the law and the right to equal protection have also been guaranteed.
Any invisible hindrance cannot stop Indian women from moving forward for equal opportunity in society. Now, the time has come for society to understand the hardship of sexual harassment. Society must see the victim just like any other common person and not discriminate. A victim should be able to  lead a life like a dignified person in society.

Recommendations Of State Human Right Commission Are Legally Enforceable, Binding On Government/Authorities

In a well-written, well-worded, well-analysed, well-reasoned, well-substantiated, well-articulated and well-concluded 517-page judgment titled Abdul Sathar vs The Principal Secretary to Government and 5 others in W.P. No. 41791 of 2006 delivered as recently as on February 5, 2021, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that the recommendation of State Human Rights Commission under Section 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is binding on the Government or Authority. The Bench comprising of Justices S Vaidyanathan, Parthiban and M Sundar also held that it is an adjudicatory order which is legally and immediately enforceable. Very rightly so! 

To start with, the ball is set rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 of this commendable judgment authored by Justice M Sundar for himself, Justice S Vaidyanathan and Justice Parthiban wherein it is laid down as a preferatory note that, “It is often said that interpretation is a journey of discovery, which is not akin to a regular journey of discussion and dispositive reasoning which predominantly turns on ‘construction’. Interpretation (unlike construction) is more in the nature of determining the idea of legal meaning of a Statute. Interpretation is a jurisprudential journey as it is the process of sifting a statute and/or it is provisions to seek the intention of the Legislature. In this order, we had embarked upon such a jurisprudential journey, which under the normal circumstances should have reached its destination before the dawn of December 2020, but that was not to be owing to the Corona virus pandemic and consequent lock down, which is now widely and commonly referred to as ‘Covid-19 situation’; Covid-19 was something which we did not portend or presage when this journey commenced on 17.02.2020 and thereafter we had no means of prophesying that it would impact one of us and personal staff of another of us.”
On an introductory note, it is then held in para 2 that, “We are much conscious over the joint effort to raise the efficiency and therefore, we feel it appropriate to state as to why there is a little delay in delivering this judgment, though it is not imperative for us to narrate the reasons, we believe that keeping a clear conscience is always better. We can speak only through our order with none to articulate these facts if this order is assailed in the Apex Court. Owing to conflict of judgments with regard to human rights violations, these batch of cases were referred to us by constitution of a Special Bench by the then Hon’ble Chief Justice, for a firm judicial pronouncement on the said aspect. These matters were heard by us on several listings / days in virtual Courts (Web hearing on a video conferencing platform) and finally judgment in this case was reserved on 29.09.2020.”
While continuing in a similar vein, the Full Bench then holds in para 5 that, “We have thought it appropriate and pertinent to write this prefatory note in the light of matters now before different Hon’ble Division Benches which are awaiting this verdict. Suffice to say that pronouncing of this order which should have happened before the dawn of December 2020, is happening now owing to circumstances narrated herein which we could neither foretell nor foreshadow.”
Most significantly and most remarkably, what forms the cornerstone of this commendable judgment is then stated in para 490 that, “In the conspectus of the above discourse, the following is our summation to the terms of the Reference: 
(i) Whether the decision made by the State Human Rights Commission under Section 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, is only a recommendation and not an adjudicated order capable of immediate enforcement, or otherwise?
Ans: The recommendation of the Commission made under Section 18 of the Act, is binding on the Government or Authority. The Government is under a legal obligation to forward its comments on the Report including the action taken or proposed to be taken to the Commission in terms of Sub Clause (e) of Section 18. Therefore, the recommendation of the H.R. Commission under Section 18 is an adjudicatory order which is legally and immediately enforceable. If the concerned Government or authority fails to implement the recommendation of the Commission within the time stipulated under Section 18(e) of the Act, the Commission can approach the Constitutional Court under Section 18(b) of the Act for enforcement by seeking issuance of appropriate Writ/order/direction. We having held the recommendation to be binding, axiomatically, sanctus and sacrosanct public duty is imposed on the concerned Government or authority to implement the recommendation. It is also clarified that if the Commission is the petitioner before the Constitutional Court under Section 18(b) of the Act, it shall not be open to the concerned Government or authority to oppose the petition for implementation of its recommendation, unless the concerned Government or authority files a petition seeking judicial review of the Commission’s recommendation, provided that the concerned Government or authority has expressed their intention to seek judicial review to the Commission’s recommendation in terms of Section 18(e) of the Act. 
(ii) Whether the State has any discretion to avoid implementation of the decision made by the State Human Rights Commission and if so, under what circumstances? 
Ans: As our answer is in the affirmative in respect of the first point of Reference, the same holds good for this point of Reference as well. We having held that the recommendation is binding, the State has no discretion to avoid implementation of the recommendation and in case the State is aggrieved, it can only resort to legal remedy seeking judicial review of the recommendation of the Commission.
(iii) Whether the State Human Rights Commission, while exercising powers under sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of Section 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, could straight away issue orders for recovery of the compensation amount directed to be paid by the State to the victims of violation of human rights under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 18 of that enactment, from the Officers of the State who have been found to be responsible for causing such violation?
Ans: Yes, as we have held that the recommendation of the Commission under Section 18 is binding and enforceable, the Commission can order recovery of the compensation from the State and payable to the victims of the violation of human rights under Sub Clause (a)(i) of Section 18 of the Act and the State in turn could recover the compensation paid, from the Officers of the State who have been found to be responsible for causing human rights violation. However, we clarify that before effecting recovery from the Officer of the State, the Officer concerned shall be issued with a show cause notice seeking his explanation only on the aspect of quantum of compensation recoverable from him and not on the aspect whether he was responsible for causing human rights violation.
(iv) Whether initiation of appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the Officers of the State under the relevant service rules, if it is so empowered, is the only permissible mode for recovery of the compensation amount directed to be paid by the State to the victims of violation of human rights under sub-clause(i) of clause(a) of Section 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, from the Officers of the State who have been found to be responsible for causing such violation?
Ans: As far as the initiation of disciplinary proceedings under the relevant Service Rules is concerned, for recovery of compensation, mere show cause notice is sufficient in regard to the quantum of compensation recommended and to be recovered from the Officers/employees of the concerned Government. However, in regard to imposition of penalty as a consequence of a delinquent official being found guilty of the violation, a limited departmental enquiry may be conducted only to ascertain the extent of culpability of the Official concerned in causing violation in order to formulate an opinion of the punishing Authority as to the proportionality of the punishment to be imposed on the official concerned. This procedure may be followed only in cases where the disciplinary authority/punishing authority comes to the conclusion on the basis of the inquiry proceedings and the recommendations of the Commission that the delinquent official is required to be visited with any of the major penalties enumerated in the relevant Service Regulations.
As far as imposition of minor penalty is concerned, a mere show cause notice is fair enough, as the existing Service Rules of all services specifically contemplate only show cause notice in any minor penalty proceedings.
(v) Whether Officers of the State who have been found to be responsible by the State Human Rights Commission for causing violation of human rights under Section 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, are entitled to impeach such orders passed by the Commission in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and if so, at what stage and to which extent?
Ans: As we have held that the recommendation of the Commission under Section 18 of the Act is binding and enforceable, the Officers/employees of the State who have been found responsible for causing violation of human rights by the Commission, are entitled to assail such orders passed by the Commission by taking recourse to remedies of judicial review provided under the Constitution of India. It is open to the aggrieved officers/employees to approach the competent Court to challenge the findings as well as recommendations of the Commission.”
No less significant is what is then stated in para 492 that, “Before we part with this Reference, we are constrained to express our considered opinion that despite all the provisions in the Act, covering wide spectrum of human rights concerns in consonance with the Rule of Law governing our polity, in the absence of an inbuilt and integral provision within the explicit frame work of the Statute, a perception has been gaining ground in the corridors of the implementing authorities that the recommendation of the H.R.Commission lacks legal sanctity and hence can be trifled with. Such perception and point of view on the part of the implementing authority may not augur well towards addressing the complaints of human rights violation in the country where the written Constitution reigns supreme and is placed at the altar of our governance.”
As it turned out, the Full Bench then observes in para 493 that, “Although the history after the introduction of the Act, reveals that by and large the recommendations of the Commission have been implemented, any discretion to the implementing authorities to either accept or not accept the recommendation would only lead to avoidable delay, forcing the Commission to invoke Section 18(b) of the Act.” 
Be it noted, it is then rightly and remarkably pointed out in para 494 that, “In a constitutional democracy, there is always a possibility of change of Governments, policy makers and so are the policies. The policies are always in a state of fluidity depending on expectations resulting in shifts and changes of perspective framework of the policy makers. In such circumstances, at the time of enactment of the Act, an assurance given on behalf of the Treasury Bench by the Hon’ble Minister concerned that recommendation of the H.R.Commission would be accorded due respect as in the case of recommendation of the Finance Commission and the Government in the past had never declined to accept the recommendation of the Finance Commission as matter of healthy convention.”
Frankly speaking, the Full Bench then adds on a practical note in para 495 that, “The history of politics and governance has been witnessing constant change through evolution of different policies and as a consequence of such change any convention observed in the past has its breaking point in tune with the time. Therefore, the Act which was introduced providing a public law remedy, cannot be operated on the basis of the assurance of the Hon’ble Minister concerned, unless the assurance is transformed into a letter of law for all the time to be followed.”
For the sake of clarity, it is then made clear in para 496 that, “The avowed intention of the policy frames at that point of time was clear but at the same time, following any convention after all is a only a matter of choice at the end of the day. If in this context, we are of the considered opinion that the intention of the framers may be given a statutory sanction within the Act itself to make the Act a complete code in itself instead of invoking the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court for execution of the recommendation.”
As an advisory note, the Full Bench then holds in para 497 that, “We earnestly trust and hope that the Parliament in its collective wisdom would bring necessary amendments in the Act to provide wherewithal to the Commission for direct execution of the recommendation. By such initiation, the learned Parliament would be according befitting status to the Commission steered by the high constitutional dignitaries of the highest legal order.”
While making further suggestion, the Full Bench then also observes in para 498 that, “In the said circumstances, we hereby suggest to the policy makers to make suitable amendment/s in the Act providing for an internal/self-contained mechanism qua Human Rights Commission for enforcing its recommendations under Section 18 of the Act. By such amendment/s, the Act would become complete in all fours, leaving no room for procrastination in offering remedial action promptly.”
Now coming to the concluding paras. It is held in para 499 that, “Now we part this case with trust and hope that our suggestion finds codified Statutory expression in the realm of Human Rights Laws in the days to come.” Para 500 states that, “The terms of the Reference are answered accordingly.” 
Finally, it is then held in the last para 501 that, “All the individual Writ Petitions are to be posted before the Honble Benches concerned for disposal on the respective merits of the Writ Petitions, after taking note of our answers to the Reference.”
On a concluding note, it has to be said that the Full Bench of Madras High Court has very commendably held that the recommendations of State Human Rights Commission are legally enforceable, binding on government/authorities. As the ruling is 517 pages, it was just not possible to mention each and every significant point mentioned in this latest, learned landmark and laudable judgment. But we can derive satisfaction from this that we have dwelt considerably on the vital parts of this leading case which forms the sum and substance also. It would be prudent to always remember what is mentioned in para 477 of this notable judgment that, “We may not be elected Judges through Universal suffrage, nay we are nominated by operation of the Constitutional provisions to preside over Constitutional Court. Our partnership with Executive and Legislature ordains us with shared responsibility in safeguarding, protection and promotion of Human Rights. In discharge of the sublime responsibility, the role of the Constitutional Court assumes sovereign coloration and the interpretation of the Statute lies at its portals. The Act which has been conceived and designed as a Protector of Human Rights, has to necessarily include enforcer of Human Rights as well. Protection of Human Rights without enforcement would only amount to empty proclamation, as promise without a guarantee.” Same is the case with para 470 which holds that, “Human Rights Commission created to address the exalted human rights concerns is not a show-piece to the world as a token of conformity to the commitment of India to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International treaties, viz., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 1966. The institution’s reach and the functional efficacy must be real to carry its constitutional obligation to the hilt. Our lawmakers must remember this always now and must amend laws to meet the present circumstances accordingly in the right earnest!
Sanjeev Sirohi

Despite Marrying Willingly A Minor Girl Can’t Be Allowed To Stay With Husband Till She Attains Majority

In a significant judgment titled Pradeep Tomar And Another v. State of U.P. and Another [Matters Under Article 227 No. 4804 of 2020] delivered on January 27, 2021, the Allahabad High Court has recently, righteously and remarkably held that a minor girl cannot be allowed to live in a matrimonial relationship with a man she claims to be her husband even if she had left her home of her own accord and married the man out of her own free will. The Single Judge Bench of Justice JJ Munir ruled thus while taking into account her High School Certificate which “clearly indicated” that she is minor as her date of birth is 04 November 2004. The Bench specifically stated that, “So long as the prosecutrix is a minor, she cannot be permitted to accompany the accused Pintoo, whom she claims to have married.”

To start with, the ball is set rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been filed seeking to set aside an order of the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Hapur, dated 24.11.2020, passed in Case Crime No. 516 of 2020, under Section 363 IPC, P.S. Pilakhuwa, District Hapur, directing that the prosecutrix Km. Shivani be permitted to go along with her husband, the accused Pintoo son of Omvir.”
To be sure, it is then stated in para 2 that, “A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the second opposite party by Mr. Rama Shankar Mishra, Advocate, which is taken on record. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder.”
On the one hand, it is put forth in para 6 that, “The submission of Mr. Sudhir Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioners, briefly said, is to the effect that the date of birth of the prosecutrix, according to her High School Examination Certificate issued by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, is 04.11.2004. She is, thus, a minor, aged 16 years and 2 months approximately. She would attain majority on 05.11.2022. Mr. Mehrotra submits that the Magistrate has erred in permitting the prosecutrix to accompany her husband, an accused in the crime, going by the marriage acknowledged by the parties to be solemnized on 21.09.2020 at the Pandav Kalin Neeli Chhatri Mandir Sanatan Dharam Vivah Padti Trust, Yamuna Bazar, Delhi. Mr. Mehrotra submits that the prosecutrix, being a minor, cannot be permitted to stay in a matrimonial relationship, where the marriage would be void under Section 12 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (for short, ‘the Act of 2006’). He submits that in any case the prosecutrix, who is not a major, cannot be permitted to stay with her husband and ought not to be allowed to accompany him. Doing so, would be permitting statutory rape and also an offence under Section 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.”
On the other hand, it is then brought out in para 7 that, “Mr. Rama Shankar Mishra, on the other hand, submits that the prosecutrix in her stand before the Magistrate has made it clear that she has married the accused Pintoo of her free will and wishes to stay with him. He emphasizes that the parties’ marriage has been registered under the U.P. Marriage Registration Rules, 2017 by the Marriage Registration Officer, Ghaziabad on 21.09.2020. He has drawn the attention of this Court towards a certificate of the registration of marriage, dated 21.09.2020.”
To put things in perspective, it is then pointed out in para 8 that, “This Court has perused the impugned order and considered the entire facts and circumstances. The prosecutrix is a little over 16 years of age. The Magistrate has been swayed to permit the prosecutrix to go along with the accused, her husband on ground that the father of the prosecutrix made an application that he would not take her back home and that he had lodged an FIR, out of social embarrassment. The Magistrate has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Smt. Rajkumari vs. Superintendent, Nari Niketan, 1998 Cr.L.J 654 (All) and Smt. Ramsati @ Syamsati vs. State of U.P., Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 245 of 2015, decided on 07.09.2005 to hold that upon marriage of a minor according to her wishes, she could be left free to live her life.”
As it turned out, it is then stated in para 10 that, “So far as the age of the prosecutrix is concerned, in the face of the High School Certificate, there is no cavil that evidence about her being a major, which is her stand, cannot be accepted. She cannot be referred to medical examination for determination of her age, so long as her date of birth founded on her High School Certificate, is available. This certificate clearly indicates that she is a minor. There, her date of birth is 04.11.2004. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 makes the following provision regarding presumption and determination of age: 
“94. Presumption and determination of age.– (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining –
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; 
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; 
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
Be it noted, it is then stated in para 11 that, “The provisions of Section 94 (2) of the Act, which are designed to determine the age of a juvenile, have been extended to the victim in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana; (2013) 7 SCC 263 and by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Priyanka Devi through her husband vs. State of U.P. and others 2018 (1) ACR 1061, to which I was a party. It has been held in Smt. Priyanka Devi thus: 
“13. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly urged that provisions of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 do not apply to the case in hand as the same are available for the purposes of determination of age for a juvenile or a child in conflict with the law but would not apply to the determination of age in the case of a victim.
14. We are afraid that the aforesaid submission is not correct. The issue was examined by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske v. State of Maharashtra and Another; (2013) 14 SCC 637 where in paragraph no. 12 of the report it was held as under: “Under rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically provided that only in the absence of alternative methods described under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical opinion can be sought for. In the light of such a statutory rule prevailing for ascertainment of the age of the juvenile in our considered opinion, the same yardstick can be rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of the ascertaining the age of a victim as well.” 
15. This issue has also been considered in an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana; 2013 (7) SCC 263, where too it has been held that rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 must apply both to a child in conflict with law as well as to a victim of a crime. Paragraph 23 of the said report reads thus: 
“Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VWPW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.”
16. Thus, principles applicable to the determination of age in the case of a juvenile would in terms apply to cases of determination of the age of a victim as well. It may be pointed out that at the point of time when Mahadeo (supra) was decided by their lordships of the Supreme Court, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 was in force and their lordships were interpreting the provision of Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Child) Rules, 2007. The said Act of 2000 has since been repealed and has been replaced by the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The rules framed under the Act of 2000 are thus no longer on the statute book. However, the provisions that found place in Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Child) Rules, 2007 framed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 are now, with certain modifications engrafted into the Principal Act vide section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The inter se priority of criteria to determine age under Rule 12(3) of the Rules, 2007 (supra) and section 94 of the Act, 2015 remains the same albeit with certain modifications which are of no consequences to the facts in hand. In short, provisions of Rule 12(3) of the Rules, 2007 framed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 are para meteria to the provision of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. This being the comparative position, the principles of law laid down by their lordships in the case of Mahadeo (supra) would apply with equal force to the provisions of section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 while determining the age of a victim of an offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, on this score, is not tenable.””
It is also worth noting that it is then stated in para 12 that, “The provisions of Section 94(2) makes it vivid that in the face of a date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, the other evidence about the age of a victim cannot be looked into. If the date of birth certificate as envisaged in clause (i) of sub-Section (2) of Section 94 of the Act is not available, the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat is the next evidence to be considered in the rung. It is only when the evidence about age envisaged under clauses (i) and (ii) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 94 of the Act is not available, that a victim can be referred to a medico-legal examination for the determination of her age. Therefore, even if it is the prosecutrix’s stand, which this Court assumes to be so that she is 18 years old, and has married Pintoo of her free will, she cannot be regarded as a major or permitted to prove herself a major, by asking herself to be referred to medical examination by a Board of Doctors, so long as her High School Certificate is clear on the point. After the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Suhani vs. State of U.P., 2018 SCC Online SC 781, there was some confusion whether a victim could be referred to the medical examination of a Board of Doctors for determination of her age, in the face of a recorded date of birth in the High School certificate. But, after the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Nisha Naaz alias Anuradha and another vs. State of U.P. and others 2019 (2) ACR 2075 holding that the decision in Suhani does not lay down any law but is a decision on facts, the principles in Smt. Priyanka Devi, following the decision in Jarnail Singh, is law that would govern the fate of this case. In Smt. Nisha Naaz alias Anuradha, it was held: 
“14. A plain reading of Section 94 of the 2015, Act would reveal that only in absence of: (a) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board; and (b) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat, age is to be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board. A Division Bench of this court in the case of Smt. Priyanka Devi Vs. State of U.P. and others in Habeas Corpus Petition No.55317 of 2017, decided on 21st November, 2017, after noticing the provisions of the 2015, Act and the earlier 2000, Act and the rules framed thereunder, came to the conclusion that as there is no significant change brought about in the 2015, Act in the principles governing determination of age of a juvenile in conflict with law, in so far as weightage to medico legal evidence is concerned, the law laid down in respect of applicability of those provisions for determination of a child victim would continue to apply notwithstanding the new enactment. The Division Bench in Priyanka Devi’s case (supra) specifically held that as there is on record the High School Certificate, the medico legal evidence cannot be looked into as the statute does not permit.
15. The judgment of the apex court in Suhani’s case (supra) does not lay down law or guidelines to be used for determination of the age of child victim. Further, it neither overrules nor considers its earlier decisions which mandated that the age of child victim is to be determined by the same principles as are applicable for determination of the age of juvenile in conflict with law. From the judgment of the apex court in Suhani’s case (supra), it appears that the concerned victim (petitioner no.1 of that case) was produced before the court and the court considered it apposite that she should be medically examined by the concerned department of All India Institute of Medical Sciences (for short AIIMS). Upon which, AIIMS, by taking radiological tests, submitted report giving both lower as well as higher estimates of age. On the lower side the age was estimated as 19 years and on the higher side it was 24 years. Therefore, even if the margin of error was of 5 years, the victim was an adult. Hence, on the facts of that case, in Suhani’s case, the first information report was quashed by the Apex Court. The decision of the Apex Court was therefore in exercise of its power conferred upon it by Article 142 of the Constitution of India which enables it to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The said decision cannot be taken as a decision that overrules the earlier binding precedents which lay down the manner in which the age of a child victim is to be determined.””
No less significant is what is then stated in para 13 that, “So long as the prosecutrix is a minor, she cannot be permitted to accompany the accused Pintoo, whom she claims to have married. In order to determine whether the prosecutrix was enticed away from her guardian’s lawful custody, or she went away of her own, this Court ascertained the prosecutrix’s stand, who is present in Court. Her stand is recorded verbatim:
Q. Aapka Naam? 
Ans. Shivani 
Q. Aapki Aayu Kya Hai? 
Ans. 04.01.2002 (18 years) 
Q. Aap Pintoo Ko Janti Hain? 
Ans. Haan. 
Q. Pintoo Kaun Hain? 
Ans. Mere Pati. 
Q. Pintoo Aapko Bahla Fusla Kar Le Gaya Tha? 
Ans. Nahi, Mai Apni Marzi se Uske Saath Gayi Thi. 
Q. Aap Apne Mata-Pita Ke Pass Jaana Chahti Hain? 
Ans. Nahi. Main Apne Pati Ke Pass Jana Chahti Hun.”
As a corollary, it is then stated in para 14 that, “Looking to Shivani’s stand, it is evident that she has not been enticed away by Pintoo. Rather, she has left her home of her own accord and married him. In this view of the matter, the marriage would not be void under Section 12 of the Act of 2006, but would be voidable under Section 3 of the said Act.”
Interestingly enough, it is then envisaged in para 15 that, “The conclusion is evident from the provisions of Sections 3 and 12 of the Act of 2006 which read as under: 
“3. Child marriages to be voidable at the option of contracting party being a child.—(1) Every child marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable at the option of the contracting party who was a child at the time of the marriage:
Provided that a petition for annulling a child marriage by a decree of nullity may be filed in the district court only by a contracting party to the marriage who was a child at the time of the marriage.
(2) If at the time of filing a petition, the petitioner is a minor, the petition may be filed through his or her guardian or next friend along with the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer.
(3) The petition under this section may be filed at any time but before the child filing the petition completes two years of attaining majority. 
(4) While granting a decree of nullity under this section, the district court shall make an order directing both the parties to the marriage and their parents or their guardians to return to the other party, his or her parents or guardian, as the case may be, the money, valuables, ornaments and other gifts received on the occasion of the marriage by them from the other side, or an amount equal to the value of such valuables, ornaments, other gifts and money: Provided that no order under this section shall be passed unless the concerned parties have been given notices to appear before the district court and show cause why such order should not be passed.
12. Marriage of a minor child to be void in certain circumstances.—Where a child, being a minor— 
(a) is taken or enticed out of the keeping of the lawful guardian; or
(b) by force compelled, or by any deceitful means induced to go from any place; or 
(c) is sold for the purpose of marriage; and made to go through a form of marriage or if the minor is married after which the minor is sold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes,
such marriage shall be null and void.””
Needless to say, it is then rightly asserted in para 16 that, “It would, therefore, be open to the prosecutrix to acknowledge the marriage or claim it to be void, once she attains the age of majority. It would also be open to her, once she attains the age of majority, to go wherever she likes and stay with whomsoever she wants.”
Simply put, the Bench then holds in para 17 that, “Since, she is not inclined to go back to her parents, for the present, this Court is left with no alternative but to direct the State to place her in a suitable State facility other than a Nari Niketan, may be a Safe Home/Shelter Home.”
What’s more, the Bench then also holds in para 18 that, “The District Magistrate, Hapur and the Superintendent of Police, Hapur are ordered to ensure that the prosecutrix is immediately housed in a suitable Safe Home/Shelter Home, or other State facility where she would be safe and taken care of.”
Furthermore, para 19 then states that, “The learned District Judge, Hapur is also directed to ensure that a Lady Judicial Officer, posted in his Judgeship, will visit the prosecutrix once a month and inquire about her welfare. In case there is anything objectionable, she will immediately report the matter to the District Judge, who will take appropriate steps to ensure the prosecutrix’s welfare during her stay in the State facility/Safe Home/ Shelter Home, wherever she is housed.”
Thereafter, it is then held in para 20 that, “Shivani would be permitted to live in State facility/Safe Home/ Shelter Home till 04.11.2022, and thereafter, she may go wherever she wants and stay with whomsoever she likes, including Pintoo, whom she claims to be her husband.”
As we see, it is then stated in para 21 that, “In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 24.11.2020, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Hapur in Case Crime No. 516 of 2020 under Section 363 IPC, P.S. Pilakhuwa, District Hapur is hereby set aside. The prosecutrix shall be dealt with in accordance with the directions made hereinabove.”
Adding more to it, para 22 then states that, “Let Shivani, who is present in person, be forthwith taken into the care of the Court Officer and conveyed through the Registrar General to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Prayagraj. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Prayagraj shall cause the prosecutrix to be conveyed in safety to the Superintendent of Police, Hapur, who, along with the District Magistrate, Hapur will carry out the directions carried in this order forthwith.”
Now coming to concluding paras. Para 23 states that, “The Court Officer shall convey Shivani to the Registrar General, who shall make immediate arrangement to take her into his immediate care and ensure compliance of this order.” Finally, the last para 24 holds that, “Let this order be communicated to the learned District Judge, Hapur, the District Magistrate, Hapur, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Prayagraj and the Superintendent of Police, Hapur by the Joint Registrar (Compliance) within 24 hours.”
To sum it up, what can be inferred from this noteworthy ruling of Allahabad High Court is that despite marrying willingly a minor girl can’t be allowed to stay with her husband till she attains majority. This is so because if she is permitted to stay with her husband it would tantamount to permitting statutory rape and also would constitute an offence under Section 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Such a marriage of minor would not be void under Section 12 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 but would be voidable under Section 3 of the said Act. It would be open to the minor girl to either acknowledge the marriage or claim it to be void once she attains the age of majority. It is left entirely on her own discretion to take what decision she likes once she attains the age of majority. This is the real crux of this commendable judgment! 
Sanjeev Sirohi

This Is No Way To Protest And Hold Nation To Ransom

“I am always ready to bear Allah’s full fury but under no circumstances will I ever block road for offering namaz. There was no space in mosque or anywhere else except on road! Offering namaz on road is a big crime for me which I will never commit under any circumstances! Not for a second will I ever do anything that disturbs others and forces them to wait for me to leave road so that they can leave for their own work!”

– Sageer Khan my best friend who in 1993-94 said this to me when I asked him why he was so upset while returning from a mosque and why can’t he offer namaz on road just like others
It is most shocking to see that in his second term as PM Narendra Modi has senselessly, shamelessly and stupidly allowed blocking of roads and so also the Chief Minister of Punjab Captain Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister of Delhi Arvind Kejriwal and Rajasthan Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot also have also allowed for blocking of roads and rail tracks to register their protest against the new farm laws. What is even worst is that even Supreme Court too didn’t promptly order lifting of blockade of roads and rail tracks which is most unfortunate. My best friend Sageer Khan once also rightly said to me way back in 1993 that, “No cause no matter how sacred it may be can ever justify blocking of roads and rail tracks under any circumstances. My friendship will break with you if I ever come to know that you are a party to blocking of road or rail track. But I am sure that you will never ever commit such crime in your life.”
Bluntly put: Any PM who cannot stop blockade of road and rail tracks must promptly resign and pave way for some other capable person! Which Constitution or which law or which religion or which God can justify blocking of roads and rail tracks? To hell with such Constitution or law or religion or God! To hell with all of them or any one of them depending on which ever try to justify blocking of road or rail tracks under any circumstances whatsoever which cannot be ever justified! 
Needless to say: Any PM who cannot stop carrying out of tractor rally or any other parallel rally during Republic Day in Delhi must promptly resign as this definitely lead to giving free hand to hoodlums, criminals, goons and terrorists who will not spare any opportunity to even desecrate Red Fort as we saw most recently during 26 January, 2021 which has shamed our nation in front of the whole world! More than 500 policemen were injured by armed rioters under the garb of farmers and even with folded hands when police cops requested when their was no space left for them to escape then also they kept on beating them mercilessly! Can this be justified in the name of dissent? To hell with such dissent! This can only be justified on the ground of “Might is right” and this is exactly what is happening unabashedly in our country since last two years!
Of course, it was not a coincidence that Khalistani supporters were simultaneously raising anti-India slogans and so also the historic statute of Mahatma Gandhi in America was broken! Can this also be justified in the name of dissent? Can chanting of Khalistani slogans also be justified in the name of dissent? 
More broadly, can carrying of weapons be justified during tractor rally as we saw in Delhi during 26 January? Can tractors be allowed to break all barricading that comes their way? Can tractors be allowed to crush police men if they come in their way?
Why police never spares any person even if a person commits a small mistake like not wearing a helmet etc but on the contrary when many rogues threaten to carry out rallies and dare to throw aside all check posts then they are treated with kidgloves as we saw when more than 300 policemen were injured. How long will mob violence be justified on one pretext or the other? How long will terrorists be glorified in such protests? How long will women and men be allowed to chant that, “Hain Hain Modi Marja Tun Pehla Indira ko thoka hain aab Modi ki bari hain”? Why were such anti-nationals not arrested promptly? Why was all this taken so lightly? 
There are many actors both in India and in abroad who are not coming out in open but who have made it their latest weapon to sponsor such blockade of roads and rail tracks and those foreign forces who are inimical to the very concept of India are the “real force” behind all such fundings and they must be identified at the earliest and exposed in front of the world. It is a national shame that why our government in Centre as well the Supreme Court allowed such dangerous, deplorable, despicable and dastardly blocking of roads and rail tracks which causes maximum inconvenience to the common person for months and months together and now Rakesh Tikait has warned to carry it for a year by end of 2021! All the legal luminaries, senior Supreme Court lawyers and Supreme Court Judges including CJI along with PM and Cabinet Ministers must feel most ashamed that they have allowed this most despicable blocking of roads and rail tracks right under their nose! 
Under no circumstances should the administration both in the State as well as in the Centre should have ever allowed farmers instigated by their leaders for advancing their own interests to occupy roads and rail tracks. India’s international reputation has been worst affected but leaders like Rakesh Tikait among others are least bothered about all this! What is most shocking is that the PM and the CJI have not taken it most seriously due to which this shameful, senseless and stupid act of blocking of road and rail tracks is fast becoming the order of the day! CJI Sharad Arvind Bobde should have first ordered protesters to vacate the road and to give an undertaking that they would never again occupy roads and rail tracks like this before staying the Central laws or appointing a high powered Committee to look into it. But nothing of this sort happened and the result are there for all of us as we saw during Republic day! 
To put it mildly: Our Red Fort was desecrated by hoodlums and vandalisers and this happened right under the nose of the administration. Why was permission given for such tractor parade and that too on Republic Day and that too in Capital itself to so many vehicles that it was virtually impossible to keep a control on all of them? There are many more such troubling questions which keep haunting us who love this nation!
Needless to say, too much freedom and too much tolerance allowed to mob under the garb of farmers or any other form will destroy India completely as it is goons who hijack the agenda as we saw during the Republic day parade! Who is responsible for many places like Ghazipur turning into fortress with nails on roads and concrete walls? It is these hoodlums who tarnished the reputation of India and indulged in wanton violence in which more than 500 police cops were injured which cannot be justified under any circumstances whatsoever!
How can we forget the images of farmers in their tractors considering themselves above law and clashing with the Delhi police at Red Fort where they were not permitted to go and rampaging whatever came in their way and carried out huge destroying of precious items even inside the Red Fort? As if this was not enough, many of them even tried to run tractor over police cops who had to run for saving their lives! Should the CJI and his brother Judges have sympathy for such farmers? Should they allow farmers to hold nation to ransom by blocking all entry points to Delhi?
It cannot be lightly dismissed that among all the Congress leaders, it was Captain Amarinder Singh who is Chief Minister of Punjab who was most vocal in denouncing what all happened under the garb of tractor rally on January 26, 2021. He minced no words to state unequivocally that, “My head hangs in shame at what happened yesterday in the national capital.” He also said categorically that those who were responsible for the incident were not farmers but misguided youth who were indulging in symbolism. How can this or blocking of roads be ever justified? Why rail tracks in Punjab were allowed to be blocked for months together? 
What message has gone out? Why judiciary too allowed this most despicable act of blocking of road right under its very nose? Why were these protesters allowed to take the nation for a ride and injure as many as more than 500 police personnel? What message are we setting? 
It is a no-brainer that this farmers movement has defamed India to the hilt. Spineless, senseless and shameless justification of violence under the garb of farmers protest and blocking of roads and rail tracks cannot be justified under any circumstances. Who is having the last laugh? It is countries like Canada, UK, US, Italy and Germany among others who openly support Khalistani movement and encourage them to rebel against India by allowing openly anti-India and pro-Khalistani activities on their soil and allowing them to vandalise even statutes of Mahatma Gandhi as we saw in USA! 
Should we be proud of this? It is not just a coincidence that it is mostly celebrities from these countries who are expressing maximum concern for what is purely an internal issue of India but which Opposition parties are wanting to spare no opportunity to internationalise it. It is not just a coincidence that governments of these countries are voicing maximum concern over farm laws and this despite the irrefutable fact that USA has lent its support to the farm laws under the new President Joe Biden as mentioned in the newspapers of February 4, 2021!
Never take your enemy for granted. This where India always err. Why are protesters becoming a convenient tool in the hands of foreign powers? Why are Mir Jafars and Jai Chands being allowed to set the agenda of blocking roads for an indefinitely long period so as to tarnish, tatter and toss the impeccable reputation of India to the hilt? 
I am sorry to say but this is no way to carry out a movement! We have become a laughing stock in front of the world for which farmer leaders who have misdirected farmers cannot escape from being held accountable. Why farmer leaders allowed this sacred agitation to be hijacked by radical separatists organizations who are openly advocating a separate Khalistan for Sikhs? Why Sikhs for Justice which is one such separatist organization was allowed to take the centrestage that had gone to the extent of even giving a clarion call to the Sikhs to reach the Red Fort on 26 January and unfurl the Khalistani flag and insult the national flag? Why Centre took it most lightly and why permission was granted to tractor rally which was more a terrorist rally in which we saw violent protesters trying to crush our police cops, run over barricades and vandalise Red Fort in a manner that is completely unprecedented? Centre has a lot of explaining to do on this just like in the case of Shaheen Bagh! 
The locals are also simmering in anger as it is their right to livelihood and right to free passage that is getting worst affected due to this endless farmers agitation. We have seen how tension broke out in Tikri border where more than 100 people gathered and demanded the removal of protesters from the main Rohtak Road which has been blocked for the last more than two months. How long will the locals keep patience? Why Supreme Court gave the green signal for protest to continue on roads? Do only protesters have fundamental rights? What about others who face immense difficulties and trouble in their livelihood due to such blockades? Are they second grade citizens? Only vandalisers, hoodlums, violent agitators and road blockers entitled to fundamental rights for which our Supreme Court speaks most vociferously! What about others? Should others just keep on tolerating every nonsense quietly? This is what happened during Shaheen Bagh agitations due to which riots broke out when protesters tried to block other places also feeling emboldened to block Shaheen Bagh for more than 100 days!
Pintu Kumar who is a resident of the nearby Baba Haridas Nagar at Tikri Border said that these protesters “broke our trust” and “insulted” the national flag on January 26, when the farmers abetted by some selfish and vested leaders took out the disgraceful, disastrous, dangerous, shameful, senseless and stupid tractor rally to embarrass our nation. He rightly said that, “These people cannot be farmers, as a Kisan will never attack a Jawan. These are anti-social elements. We initially supported them and gave them food as well but they have broken our trust by resorting to violence on Republic Day.” The NIA report and intelligence report had also warned of Khalistani terrorists having entered the tractor rally and farmers protest but still stupidly sanction was granted for tractor rally and the results are there for us to see for ourselves! Most shocking indeed!
Why is it that we see maximum protesters from just Punjab and one or two other states only? Why is it that Gen Bajwa of Pakistani Army wanted Kartarpur Corridor to open fast and why huge hoardings of Khalistani Referendum 2020 not taken seriously? Why is it that drones from Pakistan were entering India and dropping weapons and still we took it lightly? It is high time that we wake up and stop this mockery of our national interests for the sake of appeasement of one religion alone. Why can’t we worship in our own country? My best friend Sageer Khan once said that “Even if Allah commands me to come to Pakistan I will refuse as nation, parents and religion can never be changed and so why should I go to Pakistan to worship? Why can’t I worship him in my own country? India is the best place for Muslims to live in.” 
Movements on roads like the Shaheen Bagh sit-in by blocking road connecting two cities – Delhi and Noida for more than 100 days and now this protest against farm laws for more than 2 months are not a revolutionary upsurge as some suggest but symbol of “India Celebrating And Inviting Lawlessness, Indiscipline, Khalistani Agenda And Violence And Insulting India’s Pride Like Red Fort” which cannot be justified under any circumstances! Even all those Opposition parties who are lending their support – open or covert in any manner have only served in discrediting India as a safe place to live in! They have certainly not covered themselves in glory by hailing those who attacked our policemen and even tried to murder them by running them down under tractors!
It cannot be denied that every government has the prerogative to make new laws or make suitable changes in the existing ones. If Centre erred in not sending the farm bills to the Select Committee for discussion and in promulgating Ordinances and later converting it into law in a hurry as former Union Minister Ajit Singh points out, this by itself cannot be a justification to block rail routes as happened in Congress ruled states like Punjab and Rajasthan or block entry routes to Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) ruled Delhi. Is it not the common person who is bearing the maximum brunt of all this nonsense? How can PM, President and CJI allow ever all this nonsense to happen right under their very nose? Will this promote “rule of law” or “rule of jungle” where “Might is right” holds the ground? What are we trying to make of India?
Why thousands of crores of rupees are being allowed to be wasted due to such shameless, senseless and stupid blockades? Can farmers be above our nation and law? Can they smash vehicles, hail terror leaders like late Bhindrawale, try to run down police personnel with tractors, attack anyone who try to stop them with swords and call for gunning down PM Narendra Modi just like earlier late Mrs Indira Gandhi was gunned down? Certainly not!
How can the CJI maintain a conspicuous silence on all this? Why can’t he order prompt removal of protesters from all roads and rail tracks? Most baffling! 
Why is blocking of road and rail tracks taken so lightly even by the Apex Court? Why it took so long for the Apex Court to deliver a ruling that condemned blocking of roads? Why still were farmers then allowed to block roads and why CJI didn’t order their prompt removal from roads?
Why is it that Apex Court stayed farm laws which many Judges like Justice Deepak Gupta of Supreme Court felt was not proper as it was not the remit of the Apex Court but why no such promptness was shown in ordering protesters to stop blocking of roads in Delhi and why no initiative was taken in this regard by the CJI? Why were the common people left to suffer in the cold? How can this be justified under any circumstances?
Why are farmers going overboard on this issue and why they are feeling more encouraged by Supreme Court’s inaction in making them vacate roads and increasing political support by parties who are just concerned about their vote banks thereby completely disregarding our national interests in the longer run? Why Rahul Gandhi instead of advising Centre to build bridges and not walls maintained a stoic silence when farmers were rampaging Delhi and desecrated even our national monuments and national pride – Red Fort? Why this dubious double standards? 
Who is responsible for Centre ensuring that iron rods are hooked between two rows of cement barriers on a flank of the main highway at the Singhu border to further restrict the movement of protesters, agitating against the Centre’s new farm laws? It is those farmers themselves who indulged in lawlessness, violence and rampaging on Republic Day even after assuring the police that they would not indulge in violence of any kind due to which more than 500 police personnel got injured! Why Opposition leaders never say a word on this? Clearly, this only shows that there is more to it than meets the eye! 
One still fervently hopes that good sense prevail over farmers also now and they see the dangerous game plan that is being played by some leaders who are only interested in serving their own vested agenda at the cost of farmers! Centre has taken a very balanced stand on this and has always agreed to hold talks time and again to review the farm laws instead of holding that it is non-negotiable! Foreign actors, leaders and even foreign countries have no right to meddle in India’s internal matters with clear design to malign India and this has been underscored by many celebrities like Sachin Tendulkar among others!
No doubt, this is no way to protest that you block road and rail tracks and become overjoyed that neither State nor Central Government acted tough and even Supreme Court refused to order prompt removal from these sites due to which people face maximum inconvenience and business worth thousands of crores of rupees is adversely affected! It is a no-brainer that there are some foreign powers and powerful terror groups who are behind all the sabotage that happened on 26 January and who don’t want that India should run smoothly on roads and rail tracks! Should PM, CJI and President allow them to have the last laugh by tolerating blockade of road and rail tracks quietly or should they display zero tolerance towards it as we have seen since independence till some time back when Shaheen Bagh episode spoiled everything? It is for them to introspect and decide on this! If not checked now this will become the most dangerous trend in India and our democratic system will be completely destroyed which we can certainly ignore only at the risk of our own peril!
Sanjeev Sirohi

Pressing Breasts Without Disrobing Not “Sexual Assault” As Per POCSO Act But Offence Under Section 354 IPC

To begin with, if there is one judgment of Bombay High Court which is attracting maximum attention and a lot of strong reactions from even the top court, it is this one which is titled Satish vs The State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 2020 delivered on January 19, 2021 in which the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that groping a child’s breasts without ‘skin-to-skin contact’ would amount to molestation under the Indian Penal Code but not the graver offence of ‘sexual assault’ under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. A single Bench of Bombay High Court of Justice Pushpa Ganediwala made the aforesaid observation while modifying the order of a sessions court that held a 39-year-old man guilty of sexual assault for groping a 12-year-old girl and removing her salwar. The Court has now sentenced the man under Section 354 IPC (outraging a woman’s modesty) to one year imprisonment for the minor offence.

As we see, this judgment authored by a single Judge Bench of Justice Pushpa V Ganediwala of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost pointing out in para 2 that, “This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 05.02.2020 in Special Child Protection Case No. 28 of 2017 passed by the Extra Joint Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, by which the appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 354, 363 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC) and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, (hereinafter referred to as POCSO Act), in Crime No. 405 of 2016 registered at Police Station Gittikhadan, Nagpur, District – Nagpur.”
Be it noted, para 3 then states that, “For the offence punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act read with Section 354 of the IPC, the appellant is sentenced to suffer R.I. for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of fine to suffer R.I. for one month. For the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC, the appellant is sentenced to suffer R.I. for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of fine to suffer R.I. for one month. For the offence punishable under Section 342 of the IPC, the appellant is sentenced to suffer R.I. for six months and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of fine, to suffer R.I. for one month. All the substantive jail sentences were directed to run concurrently. The appellant is given set off for the period of sentence, he has already undergone.”
While dwelling on the prosecution story, the Bench then puts forth in para 4 that, “The prosecution story, in brief, is as under : 
i) On 14.12.2016, the informant (mother of the prosecutrix) (PW-1) lodged a report at police station Gittikhadan, Nagpur, stating therein that the appellant took her daughter (prosecutrix) aged about 12 years, on the pretext of giving her guava, in his house and pressed her breast and attempted to remove her salwar. At that point of time, the informant reached the spot and rescued her daughter. Immediately, she lodged First Information Report. On the basis of the said FIR, crime came to be registered against the appellant / accused vide Crime No. 405 of 2016 (Exh. 1) for the offence punishable under Sections 354, 363 and 342 of the IPC and under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.”
To be sure, para 11 then reveals that, “At the outset, the informant – PW-1 and the prosecutrix – PW-2 are the star witnesses. The age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time was 12 years and this fact is not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant.”
It is worth noting that it is then mentioned in para 12 that, “The informant – PW-1 – the mother of the prosecutrix deposed that the incident took place on 14.12.2016. On that day at about 11.30 AM, her daughter – the prosecutrix (name kept undisclosed) went to bring guava. As she did not come back for a long time, she started searching for her. Her neighbour told her that the appellant, who was staying in the vicinity of their house, took her daughter to his house and showed her the house of the appellant. PW1 went there calling “Laxmi, Laxmi”. She saw the appellant coming down from the first floor. She asked the appellant about the whereabouts of her daughter. He denied the presence of the prosecutrix in his house. PW-1 searched for her daughter on the ground floor and then she went up to first floor. The room was bolted from outside. She opened it and found her daughter. Her daughter was crying. She took out her daughter from that room and her daughter narrated the incident that on the pretext of giving guava to her, the appellant brought her to his house and pressed her breast and when he tried to remove her knicker, she shouted. Thereafter he went out, after bolting the room from outside. Immediately, PW-1 along with her daughter proceeded for Police Station and lodged report.”
Going ahead, it is then stated in para 13 that, “PW-2 – Prosecutrix testified that on the day of incident, when she was going to bring guava, the appellant caught her hand and told her that he will provide guava to her and he took her to his house. He tried to remove her Salwar and pressed her breast. Then she shouted. The appellant pressed her mouth by his hand. The appellant went down by closing the door of the room from outside. Thereafter, her mother opened the door and entered the room and brought her outside. Then they went to Police Station for lodging report.”
Truth be told, it is then observed in para 15 that, “A perusal of the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 on the point of incident would reveal that both the witnesses are consistent on the point that the appellant pressed the breast of the prosecutrix. With regard to removing of knicker, though in her chief PW-1 stated that the appellant/ accused was trying to remove knicker of her daughter, however, in cross examination she has corrected her statement and deposed that she told the police that the appellant tried to remove Salwar of her daughter. The prosecutrix deposed about removing of her salwar. So there is no confusion with regard to whether the accused tried to remove salwar or knicker.”
Simply put, it is then stated in para 18 that, “Evidently, it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant removed her top and pressed her breast. The punishment provided for offence of ‘sexual assault’ is imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine. Considering the stringent nature of punishment provided for the offence, in the opinion of this Court, stricter proof and serious allegations are required. The act of pressing of breast of the child aged 12 years, in the absence of any specific detail as to whether the top was removed or whether he inserted his hand inside top and pressed her breast, would not fall in the definition of ‘sexual assault’. It would certainly fall within the definition of the offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. For ready reference, Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is reproduced below :
“354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty. – Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, with the intention to outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.””
As it turned out, it is then made clear in para 21 that, “Section 7 of the POCSO Act, defines sexual assault and the minimum sentence provided is three years and Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, which is related to outraging the modesty of a woman, prescribes minimum sentence of one year. In the instant case, having regard to the nature of the alleged act by the appellant and having regard to the circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, the alleged act fit into the definition of the offence as defined in Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code.”
What’s more, it is then brought out in para 25 that, “The learned APP read out Section 7 of the POCSO Act, which defines sexual assault and submitted that the act which has been proved by the prosecution “pressing of breast” comes within the definition of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.”
Hence it is then observed in para 26 that, “It is not possible to accept this submission for the aforesaid reasons. Admittedly, it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant removed her top and pressed her breast. As such, there is no direct physical contact i.e. skin to skin with sexual intent without penetration.”
Now coming to the concluding paras. Para 27 lays down that, “In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the appellant is acquitted under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and convicted under minor offence u/s 354 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default of fine to suffer R.I. for one month. The sentence for the offence punishable under Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code i.e. six months and fine of Rs.500/-, in default to suffer R.I. for one month, is maintained. The accused is on bail. His bail bond stands forfeited. Issue Non-bailable warrant against the appellant – accused. All the substantive jail sentences shall run concurrently and the appellant – accused is entitled for set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” Finally, it is then held in the last para 28 that, “Criminal Appeal stands disposed of accordingly.” 
It cannot be lightly dismissed that none other than the top court has stayed this ruling which acquitted a 50-year-old labourer from Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli district holding that groping a minor without removing her clothes was not sexual assault but molestation after Attorney General KK Venugopal pointed out that the judgment was likely to set a dangerous precedent. Venugopal added that, “It will mean that if a cloth is touched no case under Section 8 of the POCSO Act is made out. This Court must take notice of the judgment.” Justice Pushpa Ganediwala had ruled that the act of holding the hands of a minor “prosecutrix” or unzipping trousers in front of her, an act witnessed by PW-1 (prosecution witness1), in the opinion of the court did not fit with the definition of aggravated sexual assault. She reversed the conviction of the man Libnus Kujur for aggravated sexual assault that was a charge brought against him because the child was younger than 12 years of age.
Of course, it cannot be lightly dismissed that a petition filed by advocate Manju Jetley on behalf of the Youth Bar Association of India said that the High Court had also named the minor victim in its judgment which violated Section 228B of the IPC. It also cannot be lightly dismissed that the National Commission of Child Rights (NCPCR) and the National Commission for Women (NCW) took a serious note of the January 19 ruling. NCW expressed a desire to challenge the judgment before the Supreme Court and NCPCR wrote to the Maharashtra Chief Secretary to seek a review of the ruling. It added that, “It has been observed by the Commission (NCPCR) that the prosecution has failed in representing the case of the victim properly. If the prosecution had made the submissions as per spirit of the POCSO Act, the accused would not have been acquitted of the serious offence against the minor.” 
Furthermore, the letter added that, “Further, the remark “skin-to-skin… with sexual intention, without penetration” also needs to be reviewed and the State should take note of this, as it seems to be derogatory to the minor victim.” This condemnable incident had happened on February 11, 2018. On October 5, 2020, a special POCSO court in Gadchiroli convicted the labourer under Sections 354-A(1)(i) (sexual harassment) and 448 (house trespass) of the IPC and Sections 8 (punishment for sexual assault), 10 (punishment for aggravated sexual assault) and 12 (punishment for sexual harassment) read with Section 9(m) (sexual assault of a child below 12 years of age) and 11(i) sexual harassment) of the POCSO Act. He was sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault. 
It is worth noting that Section 7 of the POCSO Act defines sexual assault of a child as “whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person…” What is most problematic in this judgment is that the single Judge Bench of Justice Pushpa Ganediwala who delivered this judgment stated that, “as per the definition of sexual assault, a ‘physical contact with sexual intent without penetration’ is an essential ingredient of the offence” with “physical contact” requiring “skin-to-skin contact” and not just any contact. Strictly speaking, if this is agreed to, it would be interpreted as that if an offender uses a condom while penetrating the child, this would not amount to an offence since there was no direct contact. How can this be justified ever? Also, it cannot be overlooked that the serious offence under POCSO Act which carries a minimum of three years imprisonment which may extend to five years along with fine was reduced to Section 354 of IPC which carries a considerably lower punishment of only one year of minimum imprisonment. In addition, this case was delayed for nearly four years.
We cannot afford to ignore that Flavia Agnes who is an eminent women who has done extensive research in cases of child sexual abuse and is co-founder of Majlis Legal Centre while differing from those who commented that the Judge Pushpa Ganediwala who was elevated to the Bombay High Court in 2019 lacks exposure to the letter and spirit of the POCSO Act pointed out in her enlightening editorial titled “Weakening The Law” in ‘The Indian Express’ dated February 1, 2021 that, “ Lawyers and activists engaged with the RAHAT project of Majlis Legal Centre have closely observed the manner in which she conducted the trials in cases of child sexual abuse even before the enactment of the POCSO Act, when she was the trial judge for sexual offences against women and children in the Bombay City, Civil and Sessions Court. In our first case, which involved the sexual abuse of a four-year-old and where the police had delayed filing an FIR, she had convicted the accused, a watchman, for seven years. A high-profile criminal lawyer, Majeed Memon, appeared for the accused supported by the trustees of the school. On the other hand, our support person was a fresh graduate with no exposure to criminal courts. But it was the Judge’s sensitivity that helped in a fair trial. In another case which concerned the father raping his daughter, where the FIR was filed after 18 months, she had argued that when the police refused to register a complaint, how can the illiterate mother be blamed for delay in filing. She convicted and sentenced the accused to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The most challenging case she presided over is the sexual abuse by multiple men at Kalyani Mahila Bal Seva Sanstha in Navi Mumbai. We had marvelled at the manner in which she conducted the trial. There were around 10 accused and some survivors had to be examined in sign language. In May 2013, six accused were convicted, including the founder-director, of the rape of five mentally-challenged female inmates, three of whom were minors. One of the victims died after she was gang raped. Hence, prime accused and director of orphanage was also convicted of murder. So what happened in this case. Why such a mindboggling judgment that has been condemned by all concerned stakeholders – one which can become a precedent to be followed by subordinate judiciary? The harm that has been caused to the minor in this particular case as well as all future cases, cannot be easily overlooked. This judgment needs to be set aside and the comments expunged to repose the faith of all survivors of sexual violence in the judicial system.” 
So we have to concede that Justice Pushpa has a good track record and it is only in this judgment that she has erred for which she certainly deserved to be reprimanded but her entire career should not be put in jeopardy! It also cannot be ignored that mandatory sentences are counterproductive to the aim of reducing crime or acting as a deterrent. But regarding this judgment’s strong criticism we also cannot overlook what is mentioned in the editorial of Hindustan Times dated January 26, 2021 that, “The ruling is disturbing. It is a literal interpretation of the law and overlooks the fact that POCSO does not mention clothing as a factor in the crime of molesting a child. This is a matter of violating the bodily integrity of the victim. The interpretation also does not recognize the long-term psychological damage that child sexual abuse victims suffer. This reading of the law will dilute cases of child abuse and make it difficult to ensure justice. The National Commission of Women has pointed out that the order will have a cascading impact on women safety and trivialized the legal architecture in place, and has decided, rightly so, to challenge the order. The issue should also force a relook at the wording of the Act and other laws, which deal with child abuse. There can be no room for ambiguity in child abuse cases and any loophole which allows for this must be plugged at once.” 
All said and done, one has to always concede that there has to be zero tolerance on sexual offences especially in child abuse cases. All the loopholes must be first quickly identified and then deliberated, discussed and debated upon and then reformed adequately to meet the present circumstances where the cases of violence and sexual offences against children are increasing very rapidly! No doubt, there can be no leniency at all for sexual offences against children! 
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh

Punishing An Adolescent Boy Who Enters Into A Relationship With A Minor Girl

In a balanced, bold and brilliant judgment titled Vijayalakshmi & Anr. v. State & Anr. in Crl.O.P.No.232 of 2021 and Crl.M.P.No.109 of 2021 delivered on January 27, 2021, the Madras High Court minced no words to state unequivocally that, “Punishing an adolescent boy who enters into a relationship with a minor girl by treating him as an offender, was never the objective of POCSO Act.” The remarks were made while highlighting the rampant misuse of the POCSO Act by families for prosecuting the partner of their teenage daughters. A single Judge Bench of Justice N Anand Venkatesh therefore insisted that the legislature must keep pace with the changing societal needs and bring about necessary changes in law and more particularly in a stringent law such as the POCSO Act.

To start with, the ball is set rolling by first and foremost pointing out in para 1 about the intent of the petition that, “This petition has been filed seeking to quash the proceedings pending in Special S.C.No.24 of 2018 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court (Fast Track Mahila Court) Erode.” 
As we see, it is then stated aptly in para 2 that, “This is a very peculiar petition that has been filed by the Defacto Complainant and the victim girl, jointly seeking for quashing the proceedings pending against the 2nd Respondent who is facing trial before the Court below for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1806, Section 6 of the Prevention of Child from Sexual Offences, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “POSCO Act” or “the Act”) and Section 9 of the Prohibition of the Child Marriage Act, 2006.”
While elaborating further, it is then stated in para 3 that, “It is seen from records that the 2nd Petitioner, victim girl, is well known to the second respondent, and they were in love with each other. Ultimately, they decided to get married and went away from their respective homes and a police complaint came to be filed before the 1st Respondent and the same has now resulted in criminal proceedings against the 2nd Respondent before the Court below.”
As it turned out, the Bench then states in para 4 that, “Ms. Doulagh Nisha, Inspector of Police was present at the time of hearing through video conferencing and she informed this Court that the petitioners have approached her and informed her that they do not want to continue further with the criminal proceedings against the 2nd Respondent. It was informed to her that the 1st Petitioner wants her daughter to get married and that the same is getting delayed due to the criminal proceedings, thereby only causing more mental agony to the Petitioners.”
To put things in perspective, it is then envisaged in para 5 that, “The Defacto Complainant and the victim girl were also present at the time of hearing through video conferencing. This Court examined the victim girl and she stated that there was a love affair between herself and the 2nd Respondent and that she is not willing to undergo this agony any further and wanted the criminal proceedings to be quashed.” 
Adding more to it, it is then laid bare in para 7 that, “The father of the victim girl who was examined as PW1 also did not support the case of the prosecution and he was treated as a hostile witness.”
Still further adding more, it is then brought out in para 8 that, “The mother of the victim girl was also present at the time of hearing through video conferencing. She stated that let bygones be bygones, she wants her daughter to get married and settled in life. She further stated that she is not interested in pursuing the criminal proceedings any further and that same can be quashed by this Court.”
Significantly, the Bench then brings out in para 10 that, “This Court is instantaneously reminded of an earlier order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in Sabari v. Inspector of Police reported in 2019 (3) MLJ Crl 110, wherein he had discussed in detail about the cases in which persons of the age group of 16 to 18 years are involved in love affairs and how in some cases ultimately end up in a criminal case booked for an offence under the POSCO Act. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted here under for proper appreciation: 
“ 21.When this case was taken up for hearing, this Court became concerned about the growing incidence of offences under the POCSO Act on one side and also the Rigorous Imprisonment envisaged in the Act. Sometimes it happens that such offences are slapped against teenagers, who fall victim of the application of the POCSO Act at an young age without understanding the implication of the severity of the enactment.
26.In addition to the above, this Court is of the view that ‘warning’ of attraction of POCSO Act must be displayed before screening of any film, which have teenage characters suggesting relationship between boy and girl.
27.Apart from the above, this Court is of the view that as per the 3rd respondent’s report, majority of cases are due to relationship between adolescent boys and girls. Though under Section 2(d) of the Act, ‘Child’ is defined as a person below the age of 18 years and in case of any love affair between a girl and a boy, where the girl happened to be 16 or 17 years old, either in the school final or entering the college, the relationship invariably assumes the penal character by subjecting the boy to the rigours of POCSO Act. Once the age of the girl is established in such relationship as below 18 years, the boy involved in the relationship is sure to be sentenced 7 years or 10 years as minimum imprisonment, as the case may be.
28. When the girl below 18 years is involved in a relationship with the teen age boy or little over the teen age, it is always a question mark as to how such relationship could be defined, though such relationship would be the result of mutual innocence and biological attraction. Such relationship cannot be construed as an unnatural one or alien to between relationship of opposite sexes. But in such cases where the age of the girl is below 18 years, even though she was capable of giving consent for relationship, being mentally matured, unfortunately, the provisions of the POCSO Act get attracted if such relationship transcends beyond platonic limits, attracting strong arm of law sanctioned by the provisions of POCSO Act, catching up with the so called offender of sexual assault, warranting a severe imprisonment of 7/10 years. 
29.Therefore, on a profound consideration of the ground realities, the definition of ‘Child’ under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act can be redefined as 16 instead of 18. Any consensual sex after the age of 16 or bodily contact or allied acts can be excluded from the rigorous 46 provisions of the POCSO Act and such sexual assault, if it is so defined can be tried under more liberal provision, which can be introduced in the Act itself and in order to distinguish the cases of teen age relationship after 16 years, from the cases of sexual assault on children below 16 years. The Act can be amended to the effect that the age of the offender ought not to be more than five years or so than the consensual victim girl of 16 years or more. So that the impressionable age of the victim girl cannot be taken advantage of by a person who is much older and crossed the age of presumable infatuation or innocence”.”
More significantly, it is then made clear in para 11 that, “There can be no second thought as to the seriousness of offences under the POCSO Act and the object it seeks to achieve. However, it is also imperative for this Court to draw the thin line that demarcates the nature of acts that should not be made to fall within the scope of the Act, for such is the severity of the sentences provided under the Act, justifiably so, that if acted upon hastily or irresponsibly, it could lead to irreparable damage to the reputation and livelihood of youth whose actions would have been only innocuous. What came to be a law to protect and render justice to victims and survivors of child abuse, can, become a tool in the hands of certain sections of the society to abuse the process of law.”
Equally significant is what is then stated in para 12 that, “As rightly recognized by the Learned Single Judge of this Court in Sabari’s Case (cited supra), incidences where teenagers and young adults fall victim to offences under the POCSO Act being slapped against them without understanding the implication of the severity of the enactment is an issue that brings much concern to the conscience of this Court. A reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the POCSO Act would show that the Act was brought into force to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography, pursuant to Article 15 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, a large array of cases filed under the POCSO Act seems to be those arising on the basis of complaints registered by the families of adolescents and teenagers who are involved in romantic relationships with each other. The scheme of the Act clearly shows that it did not intend to bring within its scope or ambit, cases of the nature where adolescents or teenagers involved in romantic relationships are concerned.”
It is also worth noting that it is then rightly pointed out in para 16 that, “In light of the above, it is only natural that there are cases of the above-mentioned nature that are on the rise at present and it does not help matters to avoid acknowledging that the society is changing and influencing people’s identity and cognition, constantly. Therefore, painting a criminal colour to this aspect would only serve counter-productively to understanding biosocial dynamics and the need to regulate the same through the process of law.”
Of course, it is then conceded in para 17 that, “This Court is not turning a blind eye to cases where the victim or survivor may, under the effect of trauma that they have undergone, studies on which show that they might tend to reconcile with the same by blaming themselves or convincing themselves that the element of consent was infact present. Nor is this Court scientifically justifying in toto, the genuineness or predicament of the accused in every case where it appears that the accused and victim child have been in a romantic relationship. That will depend on the facts and circumstances of each and every case.” 
Most significantly, it is then made absolutely clear without mincing any words in para 18 that, “In the present case, the 2nd Petitioner who was in a relationship with the 2nd Respondent who is also in his early twenties, has clearly stated that she was the one who insisted that the 2nd Respondent take her away from her home and marry her, due to the pressure exerted by her parents. The 2ndRespondent, who was placed in a very precarious situation decided to concede to the demand of the 2nd Petitioner. Thereafter, they eloped from their respective homes, got married and consummated the marriage. Incidents of this nature keep occurring regularly even now in villages and towns and occasionally in cities. After the parents or family lodge a complaint, the police register FIRs for offences of kidnapping and various offences under the POCSO Act. Several criminal cases booked under the POCSO Act fall under this category. As a consequence of such a FIR being registered, invariably the boy gets arrested and thereafter, his youthful life comes to a grinding halt. The provisions of the POCSO Act, as it stands today, will surely make the acts of the boy an offence due to its stringent nature. An adolescent boy caught in a situation like this will surely have no defense if the criminal case is taken to its logical end. Punishing an adolescent boy who enters into a relationship with a minor girl by treating him as an offender, was never the objective of the POCSO Act. An adolescent boy and girl who are in the grips of their hormones and biological changes and whose decision-making ability is yet to fully develop, should essentially receive the support and guidance of their parents and the society at large. These incidents should never be perceived from an adult’s point of view and such an understanding will in fact lead to lack of empathy. An adolescent boy who is sent to prison in a case of this nature will be persecuted throughout his life. It is high time that the legislature takes into consideration cases of this nature involving adolescents involved in relationships and swiftly bring in necessary amendments under the Act. The legislature has to keep pace with the changing societal needs and bring about necessary changes in law and more particularly in a stringent law such as the POCSO Act.”
Needless to say, it is then stated in no uncertain terms in para 19 that, “The main issue that requires the consideration of this Court is as to whether this Court can quash the criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences pending against the second respondent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Parbathbhai Aahir @ Parbathbhai Vs. State of Gujrath, reported in 2017 9 SCC 641 and in case of The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dhruv Gurjar and Another reported in (2019) 2 MLJ Crl 10, has given sufficient guidelines that must be taken into consideration by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, to quash non-compoundable offences. One very important test that has been laid down is that the Court must necessarily examine if the crime in question is purely individual in nature or a crime against the society with overriding public interest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that offences against the society with overriding public interest even if it gets settled between the parties, cannot be quashed by this Court.”
Truth be told, it is then held in para 20 that, “In the present case, the offences in question are purely individual/personal in nature. It involves the 2ndPetitioner and the 2nd Respondent and their respective families only. It involves the future of two young persons who are still in their early twenties. The second respondent is working as an Auto driver to eke his livelihood. Quashing the proceedings, will not affect any overriding public interest in this case and it will in fact pave way for the 2nd Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent to settle down in their life and look for better future prospects. No useful purpose will be served in continuing with the criminal proceedings and keeping these proceedings pending will only swell the mental agony of the victim girl and her mother and not to forget the 2nd Respondent as well.”
Finally, it is then stated in para 21 that, “In view of the above, this Court is inclined to quash the criminal proceedings in Special S.C.No.24 of 2018 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court (Fast Track Mahila Court) Erode in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Accordingly, the same is quashed and this Criminal Original Petition is allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also closed.” 
In totality, what this extremely laudable, learned, landmark and latest judgment delivered by Justice N Anand Venkatesh of the Madras High Court seeks to convey is that, “Punishing an adolescent boy who enters into a relationship with a minor girl by treating him as an offender, was never the objective of POCSO Act.” It cannot be also denied that the Madras High Court in this leading case has also very rightly conceded that there is rampant misuse of the POCSO Act by families for prosecuting the partner of their teenage daughters. This cannot be allowed to go on till perpetuity. A full stop has to be inserted somewhere and this is exactly what the Madras High Court has sought to do in this notable case also! There can certainly be no denying or disputing it! It is also very rightly conceded by the Madras High Court that punishing an adolescent boy who enters into a relationship with a minor girl by treating him as an offender was never the objective of the POCSO Act. It is high time and the law makers must amend the POCSO Act so that the whole life of adolescent boy is not impaired for an act which he did at the adolescent stage! 
Sanjeev Sirohi

Ramani Wiped 50 Years Of My Hard Work With One Stroke: MJ Akbar

Let me begin with a disclaimer: I have no affiliation with eminent and senior journalist MJ Akbar of any kind and I have never met him in person nor am I affiliated in any way with his political party BJP of which he is a member and earlier was Union Minister of State also for External Affairs. But ever since I gained senses I have been a regular reader of his scholarly articles in most prestigious magazines like “India Today” among others and so also in many eminent newspapers. I used to enjoy reading his learned articles most when I was in school and in college even though later also I made it a point to always read his articles! I was most shocked to learn when his name figured in a controversy and when his name was dragged in it. To be brutally honest, it was the worst shock that I could ever have imagined in my life!

Needless to say, MJ Akbar has always enjoyed an impeccable reputation and even his worst critic could never have questioned his unimpeachable conduct, his impeccable reputation until Priya Ramani raised serious questions marks on his conduct. MJ Akbar through his counsel argued that it was journalist Priya Ramani who “targeted him” for which he was prompted to file the defamation complaint.
It may be recalled that MJ Akbar was left with no option but to resign as Union Minister of State for External Affairs even before the charges have been proved against him in any court and he too became a victim of “MeToo Media Trial”! Hang him if he is guilty but condemning him even before charges have been framed against him in any court and tarnishing his “impeccable reputation” which he has earned in his entire life in just few seconds cannot be justified under any circumstances! MJ Akbar could have easily continued as a Minister but he preferred to resign and first challenge those who tarnished his impeccable reputation in court.
Bluntly put: Is MJ Akbar not entitled to the benefit of the due process of law and legal defence? Should he not be given a chance to prove his innocence? There are many senior eminent women journalists like Tavleen Singh who have always appreciated him and have said that they have never experienced any such “alleged misconduct” from him but this is never highlighted in the media! Tavleen Singh is most famous for calling a spade a spade and she never fears anyone! How can all this be ignored?
Most recently, a woman journalist deposed in court in his favour and admired his upright approach in always dealing with her. Only the numbers are highlighted that 16 or 17 women have levelled most serious charges against him but I want to ask: Why they never dared to lodge FIR against him in any police station of India till now? Why they kept quiet for so many years? Why inspite of being professional they chose to keep quiet? Were they not aware of their legal rights?
Going forward: Why did they not immediately complaint? Why they didn’t spill the beans earlier? Why was there a consensual conspiracy of silence? Why were they lured to keep quiet? Why they compromised themselves just for getting some material benefit? Are they not guilty just like an adulterous women? 
It also cannot be ignored that Union Minister Pon Radhakrishnan asked: “If someone makes an allegation that such a thing happened when the incident happened we were playing together while in class 5. Would it be fair? The ‘MeToo’ movement had sullied the image of the country. Will it be right for men to start making similar accusations like them.” Even Union Minister for Tourism K Alphons had cautioned against frivolous complaints by “insincere” people with an agenda. He said that, “People should be extremely careful when they raise an allegation. Yes, if something inappropriate has taken place, it should be in public domain. There should not be any doubt about it, but I hope frivolous complaints are not raised by insincere people to fix people whom they do not like.”
We heard earlier how KWAN founder Anirban Das attempted suicide after sexual misconduct allegations but was saved by an alert police team patrolling the Navi Mumbai bridge! MJ Akbar has vowed to fight for sake of his reputation till the end! There are very few who care for what “mental trauma” a man undergoes when false allegations are levelled against him and he is defamed by “media trial” to the fullest even before charges are framed against him in any court! This must stop once and for all as it mutilates and maims to pieces a men’s integral right to reputation and right not to be defamed and denounced even before any court takes cognizance of the charges levelled against him! 
“You do me favors, I do you favors 30 years later
lets call it “me too”
A strong woman does not wait 30, 20, 10 years to speak up, she slaps him on the first “bad touch” and knocks him out
Don’t hide your weakness, the favors in returns that you enjoyed and the work you got by “I was too scared” cry now
You were scared to say NO then because its hard to stand up for what is right and you were scared to loose your status and position in the work place, so YOU CHOOSE to accept the molestation and went back for more …Its very easy to play the abla nari card later and gain sympathy
The Shakti does not wait later to speak up, she silences the evil on spot…
My thoughts on this nonsense of me too
I don’t have me too stories …anyone who tried got a tight slap then and there and I was never afraid to walk out with my head held high ..be it a Job or relationship!
“strong women don’t have me too sob
Stories, they have I gave him thappad
(slap) back short essays”.”
– Geetanjali Arora in Sunday Times of India dated October 21, 2018
Every person must applaud, admire and appreciate Geetanjali Arora for what she has written so courageously on 9 October at 5.35 pm which got published on October 21 in one of the most reputed newspapers of India – The Times Of India! Why should women be treated always as victims? Why should women keep quiet for many decades and then speak up if she herself has nothing to hide from the world?
Does men have no right? Should only women have all the right to speak up whenever she likes? Very few know that a woman had levelled serious allegations against eminent film actor Jitender about an act allegedly done by him 47 years ago when she was very young but the Himachal Pradesh High Court didn’t accept it and rejected the petition as it said that the time limit of lodging the complaint within the limitation period of 3 years was not complied with! 
Anyway, coming to the case at hand, while appearing before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Ravindra Kumar Pandey, senior women advocate Geeta Luthra further argued that Ramani didn’t feel the need to check with the Ministry, department or PRO to confirm if he had resigned before tweeting that he did. “You wiped out 50 years of his hard work with one stroke,” submitted Luthra while rebutting the submissions of Ramani’s lawyer, senior counsel Rebecca John. John had on a previous occasion submitted that, “It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person if it for the public good… If the imputation of sexual harassment is in good faith and for public it is not defamation. It is not defamation if the imputation relates to something that touches a public question.”
While contesting this submission, Geeta Luthra quipped: “Good faith would have been if you had any evidence. It can’t be for public good. Public good doesn’t mean you will malign someone’s image. Public good is when you’re making a statement then you have to do it with responsibility.”
Most significantly, Geeta Luthra very rightly pointed out while referring to a sexual harassment incident that, “Just by calling it my truth, doesn’t make it a truth… you haven’t proved whether you have made a call to the complainant, you haven’t proved that you met (Akbar).” Luthra also further pointed out that, “This version is a figment of imagination and not truth..After 30 years you are trying to bring something without any evidence. It is all in the air.”
While stating that “whether you make a whisper that a person is a thief or a cheat” it has to be backed with evidence. Luthra told the court that, “You have to have empirical evidence which can stand scrutiny in the court of law. There is no such evidence in this case. There is no investigation.” 
As it turned out, Luthra then read out the statement of a witness, Joyeeta Basu who had testified from Akbar’s side. Basu, Luthra claimed, was called a tutored witness. Calling Basu a respected journalist, the counsel said she was a natural witness unlike Ramani’s witness. Luthra also added that, “Her witness is her friend who doesn’t know anything about the alleged incident.” 
Needless to say, for Akbar, the defamation complaint was filed as the “malicious tweets by Ramani” had “destroyed my reputation in the eyes of the society”. Luthra also read out another testimony of one Akbar’s witnesses, Sunil Gujral to assert that his reputation was “impeccable”. Gujral was stated to have known Akbar for a long time personally and professionally.
MJ Akbar through his counsel Luthra rightly submitted that, “Harm is done by the man who instigates and ignites the first flame.” The submissions were made by Luthra before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Ravindra Kumar Pandey. While reading Ramani’s testimony, Luthra told the court that, “She wrote an article without naming anyone because it was a piece of fiction..You said you didn’t name him because he didn’t do anything. The tweet doesn’t say that I’m saying all this because so many women are speaking up.” 
Moreover, it cannot be lightly dismissed that MJ Akbar also told the court that Priya Ramani “deliberately, intentionally and maliciously” destroyed evidence by deleting the Twitter account. Akbar’s lawyer Geeta Luthra told the court that, “This strange argument that this Twitter account, the court didn’t tell me to save so I didn’t. How can one take a defence like this?” Luthra also told the court that Ramani knew there was a criminal complaint pending against her. 
More to the point, Geeta Luthra also pertinently told the court that, “These are all tweets. They were all primary evidence. Can she destroy evidence…another criminal case can be made out. I would have wanted to cross examine her. This whole thing is destruction of evidence which is not something which is not viewed very seriously…suppose the court wanted to see it. Fact is that everything has been deliberately destroyed to subvert the cause of justice.
Furthermore, Luthra also told the court that, “All evidence which was part of the trial..deliberately, intentionally, maliciously has been destroyed by deleting the Twitter account. These lies have left me defending my reputation in the last few years. It is unpardonable. I wonder at what kind of cost has it come to you. You have damaged a person’s 50 years of reputation.” Luthra also said that, “There was no overt physical attack.”
Adding further more, Luthra said that, “Here also she is self contradictory. She said it was sarcasm then takes alternate defence. Sarcasm is also defamation. Did he do anything or not do anything..same can’t have a non-sarcastic meaning and still be sarcastic…First she says first fourt para are about her. But then talks about ‘shared experience’. Whom did she interview? This has to be before the cause of action. She says it’s my story..what is she trying? Every sentence when examined is contradictory to the next.” 
     <div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Truth be told, Akbar had filed a defamation case in 2018 stating that Ramani’s allegations were viewed and read by several people online and he received numerous calls from friends and colleagues from the media and political sphere. For having reportedly suffered “great humiliation” and his reputation being “severely tarnished” he had sought court’s intervention. Luthra reiterated that Ramani had some other motive and “there is no public interest. There is no good faith.”</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Without mincing any words, Luthra said that, “What she (Ramani) said does not mean predator. Many people in positions of hierarchy are more powerful but you can’t call them a predator. There are many words to describe a junior-senior relationship.” Luthra also told the court that, “You cannot turn around and say that you are calling a person the media’s biggest predator…You are a journalist. You have to be responsible ..You can’t write as if without any sense of responsibility or accountability..It doesn’t matter what people say post facto. Harm is done by the man who instigates and ignites the first flame. She is not an eye witness. It is fabricated. She is an interested witness.” Luthra told the court that the meaning of the word predator is a person who has propensity for violent sexual behaviour. </div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">What has really shaken me most is the enlightening editorial written by Ramesh Thakur who is Professor of Public Policy, Australian National University in ‘The Times Of India’ dated November 9, 2018 titled “Believe Evidence Over Gender” which begins by coming straight to the point saying that, “The #MeToo campaign began as a long overdue effort to call out men abusing positions of power and authority to exploit vulnerable women sexually, but then morphed into some settling of scores for dates gone wrong. In the age of social media, #MeToo swarms of screaming mobs, and bird-dogging, the wildest accusations are amplified instantaneously across the whole world. This makes the charge themselves a powerful political weapon.” He rightly suggests the following to check mud slinging matches: “First, ensure anonymity for both or neither. Name only the guilty party after the trial. If the verdict is inconclusive, keep all names confidential. Second, treat both accuser and accused with sympathy, respect and courtesy. Evaluate the testimony of both with equal skepticism, ask questions accordingly, and weigh their statements against the facts. Everyone deserves a fair hearing: no one deserves to be believed in the absence of evidence; and shifting evidence and timeline to suit the narrative warrants over suspicion. Third, match the prosecution and penalty for false accusations to those of conviction. This will put in place a powerful deterrent. Without consequences, the political weaponisation of false charges will continue. Above all, believe evidence over gender. Senator Susan Collins was branded a rape apologist for doing so.”</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">It was in 2018 that we saw how in a landmark judgment titled ‘Joseph Shine v Union of India’, the Supreme Court led by Justice Dr DY Chandrachud very rightly decriminalized adultery as it felt that sex with consent cannot be crime and he overruled his father’s decision rendered earlier in Sowmithri Vishnu in 1985! Law has to change with time. Even the definition of rape needs change and sex with consent should not be termed rape. A woman after having consensual sex with a men for many years cannot and should not be allowed suddenly to scream rape and play the victim card by weeping!  The moot question that arises here is: Why the women promptly didn’t lodge complaint if she was forced to enter into sexual relationship? Also, why always men alone be condemned? What if it was women who lured men into sex? Why always women version is to be believed? Why should women not be punished and sent to jail for at least an year if she levels false allegations against a men solely for denigrating, damaging and destroying his untarnished reputation in front of the world? Why should she not be made to pay compensation to him for tarnishing his reputation in front of the world? Why can’t the laws be suitably amended in this regard? Why should only women have right to reputation and right not to be defamed and denounced? Why do we ignore that our laws and Constitution treats men and women as alike? Why should men be deprived of the basic fundamental tenet of law that everyone is innocent until proven guilty? </div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">It cannot be lightly dismissed that in a criminal case, where the accused will forfeit his liberty if convicted, the standard of proof required to convict him not just is higher but also needs to be proved “beyond all reasonable doubt”. It is high time and all news channels and media groups should refrain from just glamourising “#MeToo” movement and should instead always convince so called “female victims” to approach the court at the earliest and not after 10 or 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 years and fight the legal battle which would seek evidence for both prosecution and proving innocence instead of just levelling the most damning allegations after many decades which only exposes her to “defamation suits” to get real justice for herself! Also, it must be ensured that the identity of both the women levelling the allegations and the men against whom allegations are levelled are not revealed in public until the case is decided at least in the lower court! Such cases too must be decided at the earliest and not after many years as the reputation of both the women and the men suffers enormously which only robs them of their right to privacy which just recently in KS Puttaswamy case has been declared to be a fundamental right!</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">It is high time and now women too must be jailed and punished for levelling false allegations. Section 498A of IPC and so also Domestic Violence Act is many times misused and so there must be strict provision for punishing women if her allegations turn out to be false. Women is now no less inferior to men in any field. Then why should she be given blank cheque of exemption if she levels false charge against any men? Even men has the right to reputation and dignity just like women which gets severely compromised when women levels false and wild allegations against men and so should never go unpunished under any circumstances!</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">I am certainly not against women getting justice who have suffered at the hands of men but I also simultaneously favour the reasoned and logical stand that, “Men too have right not to be defamed and denounced without facing strictest legal scrutiny in accordance with due procedure of law”. Every Indian women must always abide by what Geetanjali Arora who is herself a female has said which I have quoted right at the beginning! Women are beating men in studies and outsmarting them in every field then why should they take things lying down when it comes to sexual offences?</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Why not lodge complaint at the first place instead of just indulging in character assassination after many years as part of “#MeToo” campaign and getting defamed yourself also and making a huge public spectacle of yourself? Now it is for women to decide for themselves which course of action they would like to adopt but now they must stop laying the victim card and abide in totality by what Geetanjali Arora has said so rightly and never tolerate any sort of any misconduct from any men under any circumstances whatsoever! It is high time and now women must be actually treated at par with men by not always allowing women to play always the “victim card” and encouraging her to always take men head on whenever any men dares to violate her physical or mental integrity in any manner instead of waking up after decades! There can be certainly no denying it!</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Needless to say, MJ Akbar’s case is still pending in court and we have to keep our fingers crossed till the case is finally decided. But certainly the immeasurable pain, anguish and heart bleed that MJ Akbar faced is clearly apparent and one only hopes that justice is done with him and I am sure that judiciary will vindicate the unflinching faith that he has posed in it! </div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">s/o Col BPS Sirohi,</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">A 82, Defence Enclave,</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,</div><div style="text-align: justify"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify">Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh</div>

SCBA Concerned Over Search At Delhi Lawyer’s Premises

It cannot be lightly dismissed that none other than the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) on December 28, 2020 had expressed shock and deep concern on the arbitrary, illegal and brazen exercise of brute power by the police against lawyers, including the search conducted at the premises of an advocate representing some of the accused in the North-East Delhi riots cases. This was published in ‘The Times of India’ newspaper dated December 29, 2020 as also in other leading newspapers. This is really condemnable as lawyer is an officer of the court and it cannot be lightly dismissed as none other than the Supreme Court Bar Association has taken serious note of it. 

To put things in perspective, it is pointed out that regarding the search at advocate Mehmood Pracha’s office premises, the SCBA said that such actions were intimidatory and designed to abuse the due process by coercing an advocate to succumb to police threats and methods unheard of in legal annals. How can such a search at the office premises of an advocate who is an officer of the court be justified? This alone explains why even SCBA has taken a very serious note of it.
To be sure, the SCBA said in a statement that, “Such a search/seizure is in the teeth of the specific provisions of law which recognize the client lawyer relationship and protects all correspondence between the advocate and his client.” It would be useful to go through Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act which all those in the legal field are fully well-versed with. For starters, it must be mentioned here that Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act states that:
“126. Professional communication
No barrister, attorney, pleader or vakil shall at any time be permitted, unless with his client’s express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment:
Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure –
(1) Any such communication made in furtherance of any [illegal] purpose.
(2) Any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, in the course of his employment as such, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment.
It is immaterial whether the attention of such barrister, [pleader], attorney or vakil was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf on his client.
Explanation – The obligation stated in this section continues after the employment has ceased.”
Truth be told, the SCBA also said explicitly, elegantly and effectively that, “Encroachment on the rights of an advocate by the police violates the rights of the accused to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21, and the protection against self-incrimination guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, jeopardising the rights of the client to a free trial.” Who can deny or dispute this? The police has a lot of introspection to do on what it has done.
Going forward, the SCBA also pointed out that, “The seizures of confidential information which is protected by lawyer-client privilege, in a search conducted by the very police authorities who are prosecuting the lawyer’s clients, will prejudicially affect the rights and guarantees of the accused.” Again who can deny or dispute this? What the top court Bar Association vis-à-vis the Supreme Court Bar Association has stated so rightly cannot be brushed aside or swept under the carpet!
It must be pointed out here that the Special Cell of the Delhi Police had searched the Nizamuddin East office of lawyer Mahmood Pracha. As we all know or at least many of us those who are in legal field know fully well that Pracha’s firm Legal Axis is defending several persons accused in different cases related to the Delhi riots in February 2020 – these cases include those in which sections of the stringent Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) have been invoked. It must be informed here that in August 2020, the Delhi police had told a Delhi court that Pracha had forged documents and instigated a man to depose falsely in a case related to the riots. 
According to advocate Mahmood Pracha’s associate, advocate Digvijay Singh, the law firm is handling nearly 150 riot related cases, including one filed against student activist Gulfisha Fatima, who is in judicial custody in a UAPA case. Pracha was at pains to point out that, “My phone has been seized. I am being threatened. I have told them they can take things from my computers, from my office and even my home. At the end of the day, the Constitution will win. It is not so weak….We will ensure that each and every riot victim gets justice.”
On their part, Additional PRO (Delhi Police) Anil Mittal said that, “During the course of a bail matter pertaining to an accused in the Northeast Delhi riots, use of a forged notary stamp and creation of allegedly false/manipulated evidence at the hands of certain members of the Bar was noticed. The Special Court had observed that this required thorough investigation. Pursuant to this, a criminal case under appropriate sections of law was registered and investigation was taken up.” 
Furthermore, Mittal also said that, “During the course of investigation, search warrants to look for electronic and other evidence from the premises of two members of the Bar were obtained from the Court and the same are being executed in a professional manner at one location in Nizamuddin and another at Yamuna Vihar.”
Meanwhile, many senior lawyers continued to criticize the police action against the lawyers. This included Delhi government’s Senior Standing Counsel (Criminal) Rahul Mehra who tweeted that, “I may have professional differences with Mr Mahmood Pracha and may agree to disagree with him most of the time but for an office of a lawyer to be raided like this is highly condemnable. Expecting good sense to prevail sooner rather than later.” Another high profile senior Supreme Court lawyer and eminent Congress leader Manish Tewari minced no words to say that he was “deeply disturbed” by the search conducted at Pracha’s offices and asked the Bar Council to “take up this arbitrary harassment”. So this is a very serious issue and must be taken most seriously in the right earnest. 
Adding more to it, the Delhi High Court Women Lawyers Forum has also written to the President of Delhi High Court Bar Association (DHCBA), Mohit Mathur, expressing deep concerns over investigating agency arraigning lawyers as accused in criminal cases. The Forum states that on the face of it, the proceedings initiated against lawyers are ostensibly independent of the matters being handled by them. However, the pattern emerging from all such instances, where lawyers are being targeted, is hard to ignore. The statement by the Forum minces no words to state unequivocally that, “Raids in the office of Mr. Mahmood Pracha, Advocate is the latest example of such intimation by the Delhi Police. Mr. Pracha is representing several accused persons in the recent riot cases in Delhi. The recent trend indicates that there are other lawyers too who are being intimidated and discouraged from representing their clients in these cases. However, this is also a larger issue that goes beyond the riots case, wherein lawyers who are vocal about defending civil liberties are being systematically targeted.” 
Not just this, even the Bar Council of Delhi (BCD) has written to the Union Home Minister – Amit Shah seeking immediate action in connection with the police raid at his office. The letter reads as: “We notice anguish and anger amongst the legal community, primarily because it goes to the very root and independent discharge of responsibility by an Advocate, as provided under the Constitution of India being integral part of the Justice Dispensation System, the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of India Rules.” The letter has been signed by Vice Chairman of BCD – Himal Akhtar; Member of BCD – Rajiv Khosla and former Chairman – KC Mittal also. Without going into the factual matrix of the case, the BCD has highlighted Sections 126 to 129 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides for privileges to the legal practitioners in connection with communication with clients. The communication states that, “We think the provisions of law cannot be ignored.” The letter further states that there is an understanding that in case of any case against an advocate, the representatives of the Bar Association/Bar Council would be informed and taken into confidence by the Delhi Police. The letter reads remarkably as: “This broader understanding is to maintain the harmony and cordiality between the two wings of the justice delivery system. This seems to have not been followed in the present case. While we do not want to go into various aspects of the matter, apparently the action of Delhi Police falls short on these aspects, which is a very serious matter as far as the legal community is concerned.” 
It again cannot be lightly dismissed that former Additional Solicitor General Indira Jaising condemned the raid at Pracha’s office saying that such actions will lead to a denial of justice to various accused and victims in the Delhi riots cases who are certainly entitled to a free and fair trial. It cannot be denied that if lawyers are intimidated then their morale is bound to get affected no matter how hard they may deny! It must be mentioned here that Pracha is representing pro bono nearly 100 people in the 2020 Delhi riots case. Pracha mentioned that the raid that began at noon ended at 3 am the other day. Pracha alleged that the police assaulted and intimidated him. Pracha also said that, “The search ended at 3 am and they could not find anything. Even though police are alleging misconduct on our behalf, they recorded everything on video and that video will show to the world what happened.”
It cannot be questioned that Pracha rightly pressed for a court-monitored probe of the FIR against him pointing out that the FIR was registered way back in August but the raid was conducted now with an ulterior design to deter him from appearing in riots cases. At a press conference held at the Press Club, the riot victims while coming out in open support of Pracha also claimed that the police threatened them to withdraw complaints and did not file cases. Sahil Parvez whose father was allegedly shot dead by rioters said that, “Police officials and authorities did not listen to me while preparing medico-legal certificates or first information reports. Even though I named the rioters, no action was taken against them. Some were arrested and later released on bail. During this time, I was constantly threatened to withdraw my case.” Delhi Police spokesperson Anil Mittal was quick to retort that, “All such allegations are false and baseless. Investigation into cases is being done solely on merits.”
Mohammad Nasir Khan who was shot at by rioters and lost an eye at the violence said that he received no legal help by the police in the days following the riots. Khan who is a resident of north Ghonda said that, “I had read about Pracha who took up cases pro bono of marginalized people from minority, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe communities. However, after bringing him on board, we started getting threats that we should withdraw our complaints or get another lawyer.” It must be mentioned here that communal vioplence had broken out in northeast Delhi in February 2020 over Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) between supporters and protesters which left at least 53 people dead and around 400 injured. 
Speaking to journalists after the hearing, Pracha said that the police have displayed an egregious example of lawlessness and illegalities under the guise of investigation into a forgery FIR registered against unknown persons. He further said that, “I am not even aware if I have been named as an accused or not in this FIR. It has been almost four months since registration of the FIR and there is no chargesheet till date. They took away details of all the cases and clients, which are privileged communication between a lawyer and his clients. If this is not a witch-hunt what else can be? I was assaulted but I am now being told that another FIR is lodged against me at the instance of the raiding team.” This is truly most despicable! If this can happen to such an eminent lawyer what will happen to a common man? It is anybody’s guess that a common man is at the complete mercy of the police who can extort money among other things and harass him/her to no end! 
It must be reiterated: What has happened with such an eminent lawyer like Mahmood Pracha is most despicable, deplorable, dangerous and disastrous to say the least. Pracha had rightly said that, “Bar is the last bastion. We must all rise to the occasion and save attacks on our profession and ultimately the Constitution of India.” Every lawyer must feel concerned over what has happened with him as it is quite a disturbing trend and we in frequent intervals keep hearing such untoward incidents. An impartial enquiry must be conducted and those who are guilty must be proceeded with in accordance with law.
It cannot be lightly dismissed that senior lawyers like Prashant Bhushan, Chander Uday Singh and former Bombay High Court Judge BG Kolse Patil while denouncing the most intimidating search at Pracha’s office remarked that, “Delhi police searches at advocate Mehmood Pracha’s office compromises the entire criminal justice system and rights of the accused.” Over 1200 lawyers have also signed a petition demanding strict action against erring police officers as well as the Judge who allowed the searches. Lawyer Bahadur Abhas Naqvi who is an aide of Pracha said that they plan to take out a march from the High Court to Supreme Court on January 22 to hand over the petition to Chief Justice of India SA Bobde. Chander Uday Singh minced no words to say that, “The police action compromises the entire criminal justice system and rights of the accused. The search warrant also goes against the fundamental principles of the justice system. The communication between a client and a lawyer is completely privileged. This is one of the pillars of the judicial system.” Eminent Supreme Court lawyer Prashant Bhushan too said that the searches, carried out on December 24, raise serious questions. He said that, “Pracha is a prominent lawyer who has been defending several persons accused in the February 2020 communal riots in Delhi. He has also been instrumental in getting FIRs registered against the Delhi Police for their malafide investigation into the riots.”
On the contrary, police allege that Pracha had forged documents and instigated one Irshad Ali to depose falsely in a case related to the riots. Truth must come out. Questioning the search warrant in the case, Bhushan added that instead of searches at his residence, Pracha could have been asked to produce the item concerned in this case an email under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bhushan pulled back no punches to point out in simple, suave and straight language that, “The intention was to intimidate Pracha and his clients. The police have also refused to share the video recording of the searches. Because if they share, it will be revealed that they were taking the Union Home Minister’s name during the searches.” It cannot be lightly dismissed that apart from Prashant Bhushan among other lawyers even the SCBA has also expressed its resentment over the manner in which searches were carried out at Pracha’s premises. This definitely cannot be lightly dismissed as even the SCBA has taken serious note of it. Let us wait and watch as to what comes out of the probe that follows!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh

Encroachment Of Public Land In The Garb Of A Place For Worship

In a latest, landmark, laudable and learned judgment titled Bal Bhagwan vs Delhi Development Authority in CM(M) 416/2019 delivered just recently on December 18, 2020 while dismissing a suit filed by a temple manager seeking permanent injunction against the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) from forcefully dispossessing him from 4 temple properties built on public land, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Pratibha M Singh observed that a trend could be seen of public land being “sought to be encroached upon under the shelter of a place of worship. As is seen in a large number of cases, rights are claimed by parties under the garb of temples or other places of worship located on government land.” We all know fully well how suddenly photos of some God or saint etc appear on some vacant land adjoining road or even in middle of road and how people start worshipping there and gradually a religious shrine in form of temple or dargah etc appears there and what is most concerning is that we see all this happening even in “Army Cantonment” areas also which sometimes even pose a security threat as enemy spies of foreign nations sometimes take refuge there as we have heard in news channels also but most alarmingly is mostly always either ignored or taken most lightly and all this happens right under the nose of the district administration! Moreover such illegal structures sometimes pose other problems also apart from security threats! So what Justice Pratibha M Singh has pointed out is nothing but the stark truth! 

While stating the brief background of the case, Justice Pratibha then mentions in para 4 that, “The present petition arises out of a suit for permanent injunction filed by the Petitioner/Plaintiff (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) – Mr. Bal Bhagwan against the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter, “DDA”) seeking permanent injunction restraining the DDA from demolishing or forcibly dispossessing the Plaintiff from three temple premises namely Mandir Kali Mai, Mandir Bada Beer Dham and Mandir Shivji Maharaj situated on private land bearing Khasra No. 1075/803/50 measuring 4 bigha 3 biswas and a temple premises of Sankat Mochan Bajrang Bali on land measuring 2 bigha 11 biswas in Khasra No. 1074/803/50 of village Khampura Raya, Delhi bearing MCD No.2151/18, Swami Onkara Nand Ashram, New Patel Nagar, New Delhi (hereinafter, “suit property”).” 
While elaborating further, it is then stated in para 5 that, “The Plaintiff had moved an application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC before the Civil Judge. Vide order dated 10th December, 2018, the Ld. Civil Court dismissed the application for injunction. Thereafter, the Plaintiff preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed vide the impugned order dated 27th February, 2019. This Court, at the time of admission of the present petition, on 12th March, 2019, issued notice and directed that no coercive steps be taken by the DDA against the Plaintiff.”
To put things in perspective, it is then envisaged in para 6 that, “The case of the Plaintiff has been captured in brief in the plaint. The Plaintiff claims that he is the Chela of Late Swami Onkara Nand who was managing/running four temples situated on the suit property. The temples were located on two separate khasras, with three temples being located on Khasra No. 1075/803/50 and one temple being located on Khasra No.1074/803/50. It is claimed that the said four temples are in the possession of the Plaintiff as they are managed by him and they have been running at least since the 1960s.”
While continuing further in the same vein, it is then pointed out in para 7 that, “Swami Onkara Nand expired on 10th May, 1982 and by way of a registered Will dated 13th April, 1982, the Plaintiff was made the manager of the entire temple complex. It is claimed that the DDA attempted to take forcible possession of the suit property and dispossess the Plaintiff, leading to the filing of the suit for permanent injunction. The DDA filed its written statement and claimed that the entire land is government land and that the Plaintiff is in illegal occupation of the same. It took the stand that the Plaintiff, who has no rights in the suit property, cannot prevent the DDA from taking over the land which is meant for rehabilitation of the Kathputli Colony dwellers and had been vested in the DDA by the Ministry of Rehabilitation way back in 1982. Both Courts have agreed with the DDA and have dismissed the Plaintiff’s application for interim injunction.”
On one hand, it is mentioned in para 8 while stating plaintiff’s submissions that, “Mr. Kapur, ld. counsel appearing for the Plaintiff has urged before this Court that insofar as the DDA is concerned, the issue only relates to 2 Bighas and 11 Biswas as the other land has been held to be Shamlat Deh land. The stand of the DDA is that the land was acquired and was put at its disposal. However, the Plaintiff claims that he himself is in settled possession of the land in question. Reliance is placed on the Jamabandis dating back to 1946-47 and the Khasra Girdawaris dating back to 1967-68, which show the existence of the temple. Mr. Kapur specifically relies upon the various documents of the Revenue Authorities filed by the DDA to show that these documents themselves establish the existence of the temple as also the fact that the same was managed by Swami Onkara Nand. Vehement reliance is also placed on an alleged copy of DDA’s City Planning Wing’s document which shows the regularisation of New Patel Nagar area of which the suit property is alleged to be forming part. It is claimed that the survey which was conducted in this area on 15th September, 1977 itself shows the existence of a temple on the said land.”
On the other hand, it is then mentioned in para 20 while stating DDA’s submissions that, “Mr. Rajiv Bansal, ld. senior counsel along with Mr. Dhanesh Relan, ld. counsel appears for the DDA. He raises two preliminary objections. The first preliminary submission is that the petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is not an appellate remedy. The scope of judicial review is limited in such a petition. The Court is not to act as an appellate authority and neither is such a petition to be treated as a second appeal. The Court cannot interfere unless there is flagrant miscarriage of justice or abuse of principles of law. The Trial Court’s finding has to be perverse or patently erroneous for the Court to exercise jurisdiction in such a petition. It is submitted that the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and also cannot reverse the finding on insufficiency of evidence. The Court also cannot substitute the trial court’s finding with its own opinion in the matter. It is further submitted that if there are two concurrent findings, the power under Article 227 ought to be sparingly exercised. Reliance is placed on the following judgments:
a) Annad Kumar v. Dinesh Kumar, (2017) 125 ALR 75 
b) Surender v. Roshani & Ors., 2010 SCCOnline Del 2482 
c) Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 
d) Ouseph Mathai & Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir, (2002) 1 SCC 319
e) Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan v. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur, (2009) 5 SCC 162.”
Truth be told, it is then disclosed in para 37 that, “An application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, which was rejected by both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, is the subject matter of the present petition, which has been argued extensively by ld. counsels for the parties. This comes as no surprise as the land involved is precious land located in the heart of Delhi in which the Plaintiff wishes to continue to retain possession.”
Significantly, it is then pointed out in para 39 that, “A perusal of the plaint shows that the Plaintiff claims ownership in the suit property. Paragraph 10 of the plaint reads as under: 
“10. That the plaintiff is owner in possession or a transferee/successor from the original owner of the suit property through documents in his favour and is legal occupier of the suit property.”
However, before this Court, the Plaintiff concedes that he does not have any document of title in respect of the suit property. Thus, the only question is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to interim relief from being dispossessed.”
No less significant is what is then stated in para 40 that, “In the plaint it is admitted that the land is government land and that the Plaintiff has rights in the same by way of adverse possession. The relevant extract of the plaint reads as under:
“That no action to take forcible possession after dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land can be taken as the same is barred by Section 27 read with Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963. The government can take action for eviction and for possession against the alleged illegal occupant on the government land within 30 years and the period of limitation had began to run. under this act against a like suit by a private person and hence the threat of alleged action of dispossession/forcible dispossession by the defendant is barred by time as the right of the defendant has extinguished in respect of the suit property. 
Even otherwise the plaintiff is owner by adverse possession in view of notice of defendant issued in the month of November, 1982 to the plaintiff and other residents of the area site of New Patel Nagar in respect of alleged acquired land of village Khampur Raya, Delhi.”
For the sake of clarity, it is then stated in para 41 that, “However, before this Court the Plaintiff’s case has changed and is one of settled possession and not of adverse possession. The issue, therefore, is very short – Whether the Plaintiff claiming settled possession without any ownership can be dispossessed or is entitled to injunction against dispossession?”
Of course, it cannot be ignored that Justice Pratibha then points out in para 44 that, “The Trial Court vide its order dated 10th December, 2018 held as under:
i. That one part of the suit property lies in Khasra No.1074/803/50 and another part lies in Khasra No.1075/803/50;
ii. Insofar as Khasra No. 1074/803/50 is concerned, the same is part of acquired land, which was purchased by the DDA on 2nd September, 1982. The acquisition is not challenged and the same is more than 60 years old. The Plaintiff, thus, encroached in Khasra No. 1074/803/50.; 
iii. Insofar as Khasra No.1075/803/50 is concerned, the same is private land i.e. Shamlat Deh land. Following the judgment in Jagpal Singh (supra), the Trial Court held that Shamlat Deh land is meant for the common use of the village and no one person can claim rights in the same.;
iv. That the Plaintiff does not have title on either part of the suit property and, at best, he is an encroacher.;
v. The Plaintiff claims ownership on one hand and on the other hand, claims rights by way of adverse possession.;
vi. The judgment in Rame Gowda (supra) has been considered by the Trial court along with the judgment in Maria Margarida (supra). The Trial Court holds that the moment the pleadings are filed by the parties and the Court applies its mind to the matter and finds that the Plaintiff has no title to the land, the requirement of due process of law is complete. The Plaintiff was found to be an unauthorised occupant who had no right to remain on the land. Thus, the injunction application was dismissed.”
What’s more, it is then rightly noted in para 45 that, “The Plaintiff filed an appeal against the said order, which was heard by the ld. ASCJ. The Appellate Court, vide its order dated 27th February, 2019, held that the land belongs to the DDA and the Trial Court has rightly rejected the prayer for injunction.” 
Briefly stated, it is then also conceded in para 46 that, “The petition before this Court is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Clearly, the extent of intervention in such cases is quite limited. There are concurrent findings by the Trial Court and Appellate Court. All the relevant facts have been considered by the Courts below. Thus, in view of the settled legal position, no interference would ordinarily be called for in the writ petition.”
Be it noted, it is then rightly mentioned in para 62 that, “Several judgments on various propositions have been cited, which, according to the Court, do not require any consideration in the present case. The main question to be determined is whether the Plaintiff, who is in settled possession, can be dispossessed in an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. The answer is a clear yes.” 
Furthermore, it is also pointed out in para 63 that, “Insofar as the Shamlat Deh land is concerned, the Plaintiff cannot claim any rights in the same as the same vests for the common interest of the villagers. This Court agrees with the stand of the DDA that the land has been urbanised and once urbanization takes place, the village owners have no rights.”
More significantly, it is then elucidated in para 66 that, “Though the land in question was vested in the DDA several years ago, the DDA is yet to obtain possession of the land. An important developmental project has been derailed because of the present litigation as the DDA continues to make valiant attempts to obtain possession in accordance with law. The photographs in the present case are extremely revealing. The mandir constitutes a miniscule portion of the entire land which has various commercial shops and residences. The case of the DDA is that the Plaintiff is earning huge revenues by collecting rent from these occupants, however, this Court does not see the need to go into this aspect. Clearly, the Plaintiff, or anyone occupying or claiming rights through the Plaintiff, does not have any right to continue to remain in possession of the suit property. Ld. counsel for the DDA has submitted that an alternative accommodation has been given to the dwellers in the colony. It is for the DDA to ensure that the same is provided to everyone in occupation, in accordance with its policy.”
Most remarkably, most significantly and most appropriately, what forms the cornerstone of this extremely laudable judgment as illustrated by Justice Pratibha finds mention in para 67 in which it is stated explicitly, elegantly and effectively that, “Finally, this Court expresses grave concern over the fact that public land is sought to be encroached upon under the shelter of a place of worship. As is seen in a large number of cases, rights are claimed by parties under the garb of temples or other places of worship located on government land. This trend has been repeatedly frowned upon by the Supreme Court and other courts. The Supreme Court, in its judgment in Union of India v. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2011) 14 SCC 62 has, in fact, taken cognizance of this menace and directed State Governments and Union Territories to review the situation and take appropriate action in an expeditious manner. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as under: 
“5. As an interim measure, we direct that henceforth no unauthorised construction shall be carried out or permitted in the name of temple, church, mosque or gurdwara, etc. on public streets, public parks or other public places, etc. In respect of the unauthorised construction of religious nature which has already taken place, the State Governments and the Union Territories shall review the same on case-to-case basis and take appropriate steps as expeditiously as possible.””
Equally significant is what is then stated in para 68 that, “Such attempts by unscrupulous parties ought to be discouraged, inasmuch as the occupants, under the garb of a place of worship, turn the land into a completely unplanned encroachment by hundreds of people. The authorities have an obligation to ensure that in public land, places of worship are not created in this manner. Moreover, in the present case, an infrastructure project is being completely crippled due to the pendency of this litigation. This would be contrary to even public interest.”
Finally, it is then held in the last para 69 that, “The land, being public land, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. The petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.1 lakh to be deposited by the Plaintiff with the High Court of Delhi (Middle Income Group) Legal Aid Society. All pending applications are also disposed of.” 
To sum up, Justice Pratibha M Singh of Delhi High Court has rightly, remarkably and reasonably pointed out that encroachment of public land in the garb of a place for worship ought to be discouraged. For this to happen effectively, the district administration must immediately swing into action. For this to happen in turn the State Government must promptly swing into action and not be guided by vote-bank politics as most unfortunately we see happening on a regular basis in our country and all those parties who have been ruling different states since independence till now are equally responsible! 
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh