Daughters Have Coparcenary Rights Even If Their Father Was Not Alive

In a most significant judgment with far reaching implications that will immensely benefit Hindu daughters, the Apex Court in Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. Diary No. 32601 of 2018 along with some other Special Leave Petition (SLP) just recently on August 11, 2020 has held in no uncertain terms that a daughter will have a share after the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, irrespective of whether her father was alive or not at the time of amendment. This is certainly a significant step towards the attainment of gender equality in our country for which the Apex Court Bench which decided this extremely landmark and laudable judgment deserves full credit! Till this laudable judgment was delivered we saw how despite several amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 there was none such provision that gave unconditional rights to women pertaining to her father’s property!

To start with, Justice Arun Mishra who authored this notable judgment for himself and Justice Abdul Nazeer and Justice MR Shah first and foremost set the ball rolling by observing in para 1 that, “The question concerning the interpretation of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short, ‘the Act of 1956’) as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (in short, ‘the Act of 2005’) has been referred to a larger Bench in view of the conflicting verdicts rendered in two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 36 and Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar & Ors., (2018) 3 SCC 343. In other connected matters, the question involved is similar; as such, they have also been referred for hearing along.”

Be it noted, it is then enunciated in para 116 that, “The intendment of amended Section 6 is to ensure that daughters are not deprived of their rights of obtaining share on becoming coparcener and claiming a partition of the coparcenary property by setting up the frivolous defence of oral partition and/or recorded in the unregistered memorandum of partition. The Court has to keep in mind the possibility that a plea of oral partition may be set up, fraudulently or in collusion, or based on unregistered memorandum of partition which may also be created at any point of time. Such a partition is not recognized under Section 6(5).”

What’s more, it is then observed in para 126 that, “The protection of rights of daughters as coparcener is envisaged in the substituted Section 6 of the Act of 1956 recognises the partition brought about by a decree of a court or effected by a registered instrument. The partition so effected before 20.12.2004 is saved.”

More significantly, the Bench then minces no words to state in suave, simple and straight language in para 127 while highlighting the dire need to protect daughter’s interests in property that, “A special definition of partition has been carved out in the explanation. The intendment of the provisions is not to jeopardize the interest of the daughter and to take care of sham or frivolous transaction set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her right as coparcener and prevent nullifying the benefit flowing from the provisions as substituted. The statutory provisions made in section 6(5) change the entire complexion as to partition. However, under the law that prevailed earlier, an oral partition was recognised. In view of change of provisions of section 6, the intendment of legislature is clear and such a plea of oral partition is not to be readily accepted. The provisions of section 6(5) are required to be interpreted to cast a heavy burden of proof upon proponent of oral partition before it is accepted such as separate occupation of portions, appropriation of the income, and consequent entry in the revenue records and invariably to be supported by other contemporaneous public documents admissible in evidence, may be accepted most reluctantly while exercising all safeguards. The intendment of Section 6 of the Act is only to accept the genuine partitions that might have taken place under the prevailing law, and are not set up as a false defence and only oral ipse dixit is to be rejected outrightly. The object of preventing, setting up of false or frivolous defence to set at naught the benefit emanating from amended provisions, has to be given full effect. Otherwise, it would become very easy to deprive the daughter of her rights as a coparcener. When such a defence is taken, the Court has to be very extremely careful in accepting the same, and only if very cogent, impeccable, and contemporaneous documentary evidence in shape of public documents in support are available, such a plea may be entertained, not otherwise. We reiterate that the plea of an oral partition or memorandum of partition, unregistered one can be manufactured at any point in time, without any contemporaneous public document needs rejection at all costs. We say so for exceptionally good cases where partition is proved conclusively and we caution the courts that the finding is not to be based on the preponderance of probabilities in view of provisions of gender justice and the rigor of very heavy burden of proof which meet intendment of Explanation to Section 6(5). It has to be remembered that courts cannot defeat the objects of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act. The exception is carved out by us as earlier execution of a registered document for partition was not necessary, and the Court was rarely approached for the sake of family prestige. It was approached as a last resort when parties were not able to settle their family dispute amicably. We take note of the fact that even before 1956, partition in other modes than envisaged under Section 6(5) had taken place.”

Most significantly, the Bench then cogently, convincingly and clearly holds in para 129 that, “Resultantly, we answer the reference as under:

(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and abilities.

(ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20^th day of December, 2004.

(iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.

(iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class-I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.

(v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been effected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.”

No less significant is what is then stated finally in the last para 130 that, “We understand that on this question, suits/appeals are pending before different High Courts and subordinate courts. The matters have already been delayed due to legal imbroglio caused by conflicting decisions. The daughters cannot be deprived of their right of equality conferred upon them by Section 6. Hence, we request that the pending matters be decided, as far as possible, within six months. In view of the aforesaid discussion and answer, we overrule the views to the contrary expressed in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju & Ors. The opinion expressed in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar is partly overruled to the extent it is contrary to this decision.”

No doubt, this latest, landmark and laudable judgment by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court must be applauded, admired and appreciated in no uncertain terms as it places daughter on an equal footing with son in property matters which is a revolutionary move that will ensure that a daughter’s rights are not smothered under any circumstances by anyone as they like as per their own whims and fancies! But what is even more crucial is that society’s patriarchal mindset favouring only son must also change at the earliest and simultaneously the litigation processes in courts must be simplified, made inexpensive so that the poor women too can get their due and time-bound so that women does not suffer the ordeal of running from pillar to post first in lower courts, then in higher courts and then ultimately in the highest court! More awareness programme must be launched by Centre and State Governments to ensure that women are made aware of their legal rights as have been marked by the Apex Court in this landmark judgment! Only then can daughters gain immensely by this extremely laudable and landmark judgment which they must as no society can progress where women remains backwards and stands deprived of her basic legal rights!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Who is Owner of the Vehicle?

In a fresh development, the Supreme Court just recently on June 18, 2020 in a latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment titled Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs The New India Assurance Company Limited in Civil Appeal No. 2632 of 2020 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 20569 of 2016) has laid down in no uncertain terms that it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered, who would be treated as the owner of the vehicle, for the purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act. The case arose out of an insurance claim made by one Surendra Kumar Bhilawe. Surendra’s insurance claim was thus upheld!

To start with, this noteworthy judgment authored by Justice Indira Banerjee for herself and Justice R Banumathi sets the ball rolling in para 2 wherein it is observed that, “This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 23.2.2015 passed by the National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, hereinafter referred to as ‘National Commission’, allowing Revision Petition No. 4126/2014 filed by the Respondent, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Insurer’, setting aside an order dated 09.01.2014 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Raipur, hereinafter referred to as ‘the District Forum’ allowing the Complaint Case No. 404 of 2012; and an order dated 22.7.2014 passed by the Chhatisgarh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Pandri, Raipur (C.G), hereinafter referred to as the State Commission, dismissing an appeal being Appeal No. FA/14/85 of the Insurer against the said order of the District Forum; and dismissing the said complaint filed by the Appellant.”

To be sure, para 3 then states that, “The Appellant was the owner of Ashok Leyland 2214 Truck bearing Registration Number C.G.04/JA3835, which was covered by a Policy of Insurance issued by the Insurer being Policy Number was 45030031110100001693, effective for the period from 2.6.2011 to 1.6.2012.”

Needless to say, it is then mentioned in para 4 that, “On 11.11.2011, the said lorry, which was loaded with Ammonia Nitrate at Raipur, commenced its journey for Dhanbad, where the Ammonia Nitrate was to be unloaded. The lorry was driven by Driver, Rajendra Singh.”

While elaborating further, it is then specified in para 5 that, “On 13.11.2011, at about 1.45 p.m., while the said truck was on its journey from Raipur to Dhanbad, it met with an accident near Bhakuwa Toil Police Station, Gumla in Jharkhand. It is stated that while negotiating the said truck, near a culvert, to save a cow, which had come on its way, the Driver lost control, as a result of which the said truck turned turtle and fell into a river by the side of the road and was extensively damaged. The Ammonia Nitrate, carried in the truck was also washed away.”

On expected lines, we then see that it is revealed in para 6 that, “The accident was reported to the Gumla Police Station, District Gumla, Jharkhand on 16.11.2011 and on 25.11.2011 the Appellant lodged a claim with the Insurer, through one Mohammad Iliyas Ansari.”

What followed next is then stated in para 7 that, “On receipt of information regarding the accident, and the claim, the Insurer appointed an independent Surveyor and Loss Assessor to conduct a spot survey. The independent Surveyor and Loss Assessor appointed by the Insurer, namely, Shri Birendra Kumar Gupta, conducted a spot survey and submitted his report on 29.11.2011.”

As it turned out, para 8 then notes that, “The Insurer, thereafter, appointed one Shri Gyan Chandra, Valuer, Surveyor, Loss Assessor and Investigator to conduct the final survey. The said Shri Gyan Chandra submitted a report dated 25.1.2012 assessing the loss recoverable from the insurer at Rs. 4,93,500/- after deduction of salvage value.”

While explaining the twists and turns that followed, it is then enunciated in para 9 that, “However, instead of reimbursing the loss, the Insurer issued a show cause Letter dated 22.3.2012 to the Appellant requiring the Appellant to show cause why the claim of the Appellant should not be repudiated, on the allegation that, he has already sold the said truck to the said Mohammad Iliyas Ansari on 11.4.2008. It is, however, not in dispute that the Appellant continued to be the registered owner of the said truck, on the date of the accident.”

While dwelling on the appellant’s version, it is then enshrined in para 10 stating: “It is the case of the Appellant that the said truck which had been purchased with finance from ICICI Bank, stood hypothecated to ICICI Bank, and the same could not be transferred without the consent of ICICI Bank. ICICI Bank had not issued ‘No Objection’ to the Appellant for transfer of the said truck, as the dues of ICICI Bank had not been repaid in full till the date of the accident. Admittedly, however, the Appellant had entered into a sale agreement with the said Mohammad Iliyas Ansari.”

While carrying on forward in the same vein, it is then pointed out in para 11 that, “The Appellant claims that he duly replied to the show cause letter and that he also sent a legal notice on 2.6.2012 to the Insurer to which there was no reply. The Insurer was disputing the claim, as it had been submitted by Mohammad Iliyas Ansari, and also on the ground of delay in filing the police complaint and in reporting the accident to the Insurer.”

Furthermore, it is then revealed in para 12 that, “The Appellant himself submitted a motor claim again on 22.8.2012, but the Insurer refused to accept the same. Under cover of a letter dated 22.8.2012, the Appellant sent the claim form, along with the requisite documents, to the Insurer by Registered Post.”

As a consequence, what then unfolds is elaborated in para 13 stating that, “Aggrieved by the action of the Insurer company in not releasing the claim of the Appellant, towards reimbursement of losses on account of the Accident, the Appellant approached the District Forum with the complaint numbered Case No. 404 of 2012, referred to above.”

What came as a shot in the arm for the Appellant is then enumerated in para 14 stating that, “By a judgment and order dated 9.1.2014, the District Forum allowed the complaint filed by the Appellant and directed the Insurer to pay Rs. 4,93,500/- to the Appellant within a month along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, that is, 6.10.2012 till the date of payment and further directed the Insurer to pay the Appellant a sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards compensation for mental agony and Rs. 2,000/- towards cost of litigation.”

Against this backdrop, what follows next is then explained in para 15 holding that, “The Insurer appealed to the State Commission. The said appeal, being Appeal No. FA/14/85, was dismissed by the State Commission by an order dated 22.7.2014, which was challenged by the Insurer before the National Commission by filing the Revision Petition No. 4126 of 2014.”

What ultimately turned the tables is then stated in para 16 as follows: “By the judgment and order impugned bfore us, the National Commission has allowed the Revision Petition, set aside the orders of the District Forum and the State Commission respectively, and dismissed the complaint of the Appellant.”

No doubt, the tables were again restored to its original state by the Supreme Court Bench and this is best manifested in para 29 wherein it is held that, “There was no material evidence at all before the National Commission, on the basis of which the National Commission could have reversed the concurrent factual findings of the District Forum and the State Commission which unerringly led to the conclusion that ownership of the said truck never stood transferred to Mohammad Iliyas Ansari.”

In a stinging rebuke to the National Commission, the Apex Court Bench also noted in para 28 that, “The National Commission completely ignored the following concurrent findings of the District Forum and State Commission:-

(i) Even after the date of the purported sale agreement, that is, 11.4.2008, the Appellant continued to pay instalments to ICICI Bank towards repayment of the loan for purchase of the said truck.

(ii) The ICICI Bank had neither released the said truck from hypothecation nor given ‘No Objection’ for the sale of the said truck.

(iii) The Appellant paid the premium and took out the policy of insurance on or about 31.5.2011 covering the period from 2.6.2011 to 1.6.2012 in his own name. This was over three years after the date of the purported sale agreement.

(iv) No steps were taken by the Appellant or by Mohammad Iliyas Ansari to have the registration of the said truck transferred in the name of Mohammad Iliyas Ansari.

(v) The permit for operating the said truck was still in the name of the Appellant over three years after the purported sale agreement.”

More damningly, it is then also held in para 39 that, “It appears that the National Commission patently erred in holding that the Appellant had been paid the consideration without even examining if Mohammad Iliyas Ansari had paid any instalments to ICICI Bank.”

Most significantly, it is then very rightly held in para 53 that, “In our considered opinion, the National Commission erred in law in reversing the concurrent factual findings of the District Forum and the State Commission ignoring vital admitted facts as stated above, including registration of the said truck being in the name of the Appellant, even as on the date of the accident, over three years after the alleged transfer, payment by the Appellant of the premium for the Insurance Policy, issuance of Insurance Policy in the name of the Appellant, permit in the name of the Appellant even after three years and seven months, absence of ‘No Objection’ from the financier bank etc. and also overlooking the definition of owner in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder, including in particular the transferability of a policy of insurance under Section 157.”

Be it noted, it is then envisaged in para 54 that, “In view of the definition of ‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Appellant remained the owner of the said truck on the date of the accident and the Insurer could not have avoided its liability for the losses suffered by the owner on the ground of transfer of ownership to Mohammad Iliyas Ansari.”

Finally, it is then held in the last para 57 that, “The judgment and order of the National Commission is unsustainable. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order of the National Commission under appeal is set aside and the order of the District Forum is restored. The Insurer shall pay to the Appellant a sum of Rs. 4,93,500/- as directed by the District Forum with interest as enhanced by this Court to 9% per annum from the date of claim till the date of payment. The sum of Rs. 5,000/- awarded by the District Forum towards compensation for mental agony and Rs. 2,000/- awarded towards the cost of litigation, is in our view grossly inadequate. The Insurer shall pay a composite sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the Appellant towards cost and compensation for the agony caused to the Appellant by withholding his legitimate dues. The amounts as directed above shall be paid to the Appellant within six weeks from date of the judgment and order.”

To sum up, this carefully drafted, excellently worded and well reasoned judgment delivered by a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice R Banumathi speaks for itself! It makes it abundantly clear that the Insurer cannot shirk of his responsibility in case of an accident on any ground if the insured continues to remains the owner of the vehicle as we see in this case also! Very rightly so! No denying or disputing it!