Tag: Supreme court

State Legislature Cannot Enact Law Providing Direct Appeal To Supreme Court

Without mincing any words, it has been held very categorically and convincingly by the Apex Court in HS Yadav vs Shakuntala Devi Parakh in Civil Appeal No(s). 5153 of 2019 most recently on October 15, 2019 that a State Legislature cannot enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India. All the States are bound to comply with this latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment. The Bench comprising of Justice Deepak Gupta and Justice Aniruddha Bose struck down Section 13(2) of Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011, in so far as it provides an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, holding explicitly that the same is totally illegal, ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers of the State Legislature.

                                          To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 1 of this noteworthy judgment authored by Justice Deepak Gupta for himself and Justice Aniruddha Bose by first and foremost observing that, ““Whether the State Legislature can enact a law providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court of India?” is the question arising in this appeal.” The entire judgment, therefore, revolves rightly around this moot question. Very rightly so!

                                 To be sure, it is then envisaged in para 3 that, “Section 13 of the Act provides for an appeal against orders of the Rent Controller and the Tribunal. It reads thus:-

“13. Appeal.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, a landlord and/or tenant aggrieved by any order of the Rent Controller shall have the right to appeal in the prescribed manner within the prescribed time to the Rent Control Tribunal.

(2) Appeal against an order of the Rent Control Tribunal shall be with the Supreme Court.”

                                   Needless to say, it is then pointed out in para 4 that, “A bare perusal of Section 13 shows that from any order of the Rent Controller an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal and in terms of Section 13(2), an appeal lies as a matter of right to the Supreme Court.”

                                        What follows next is as mentioned in para 5 that, “When the present appeal, filed under Section 13(2) of the Act, came up for admission, while issuing notice we had also ordered as follows:-

            “xxx                   xxx                      xxx

Notice be given to the learned Advocate General of the State of Chhattisgarh and the learned Attorney General for India as to whether the provisions contained in Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 providing for an appeal to the Supreme Court of India against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, Chhattisgarh would be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

              xxx                  xxx                           xxx””    

Para 6 then further states that, “Pursuant to the notice, learned Attorney General has appeared and assisted the Court.”

                                As it turned out, it is then noted in para 7 that, “At the outset, we would like to point out that the Tribunal has been constituted in exercise of the powers vested in the State Legislature under Article 323B of the Constitution of India which deals with tribunal for other matters. Sub-clause (h) of Clause (2) of the said Article which empowers the appropriate legislature to constitute a tribunal to deal with the issues relating to rent and its regulations read as follows:-

“323B. Tribunals for other matters:-

(1)     xxx                        xxx                        xxx

(2) The matters referred to in clause (1) are the following, namely:-

         xxx                        xxx                         xxx

(h) rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues including the rights, title and interest of landlords and tenants:”

                              Of course, it is then clarified in para 8 that, “It is not in dispute before us that the State has the power to constitute the Tribunal. The only issue is whether in terms of Section 13(2) of the Act, the State Legislature could provide an appeal as a matter of right from the order of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court.”

                                        What’s more, it is then laid down in para 9 that, “Article 246 of the Constitution specifically provides that Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws in respect of matters enumerated in List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule. As far as the Concurrent List, i.e. List III is concerned, both the Union and the State have the power to enact laws but if the field is occupied by any law enacted by Parliament then the State cannot legislate on the same issue.”

                                      Simply put, it is then made clear in para 10 that, “Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule reads as under:-

“77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before the Supreme Court.”

Entry 77 gives power to the Union in respect of jurisdiction and the powers of the Supreme Court. This power cannot be exercised by the State Legislature.”     

                                  While continuing in the same vein, it is then enunciated in para 11 that, “It would also be apposite to refer to Entry 65 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, which reads as follows:-

“65. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.”

A bare reading of Entry 65 clearly indicates that the State Legislature has no power to enact any legislation relating to jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court. This power is specifically excluded.”

                                   Be it noted, para 12 then lays bare that, “Entry 46 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is also relevant. This reads as follows:-

“46. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list.”

Even Entry 46 makes it clear that as far as the jurisdictional powers of the Supreme Court are concerned, they cannot be exercised under the Concurrent List. Therefore, the powers with regard to jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court vest with the Union and Parliament alone can enact a legislation in this regard. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 is always there. However, the State cannot enact a legislation providing an appeal directly to the Supreme Court. That would amount to entrenching upon the jurisdiction of the Union, which the State Legislature does not have.”

                                 More importantly, it is then observed unambiguously in para 13 that, “We are constrained to observe that the men who drafted the Act did not even consider the hierarchy of Courts. As pointed above, the Rent Control Tribunal is headed by a retired Judge of the High Court or District Judge in the Super Time Scale or above. What was the rationale of making such an order appealable directly to the Supreme Court? We see no reason why the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court should be excluded.”

                                  Equally important is what is spelt out in para 14 that, “We, therefore, have no doubt in our mind that Section 13(2) of the Act, in so far as it provides an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, is totally illegal, ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers of the State Legislature. Section 13(2) of the Act is accordingly struck down.”     

                                     A key point is then made in para 15 that, “While dealing with the issue, we may make reference to the fact that the Rent Control Tribunal is a tribunal constituted under Article 323B of the Constitution.”

                             While referring to a landmark case of the past, it is then revealed in para 16 that, “In L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 119, this Court clearly held that tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution are subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts. In view of the law laid down in L Chandrakumar’s case (supra), the High Court can exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution against the orders of the Rent Control Tribunal.”

                                    Finally and no less importantly, it is then held in the last para 17 that, “In view of the above, we hold that an appeal under Section 13(2) of the Act directly to the Supreme Court is not maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, we keep it open to the appellant to approach the High Court for redressal of his grievance under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the appellant does so, the High Court shall decide the matter strictly in accordance with law. Pending application(s) if any, stand(s) disposed of.”

                                         No doubt, on a concluding note, it has to be said that it is a very well written and well reasoned judgment which deserves unqualified appreciation. All the State Legislatures must always keep in mind in similar such cases what the Apex Court has so very rightly laid down in this case also  so elegantly, eloquently and effectively! As a corollary, no denying that it must always be ensured by all the State Legislatures that no law should be enacted which provides direct appeal to the Supreme Court in such cases  as  has  been  very held in this case!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

No Automatic Conviction U/s 306 IPC For Abetment Of Suicide Merely Because Accused Was Found Guilty U/s 498A IPC: SC

Coming straight to the nub of the matter, it has to be said that the Supreme Court just recently on November 26, 2019 in a latest, landmark and extremely laudable judgment titled Gurjit Singh vs State of Punjab in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1492-1493 of 2010 has remarkably ruled that merely because an accused is found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and the death of the wife has occurred within a period of seven years of marriage, the accused cannot be automatically held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC by employing the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. To sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC, the Apex Court made it clear that the prosecution has to establish that some act or illegal omission by the accused has driven the deceased to commit the suicide. Very rightly so!

                                          To start with, this commendable judgment authored by Justice BR Gavai for himself and Justice Navin Sinha sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “These appeals by special leave challenge the judgment and order dated 20.2.2009 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 544-DBA of 2001 and Criminal Appeal No. 959-SB of 2000. All the four accused, including the appellant herein (accused No. 3), who is husband of the deceased, were charged and tried by the learned trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 304-B and Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). The other accused were the father (accused No. 1), the mother (accused No. 2) and the sister-in-law (wife of brother) (accused No. 4) of the appellant. The Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur, held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving the case against accused Nos. 1 to 3 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC but has failed to prove the case against the said accused (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. Insofar as accused No. 4 is concerned, it was held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against her for both the offences and she was accordingly acquitted of the offence charged. The trial Judge, therefore, convicted the appellant and his father and mother for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 4000/- each and, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.”

                                     As a consequence what ensued then is stated in para 2 that, “Being aggrieved by the conviction and sentence under Section 498-A of the IPC, the appellant along with his parents preferred an appeal (being Criminal Appeal No. 959-SB of 2000) before the High Court. So also, the State preferred an appeal (being Criminal Appeal No. 544-DBA of 2001), being aggrieved by that part of the order by which the trial Court acquitted accused No. 4 and also acquitted accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. The High Court upheld the conviction of accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. It also upheld the acquittal of accused No. 4 and further held that, though the prosecution could not bring the case under Section 304-B of the IPC, the appellant herein was liable to be punished for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC. The High Court maintained the order of the sentence and fine as recorded by the trial Judge for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. For the offence under Section 306 of the IPC, the High Court sentenced the appellant herein to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five months. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals are preferred by the appellant.”

                                    To be sure, it is then elegantly observed in para 5 that, “The perusal of the record would reveal that though the appellant has disputed the date of marriage to be 04.02.1989, both the courts have disbelieved him and rightly so. The deceased died an unnatural death on 28.09.1994 by consuming poison. As such, the unnatural death occurred within a period of seven years of the marriage. The learned trial Judge has acquitted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC since the prosecution has failed to prove the demand for dowry, while convicting him along with the parents for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. The High Court maintained the conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC, however, it also convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC with the aid of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.”

                                                   More importantly, it is then rightly envisaged in para 33 that, “Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, we find that though the prosecution is successful in proving the case under Section 498-A of the IPC, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove that the cruelty was of such a nature which left no choice to the deceased than to commit suicide. The prosecution has not been in a position to place on record any evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that any act or omission of the accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide. There is no material on record to show that immediately prior to the deceased committing suicide there was a cruelty meted out to the deceased by the accused due to which the deceased had no other option than to commit the suicide. We are of the view, that there is no material placed on record to reach a cause and effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising presumption.”

                                     What’s more, it is then elaborated in para 34 stating that, “It could further be seen from the evidence on record that the time gap between the last visit of the deceased to her parents with regard to the illegal demand and the date of commission of suicide is about two months. As such, there is nothing on record to show that there was a proximate nexus between the commission of suicide and the illegal demand made by the appellant. In the case of Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P. [(2002) 5 SCC 371] this Court found that there was time gap of 48 hours between the accused telling the deceased ‘to go and die’ and the deceased ‘committing suicide’. As such, this Court held that there was no material to establish that the accused had abetted the suicide committed by the deceased.”

                                        It cannot be lost on us that it is then pointed out in para 35 that, “Another aspect that needs consideration is that the cases wherein this Court has held that the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC was tenable though charge was only under Section 304-B of the IPC, it was found the charge specifically stated that the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of cruelty meted out to the deceased. However, in the present case, the charge reads thus:

“That you all on 28.9.94 in the area of Village Bohan, the death of Jaswinder Kaur wife of you, Gurjit Singh and daughter-in-law of you, Gurdial Singh and Mohinder Kaur and sister-in-law of Ranjit Kaur, was caused otherwise than under normal circumstances, you all being her relatives, within a period of seven years of her marriage subjected her to cruelty and harassment for all in connection with demand for dowry and thereby committed an offence of dowry death punishable under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.””

                                   Needless to say, a bare perusal of para 35 would make it clear what is then mentioned in para 36 stating that, “It would thus be seen, that the charge does not state that the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of the harassment meted out to the deceased. It also does not mention that the accused had abetted in commission of suicide by the deceased. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the cases wherein conversion is held to be permissible are clearly distinguishable.”

                                          No wonder, the Apex Court Bench then rightly held in para 37 that, “In the foregoing circumstances, the appeals are partly allowed. Conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC is maintained and the conviction under Section 306 of the IPC is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 306 of the IPC.” Finally, it is then held in the last para 38 that, “The appellant is stated to be on bail, his bail bonds shall stand discharged and he is directed to surrender within four weeks for serving the remaining period of his sentence, if not already undergone.”

                                             It is quite discernible from the above foregoing discussion that the Supreme Court while citing leading case laws like Ramesh Kumar vs State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 minced no words to conclude unambiguously that there shall be no automatic conviction U/s 306 IPC for abetment of suicide merely because accused was found guilty U/s 498A IPC by employing the presumption U/s 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. It is imperative that to sustain conviction under Section 306 IPC, the prosecution has to establish that some act or illegal omission by the accused has driven the deceased to commit suicide. As nothing of any act or illegal omission by the accused could be proved that could be considered as having driven the deceased to commit suicide, therefore the accused conviction under Section 306 IPC is set aside even while he is held guilty under Section 498A of the IPC! Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Why Only One Dhananjoy Chatterjee Hanged Till Now?

Let me begin by first and foremost saying that, “A rape is a rape and under no circumstances can ever be justified! Even if a woman roams nude or is habituated to sex, this can be no ground to justify rape”! Even Supreme Court has time and again reiterated this! Yet it is the single biggest misfortune of India that in last 15 to 16 years, only one poor rapist named Dhananjoy Chatterjee was hanged for rape cum murder of a Class XI girl and that too on circumstantial evidence alone and still he was not given the benefit of doubt! Why this zero tolerance as shown in Dhananjoy Chatterjee’s case not shown in other cases also? Why should we be not ashamed of it?

Photo by Matthias Zomer on Pexels.com

While lamenting about this, senior and eminent Supreme Court advocate Colin Gonsalves very rightly pointed out that his petition was drafted by prisoners of Tihar jail and we cannot dispute that this was rightly termed as “miscarriage of justice! Why in many other similar cases like that of Priyadarshini Mattoo murder case where a law student studying in LLB who was raped and murdered by her senior was the convict not hanged similarly?

Just because the convict was affluent and powerful! This is just one case I am citing. There are many more such cases where we see that the rich and powerful very easily escape death penalty by hiring a battery of eminent and experienced lawyers and escape with far lesser punishment! All this happens right under the nose of the Supreme Court and still we see nothing changes in last so many years! This is what I find most worrying!

What is even more deplorable is that our legal system proceeds on an excruciatingly glacial pace for which no one else but our lawmakers are directly responsible! Who are these lawmakers? Those who are elected to Parliament and 45% of them are facing criminal cases including that of rape case! Why should these lawmakers not be barred from entering Parliament until they are finally exonerated not by just lower court but by the top court? How can we expect such lawmakers to make tough laws?

This alone explains why we have all this review petition, curative petition, mercy petition etc which ensures that cases are not decided in time and by the time cases are decided finally the family of victims lose all hope and break down completely! Should we be proud of this? Why there is no mandatory death penalty for rape cases? Who is protecting them?

The Vice President M Venkaiah Naidu very rightly said that, “What happens even after punishment is given (to convicts). We all are witness…appeal, mercy (petition)… can anybody think of having mercy on such people? This kind of violation of dignity of women cannot go on unchallenged. What is required is not a new bill; what is required is political will, administrative skill and then change of mindset and then go for the kill of the social evil.” He has very rightly expressed his utmost unhappiness on the niggardly and glacial pace with which our justice system moves most excruciatingly which completely destroys the morale of the parents and relatives of victims which under no circumstances can ever be justified by anyone! The Vice President has very rightly and eruditely suggested a rethink on the practice of allowing convicts in such heinous crimes to go in for mercy appeals because the death sentence of convicts in the 2012 Nirbhaya case, which saw major protests and tougher legislation, were still to be carried out. He also very rightly suggested that photographs of those guilty of crimes against women should be published to instill social stigma and fear in them!

Police encounters in which undertrials are killed cannot be justified. But we saw how just recently in early morning hours of December 6, 2019 when the police killed all the four rape accused in Hyderabad gangrape-cum-murder, there was a national rejoicing as we saw for ourselves in different newschannels and even MPs and Chief Ministers as well as former Chief Ministers welcomed this and a huge crowd of people started throwing flowers on those policemen who killed them! This is mainly because we rarely see rapist being hanged and our legal system proceeds so slowly that many people now have lost faith in the capability of our judicial system to deliver justice in time! This is most dangerous for our country and for this not just Supreme Court but even Parliament which comprises of our lawmakers and many of whom are themselves facing serious crime charges must introspect honestly and make tough laws in this regard including barring all those MPs who are under the scanner!

Why should a civilized society have any soft corner for such “dreaded goons” who indulge in gangrape? Why do our courts display leniency towards such dastardly acts of crime and why mandatory death penalty is not awarded to such “dreaded goons”? Why those committing such dastardly acts are not awarded mandatory death penalty in all such cases where either a child is raped or gang rape is omitted accompanied with murder?

Why in our IPC punishment for gangrape is classified according to age? Why are “minors” who are less than 18 years of age allowed to get away most easily by just spending 3 years at the most in a child reform house? Why should any form of leniency be shown even for “minors” who “brutally vandalise” the very dignity and wellbeing of a female without any fault of her?

Why should those rapists who know how to gangrape be let off just by citing their age factor? How can Centre justify it? How can Parliament justify it? How can any Court justify it?

Why are rapists released for some time on bail? Why the life and safety of victim is not cared for by the police? Why do we see that rapists after coming out of the jail many times corner the girl and then killed her by either burning her as we saw most recently in Unaao in UP where the women was raped in March and then just recently while she was going to a court in Rai Bareli in a rape case was most brutally attacked by 5 men who had earlier raped her and was burnt 90 percent? Still our Parliament will keep dwelling on whether to award death penalty to such rapists or not!

Why women does not feel safe anywhere in India? It is because our politicians, Judges, lawmakers feel most happy and proud to note that in last 15 to 16 years just one poor Dhananjoy Chatterjee is hanged for rape cum murder and do just nothing to ensure that others against whom there is strong evidence also unlike Dhananjoy’s case where evidence was just circumstantial are hanged similarly! Should we be proud of this and does it enhance the reputation of our country in the world?

Under the amended law for rape, no “discretion bomb” in the form of “may” should be left which has been mostly abused in favour of the rape accused and the punishment should only be death and nothing but death so that all those who rape are promptly hanged and not once in 15 or 16 years as we saw in case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee! There should be no life term, no twenty years but only death for gang rape. It is most unfortunate that even under the 2018 amended Section 376D of IPC which prescribes punishment for gang rape we see that the punishment is not less than twenty years but which may extend to life! Why “may extend to life”? Why so much of leniency that even for gang rape we see that punishment starts from twenty years but extends only to life and here too discretionary power rests with Judge which is shameful and what is most shameful is that there is no mention of death penalty even here leave alone making it mandatory? This must change now!

Why different punishment prescribed for gang rape on woman under 16 years of age as prescribed in Section 376DA and that on woman under 12 years of age as prescribed under Section 376DB of IPC? Why only life imprisonment under Section 376DA and not death? Why option of life and death in Section 376DB of IPC?

Why even for repeated offenders there is no mandatory death penalty and why the option of life term is added simultaneously in Section 376E of IPC? All these escape routes must be closed now forever so that rapists are never able to take advantage of the loopholes in our legal system anymore now! But are our politicians, lawmakers and Centre ready to do this or will they be happy with just face saving exercise and lip service? Only time will tell!

The past track record in cases like Nirbhaya and many others are not very inspiring but they can still be rectified! The ball is in court of Centre, lawmakers and Parliament for it is they who enact the law and it is they who ensure that rapists in Nirbhaya case like many others are not hanged even after being convicted by the Supreme Court and even after their review petition gets rejected by Supreme Court as they just sit on mercy petition and don’t decide it soon as we saw in case of killers of former PM late Rajiv Gandhi whose mercy petition kept pending for decades! Should we be proud of this?

Must act now without fail or else our democratic system will crumble and if gang hanging is not done it is people who will then do mob hanging like we are seeing also in many cases! No more excuses! No castration, no jail term, no life term and no minor excuse but only death as they deserve to be hanged at the earliest and killed like mosquitoes! No mercy for them, no review for them and no other escape route for them! Only death!

Why rape cases are not decided within few days or a month? Why sentence is not handed out promptly? Why cases keep pending for decades first in lower courts, then in high court and finally in Supreme Court?

Why can’t this be corrected by our lawmakers by amending law accordingly and setting a fixed time limit for deciding rape cases? Why is time limit not set for deciding review petition? Why is review and curative petition not abolished in heinous crimes like rape and terror?

Why mercy petition is not decided in few days or why should it not be abolished altogether for rape and terror cases? Why only the rights of the accused takes precedence over the rights of the victim? Why even our lawmakers prefer to look the other way on this all important issue as we have been seeing since last 72 years?

It is high time and now concrete steps must be taken on ground to ensure that our penal laws are amended and the most strictest punishment of death penalty be imposed uniformly on all those indulging in gang rape and there should be no “mercy petition” facility for such “dreaded goons” who display the worst form of violence against women whom we all worship in one form or the other like Durga, Gauri, Kali etc or in form of our mother and sister!

Can gangrape of any female accompanied with murder be justified under any circumstances? Can any punishment less than death penalty be ever justified in such cases of heinous crimes? If still Centre says “Yes” then it must immediately abolish death penalty for all types of crimes for it has no right to be on our penal laws if it cannot be awarded to those who indulge in gangrape or even rape accompanied with murder!

What the hell is Centre doing? How long will it keep inviting views from all on this? How long will it shy away from amending our penal laws to make it mandatory for death penalty to be imposed in all cases of rape or gangrape accompanied with murder? How long will female keep getting raped, gangraped and murdered?

Needless to say, this alone explains that why we are even below Pakistan and Bangladesh when it comes to “happiness index”! No time is spared to hang those who commit heinous crimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh. But see what is happening in our country!

Those accused in Nirbhaya gangrape cum murder case have not even been hanged till now seven years later even though Supreme Court has awarded them death penalty and their review petition have also been rejected! They are now availing the facility of “mercy petition” for which no definite time limit is specified for deciding it due to which they remain pending for many years! How can all this be justified by anyone on any ground whatsoever?

Why is gang rape in India not accompanied with gang hanging? Why should they be allowed to escape on any ground whatsoever? Why should they be allowed to escape punishment citing age as a reason? What message are we sending by exempting minors from strictest punishment?

The biggest treachery that our politicians have done with our Constitution is to ensure that heinous crimes like gang rape or rape accompanied with murder, terror crimes funded by foreign countries are not punished with mandatory death penalty and also by not abolishing ‘mercy petition’ privilege for such “dreaded goons” and terrorists! Why our judicial and legal system saves rapists and more crucially gang rapists from being hanged? How many gang rapists have been hanged till now since 1947 till 2019? We all know the answer! We all must be terribly ashamed of it. All Supreme Court Judges and all senior and eminent lawyers whom I would term “legal giants” like Soli J Sorabjee, Harish Salve, Kapil Sibal, Abhishek Manu Singhvi among others must introspect on this and give their expert advice to enhance the reputation of judiciary in the eyes of people and restore the waning confidence among the people which is a matter of utmost concern for all of us! We just cannot now afford to sit idle anymore!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.