Citation
Hiếu, P. T. (2026). Negative emotions in modern psychology and Buddhist thought: A conceptual and comparative analysis. International Journal of Research, 13(3), 212–221. https://doi.org/10.26643/ijr/14
APA
Phí Thị Hiếu
Associate Professor, Thai Nguyen University of Education, Thai Nguyen, Vietnam
Abstract
Negative emotions constitute a central concern in both modern psychology and Buddhist thought, yet they are conceptualized within distinct theoretical and philosophical frameworks. This article presents a conceptual and comparative analysis of negative emotions as understood in contemporary psychological theories and Buddhist psychology. Drawing on authoritative secondary sources, the study examines key dimensions of comparison, including the definition and function of negative emotions, their underlying causes, the role of the self, and approaches to emotional change.
The analysis indicates that modern psychology primarily interprets negative emotions as adaptive affective responses that become problematic when dysregulated, emphasizing strategies of awareness and regulation to support psychological functioning. In contrast, Buddhist psychology conceptualizes negative emotions as afflictive mental states rooted in ignorance and attachment, framing emotional suffering as inseparable from self-clinging and existential dissatisfaction. While both traditions highlight the importance of awareness and non-reactivity, they diverge in their ultimate aims, with modern psychology focusing on adaptive well-being and Buddhist thought emphasizing transformative insight.
By clarifying these conceptual differences and points of convergence, the article contributes to a more precise understanding of how negative emotions are theorized across traditions. The findings underscore the value of comparative analysis for enriching theoretical discussions of emotion while acknowledging the distinct goals and assumptions underlying each framework.
Keywords
Negative emotions; modern psychology; buddhist psychology; suffering; emotional suffering
Introduction
Negative emotions have long occupied a central position in psychological inquiry due to their profound influence on human well-being, behavior, and mental health. Contemporary psychological research has extensively examined negative emotions such as anger, fear, sadness, and anxiety, primarily focusing on their adaptive functions, regulatory mechanisms, and implications for psychological adjustment (Gross, 2015; Lazarus, 1991). Within this framework, negative emotions are generally understood as functional affective responses that become problematic when they are excessive, poorly regulated, or contextually inappropriate (Ekman, 1992; Gross & Thompson, 2007).
Parallel to developments in modern psychology, Buddhist thought has for centuries offered a systematic analysis of emotional suffering, conceptualizing negative emotions as core mental afflictions (klesas) that sustain dissatisfaction and suffering (dukkha) (Gethin, 1998; Harvey, 2013). Buddhist psychology places particular emphasis on the cognitive and existential roots of negative emotions, especially ignorance (avidyā), attachment (taṇhā), and the reification of the self (attā) (Rahula, 1974; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006). From this perspective, emotional suffering is not merely a matter of dysregulation but reflects deeper patterns of misperception regarding the nature of reality and selfhood.
In recent decades, scholarly interest in dialogue between psychology and Buddhism has grown substantially, particularly through the incorporation of Buddhist-derived practices such as mindfulness into psychological interventions (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Baer, 2003). While this interdisciplinary engagement has generated valuable insights, existing literature has largely focused on practical integration or therapeutic effectiveness (Khoury et al., 2015). Comparatively less attention has been given to the underlying conceptual assumptions that shape how negative emotions are defined, explained, and addressed within each tradition. As a result, important theoretical differences—particularly concerning the ontological status of emotions, the role of the self, and the ultimate aims of emotional change—remain insufficiently clarified (Wallace, 2007; Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2015).
Moreover, comparative discussions often risk presenting both modern psychology and Buddhist psychology as internally homogeneous traditions, overlooking conceptual diversity and methodological limitations (Lomas, 2016). Without careful conceptual analysis, such comparisons may conflate distinct explanatory levels or selectively appropriate Buddhist concepts while detaching them from their ethical and philosophical foundations (Purser & Loy, 2013). Addressing these challenges requires a systematic and critically informed comparative approach that respects the integrity of each framework while identifying meaningful points of convergence and divergence.
Against this background, the present study aims to conduct a conceptual and comparative analysis of negative emotions as theorized in modern psychology and Buddhist thought. Rather than proposing an integrative model or empirical synthesis, the article seeks to clarify key theoretical assumptions and analytical dimensions underlying each tradition. The analysis is guided by the following research questions:
(1) How are negative emotions defined and explained within modern psychological theories and Buddhist psychology?
(2) What role does the concept of the self play in shaping emotional experience and suffering in each framework?
(3) How do approaches to emotional change differ with respect to regulation, transformation, and ultimate aims?
By addressing these questions, this study contributes to ongoing interdisciplinary discussions by offering a more precise conceptual comparison of negative emotions across traditions. Clarifying these theoretical foundations may enhance mutual understanding between psychological science and Buddhist philosophy, while also informing future research on emotional suffering and well-being.
Methods
This study adopts a qualitative conceptual comparative approach to examine how negative emotions are theorized in modern psychology and Buddhist psychology. The purpose of the analysis is not to synthesize empirical findings or evaluate intervention outcomes, but to clarify and compare the underlying conceptual assumptions, explanatory frameworks, and approaches to emotional change within each tradition.
The analysis is based on a purposive selection of authoritative secondary sources. For modern psychology, the corpus includes foundational and influential works on emotion theory and emotion regulation, such as appraisal-based models, constructivist perspectives, and contemporary regulation frameworks. For Buddhist psychology, the sources consist of well-established scholarly interpretations of early Buddhist teachings and Buddhist psychological concepts, including discussions of klesas, dukkha, ignorance, attachment, and non-self. To ensure conceptual coherence, the study primarily draws on interpretations grounded in early Buddhist and broadly Theravāda-informed psychological frameworks, while acknowledging the diversity of Buddhist traditions.
Sources were selected according to three criteria: (1) academic credibility, indicated by peer-reviewed publication or established scholarly status; (2) direct relevance to the conceptualization, causes, or transformation of negative emotions; and (3) frequent citation and recognition within their respective fields. Empirical studies were included selectively to illustrate dominant theoretical assumptions rather than to provide systematic evidence of effectiveness.
The analytical procedure involved close reading and thematic comparison of key concepts across the two traditions. Core analytical dimensions—such as the definition of negative emotions, their underlying causes, the role of the self, and approaches to emotional change—were identified inductively from the literature and then used to structure the comparative analysis. Throughout the process, care was taken to avoid reducing one framework to the terms of the other or implying theoretical equivalence where fundamental philosophical differences exist.
As this study is based exclusively on published academic literature and does not involve human participants or original data collection, formal ethical approval was not required. While the conceptual scope of the analysis limits empirical generalization, this methodological approach is appropriate for the study’s aim of clarifying theoretical assumptions and advancing interdisciplinary understanding of negative emotions.
Results
The comparative analysis reveals both convergence and fundamental divergence in how negative emotions are conceptualized, explained, and addressed within modern psychology and Buddhist psychology. Although both traditions focus on similar emotional phenomena, such as anger, fear, and sadness, they differ markedly in their underlying assumptions and explanatory priorities.
In modern psychology, negative emotions are predominantly understood as affective responses that serve adaptive and communicative functions. Across major theoretical traditions, negative emotions are viewed as integral to survival, goal regulation, and social interaction, becoming maladaptive primarily when their intensity, duration, or expression is poorly regulated (Lazarus, 1991; Ekman, 1992; Gross, 2015). While explanatory models differ—ranging from appraisal-based accounts emphasizing cognitive evaluation (Lazarus, 1991) to constructivist perspectives highlighting social learning and categorization (Barrett, 2017)—a shared assumption is that negative emotions are not inherently pathological but context-sensitive responses shaped by biological and environmental factors.
By contrast, Buddhist psychology conceptualizes negative emotions as klesas, or afflictive mental states, that are intrinsically linked to suffering (dukkha). Rather than emphasizing functional adaptation, Buddhist explanations locate the origin of negative emotions in fundamental cognitive distortions, particularly ignorance (avidyā) and craving (taṇhā) (Rahula, 1974; Gethin, 1998; Harvey, 2013). From this perspective, negative emotions are not merely situational responses but manifestations of deeper patterns of misperception concerning impermanence and selfhood.
A central point of divergence emerging from the analysis concerns the role of the self in emotional experience. Modern psychological approaches generally presuppose a relatively stable self that experiences emotions and is capable of regulating them through deliberate strategies. Emotion regulation models conceptualize this self as an active agent that monitors emotional processes and modifies them to achieve adaptive outcomes (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Koole, 2009). Even acceptance-based and mindfulness-informed approaches often retain an implicit observer-self that relates to emotional experiences in a non-reactive manner (Baer, 2003).
In contrast, Buddhist psychology challenges the ontological status of the self itself. Emotional suffering is understood as arising from attachment to the notion of a permanent, autonomous self (attā), which gives rise to craving, aversion, and emotional reactivity (Rahula, 1974; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006). Negative emotions, in this framework, are sustained not only by situational triggers but by self-referential cognitive patterns that reinforce emotional clinging and aversion. Emotions are thus interpreted as conditioned and impermanent processes rather than attributes of a stable personal identity (Gethin, 1998).
Differences between the two traditions are also evident in their approaches to emotional change. In modern psychology, interventions targeting negative emotions primarily emphasize regulation strategies aimed at modifying emotional intensity, duration, or expression. Techniques such as cognitive reappraisal, attentional deployment, and acceptance are designed to enhance psychological flexibility and functional well-being, rather than to eradicate negative emotions altogether (Gross, 2015; Hayes et al., 2012). Emotional change is therefore framed as an ongoing process of management and adaptation.
Buddhist psychology, by contrast, conceptualizes emotional change as a gradual transformation rooted in insight, ethical cultivation, and the weakening of ignorance and attachment. Practices such as mindfulness (sati) and insight meditation (vipassanā) are directed not only toward observing emotions but toward undermining the cognitive conditions that give rise to them (Wallace, 2007). From this perspective, emotional change involves a reorientation of understanding that reduces the very basis of emotional affliction.
The analysis further indicates that contemporary psychological adaptations of Buddhist practices, particularly mindfulness-based interventions, selectively emphasize attentional awareness and emotional regulation while often bracketing broader ethical and philosophical dimensions central to Buddhist psychology (Purser & Loy, 2013; Shonin et al., 2015). This selective appropriation highlights an important conceptual distinction between managing negative emotions within existing psychological frameworks and pursuing deeper transformation of emotional suffering as articulated in Buddhist thought.
Discussion
The present study set out to clarify how negative emotions are conceptualized and addressed within modern psychology and Buddhist psychology through a conceptual comparative analysis. The findings indicate that, although both traditions engage with similar emotional phenomena, they are grounded in distinct theoretical assumptions that lead to different understandings of emotional suffering and change. This section discusses the implications of these differences, focusing on conceptual scope, the role of the self, and the aims of emotional intervention.
A central implication of the findings concerns the functional versus afflictive framing of negative emotions. In modern psychology, negative emotions are predominantly interpreted through a functional lens, emphasizing their adaptive value and the importance of effective regulation. This framing has proven productive for developing empirically grounded interventions that enhance emotional flexibility and psychological functioning. However, as the results suggest, such approaches tend to bracket deeper ontological or existential questions regarding why negative emotions arise and persist beyond situational triggers. Buddhist psychology, by contrast, situates negative emotions within a broader account of suffering, interpreting them as manifestations of ignorance and attachment. This perspective extends the explanatory scope of emotional suffering beyond regulation failure to include self-related cognitive distortions.
The comparative analysis also highlights the concept of the self as a critical point of divergence. Modern psychological models typically presuppose a self that regulates emotions, whether through cognitive control, acceptance, or metacognitive awareness. While this assumption is rarely made explicit, it structures both theoretical explanations and intervention strategies. Buddhist psychology challenges this presupposition by questioning the ontological status of the self itself, suggesting that emotional suffering is sustained by self-reification rather than by emotions alone. This distinction offers an important conceptual contribution by identifying limits to self-based regulation strategies, particularly in addressing persistent or existential forms of emotional distress.
Another significant implication emerges in relation to approaches to emotional change. Modern psychology emphasizes regulation-oriented strategies aimed at managing emotional responses within existing psychological structures. Buddhist psychology, in contrast, frames emotional change as a process of gradual transformation grounded in insight and ethical cultivation. Rather than opposing these approaches, the findings suggest that they operate at different explanatory levels. Regulation-oriented strategies may be effective for enhancing short-term functioning, while transformation-oriented practices address deeper cognitive and existential conditions underlying emotional suffering. Clarifying this distinction helps avoid conflating fundamentally different therapeutic aims.
The analysis further sheds light on ongoing debates surrounding the integration of Buddhist practices into contemporary psychological interventions. While mindfulness-based approaches have demonstrated effectiveness in emotion regulation, the selective adaptation of Buddhist techniques often involves detaching them from their broader philosophical and ethical contexts. As a result, mindfulness may function primarily as a regulatory tool rather than as a means of transforming the roots of emotional suffering. This observation does not undermine the value of mindfulness-based interventions but underscores the importance of conceptual clarity when translating practices across traditions.
Several limitations of the present study should be acknowledged. As a conceptual analysis based on secondary literature, the findings do not provide empirical evidence regarding the comparative effectiveness of psychological or Buddhist approaches to negative emotions. In addition, the focus on broadly influential psychological models and early Buddhist–informed interpretations necessarily involves a degree of generalization. Future research could address these limitations by empirically examining how self-related assumptions influence emotional outcomes or by exploring conceptual differences across specific psychological schools and Buddhist traditions.
Overall, the study contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship by clarifying key conceptual distinctions that are often blurred in discussions of negative emotions. Rather than proposing an integrative model, the analysis emphasizes the importance of maintaining theoretical integrity while recognizing the complementary insights offered by modern psychology and Buddhist thought. Such conceptual clarity may support more informed dialogue between traditions and guide future research on emotional suffering and well-being.
Conclusion
This study has undertaken a conceptual and comparative analysis of negative emotions as theorized in modern psychology and Buddhist psychology, with the aim of clarifying their underlying assumptions, explanatory frameworks, and approaches to emotional change. The analysis demonstrates that, although both traditions address similar emotional phenomena, they operate at different theoretical levels and pursue distinct goals.
Modern psychology primarily conceptualizes negative emotions as functionally adaptive responses that require effective regulation to support psychological well-being. Buddhist psychology, by contrast, frames negative emotions as afflictive mental states rooted in ignorance and attachment, emphasizing their role in sustaining suffering through self-related cognitive distortions. The comparison highlights the role of the self as a key conceptual axis distinguishing the two frameworks, as well as the contrast between regulation-oriented and transformation-oriented approaches to emotional change.
Rather than proposing an integrative model, this study contributes by clarifying these conceptual distinctions and by identifying points of convergence and divergence that are often obscured in interdisciplinary discussions. By maintaining the theoretical integrity of each tradition, the analysis underscores the value of comparative inquiry for deepening understanding of emotional suffering without reducing complex frameworks to simplified common denominators.
Policy implications
The findings of this conceptual analysis suggest several implications for policy and practice in mental health, education, and professional training, while acknowledging the limits inherent in theory-based research.
First, mental health policy may benefit from recognizing that emotional distress cannot be fully addressed through regulation-based interventions alone. While strategies aimed at managing negative emotions are essential, the analysis suggests that persistent emotional suffering may also be shaped by deeper self-related assumptions. Policymakers may therefore consider supporting complementary approaches that incorporate reflective and insight-oriented practices, provided they are adapted responsibly and evaluated within appropriate ethical and cultural frameworks.
Second, in the domain of education and emotional development, the results indicate the value of moving beyond instrumental emotion management toward cultivating emotional understanding and self-awareness. Educational policies that promote social and emotional learning could be strengthened by including reflective practices that encourage non-reactive engagement with emotions, without imposing specific religious or philosophical doctrines.
Third, regarding professional training in psychology and counseling, the comparative findings highlight the importance of conceptual literacy when drawing on non-Western psychological traditions. Policy frameworks governing professional education may encourage exposure to diverse theoretical perspectives, including Buddhist psychology, in order to enhance critical reflection, cultural sensitivity, and theoretical flexibility among practitioners.
Finally, at a broader societal level, the study supports policies that frame negative emotions not solely as individual deficits or pathologies, but as experiences shaped by cognitive, relational, and existential factors. Such an orientation may help reduce stigma associated with negative emotional states and promote more holistic approaches to mental health and well-being.
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