Advent thoughts: December 21

“But you, O Bethlehem Ephrathah, who are too little to be among the clans of Judah, from you shall come forth for me one who is to be ruler in Israel, whose origin is from of old, from ancient days” (Micah 5:2—read Micah 5:1-6).

Once again Matthew assures us that a verse prophesies the coming of the Messiah, even though a quick reading of the chapter would seem to suggest that it concerns the days of the tribes of Israel being invaded by the Assyrian Empire. Matthew even makes a subtle change in his translation of the verse, rendering it, “And you, O Bethlehem, in the land of Judah, are by no means least among the rulers of Judah; for from you shall come a ruler who will shepherd my people Israel” (Matthew 2:6). The shepherd reference is borrowed from Micah 5:4, but the change from “too little” to “by no means least” would seem to be a contradiction and not a paraphrase.

“Too little to be among the clans,” but, “by no means least” fit together because of the meaning of the rest of the verse. Bethlehem was a small town; but it has become the most famous small town in the world because Jesus was born there. The victory Jesus was born to win was far bigger than any victory over an Assyrian army. Jesus defeated all the forces of evil, including our sins and the power of death. For that reason, the prophet Micah looked beyond the fearsome invaders of his time to focus on the victory that matters more than any other, because it defeats the forces that cause wars and other violence on earth.

The Bible experts used Micah’s prophecy to tell King Herod where the Messiah would be born. They chose a simple verse for a king who ruled over the Jews but did not understand their faith. The experts knew that the Messiah must be born in Bethlehem, not because of a single verse in Micah, but because of the promise God made to David. God told David that one of his descendants would rule an eternal kingdom. To inherit the throne of David, the Savior-King had to be born in David’s hometown. Sharing a birthplace was necessary because of the terms of the old covenant.

God stressed a connection between his chosen people and the Promised Land. Each plot of land was to remain the property of the same family. They could not sell land; they could only rent it out for a time if they needed money. God wanted his people to be good stewards of the land. His concern for stewardship of the land was expressed already to Adam and Eve in the beginning. They and all their descendants were to care for the planet and especially for its living beings. God did not say that people could do whatever they want with the land and with plants and animals. Part of the Judgment to be announced on the Day of the Lord will be the matter of how well or how poorly we have cared for the planet.

We must confess that we have not, for the most part, been good stewards of God’s creation. Some areas have been farmed to exhaustion and have become human-made deserts. Others have been poisoned by human-made pollution. Habitats have been stolen for human use. Habitat loss and careless hunting has driven many species into extinction. When Jesus is seen on his throne of judgment, he will have things to say about the way we treated his world.

Yet the forgiveness of Jesus covers even our sins against the planet. One reason Jesus went to the cross was to pay the penalty for all the times we have damaged and destroyed the world he created.  Jesus is not pleased to see mismanagement of his creation, but that sin is forgiven through his life and death and resurrection. Forgiveness is not license to continue sinning; forgiveness gives us power to reverse our mistakes, to do what is right instead of what is wrong.

The King who inherits David’s throne is also a Shepherd to protect his flock so we live in safety and are not threatened by our enemies. He is our peace—through him we are at peace with God, at peace with one another, and at peace with all creation. Coming from ancient times—indeed, from outside of time—Jesus comes to rescue us and to claim us. We belong to him and his kingdom forever. Thanks be to God! J.

1984 Anti-Sikh Riots: Delhi HC Awards Life Term To Congress Leader Sajjan Kumar

To begin with, it has been a long and gruelling wait of 34 long years for the survivors of 1984 anti-Sikh riots to finally see one big leader Sajjan Kumar being sentenced to life term by Delhi High Court in a recent landmark judgment titled State Through CBI vs Sajjan Kumar & Ors in CRL.A. 1099/2013 reserved on 29th October 2018 and pronounced on 17th December 2018. This landmark and laudable judgment was authored by Justice Dr S Muralidhar of Delhi High court for himself and Justice Vinod Goel. But there is still a long way to go because many other big stalwarts of Congress party like Jagdish Tytler among others have always been under the scanner but have somehow managed to save themselves from the long arms of the law as the Akali leaders among others keep pointing out repeatedly!
                                     At the outset, this historic judgment begins by bringing out that, “In the summer of 1947, during partition, this country witnessed horrific mass crimes where several lakhs of civilians, including Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus were massacred. A young poet, Amrita Pritam, who fled to this country with her two little children from Lahore was witness to the manifold tragedies during that perilous journey. She was moved to pen an ‘Ode to Waris Shah’ in which she spoke of the fertile land of Punjab having “sprouted poisonous weeds far and near” and where “Seeds of hatred have grown high, bloodshed is everywhere / Poisoned breeze in forest turned bamboo flutes into snakes / Their venom has turned the bright and rosy Punjab all blue.” The killings would continue in the streets of Delhi.
Thirty-seven years later, the country was again witness to another enormous human tragedy. Following the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, on the morning of 31st October 1984 by two of her Sikh bodyguards, a communal frenzy was unleashed. For four days between 1st and 4th November of that year, all over Delhi, 2,733 Sikhs were brutally murdered. Their houses were destroyed. In the rest of the country too thousands of Sikhs were killed.
A majority of the perpetrators of these horrific mass crimes, enjoyed political patronage and were aided by an indifferent law enforcement agency. The criminals escaped prosecution and punishment for over two decades. It took as many as ten Committees and Commissions for the investigation into the role of some of them to be entrusted in 2005 to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 21 years after the occurrence.
The present appeals arise as a result of the investigation by the CBI into the killings of five Sikhs in the Raj Nagar Part I area in Palam Colony in South West Delhi on 1st and 2nd November 1984 and the burning down of a Gurudwara in Raj Nagar Part II. Six accused, including Sajjan Kumar a Congress leader who was a Member of Parliament at that time, were sent up for trial some time in 2010. Three years later, the trial court convicted five of the accused: three of them for the offences of armed rioting and murder and two of them for the offence of armed rioting. Sajjan Kumar stood acquitted by the trial Court of all offences. The convicted accused as well as the CBI appealed to this Court.  
In the judgment that follows this Court has partly allowed CBI’s appeal and reversed the acquittal of Sajjan Kumar. This Court has convicted him for the offences of criminal conspiracy and abetment in the commission of the crimes of murder, promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of communal harmony, defiling and destruction of the Gurudwara by burning. Further while affirming the conviction and sentences awarded by the trial court to the other five accused, this Court has additionally convicted and sentenced them for the offence of criminal conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes.
The accused in this case have been brought to justice primarily on account of the courage and perseverance of three eyewitnesses. Jagdish Kaur whose husband, son and three cousins were the five killed; Jagsher Singh, another cousin of Jagdish Kaur, and Nirpreet Kaur who saw the Gurudwara being burnt down and her father being burnt alive by the raging mobs. It is only after the CBI entered the scene, that they were able to be assured and they spoke up. Admirably, they stuck firm to their truth at the trial.
This Court is of the view that the mass killings of Sikhs in Delhi and elsewhere in November 1984 were in fact ‘crimes against humanity’. They will continue to shock the collective conscience of society for a long time to come. While it is undeniable that it has taken over three decades to bring the accused in this case to justice, and that our criminal justice system stands severely tested in that process, it is essential, in a democracy governed by the rule of law to be able to call out those responsible for such mass crimes. It is important to assure those countless victims waiting patiently that despite the challenges, truth will prevail and justice will be done.”
                                      Having said this, let us now turn to what the opening para i.e. para 1 of this landmark judgment says. It says that, “These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 30th April 2013 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, North-east District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi (‘trial Court’) in SC No. 26/2010 arising out of FIR No. RC-SI-1/2005/S0024 registered at PS Delhi Cantonment acquitting Sajjan Kumar (Accused No. 1: ‘A-1’) of the offences of criminal conspiracy and abetment while, at the same time, convicting Balwan Khokar (‘A-2’), Mahender Yadav (‘A-3), Captain Bhagmal (Retd.) (‘A-4’), Girdhari Lal (‘A-5’), and Krishan Khokar (‘A-6’). The trial Court convicted A-2, A-4, and A-5 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, and 302 read with 149 IPC. A-3 and A-6 were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 147 and 148 IPC. By the order on sentence dated 9th May 2013, they have been sentenced in the following manner:
(i)                         For the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, A-2, A-4 and A-5 were sentenced to imprisonment for life along with payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment (‘RI’) for six months;
(ii)                      For the offence punishable under Section 147 IPC, all five convicted accused were sentenced to two years’ RI along with payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo RI for six months;
(iii)                   For the offence punishable under Section 148 IPC, all five convicted accused were sentenced to three years’ RI along with payment of a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo RI for six months.”    
                                  Needless to say, para 2 brings out that, “The Central Bureau of Investigation (‘CBI’) has filed Crl. A. 1099/2013 challenging the complete acquittal of A-1 and the acquittal of the other accused for the other charges framed against them. The complainant, Jagdish Kaur (PW-1), had also preferred Crl. A. 850/2013 against the acquittal of A-1 which was subsequently withdrawn, with this Court granting her liberty to address arguments in Crl. A. 1099/2013.” Para 3 then states that, “The convicted accused, have filed separate appeals. Crl.A.861/2013 has been preferred by A-2, Crl.A.715/2013 by A-3, Crl.A.851/2013 by A-4, Crl.A.710/2014 by A-5 and Crl.A.753/2013 by A-6.”
       Charges framed against A-1
                           As it turned out, para 4 then elucidates that, “Four articles of charge were framed against A-1. First, he was charged with having committed the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 147, 148, 302, 395, 427, 436, 449, 153A, 295 and 505 IPC on account of entering into an agreement, on or about 31st October 1984, with A-2 to A-6 as well as Mala Singh, Santosh Rani @ Janta Hawaldarni, Ishwar Chand Gaur @ Chand Sharabi, Dharamveer Singh Solanki, Balidan Singh, Raj Kumar @ Rajaram (all since deceased), and other known and unknown persons including police personnel to commit the following acts:
(i)     Rioting,
(ii)    Rioting armed with deadly weapon,
(iii)    Murder,
(iv)    Mischief causing damage,
(v)   Mischief by fire with intent to destroy houses etc.,
(vi) House trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death,
(vii)   Dacoity,
(viii)  Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony,
(ix) Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of Sikh community, and
(x) Making statements conducing to public mischief.
                                                          Going forward, para 5 then says that, “Secondly, A-1 was charged with being a principal offender who abetted and instigated the aforementioned co-accused persons in the wake of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi to commit, in pursuance of the aforementioned conspiracy, offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 395, 427, 436, 449, 153A, 295 and 505 IPC and thereby having committed the offence punishable under Section 109 IPC read with the aforementioned provisions of the IPC.”
                                                   To be sure, para 6 then adds that, “Thirdly, A-1 was charged with having delivered fiery/provocative speeches to the mob gathered at Raj Nagar, Palam Colony, Delhi Cantonment on 1st/2nd November 1984 and having instigated and promoted violent enmity against the Sikh community and disturbed harmony between the two religious groups/communities of the locality in retaliation of the assassination of Smt.Indira Gandhi, giving rise to feelings of enmity, hatred, and ill will between members of the non-Sikh and Sikh communities which was prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony and disturbed public tranquility and was thereby guilty of committing the offence punishable under Section 153A IPC.”
                                                            In the same vein, it is then pointed out in para 7 that, “Fourthly, A-1 was charged with having publicly made a statement on 1st/2nd November 1984, to wit, by asking members of the Jat community to not leave any Sikh or any other person who had given shelter to Sikhs alive, inciting the mob gathered there by delivering fiery/provocative speeches and was thereby guilty of committing the offence punishable under Section 505 IPC.”
                          Charges framed against A-2 to A-6        
                                     Of course, para 8 then stipulates that, “Nine articles of charge were framed separately against the five other accused, viz. A-2 to A-6. Firstly, they were charged in a manner similar to A-1 with commission, on or about 31st October 1984, of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 147, 148, 302, 395, 427, 436, 449, 153A, 295 and 505 IPC.”
                                       Moving ahead, para 9 then goes on to state that, “Secondly, they were charged with having been members of an unlawful assembly on 1st/2nd November 1984 in Raj Nagar, Palam Colony, Delhi Cantonment using force and violence in pursuance of the common object to loot, damage, and burn the properties of the Sikh community as well as to kill members of the Sikh community residing in the area in retaliation to the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 147 IPC. Thirdly, they were charged with commission of the aforementioned acts while being members of an unlawful assembly armed with guns, jellies, iron rods/pipes, lathis, kerosene oil, etc. and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 148 IPC.”
                                               As we see, it is then next pointed out in para 10 that, “Fourthly, they were charged with having committed, while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly, the murders of Kehar Singh son of Dhyan Singh, Gurpreet Singh son of Kehar Singh, Raghuvinder Singh son of Gurcharan Singh, Narender Pal Singh son of Gurcharan Singh, and Kuldeep Singh son of Hardev Singh and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Fifthly, they were charged with committing mischief and causing loss and damage amounting to approximately Rs. 3,30,000/- while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 427 read with Section 149 IPC.”
                                                      Interestingly enough, para 11 then reveals that, “Sixthly, they were charged with committing mischief while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly by setting fire to a place of worship, viz. the Raj Nagar Gurudwara, as well as the dwelling houses H.No.RZ-1/129 & RZ-15, Shiv Mandir Marg, Raj Nagar, Palam Colony, New Delhi and were thereby guilty of the commission of the offence punishable under Section 436 read with Section 149 IPC. Seventhly, they were charged with having committed house trespass while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly by entering H.No.RZ-1/129 & RZ-15, Shiv Mandir Marg, Raj Nagar, Delhi Cantonment, which were the dwelling house of the five deceased persons, in order to commit the offence of murder which is punishable with death, and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 449 read with Section 149 IPC.”
                More importantly, para 12 then reveals that, “Eighthly, they were charged with having committed dacoity while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly in H.No.RZ-1/129 & RZ-15 which belonged to the deceased persons, and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 395 read with Section 149 IPC. Lastly, they were charged with destroying/damaging/defiling a place of worship, i.e. the Raj Nagar Gurudwara held sacred by the Sikh community, while being members of the aforementioned unlawful assembly with the common intention of insulting the Sikh religion and were thereby guilty of commission of the offence punishable under Section 295 read with Section 149 IPC.”
                                         Summary Of Findings
                                   Most importantly, it is time now to focus on what the summary of findings are of the two Judge Bench of Delhi High Court in this landmark case. Para 368 states that, “The summary of conclusions arrived at by the Court is as under: –
(i)           There was an abject failure by the police to investigate the violence which broke out in the aftermath of the assassination of the then Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi is apparent from the several circumstances highlighted hereinabove. (Para 136)
(ii)       There was an utter failure to register FIRs with respect to the five deaths that form the subject matter of the present appeals. The failure to record any incident whatsoever in the DDR and the lack of mention of PW-1“s statement therein, amongst other circumstances, established the apathy of the Delhi Police and their active connivance in the brutal murders being perpetrated. (Paras 146 and 149)
(iii)   What happened in the aftermath of the assassination of the then Prime Minister was carnage of unbelievable proportions in which over 2,700 Sikhs were murdered in Delhi alone. The law and order machinery clearly broke down and it was literally a “free for all” situation which persisted. The aftershocks of those atrocities are still being felt. (Para 152)  
 (iv)    This was an extraordinary case where it was going to be impossible to proceed against A-1 in the normal scheme of things because there appeared to be ongoing large-scale efforts to suppress the cases against him by not even recording or registering them. Even if they were registered they were not investigated properly and even the investigations which saw any progress were not carried to the logical end of a charge sheet actually being filed. Even the defence does not dispute that as far as FIR No. 416/1984 is concerned, a closure report had been prepared and filed but was yet to be considered by the learned MM. (Para 159)
(v) The argument that the CBI deliberately suppressed the fact of the pendency of the closure report in FIR No. 416/1984 is born out of sheer desperation. Even if FIR No. 416/1984 was not closed as “untraced”, the fact remains that there was no progress whatsoever in the said FIR. (Para 160)
(vi) PW-1 comes across as a fearless and truthful witness. Till she was absolutely certain that her making statements will serve a purpose, she did not come forward to do so. Nothing in the deposition of PW1 points to either untruthfulness or unreliability. Her evidence deserves acceptance. (Paras 219 and 220)
(vii) PW-4 is also definitely a witness in support of the case of the prosecution. (Para 232)
(viii) PW-6 was one of the persons who had suffered tragedies and had no reason to falsely implicate anyone. (Para 242)
(ix) The failure to examine important witnesses including PWs 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 12 by the Riot Cell of the Delhi Police and also the non-examination of Daljit Kaur and Harbhajan Kaur establishes that the Riot Cell did not carry out any genuine investigation. PW-1 was justified in not joining such an investigation. (Paras 280 and 281)   
(x) The trial Court completely omitted to address the charge of conspiracy despite detailed arguments submitted by the CBI in that regard. There was a two-pronged strategy adopted by the attackers. First was to liquidate all Sikh males and the other was to destroy their residential houses leaving the women and children utterly destitute. The attack on the Raj Nagar Gurudwara was clearly a part of the communal agenda of the perpetrators. (Paras 288 and 294)
(xi) The mass killings of Sikhs between 1st and 4th November 1984 in Delhi and the rest of the country, engineered by political actors with the assistance of the law enforcement agencies, answer the description of crimes against humanity”. Cases like the present are to be viewed in the larger context of mass crimes that require a different approach and much can be learnt from similar experiences elsewhere. (Paras 367.1 and 367.10)
(xii) Common to the instances of mass crimes are the targeting of minorities and the attacks spearheaded by the dominant political actors facilitated by the law enforcement agencies. The criminals responsible for the mass crimes have enjoyed political patronage and managed to evade prosecution and punishment. Bringing such criminals to justice poses a serious challenge to our legal system. Decades pass by before they can be made answerable. This calls for strengthening the legal system. Neither “crimes against humanity” nor “genocide” is part of our domestic law of crime. This loophole needs to be addressed urgently. (Para 367.6)
(xiii) The acquittal of A-1 by the trial Court is set aside. He is convicted of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 302, 436, 295 and 153A(1)(a) and (b) IPC; for the offence punishable under Section 109 IPC of abetting the commission of the aforementioned offences; and for the offence of delivering provocative speeches instigating violence against Sikhs Crl.A. 1099/2013 & Connected Matters Page 201 of 203 punishable under Section 153A (1) (a)and (b) IPC. (Para 307)
(xiv) The convictions and sentences of A-2 to A-6 as ordered by the trial Court are affirmed. Additionally, each of them is convicted for the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 436, 295, and 153A (1) (a) and (b) IPC. (Paras 331, 356, 360 and 366)
                    Sentences
                               No less important is the sentencing part of this landmark judgment. Let us deal with it one by one. First and foremost, para 369 states that, “As far as A-1 is considered, he is sentenced as under:
(i)                         For the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B read with
(a)          Section 302 IPC, to imprisonment for life, i.e. the remainder of his natural life,
(b)         Section 436 IPC, to RI for 10 years and fine of Rs 1 lakh and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment (SI) for 1 year;
(c)           Section 153A(1)(a) and (b) IPC, to RI for three years; and
(d)         Section 295 IPC, to RI for two years.  
(ii)                      For the offence punishable under Section 109 read with Sections 302, 436, 153A, and 295 IPC to identical sentences as in (i) (a) to (d) above.
(iii)                   For the offence punishable under Section 153A(1)(a) and (b) IPC, to RI for three years.
All sentences shall run concurrently.
                                       Be it noted, it is then directed in para 370 that, “The bail and surety bonds furnished by A-1 stand cancelled and he shall surrender not later than 31st December 2018, failing which he shall forthwith be taken into custody to serve out the sentences awarded to him. A-1 shall not from this moment till his surrender leave the NCT of Delhi in the meanwhile and shall immediately provide to the CBI the address and mobile number(s) where he can be contacted.”                
                               All said and done, it is a landmark and laudable judgment but the victims of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots have had to wait for far too long more than 34 years which is most disgusting and disgraceful! Even now they have to fight a long legal battle in the Supreme Court! They must be given top priority and decided at the earliest! Nearly 3000 Sikhs being killed in Delhi alone and no one being hanged or even awarded life term until recently is a huge national shame for which both Centre and the judiciary are equally responsible for not doing enough to act swiftly and sternly against the powerful political offenders!
                          Before concluding, let me again remind esteemed readers what is so rightly pointed out in para 367.6 of this landmark judgment. It says that, “In India, the riots in early November 1984 in which in Delhi alone 2,733 Sikhs and nearly 3,350 all over the country were brutally murdered (these are official figures) was neither the first instance of a mass crime nor, tragically, the last. The mass killings in Punjab, Delhi and elsewhere during the country’s partition remains a collective painful memory as is the killings of innocent Sikhs in November 1984. There has been a familiar pattern of mass killings in Mumbai in 1993, in Gujarat in 2002, in Kandhamal, Odisha in 2008, in Muzaffarnagar in U.P. in 2013 to name a few. Common to these mass crimes were the targeting of minorities and the attacks spearheaded by the dominant political actors being facilitated by the law enforcement agencies. The criminals responsible for the mass crimes have enjoyed political patronage and managed to evade prosecution and punishment. Bringing such criminals to justice poses a serious challenge to our legal system. As these appeals themselves demonstrate, decades pass by before they can be made answerable. This calls for strengthening the legal system. Neither ‘crimes against humanity’ nor ‘genocide’ is part of our domestic law of crime. This loophole needs to be addressed urgently.” So this must be done at the earliest as has been very rightly pointed out by the Delhi High Court in this landmark judgment! There can be no denying it!
                                In conclusion, if there has to be respect for law in our country, the punishment for those indulging in such heinous crimes has to be swift and strict! Just because accused enjoys political patronage they should not be allowed to evade the due process of law as we have seen in many cases including  this one also for many decades because this would tantamount to making a mockery of our legal system and due process of law which cannot be permitted to happen in our country under any circumstances because doing so would lead our country to anarchy, dictatorship and lawlessness! No one who indulges in crime should ever be allowed to get away under any circumstances.
                                       It cannot be lost on us that in this 1984 anti-Sikh riots also there are many other big fishes who are still roaming free and they too must be brought to book and after following due process of law must be sent behind bars or to gallows which is the right place for them who mercilessly ensured the killings of thousands of Sikh men, women and even children without having any mercy on anyone! Can anyone deny this? Why have they been allowed to take law for granted? Why the killers were not sent to gallows promptly? Why even after killing of nearly 4000 Sikhs all over the country, no one has been hanged till now?
                                   Bluntly put: What image does this send of India in abroad? That one can get away with doing anything provided one has the right connections and the right political patronage! This must end now once and for all! No one should be allowed to get away after committing crime of any kind! Only then will our image in international forum get strengthened which will not just garner more investment in India from other countries but also strengthen India’s demand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council! Also, this will severely hamper hostile countries like Pakistan from easily misguiding young Sikh youths and they will also realize that in India no one who killed their near and dear ones are being spared or left scot free just because of their political connections! India must act tough now on killers and those who masterminded such mass killings must be now punished most swiftly and most strictly!  
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.   

Advent thoughts: December 20

“When Israel was a child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son” (Hosea 11:1—read Hosea 11:1-9).

According to Matthew 1:15, Hosea was talking about Jesus when he uttered the words, “Out of Egypt I called my Son.” Looking at Hosea’s prophecy, it is not easy to find Jesus. The prophet seems to be talking about the nation Israel, not about Jesus. God speaks of his kindness to his chosen people, describes their sin and the punishment they deserve, but concludes by describing his warm and tender compassion. Though they deserve judgment and punishment, God will not pour out his wrath on his people. He will treat them according to the new covenant of grace and not according to the old covenant.

The new covenant is only possible because of Jesus, but Matthew’s point is more profound than that simple fact. In taking God’s words about Israel and applying them to Jesus, Matthew is showing Jesus to be the new Israel. In the days of Joseph, the great-grandson of Abraham, the descendants of Abraham moved to Egypt to escape famine in the Promised Land. At first, they were honored guests, but they later became slaves. God raised up Moses to lead the Israelites out of Egypt. He brought them first to Mount Sinai, where God made a covenant with the nation. Then they started toward the Promised Land. When they heard about the strength of the people living in Canaan, the Israelites lost their nerve. They doubted God’s promises to give them the victory. Therefore, the Israelites who had left Egypt wandered in the wilderness for forty years until they all had died. The next generation then followed Joshua across the Jordan River and conquered the Canaanites as God had promised.

The journey of the Israelites under Moses and Joshua was delayed because of sin and doubt. God called Israel his son, but Israel was a disobedient son. When the right time arrived, God sent his Son to retrace the steps of Israel. Like Abraham’s son Isaac, and Isaac’s son Jacob, and Jacob’s twelve sons, Jesus was born in the Promised Land. But, like Jacob and his family, Jesus and his parents fled to Egypt for a time. When they returned to the Promised Land, they did not doubt God’s power to protect them. Although they relocated to Nazareth rather than Bethlehem, they did not hesitate in the wilderness.

When he was a man, Jesus returned to the wilderness to be tempted by Satan. The Israelites led by Moses sinned repeatedly against the Lord in the wilderness, but Jesus did not sin. He said no to every temptation from the devil. He remained faithful to his Father, trusting his promises and obeying his commands. Through his obedience, Jesus was able to establish a new covenant between God and his people. Jesus bore the wrath of the old covenant so God’s people could be spared that wrath. Jesus suffered to become victorious over all evil. Jesus died to defeat death. Jesus rose to share his victory and his new covenant with all people.

We are children of God, adopted into his family through the new covenant. In Baptism we are clothed in the righteousness of Christ. We are also his Church, the body of Christ. Therefore, in a sense, we traveled into Egypt with Mary and Joseph and Jesus. In a sense, we retraced the steps of the ancient Israelites out of Egypt to the Promised Land. In a sense, we got it right along with Jesus, even though our predecessors on this path got it wrong.

Because of the new covenant, God’s compassion for us grows warm and tender. He will not execute burning anger at us or come in wrath against us, because that anger and wrath was poured out on Jesus on the cross. Because Jesus suffered and died and rose, we will not be destroyed. Thanks be to God! J.

Advent thoughts: December 19

“Behold, the days are coming, declares the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah” (Jeremiah 31:31—read Jeremiah 31:31-34).

God’s love is more important to him than his justice. God has justice and righteousness, but God is love. His grace is greater than his law. He prefers rescuing sinners rather than punishing them.

Therefore, God’s new covenant is older than his old covenant. The old covenant comes first to diagnose our need for a Savior, but the new covenant was in God’s mind when he began to create the world. God knew that his people would sin. He knew they would need a Savior, because they would not be able to rescue themselves from sin and evil. He knew that he would have to pay the full price to redeem sinners. Knowing these things, God chose to create the world and chose to continue his plan of redemption.

So, God gave the old covenant to his chosen people. He said, “I will be your God, and you will be my people.” He told them what it meant to be his people: to have no other gods; to honor his name and his time and the earthly authorities that represent his authority; to love their neighbors and respect their neighbors’ lives, marriages, property, and reputations; and to be content with what God provided them, not coveting what belonged to their neighbors. He said that if they kept their side of the covenant, he would provide them with safety and prosperity. If they broke the terms of the old covenant, he would cause famine and drought and poverty, and he would allow them to fall into the hands of their enemies.

The old covenant is conditional. The new covenant is unconditional. Because his people broke the terms of the old covenant, he allowed them to be afflicted by drought and famine. He allowed them to be afflicted by Midianites and Philistines and Assyrians and Babylonians. He allowed them to be captured and carried off into captivity. Even the holy city Jerusalem and the Temple of the Lord were destroyed under the terms of the old covenant because his chosen people were unfaithful to the Lord.

At the same time that they preached about the old covenant and the consequences of breaking God’s commands, Moses and the prophets also spoke of a new covenant. Moses prepared the people for a king and priest and prophet. Isaiah repeatedly told of the coming servant who would be Immanuel, God with us. Jeremiah specifically promised a new covenant that would be different from the old covenant, because it would be based on God’s faithfulness and not on the faithfulness of the people.

“I will be their God, and they will be my people,” God said. Those words belong to both the old covenant and the new covenant. Under the terms of the old covenant, the thoughts and words and actions of the people determined whether they remained God’s people. Under the terms of the new covenant, the thoughts and words and actions of God determine whether we remain God’s people.

Old Testament believers were saved by faith through grace under the terms of the new covenant. They believed the promise of a coming Savior. New Testament believers are saved by grace through faith under the terms of the new covenant. We believe that the Savior has come—he is Christ, the Lord—and he has kept all the promises upon which the new covenant depends. He has lived a life of perfect righteousness, earning rewards which he shares with his people. He has offered that life as a sacrifice, removing the sins of his people. He has risen from the dead, victorious over all enemies, sharing that victory with his people.

“For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.” God knows everything, but he is able to forget. Between his birth and his resurrection, Jesus forgot the date of his glorious appearing on the Day of the Lord. God has forgotten the iniquity of his people because Jesus paid in full for those sins. God has forgotten the iniquity of his people because our sins were killed with him on the cross, buried with him, and left dead and buried when Jesus rose from the dead. God has forgotten the iniquity of his people because he has removed our sins from us “as far as the east is from the west.” We belong to him forever. Thanks be to God! J.

Advent thoughts–December 18

“Arise, shine, for your light has come, and the glory of the Lord has risen upon you” (Isaiah 60:1—read Isaiah 60:1-7).

The contrast of light and darkness is one of the great recurring themes of the Bible. The first thing God created when he made the heavens and the earth was light, and then God separated the light from the darkness. John begins his Gospel writing about the Word, who is the light and the life of all people. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overtaken it. Isaiah said that the people sitting in darkness have seen a great light. Both Isaiah and Simeon called Jesus a light to enlighten the nations. Now Isaiah calls upon God’s people to arise and shine, because our light has come and the glory of the Lord has risen upon us.

Jesus told his disciples that they are the lights of the world. Jesus also declared himself to be the Light of the world. He is the primary light; his disciples are secondary lights. He shines like the sun; we shine like windows through whom the sun shines. When Jesus shines through us, his light enlightens others. As we share his promises and the good news of his victory over evil, we do our job as windows, letting his light shine into the lives of others.

Without Jesus we cannot shine. His light comes first and passes through us. Along the way, his commandments reveal our flaws and our faults. When someone washes the windows on a cloudy day, the streaks and smears might not be visible. When the sunlight shines brightly on that window, every missed spot and every speck of dirt can be seen.

We might not want Jesus to shine on us and show our sins. But the light of Jesus does something that sunlight never does to windows: his light removes the dirt and makes us pure and holy. When his light shines through us, we become clean; and because of that cleansing, the light is all the more able to shine through us to enlighten others.

Isaiah pursues that theme as he describes the nations coming to the light of Israel. Isaiah even mentions the nations bringing gifts of gold and frankincense. The wise men who followed a star to find Jesus in Bethlehem were the first of the nations to seek the light in Israel. Centurions in the Roman army also sought help from Jesus during his years of ministry, and one came into the Church early in its history through Peter’s ministry. An Ethiopian official was told about Jesus and was baptized by the deacon Philip. Paul preached to Jews and to the nations, to whomever would listen, and over the course of three hundred years the Roman Empire became a Christian nation. Now the Gospel continues to be spread throughout the world. As missionaries teach about Jesus, people hear and believe and are saved: God’s kingdom comes, and God’s will is done. Thanks be to God! J.

SC Dismisses Petitions Seeking Probe Into Rafale Deal

In what has come as a big shot in the arm for the present ruling dispensation at the Centre led by PM Narendra Modi, the Supreme Court in its landmark judgment titled Manohar Lal Sharma vs Narendra Damodardas Modi & Ors in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 225 of 2018 with W.P. (C) No. 1205/2018, W.P. (Crl) No. 297/2018 and W.P. (Crl) No. 298/2018 delivered on December 14, 2018 has dismissed a string of petitions seeking an independent probe into the 2015 Rafale deal, according it a clean chit in all respects – decision-making, pricing and procurement procedure. The Bench of Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi and Justices SK Kaul and KM Joseph pronounced this landmark, laudable and excellent judgment on a batch of PILs by Advocates ML Sharma, Vineet Dhanda, Prashant Bhushan and former Union Ministers Arun Shourie and Yashwant Sinha and AAP MP Sanjay Singh for registration of FIR and Court-monitored investigation by CBI into corruption allegations in Rafale deal. All petty politics must now stop over Rafale deal and what the highest court of the land has held so unambiguously must be respected by all of us including the petitioners!Image result for narendra modji
                                          To begin with, para 1 sets the ball rolling by first and foremost pointing out that, “The issues arising in this group of writ petitions, filed as Public Interest Litigations, relate to procurement of 36 Rafale Fighter Jets for the Indian Airforce. The procurement in question, which has been sought to be challenged, has its origins in the post-Kargil experience that saw a renewed attempt to advance the strategic needs of the armed forces of the country.”
               In retrospect, para 2 then brings out that, “As far back as in the month of June of the year 2001, an in-principle approval was granted for procurement of 126 fighter-jets to augment the strength of the Indian Airforce. Simultaneously, a more transparent Defence Procurement Procedure (“DPP”) was formulated for the first time in the year 2002. A robust ‘offset clause’ was included in the DPP in the year 2005 so as to promote Indigenisation and to that effect Services Qualitative Requirements (“SQRs”) were prepared in June 2006. On 29th June 2007 the Defence Acquisition Council (“DAC”) granted the “Acceptance of Necessity” for the procurement of 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircrafts (for short “MMRCA”) including 18 direct fly-away aircrafts (equivalent to a single squadron) to be procured from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) with the remaining 108 aircrafts to be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (for short “HAL) under licence, to be delivered over a period of 11 years from the date of signing. The bidding process commenced in August 2007. Six (06) vendors submitted proposals in April 2008. The proposals were followed by technical and field evaluations; a Staff Evaluation Report and a Technical Oversight Committee Report. All these were completed in the year 2011. The commercial bids were opened in November, 2011 and M/s Dassault Aviation (hereinafter referred to as “Dassault”) was placed as the L-I sometime in January 2012. Negotiations commenced thereafter and continued but without any final result. In the meantime, there was a change of political dispensation at the centre sometime in the middle of the year 2014.”     
                          To be sure, para 3 then brings out that, “According to the official respondents negotiation continued. A process of withdrawal of the Request for Proposal in relation to the 126 MMRCA was initiated in March 2015. On 10th April, 2015 an Indo-French joint statement, for acquisition of 36 Rafale Jets in fly-away condition through an Inter-Governmental Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “IGA”), was issued and the same was duly approved by the DAC. The Request for Proposal for the 126 MMRCA was finally withdrawn in June 2015. Negotiations were completed after Inter-Ministerial Consultations with the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security (for short “CCS”). The contract along with Aircraft Package Supply Protocol: Weapons Package Supply Protocol: Technical Arrangements and Offset contracts was signed in respect of 36 Rafale Jets on 23rd September, 2016. The aircrafts were scheduled to be delivered in phased manner commencing from October 2019.”
                                     More importantly, it is then brought out in para 4 that, “Things remained quiet until sometime in the month of September, 2018 when certain newspapers reported a statement claimed to have been made by the former President of France, Francois Hollande, to the effect that the French Government were left with no choice in the matter of selection of Indian Offset Partners and the Reliance Group was the name suggested by the Government of India. This seems to have triggered of the writ petitions under consideration.
                                  The first writ petition i.e. Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 225 of 2018 has been filed by one Shri Manohar Lal Sharma, a practicing lawyer of this Court. What is sought for in the said writ petition is registration of an FIR under relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and a Court Monitored Investigation. The further relief of quashing the Inter-Governmental Agreement of 2016 for purchase of 36 Rafale Jets has also been prayed for.
                           Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1205 of 2018 has been filed by one Shri Vineet Dhanda claiming to be a public spirited Indian. The petitioner states that he was inspired to file the writ petition being agitated over the matter on the basis of the newspaper articles/reports.
                        The third writ petition bearing Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 297 of 2018 has been filed by one Shri Sanjay Singh, a Member of Parliament alleging illegality and non-transparency in the procurement process. The said writ petition seeks investigation into the reasons for “cancellation of earlier deal” and seeks a scrutiny of the Court into the alteration of pricing and, above all, how a ‘novice’ company i.e. Reliance Defence came to replace the HAL as the Offset partner. Cancellation of Inter-Governmental Agreement and registration of an FIR has also been prayed for.
                          The fourth and the last writ petition bearing Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018 has been filed by Shri Yashwant Sinha, Shri Arun Shourie and Shri Prashant Bhushan claiming to be public spirited Indians. They are aggrieved by non-registration of FIR by the CBI pursuant to a complaint made by them on 4th October, 2018 which complaint, according to the petitioners, disclose a prima facie evidence of commission of a cognizable offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prayer, inter alia, made is for direction for registration of an FIR and investigation of the same and submitting periodic status reports to the Court.”  
                                   It is then underscored in para 5 that, “Adequate Military strength and capability to discourage and withstand external aggression and to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India, undoubtedly, is a matter of utmost concern for the Nation. The empowerment of defence forces with adequate technology and material support is, therefore, a matter of vital importance.”
                                 Simply put, para 6 then stipulates that, “Keeping in view the above, it would be appropriate, at the outset, to set out the parameters of judicial scrutiny of governmental decisions relating to defence procurement and to indicate whether such parameters are more constricted than what the jurisprudence of judicial scrutiny of award of tenders and contracts, that has emerged till date, would legitimately permit.”
                                                  Broadly speaking, para 7 then makes the picture more clear by pointing out that, “Parameters of judicial review of administrative decisions with regard to award of tenders and contracts has really developed from the increased participation of the State in commercial and economic activity. In Jagdish Mandal vs State of Orissa and Ors, (2007) 14 SCC 517, this Court, conscious of the limitations in commercial transactions, confined its scrutiny to the decision making process and on the parameters of unreasonableness and mala fides. In fact, the Court held that it was not to exercise the power of judicial review even if a procedural error is committed to the prejudice of the tenderer since private interests cannot be protected while exercising such judicial review. The award of contract, being essentially a commercial transaction, has to be determined on the basis of considerations that are relevant to such commercial decisions, and this implies that terms subject to which tenders are invited are not open to judicial scrutiny unless it is found that the same have been tailor-made to benefit any particular tenderer or a class of tenderers. [See Maa Binda Express Carrier & Anr. Vs. North-East Frontier Railway & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 760]. Para 8 then states explicitly that, “Various Judicial pronouncements commencing from Tata Cellular vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651, all emphasise the aspect that scrutiny should be limited to the Wednesbury Principle of Reasonableness and absence of mala fides or favouritism.”
                           Truth be told, para 9 then seeks to clarify that, “We also cannot lose sight of the tender in issue. The tender is not for construction of roads, bridges, etc. It is a defence tender for procurement of aircrafts. The parameter of scrutiny would give far more leeway to the Government keeping in mind the nature of the procurement itself. This aspect was even emphasized in Siemens Public Communication Networks Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 215. The triple ground on which such judicial scrutiny is permissible has been consistently held to be “illegality”, “irrationality” and “procedural impropriety”.”
                            As it turned out, para 11 then elucidates that, “It is our considered opinion/view that the extent of permissible judicial review in matters of contracts, procurement, etc. would vary with the subject matter of the contract and there cannot be any uniform standard or depth of judicial review which could be understood as an across the board principle to apply to all cases of award of work or procurement of goods/material. The scrutiny of the challenges before us, therefore, will have to be made keeping in mind the confines of national security, the subject of the procurement being crucial to the nation’s sovereignty.”
                                       Going forward, it is then observed in para 12 that, “Adopting such an approach, on 10th October, 2018 when the first two writ petitions were initially listed before the Court, the Court had specifically observed in its order that it is proceeding in the matter by requiring the Government of India to apprise the Court of the details of the steps taken in the decision making process notwithstanding the fact that the averments in the writ petitions were inadequate and deficient. The Court had also indicated that it was so proceeding in the matter in order to satisfy itself of the correctness of the decision-making process. It was also made clear that the issue of pricing or matters relating to technical suitability of the equipment would not be gone into by the Court. The requisite information was required to be placed before the Court by the Government of India in sealed cover. Before the next date of hearing fixed i.e. 31st October, 2018, the other two writ petitions came to be filed.”
                                Be it noted, it is then revealed in para 13 that, “On 31st October, 2018, the Court in its order had recorded that in none of the writ petitions the suitability of the fighter jets and its utility to the Indian Airforce had been called into question. Rather what was doubted by the petitioners is the bona fides of the decision-making process and the price/cost of the equipment at which it was proposed to be acquired.” Para 14 then states that, “Pursuant to the order dated 10th October 2018, a note in sealed cover delineating the steps in the decision-making process was submitted to the Court and by order dated 31st October 2018 this Court had directed that such of the information which has been laid before the Court, which can legitimately be brought into the public domain, be also made available to the petitioners or their counsels. Details with regard to the induction of the Indian Offset Partner (IOP), if any, was also required to be disclosed. The Court also directed that the details with regard to pricing; the advantages thereof, if any, should also be submitted to the Court in a sealed cover.”
                                     Needless to say, para 15 then states that, “It is in the backdrop of the above facts and the somewhat constricted power of judicial review that, we have held, would be available in the present matter that we now proceed to scrutinise the controversy raised in the writ petitions which raise three broad areas of concern, namely, (i) the decision-making process; (ii) difference in pricing; and (iii) the choice of IOP.”  
              Decision Making Process
                                       It cannot be lost on us that para 16 then spells out that, “The details of the steps in the decision-making process leading to the award of the 36 Rafale fighter aircrafts’ order have been set out in response to the order dated 10th October, 2018. The Government states that the DPP 2002 has been succeeded by periodical reviews in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2016. The preamble to DPP has been referred to capture its essence, which emphasises that –
“Defence acquisition is not a standard open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique features such as supplier constraints, technological complexity, foreign suppliers, high cost, foreign exchange implications and geo-political ramifications. As a result, decision making pertaining to defence procurement remains unique and complex.”
It also states that –
              “Defence procurement involves long gestation periods and delay in procurement will impact the preparedness of our forces. The needs of the armed forces being a non-negotiable and an uncompromising aspect, flexibility in the procurement process is required, which has also been provisioned for.”
It is DPP 2013 which is stated to have been followed in the procurement in question.
                              It is no doubt true that paragraph 77 of the DPP 2013 reads as follows:
                    “77. This procedure would be in supersession of Defence Procurement Procedure 2011 and will come into effect from 01 June 2013. There are, however, cases which would be under various stages of processing in accordance with provision of earlier versions of DPP at the time of commencement of DPP-2013. The processing of these cases done so far under the earlier procedure will be deemed to be valid. Only those cases in which RFP is issued after 01 June, 2013, will be processed as per DPP-2013.”           
In other words when it is stated that only those cases in which RFP is issued after 1st June 2013 will be processed as per DPP 2013, in this case where the RFP was issued much prior to 1st April 2013 and it was withdrawn, as already noted, in June 2015, a question may arise as to how it could be claimed that DPP 2013 was followed. We, however, also notice clause 75 of DPP 2013 which reads as follows:
                  “75. Any deviation from the prescribed procedure will be put up to DAC through DPB for approval.”
                                    To put it gently, it is then observed in para 17 that, “Also, we notice that the official respondents have sought support from paragraph 71 of the DPP 2013. Para 71 of DPP 2013, in respect of the IGA has been referred to, which postulates possibilities of procurement from friendly foreign countries, necessitated due to geo-strategic advantages that are likely to accrue to the country. Such procurement would not classically follow the Standard Procurement Procedure or the Standard Contract Document, but would be based on mutually agreed provisions by the Governments of both the countries based on an IGA, after clearance from the Competent Financial Authority (hereinafter referred to as “CFA”). Of the total procurement of about Rs 7.45 lakh crores since 2002 under DPP, different kinds of IGAs, including Foreign Military Sales and Standard Clauses of Contract account for nearly 40%. With the object of promoting indigenization, a robust offset clause is said to have been included since 2005. As per the Defence Offset Guidelines of 2013, the vendor/Original Equipment Manufacturer (hereinafter referred to as “OEM”) is free to select its IOPs for implementing the offset obligation.”
                                           It would be pertinent to mention here that while shedding light on the unresolved issues involved in procuring the 126 fighter aircrafts is concerned, para 18 states eloquently that, “As far as the endeavour to procure 126 fighter aircrafts is concerned, it has been stated that the contract negotiations could not be concluded, inter alia, on account of unresolved issues between the OEM and HAL. These have been set out as under:
“i) Man-Hours that would be required to produce the aircraft in India: HAL required 2.7 times higher Man-Hours compared to the French side for the manufacture of Rafale aircraft in India.
ii) Dassault Aviation as the seller was required to undertake necessary contractual obligation for 126 aircraft (18 direct fly-away and 108 aircraft manufactured in India) as per RFP requirements. Issues related to contractual obligation and responsibility for 108 aircraft manufactured in India could not be resolved.”   
                                     Truly speaking, para 19 then minces no words in clearly and convincingly pointing out that, “The aforesaid issues are stated to have been unresolved for more than three years. Such delay is said to have impacted the cost of acquisition, as the offer was with ‘in-built escalation’ and was influenced by Euro-Rupee exchange rate variations. The stalemate resulted in the process of RFP withdrawal being initiated in March 2015. In this interregnum period, adversaries of the country, qua defence issues, inducted modern aircrafts and upgraded their older versions. This included induction of even 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Aircrafts of almost 20 squadrons, effectively reducing the combat potential of our defence forces. In such a situation, government-to-government negotiations resulted in conclusion of the IGA for the supply of 36 Rafale Aircrafts, as part of a separate process. The requisite steps are stated to have been followed, as per DPP 2013. An INT (Indian Negotiating Team) was constituted to negotiate the terms and conditions, which commenced in May 2015 and continued till April 2016. In this period of time, a total of 74 meetings were held, including 48 internal INT meetings and 26 external INT meetings with the French side. It is the case of the official respondents that the INT completed its negotiations and arrived at better terms relating to price, delivery and maintenance, as compared to the MMRCA offer of Dassault. This was further processed for inter-ministerial consultations and the approval of the CCS was also obtained, finally, resulting in signing of the agreement. This was in conformity with the process, as per para 72 of DPP 2013.”
                                      Of course, para 20 then adds that, “The petitioners, on the other hand, seek to question the very fulfillment of the prerequisites for entering into an IGA. The Government of France, giving onlya ‘Letter of Comfort’ and not a ‘Sovereign Guarantee’ has been questioned.”
               Taking the argument of the petitioners forward, para 21 then brings out that, “It is a say of the petitioners that para 71 envisages three eventualities, where the question of entering into an IGA would arise, which have not arisen in the present case:
(a)          Proven technology and capabilities belonging to a friendly foreign country is identified by our Armed Forces while participating in joint international exercises;
(b)         Large value weapon system/platform in service in a friendly foreign country is available for transfer or sale normally at a much lesser cost; or
(c)           Requirement of procuring a specific state-of-the-art equipment/platform where the Government of the OEM’s country might have imposed restriction on its sale and thus the equipment cannot be evaluated on ‘No Cost No Commitment’ basis.”
                                          Now coming to one of the most important paras of this landmark judgment which vindicates Centre’s stand on Rafale deal, para 22 very clearly and categorically holds that, “We have studied the material carefully. We have also had the benefit of interacting with senior Air Force Officers who answered Court queries in respect of different aspects, including that of the acquisition process and pricing. We are satisfied that there is no occasion to really doubt the process, and even if minor deviations have occurred, that would not result in either setting aside the contract or requiring a detailed scrutiny by the Court. We have been informed that joint exercises have taken place, and that there is a financial advantage to our nation. It cannot be lost sight of that these are contracts of defence procurement which should be subject to a different degree and depth of judicial review. Broadly, the processes have been followed. The need for the aircrafts is not in doubt. The quality of the aircraft is not in question. It is also a fact that the long negotiations for procurement of 126 MMRCAs have not produced any result, and merely conjecturing that the initial RPF could have resulted in a contract is of no use. The hard fact is that not only was the contract not coming forth but the negotiations had come practically to an end, resulting in a recall of the RFP. We cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of deciding to go in for purchase of 36 aircrafts in place of 126. We cannot possibly compel the Government to go in for purchase of 126 aircraft. This is despite the fact that even before the withdrawal of RFP, an announcement came to be made in April 2015 about the decision to go in only for 36 aircrafts. Our country can afford to be unprepared/underprepared in a situation where our adversaries are stated to have acquired not only 4th Generation, but even 5th Generation Aircrafts, of which, we have none. It will not be correct for the Court to sit as an appellate authority to scrutinize each aspect of the process of acquisition.”      
                               Going forward, para 23 then observes that, “We may also note that the process was concluded for 36 Rafale fighter jet aircrafts on 23rd September, 2016. Nothing was called into question, then. It is only taking advantage of the statement by the ex-President of France, Francois Hollande that these set of petitions have been filed not only qua the aspect which formed the statement, that is, the issue of IOPs but also with respect to the entire decision-making process and pricing. We do not consider it necessary to dwell further into this issue or to seek clause-by-clause compliances.”
              Pricing
                                         On the issue of pricing, first and foremost the Apex Court Bench held in para 24 that, “The challenge to the pricing of the aircrafts, by the petitioners, is sought to be made on the ground that there are huge escalations in costs, as per the material in public domain, as found in magazines and newspapers. We did initially express our disinclination to even go into the issue of pricing. However, by a subsequent order, to satisfy the conscience of the Court, it was directed that details regarding the costs of the aircrafts should also be placed in sealed covers before the Court.”
                                       To put things in perspective, it is then very rightly observed by the top court in para 25 that, “The material placed before us shows that the Government has not disclosed pricing details, other than the basic price of the aircraft, even to the Parliament, on the ground that sensitivity of pricing details could affect national security, apart from breaching the agreement between the two countries. The pricing details have, however, been shared with the Comptroller and Auditor General (hereinafter referred to as “CAG”), and the report of the CAG has been examined by the Public Accounts Committee (hereinafter referred to as “PAC”). Only a redacted portion of the report was placed before the Parliament, and is in public domain. The Chief of the Air Staff is stated to have communicated his reservation regarding the weaponry which could adversely affect national security. The pricing details are stated to be covered by Article 10 of the IGA between the Government of India and the Government of France, on purchase of Rafale Aircrafts, which provides that protection of classified information and material exchanged under the IGA would be governed by the provisions of the Security Agreement signed between both the Governments on 25th January, 2008. Despite this reluctance, the material has still been placed before the Court to satisfy its conscience.”   
                             To say the least, it is then clarified in para 26 that, “We have examined closely the price details and comparison of the prices of the basic aircraft along with escalation costs as under the original RFP as well as under the IGA. We have also gone through the explanatory note on the costing, itemwise.
   Suffice it to say that as per the price details, the official respondents claim there is a commercial advantage in the purchase of 36 Rafale aircrafts. The official respondents have claimed that there are certain better terms in IGA qua the maintenance and weapon package. It is certainly not the job of this Court to carry out a comparison of the pricing details in matters like the present. We say no more as the material has to be kept in a confidential domain.”
              Offsets
                       To put it succinctly, para 27 then envisages that, “The issue of IOP is what has triggered this litigation. The offset contract is stated to have been governed by the Defence Offset Guidelines of DPP 2013. Two of the said contracts were signed with Dassault and M/s MBDA Missile Systems Limited on 23rd September, 2016, the same day on which the IGA was signed between the Government of India and the Government of France. These are the French industrial suppliers of the Aircraft package and Weapon Package respectively. There are stated to be no offset obligations in the first three years, but the offset obligations are to commence from October 2019 onwards.”
                        While craving for the exclusive indulgence of esteemed readers, it must be informed here that para 28 then while shedding light on the complaint of the petitioners brings out that, “The complaint of the petitioners is that the offset guidelines contemplate that the vendor will disclose details about the Indian Offset partner however, in order to help the business group in India in question, an amendment was carried out in paragraph 8 of the Offset Guidelines that too with retrospective effect. By virtue of the said amendment it is contended that cloak of secrecy is cast about the Offset partner and the vendor is enabled to give the details at a much later point of time. It is contended, however, that other provisions of the Offset Guidelines remain unamended, and, therefore, Government cannot pretend ignorance about the Indian Offset partner as has been done in the affidavit filed. It is complained that favouring the Indian business group has resulted in offence being committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act.”    
                     For esteemed readers exclusive indulgence, it must also be informed here that para 29 then discloses that, “As per clause 8 of DPP 2013, dealing with the processing of offset proposals, it has been stated in clause 8.2 as under:
                  “8. Processing of Offset Proposals
                    8.2 The TOEC (Technical Offset Evaluation Committee) will scrutinize the technical offset proposals (excluding proposals for Technology Acquisition by DRDO as per para 8.3) to ensure conformity with the offset guidelines. For this purpose, the vendor may be advised to undertake changes to bring his offset proposals in conformity with the offset guidelines. The TOEC will be expected to submit its report within 4-8 weeks of its constitution”.”
                                   Having said this, let us now turn to para 30 which says that, “It has been categorically stated that the vendor/OEM is yet to submit a formal proposal, in the prescribed manner, indicating the details of IOPs and products for offset discharge. A press release in the form of a ‘Clarification on Offset Policy’, posted on 22nd September, 2018 has also been placed before us. Inter alia, it states that the Government reiterates that it has no role to play in the selection of the IOP. As per the Defence Offset Guidelines, the OEM is free to select any Indian company as its IOP. A joint venture is stated to have come into being between Reliance Defence and Dassault in February 2017, which is stated to be a ‘purely commercial arrangement’ between the two private companies. Media reports of February 2012 are stated to suggest that Dassault, within two weeks of being declared the lowest bidder for procurement of 126 aircrafts by the previous Government, had entered into a pact for partnership with Reliance Industries (Another business group) in the Defence sector. Dassault has also issued a press release stating that it has signed partnership agreement with several companies and is negotiating with over hundred other companies. As per the guidelines, the vendor is to provide details of the IOPs, either at the time of seeking offset credit or one year prior to discharge of offset obligation which would be due from 2020 onwards. The aforesaid press release is in conformity with the clause dealing with IOPs which reads as under:
                    “4. Indian Offset Partner
                     4.3 The OEM/vendor/Tier-1 sub-vendor will be free to select the Indian offset partner for implementing the offset obligation provided the IOP has not been barred from doing business by the Ministry of Defence.”
                                Now coming to para 31, it stipulates that, “Despite the aforesaid illustration, the petitioners kept on emphasising that the French Government has no say in the matter, as per media reports. It is also stated that there was no reason for Dassault to have engaged the services of Reliance Aerostructure Ltd., through a joint venture, when the company itself had come into being only on 24th April, 2015. The allegation, thus, is that the Indian Government gave a benefit to Reliance Aerostructure Ltd., by compelling Dassault to enter into a contract with them, and that too at the cost of the public enterprise, HAL.”
                                       Now let us talk about para 32. It says: “It is no doubt true that the company, Reliance Aerostructure Ltd., has come into being in the recent past, but the press release suggests that there was possibly an arrangement between the parent Reliance company and Dassault starting from the year 2012. As to what transpired between the two corporate would be a matter best left to them, being matters of their commercial interests, as perceived by them. There has been a categorical denial, from every side, of the interview given by the former French President seeking to suggest that it is the Indian Government which had given no option to the French Government in the matter. On the basis of materials available before us, this appears contrary to the clause in DPP 2013 dealing with IOPs which has been extracted above. Thus, the commercial arrangement, in our view, itself does not assign any role to the Indian Government, at this stage, with respect to the engagement of the IOP. Such matter is seemingly left to the commercial decision of Dassault. That is the reason why it has been stated that the role of the Indian Government would start only when the vendor/OEM submits a formal proposal, in the prescribed manner, indicating details of IOPs and products for offset discharge. As far as the role of HAL, insofar as the procurement of 36 aircrafts is concerned, there is no specific role envisaged. In fact, the suggestion of the Government seems to be that there were some contractual problems and Dassault was circumspect about HAL carrying out the contractual obligation, which is also stated to be responsible for the non-conclusion of the earlier contract.”
                                      It is a no-brainer that para 33 while vindicating Centre’s position on rafale deal very clearly and convincingly points out that, “Once again, it is neither appropriate nor within the experience of this Court to step into this arena of what is technically feasible or not. The point remains that DPP 2013 envisages that the vendor/OEM will choose its own IOPs. In this process, the role of the Government is not envisaged and, thus, mere press interviews or suggestions cannot form the basis for judicial review by this Court, especially when there is categorical denial of the statements made in the Press, by both the sides. We do not find any substantial material on record to show that this is a case of commercial favouritism to any party by the Indian Government, as the option to choose the IOP does not rest with the Indian Government.”
                    Conclusion:
                                 In conclusion, it is then observed in para 34 that, “In view of our findings on all the three aspects, and having heard the matter in detail, we find no reason for any intervention by this Court on the sensitive issue of purchase of 36 defence aircrafts by the Indian Government. Perception of individuals cannot be the basis of a fishing and roving enquiry by this Court, especially in such matters. We, thus, dismiss all the writ petitions, leaving it to the parties to bear their own costs. We, however, make it clear that our views as above are primarily from the standpoint of the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India which has been invoked in the present group of cases.”
                                          It must be revealed here that Centre has sought correction in para 25 of this landmark and laudable judgment which had stated that the pricing details were shared with the Comptroller and Auditor General of India and that the report was examined by the Public Accounts Committee. The Centre said the error in the Apex Court’s judgment was “perhaps on account of misinterpretation of a couple of sentences in a note” that was handed over to it in a sealed cover. The government said in an application to the court that, “The observations in the judgment have resulted in a controversy in public domain, and would warrant correction by the court in the interest of justice.” The government said in its original note submitted to the court, the word “is” had been replaced by the word “has been”, which created the confusion. The report of the CAG will be placed before the PAC as and when it is ready, the government said in the application.
                                               All said and done, Opposition must refrain from making a political capital out of this small mistake which Centre has itself acknowledged and has sought correction also to it! There is no point in making a mountain out of a molehill! But it is the Opposition which must realize this and gracefully accept this landmark judgment!
                                      No doubt, this landmark, laudable and extraordinary judgment must be truly respected by each and every Indian and we all should desist from making India a laughing stock in front of the world by crying “scam, scam and scam without giving any proof to substantiate it.” We all need to appreciate that the  Supreme Court is the highest court of the land and its landmark and laudable judgment must be respected by Centre, Opposition and all of us in equal measure! Former UP CM Akhilesh Yadav very rightly and gracefully has accepted this landmark judgment of three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court and has refused to support the Congress demand for a JPC into it! Politics over defence deals is most deplorable and disgusting and it is our national security which suffers the most in this political one-upmanship game! How can any good Indian support it? All petty politics over it must stop and political interest must relinquish its prime position which must be replaced by national interest and it has to be above everything else if our nation is to progress and prosper in the real true sense! Is it a tall order? Certainly not!     
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Bombay HC Quashes Government Resolution Making It Mandatory For Assistant Public Prosecutors To Secure 25% Conviction For A Promotion

It must be noted first and foremost that in a landmark judgment with far reaching consequences for Assistant Public Prosecutors, the Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court in Maharashtra State Public Prosecutors Association Through its President Sanjay Purushottam Deshmukh versus 1. The State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary, Home Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai. 2. The Director of Prosecution, State of Maharashtra, Church Gate, Mumbai in Writ Petition No. 8117 of 2017 which was  reserved on 10th July 2018 and pronounced on 24th August 2018, has quashed resoundingly a government resolution dated May 12, 2015 imposing a condition that the Assistant Public Prosecutor, whose rate of conviction is less than 25% of the cases handled by him, is not entitled to promotion and thus accepted the contention of the petitioners as valid. A Division Bench of Justice SV Gangapurwala and Justice SK Kotwal at Aurangabad held that the said notification was irrational, unreasonable and against the law of the land. So it had to be quashed and naturally so! The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by Maharashtra State Public Prosecutors Association and the respondents were State of Maharashtra and the Director of Prosecution in the State. PR Katneshwarkar was advocate for the petitioner and NT Bhagat, A.G.P. for the State/respondent No. 1.Image result for bombay high court
            Submissions
                                 As it turned out, para 5 brings out that, “Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned Government Resolution, specially Clause Nos. 4 and 7, mandating the Assistant Public Prosecutors in Maharashtra State to secure minimum 25% conviction in criminal cases for getting promotion, is unreasonable, contrary to the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and decision of Supreme Court as well as decision of the High Court.”
                            To be sure, para 6 then points out that, “Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Public Prosecutor, who represents the State in the criminal trial, is not expected to assure the State that in any case he would secure the conviction. On the other hand, being officer of the Court it is the duty of Public Prosecutor to place before the Court every material collected by the Investigating Officer fairly, irrespective of the fact whether it supports the prosecution case or not.”
                                         Bluntly put: Who can deny or dispute this? How can the Investigating Officer be biased and always disposed towards securing the conviction of the accused under any circumstances? Will this not make an open mockery of justice which always demands neutrality from not just Judges but also the Investigating Officers?  
                       It also cannot be lost on us that it is rightly contended in para 7 that, “Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the result of criminal trial depends on quality and quantity of evidence collected by the Investigating Officer and not on the performance of the Public Prosecutor. There is no nexus between the performance of Public Prosecutor and conviction or acquittal.” Absolutely right! To link the performance of Public Prosecutor with conviction or acquittal would be downright absurd!
                                   No wonder, it is then rightly stated in para 8 that, “His last submission is that the impugned Government Resolution being irrational and against the law of the land, deserves to be quashed. He placed reliance on the case of “S.B. Shahane and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another”, [1995 Supp (3) Supreme Court Cases 37] and “Sushil Hiralal Chokhani Vs. State of Maharashtra”, [(2005) All M.R. (Cri.) 2673].” Can any sane person call such a Government Resolution rational? Speaking for myself, it has been rightly quashed by the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court!
                                    It would be apposite to now mention what has been contended by the Respondents. To begin with, it is pointed out in para 9 that, “Learned Counsels for the respondents submit that in the Maharashtra the rate of conviction in criminal case is less which compelled the Government to take policy decision and to pass the impugned Government Resolution for improvement in conviction rates, which is neither bias nor malafide, and therefore, the Court cannot interfere with the same. They submit that the conviction rate in Maharashtra State has dropped drastically as compared to the other States, which affects the public at large and sends a wrong signal to the society. The impugned Government Resolution was passed as a policy decision for achieving greater conviction rate and such sincere act of the State cannot be interfered by the Court.”
                                 Continuing in the same vein, it is then brought out in para 10 that, “Learned Counsels for the respondents submit that the respondents conduct seminars and workshops for the Public Prosecutors with sole object to help them to become competent and achieve higher conviction rate.” Para 11 then states that, “Respondents placed reliance on the case of “Delhi Science Forum Vs Union of India”, [1996 (2) SCC 405] wherein it is held that, “The Courts have their limitation as these issues rest with the policy makers of the nation. No directions can be given or is expected from the Courts while implementing such policies, unless there is a violation of infringement of any of the provisions” and “Tamil Nadu Education Department Vs State of Tamil Nadu”, (1980 Vol 3 SCC 97) wherein it is held that, “What was regarded as administratively impractical might, on later thought and activist reconsideration, turn out to be feasible and fair. The Court cannot strike down a Government Order or a Policy merely because there is a variation or contradiction. Life is sometimes a contradiction and even consistency is not always a virtue. What is important to know whether mala fide vitiates or irrational and extraneous factors foul”.”   
                                    Needless to say, para 12 then states that, “In fact, after going through the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2, it reveals that the respondent No. 2 has not played any role for passing the impugned Government Resolution and it was the policy decision of Government of Maharashtra. Our attention was drawn to the case of “Brij Mohanlal Vs Union of India and others”, [(2012) 6 SCC 502] wherein while considering when the Court should or should not interfere in the policy decision of the State, the following parameters are laid down:
(I)                         If the policy fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional.
(II)                     The change in policy must be made fairly and should give the impression that it was done so arbitrarily on any ulterior intention.
(III)                  The policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fides, unreasonableness, arbitration or unfairness, etc.
(IV)                 If the policy is found to be against any statute or the Constitution or runs counter to the philosophy behind these provisions.
(V)                     It is dehors the provisions of the Act or legislations.
(VI)                 If the delegate has acted beyond its power or delegation.”
                            After perusal of all the facts before it by the respondent, the Bench notes in para 13 that, “No doubt, after going through the data placed on record by the respondents, it is clear that conviction rate in Maharashtra State is dropping down. Now the question arises whether to enhance the conviction rate the Public Prosecutor, who represent the State in the criminal trial, can be compelled to get conviction at least in 25% cases handled by them.”
                           Going forward, it is then pointed out in para 14 that, “In the case of “S.B. Shahane and others Vs State of Maharashtra” (supra), while giving directions to the Government to separate Prosecution Department from Police Department, the Apex Court considered 14th Law Commission Report. The relevant paragraphs of that report are reproduced as under:-
“Para 12 – Police Prosecutors and their functioning –
                 It is obvious that by the very fact of their being members of the Police Force and the nature of the duties they have to discharge in bringing a case in court, it is not possible for them to exhibit that degree of detachment which is necessary in a prosecutor. It is to be remembered that a belief prevails amongst the Police Officers that their promotion in the Department depends upon the number of convictions they are able to obtain as prosecuting officers. Finally, they only control supervision of the work of these prosecuting officers that is exercised by the Department Officials.”
“Para 15. – Suggested remedial measure –
We therefore suggest that as a first step towards improvement, the prosecuting agency should be completely separated from the Police Department. In every district a separate prosecution department may be constituted and placed in charge of an official who may be called a ‘Director of Public Prosecutions’. The entire prosecution machinery in the District should be under his control. In order to ensure that he is not regarded as a part of the Police Department he should be independent official directly responsible to the State Government. The departments of the machinery of the Criminal Justice, namely, the Investigation Department and the prosecuting department should thus be completely separated from each other.”   
                                            It would be of immense significance to note here that para 15 explicitly states that, “After considering the above observations of the Law Commission, the Apex Court found that the Police Prosecutors who were functioning under the administrative and disciplinary control of the superior officers of the police force, were not able to exhibit needed degree of detachment expected of Prosecutors because their promotions to higher post in Department depended on the number of conviction they were able to obtain from the Court in the prosecutions conducted by them. Therefore, it was felt that the Prosecution Department should be beyond the control of police administration.”
                             Moving on, it is then observed in para 16 that, “The Apex Court in the case “State of Bihar Vs Ramnaresh Pandey and another” reported in (AIR 1957 SC 389) observed that the Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function. Following this view the Division Bench of this Court in the case of “Sushil Chokhani” (supra) also held that the duty of Public Prosecutor is not merely to secure the conviction of and imposition of punishment to the accused. It is his primary duty to place before the Court all the evidence collected by investigating agency whether it be in favour or against accused for consideration thereof by the Court. Utmost fair and impartial attitude is expected in that regard from the Public Prosecutor.”
                                        Having said this, we now need to turn our attention to para 17 which while underscoring the need for Public Prosecutors to perform their duty impartially and drawing red lines for the State observes clearly and convincingly that, “Thus, it is clear that Public Prosecutors being an officer of the Court, is not expected to only grab the conviction, but is expected to act fairly before the Court and his performance should be only in the form of assistance to the Court for arriving at proper conclusion regarding conviction or acquittal of the accused. Considering such impartial duty to be performed by the Public Prosecutor, the State cannot set target before the Public Prosecutors to get conviction at least in 25% criminal cases handled by them. What is expected by the State of Maharashtra from the Public Prosecutor is totally against law as discussed above. In other words, by passing the impugned Government Resolution, the State Government cannot fix bench-mark for the Public Prosecutors to secure at least 25% conviction in the criminal cases handed by them, to get promotion.”
                             While underscoring the critical role played by the Investigating Officer, it is then pointed out in para 18 that, “The conviction or acquittal in criminal trial depends on various factors and mainly on the quality of material collected by the Investigating Officer. If the Investigating Officer has collected good quality of material as evidence against the accused and if he has taken necessary precaution while sealing and forwarding the important Muddemal articles to Chemical Analyst, certainly such case may result into conviction, provided that material witnesses stand constant at the stage of evidence. For conviction, the credit goes to Investigating Officer and witnesses. The conviction in criminal trial is not merely related with performance of the Public Prosecutor but as discussed supra depends upon various factors.”
                                  While punching holes in the impugned Government Resolution mandating 25% conviction in criminal trial, para 19 then goes on to add that, “Therefore, issuance of the impugned Government Resolution mandating achievement of 25% conviction in criminal trial is only as a result of above-said misconception. If any negligence has been committed by the Public Prosecutor while conducting the case, that cannot be ascertained only from conviction or acquittal, but it can be ascertained only on examination of the record of that particular case. Therefore, we hold that the condition of particular conviction rate to be achieved by Public Prosecutors, embodied in the impugned Government Resolution is definitely unreasonable.”
                                 Now coming to the concluding paras 20 to 22. Para 20 minces no words in concluding that, “Thus, the impugned Government Resolution is irrational, unreasonable and against the law of the land. Therefore, in view of the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Brij Mohan Lal” (supra), this Court can definitely quash the impugned Government Resolution. It follows that this Writ Petition deserves to be allowed.” Para 21 states that, “The Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned Government Resolution dated 12.05.2015 is quashed.” Finally, the judgment is concluded in para 22 by observing that, “Rule is made absolute in the above-said terms. Parties to bear their respective costs.”
                                       In the ultimate analysis, it is an exemplary and elegantly written landmark and laudable judgment which certainly deserves to be applauded! It is worth emulating by all the courts in all parts of India! This will ensure that Public Prosecutors can impartially render their job without getting biased with pre-determined notion to ensure conviction of accused at any cost to fulfil the criteria of ensuring the set 25% conviction rate to be eligible for promotions and other benefits which is downright absurd and can never serve the true purpose of justice in the real sense! No doubt, the Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court which has dared to deliver this landmark judgment deserves unqualified appreciation for it! It is the biggest warning to all States that they should desist from setting such ridiculous criteria and those who have already done so must immediately make suitable amendments to comply unconditionally with what the Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court has laid down so emphatically in this landmark case!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Men Too Have Right Not To Be Defamed And Denounced

“You do me favors, I do you favors 30 years later
lets call it “me too”Image result for metoo
A strong woman does not wait 30, 20, 10 years to speak up, she slaps him on the first “bad touch” and knocks him out
Don’t hide your weakness, the favors in returns that you enjoyed and the work you got by “I was too scared” cry now
You were scared to say NO then because its hard to stand up for what is right and you were scared to loose your status and position in the work place, so YOU CHOOSE to accept the molestation and went back for more …Its very easy to play the abla nari card later and gain sympathy
The Shakti does not wait later to speak up, she silences the evil on spot…
My thoughts on this nonsense of me too
I don’t have me too stories …anyone who tried got a tight slap then and there and I was never afraid to walk out with my head held high ..be it a Job or relationship!
“strong women don’t have me too sob
Stories, they have I gave him thappad
(slap) back short essays”.”
        Geetanjali Arora in Sunday Times of India dated October 21, 2018
                                              First and foremost, I must laud, laud and laud Geetanjali Arora for what she has written so courageously on 9 October at 5.35 pm which got published on October 21 in one of the most reputed newspapers of India – The Times Of India! Why should women be treated always as victims? Why should women keep quiet for many decades and then speak up if she herself has nothing to hide from the world?
                                                  Even as this “#MeToo” campaign is being celebrated all over the world after American actress and activist Alyssa Milano kickstarted it by sending out a tweet asking anyone who’s faced sexual harassment or violence to write ‘me too’ as a reply which elicited a huge response in 85 countries, let me not shy away from saying that I very strongly feel that even men too have right not to be defamed and denounced before being tried in court of law in accordance with due procedure! This media trial even before the court trial has begun can never be justified under any circumstances! When women has nothing to hide from the world then why should there not be court trial instead of media trial?
                                                It cannot be ignored that even BJP lawmaker Udit Raj has termed the “#MeToo” movement as “wrong practice” and questioned the relevance of making sexual harassment allegations against anybody after 10 years. He has rightly questioned that, “What if complaints outing men for allegedly sexually harassing women proved wrong and the prestige of a man was destroyed? Taking action or seeking resignation of an accused merely on a complaint merely on a complaint of sexual exploitation means there is no need of police or the judicial system! Considering oral or written complaint of the victim of sexual exploitation as a judgement and taking action or seeking resignation means there is no need of police or judicial system. What if the matter proves wrong? Can the soiled prestige of a man be restored? The #MeToo movement has intensified in the country with more women recounting their experiences of sexual harassment in the entertainment and media industry. There are several instances where women did this after taking money and then moved on to the next target.”
                                         Does men have no right? Should only women have all the right to speak up whenever she likes? Very few know that a woman had levelled serious allegations against eminent film actor Jitender about an act allegedly done by him 47 years ago when she was very young but the Himachal Pradesh High Court didn’t accept it and rejected the petition as it said that the time limit of lodging the complaint within the limitation period of 3 years was not complied with! Similarly MJ Akbar was left with no option but to resign as Union Minister of State for External Affairs even before the charges have been proved against him in any court and he too became a victim of “MeToo Media Trial”! Hang him if he is guilty but condemning him even before charges have been framed against him in any court and tarnishing his “impeccable reputation” which he has earned in his entire life in just few seconds cannot be justified under any circumstances!
                                           Is he not entitled to the benefit of the due process of law and legal defence? Should he not be given a chance to prove his innocence? There are many senior women journalists like Tavleen Singh who have always appreciated him and have said that they have never experienced any such “alleged misconduct” from him but this is never highlighted in the media! Only the numbers are highlighted that 16 or 17 women have levelled most serious charges against him but I want to ask: Why they never dared to lodge FIR against him in any police station of India till now? Why they kept quiet for so many years? Why inspite of being professional they chose to keep quiet? Were they not aware of their legal rights? Why did they not immediately complaint? Why they didn’t spill the beans earlier? Why was there a consensual conspiracy of silence? Why were they lured to keep quiet? Why they compromised themselves just for getting some material benefit? Are they not guilty just like an adulterous women?   
                                   Union Minister Pon Radhakrishnan asked: “If someone makes an allegation that such a thing happened when the incident happened we were playing together while in class 5. Would it be fair? The ‘MeToo’ movement had sullied the image of the country. Will it be right for men to start making similar accusations like them.” Even Union Minister for Tourism K Alphons has cautioned against frivolous complaints by “insincere” people with an agenda. He said that, “People should be extremely careful when they raise an allegation. Yes, if something inappropriate has taken place, it should be in public domain. There should not be any doubt about it, but I hope frivolous complaints are not raised by insincere people to fix people whom they do not like.” Just recently KWAN founder Anirban Das attempted suicide after sexual misconduct allegations but was saved by an alert police team patrolling the Navi Mumbai bridge! There are very few who care for what “mental trauma” a man undergoes when false allegations are levelled against him and he is defamed by “media trial” to the fullest even before charges are framed against him in any court! This must stop once and for all as it mutilates and maims to pieces a men’s integral right to reputation and right not to be defamed and denounced even before any court takes cognizance of the charges levelled against him!   
                                                It is rightly pointed in ‘The Times Of India’ editorial dated October 23, 2018 that, “The biggest threat to #Me Too is not fears of a male backlash over public shaming but anonymous complaints with sole intent to defame. Anonymous complaints have dangerous repercussions for personal lives, families and companies. Something as real and pervasive as corporate or professional rivalry and personal animosity can set the ball rolling. This then becomes less about #MeToo and more about settling scores, hurting companies financially, or even gaming and subverting #MeToo. Social media platforms also have a responsibility in such cases to remove the defamatory, anonymous material before it does more damage to reputations.”
                                                What has really shaken me most is the enlightening editorial written by Ramesh Thakur who is Professor of Public Policy, Australian National University in ‘The Times Of India’ dated November 9, 2018 titled “Believe Evidence Over Gender” which begins by coming straight to the point saying that, “The #MeToo campaign began as a long overdue effort to call out men abusing positions of power and authority to exploit vulnerable women sexually, but then morphed into some settling of scores for dates gone wrong. In the age of social media, #MeToo swarms of screaming mobs, and bird-dogging, the wildest accusations are amplified instantaneously across the whole world. This makes the charge themselves a powerful political weapon.” He rightly suggests the following to check mud slinging matches: “First, ensure anonymity for both or neither. Name only the guilty party after the trial. If the verdict is inconclusive, keep all names confidential. Second, treat both accuser and accused with sympathy, respect and courtesy. Evaluate the testimony of both with equal skepticism, ask questions accordingly, and weigh their statements against the facts. Everyone deserves a fair hearing: no one deserves to be believed in the absence of evidence; and shifting evidence and timeline to suit the narrative warrants over suspicion. Third, match the prosecution and penalty for false accusations to those of conviction. This will put in place a powerful deterrent. Without consequences, the political weaponisation of false charges will continue. Above all, believe evidence over gender. Senator Susan Collins was branded a rape apologist for doing so.”
                                                   Just recently we saw how in a landmark judgment titled ‘Joseph Shine v Union of India’, the Supreme Court very rightly decriminalized adultery as it felt that sex with consent cannot be crime! Law has to change with time. Even the definition of rape needs change and sex with consent should not be termed rape. A woman after having consensual sex with a men for many years cannot and should not be allowed suddenly to scream rape and play the victim card by weeping!  The moot question that arises here is: Why the women promptly didn’t lodge complaint if she was forced to enter into sexual relationship? Also, why always men alone be condemned? What if it was women who lured men into sex? Why always women version is to be believed? Why should women not be punished and sent to jail for at least an year if she levels false allegations against a men solely for denigrating, damaging and destroying his untarnished reputation in front of the world? Why should she not be made to pay compensation to him for tarnishing his reputation in front of the world? Why can’t the laws be suitably amended in this regard? Why should only women have right to reputation and right not to be defamed and denounced? Why do we ignore that our laws and Constitution treats men and women as alike? Why should men be deprived of the basic fundamental tenet of law that everyone is innocent until proven guilty?          
                           It cannot be lightly dismissed that in a criminal case, where the accused will forfeit his liberty if convicted, the standard of proof required to convict him not just is higher but also needs to be proved “beyond all reasonable doubt”. It is high time and all news channels and media groups should refrain from just glamourising “#MeToo” movement and should instead always convince so called “female victims” to approach the court at the earliest and not after 10 or 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 years and fight the legal battle which would seek evidence for both prosecution and proving innocence instead of just levelling the most damning allegations after many decades which only exposes her to “defamation suits” to get real justice for herself! Also, it must be ensured that the identity of both the women levelling the allegations and the men against whom allegations are levelled are not revealed in public until the case is decided at least in the lower court! Such cases too must be decided at the earliest and not after many years as the reputation of both the women and the men suffers enormously which only robs them of their right to privacy which just recently in KS Puttaswamy case has been declared to be a fundamental right!
                                                 We all have seen just recently how Italian actress Asia Argento who became a leading figure in the #MeToo movement after accusing powerhouse producer Harvey Weinstein of rape, paid hush money to a man who claimed she sexually assaulted him when he was 17! The $380,000 payment was made to Jimmy Bennett who is an actor and rock musician who claimed Argento assaulted him in a California hotel room in 2013, according to the Times, which cited documents sent to the paper by an unidentified party. This was reported in Hindustan Times dated August 21.
                                            I am certainly not against women getting justice who have suffered at the hands of men but I also simultaneously favour the reasoned and logical stand that, “Men too have right not to be defamed and denounced without facing strictest legal scrutiny in accordance with due procedure of law”. Every Indian women must always abide by what Geetanjali Arora who is herself a female has said which I have quoted right at the beginning! Women are beating men in studies and outsmarting them in every field then why should they take things lying down when it comes to sexual offences?
                                           Why not lodge complaint at the first place instead of just indulging in character assassination after many years as part of “#MeToo” campaign and getting defamed yourself also and making a huge public spectacle of yourself? Now it is for women to decide for themselves which course of action they would like to adopt but now they must stop laying the victim card and abide in totality by what Geetanjali has said and never tolerate any sort of any misconduct from any men under any circumstances whatsoever! It is high time and now women must be actually treated at par with men by not always allowing women to play the victim card and encouraging her to always take men head on whenever any men dares to violate her physical or mental integrity in any manner!     
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,     
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh. 

Courts Have To Adequately Consider Defence Of The Accused U/s 313 CrPC; Non-Consideration Can Vitiate Conviction: SC

It must be observed right at the outset that in a remarkable and landmark judgment delivered on October 31, 2018 in Reena Hazarika v State of Assam in Criminal Appeal No. 1330 of 2018 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 2440 of 2018) authored by Justice Navin Sinha for himself and Justice RF Nariman, the two Judge Bench of Apex Court observed quite clearly and convincingly that a solemn duty is cast on the court in the dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of the accused taken under Section 313 CrPC and to either accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing. It was also held that, “Section 313, Cr.P.C. cannot be seen simply as a part of audi alteram partem, rather it confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence”. It also made it explicitly clear that if there has been no consideration at all of the defence taken by the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the conviction can stand vitiated.   Image result for legal
                              In retrospect, it must be pointed out that a woman, who was convicted for the murder of her husband, had approached the Apex Court assailing concurrent verdicts of the trial court and the high court. In her 313 CrPC statement, she had stated that she was falsely implicated by one Manoj. She also said that she suspects some other persons are behind the murder of her husband.
                                   To put things in perspective, it is pointed out in para 2 that, “The appellant is the wife of the deceased convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, imprisonment for one month.” It is then pointed in para 3 that, “The deceased resided along with the appellant and his minor daughter CW-1, Miss Puja Hazarika, aged about 9 years, in the tenanted premises belonging to PW-1 Manoj Kumar Deka, PW-2 Dipen Deka and PW-3 Bhrigumoni Deka, who are brothers. The appellant is stated to have assaulted the deceased in the intervening night of 10.05.2013/11.05.2013. PWs. 1, 2 and 3 are stated to have heard noises and on going there, found the deceased with head injury attributed to a fall, but that the deceased was otherwise alright. They were unable to take him to the hospital because of rains and the unavailability of an ambulance. According to the post-mortem report proved by PW-6, Dr. Ritu Raj Chaliha the deceased had the following injuries on his person:-
(i)                         Chop wound of size 11cm x 2cm x muscle deep present on left side of cheek 6 cm medial tragus and 1 cm above angle of mandible.
(ii)                      Chop wound of size 9cm x 2cm x muscle deep present back of occipital region.
(iii)                   Chop wound of size 4cm x 2cm x muscle deep present on left side of forearm.
(iv)                   Laceration of size (5 x 4) cm present over left wrist joint on posterior aspect.
(v)                      Chop wound of size (4 x 1) cm x muscle deep, present over temporal region on right side.
(vi)                   Chop wound of size (6 x 2) cm of muscle deep present over back of scapula.
(vii)                Fracture of temporal bone on both sides.
 All injuries were ante mortem and caused by moderately heavy sharp cutting weapon and homicidal in nature.
                                     Simply put, it is then pointed out in para 4 that, “The Trial Court and the High Court held that the present was a case of circumstantial evidence. The last seen theory establishes the presence of the appellant with the deceased at night. Her unnatural conduct because she was not crying, she was the assailant of the deceased.” It is then rightly elaborated upon in para 5 that, “Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the courts below have erred in holding that the links in the chain of circumstances stood established leading to the only inescapable conclusion of the appellant being the assailant and no other hypothesis of innocence being possible. PW-6 has deposed that the injuries were caused by a moderately heavy sharp cutting weapon such as a dao, and that the fracture of the temporal bone may have been caused by a moderate heavy weapon. The recovery from the place of occurrence, as proved by PW-7 S.I. Nilomani Malakar, is of an ordinary knife used for cutting betel nut, one feet long with a bent sharp point. Chop injuries were not possible with the same. The alleged knife was not even shown to PW-6 for eliciting opinion if the injuries could have been caused by the same.”  
                                   Going forward, para 6 then states that, “Miss Diksha Rai, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was last seen with the deceased in the room, confirmed by CW-1. The appellant has failed to offer any explanation of the circumstances as to how the death occurred at night. Her unnatural conduct in not even weeping was also noticed by PW-7. The knife used for assault , and blood soaked clothes of the deceased have also been recovered.”
                                Striking a note of caution, it is then observed in para 7 that, “We have considered the respective submissions, the orders of the courts below, as also the evidence available on record. Normally this court under Article 136 of the Constitution, would be reluctant in appeal to interfere with the concurrent findings of two courts by reappreciating the facts and evidence. But in an appropriate case, if this court finds that there has been erroneous consideration and appreciation of facts and evidence, leading to miscarriage of justice, this court is duty bound to ensure that ultimately justice prevails. It is a well established principle of criminal jurisprudence that several accused may go free, but an innocent person should not be punished. In Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, (1960) 2 SCR 460 this court observed as follows:-
“16. Ordinarily, it is not the practice of this Court to re-examine the findings of fact reached by the High Court particularly in a case where there is concurrence of opinion between the two Courts below. But the case against the appellant is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, and there is no direct evidence that he administered a poison, and no poison has, in fact been detected by the doctor, who performed the post-mortem examination, or by the Chemical Analyser. The inference of guilt having been drawn on an examination of a mass of evidence during which subsidiary findings were given by the two Courts below, we have felt it necessary, in view of the extraordinary nature of this case, to satisfy ourselves whether each conclusion on the separate aspects of the case, is supported by evidence and is just and proper. Ordinarily, this Court is not required to enter into an elaborate examination of the evidence, but we have departed from this rule in this particular case, in view of the variety of arguments that were addressed to us and the evidence of conduct which the appellant has sought to explain away on hypotheses suggesting innocence. These arguments, as we have stated in brief, covered both the factual as well as the medical aspects of the case, and have necessitated a close examination of the evidence once again, so that we may be in a position to say what are the facts found, on which our decision is rested”.”  
                                  While reiterating that benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, it is then stated in para 8 that, “The essentials of circumstantial evidence stand well established by precedents and we do not consider it necessary to reiterate the same and burden the order unnecessarily. Suffice it to observe that in a case of circumstantial evidence the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the chain of circumstances, so as to lead to the only and inescapable conclusion of the accused being the assailant, inconsistent or incompatible with the possibility of any other hypothesis compatible with the innocence of the accused. Mere invocation of the last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. If the links in the chain of circumstances itself are not complete, and the prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case, leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner, the onus will not shift to the accused, and the benefit of doubt will have to be given.”
                                 Needless to say, para 9 then brings out that, “Before proceeding with the discussion further, we deem it proper to notice that the appellant did not have the benefit of a lawyer of her choice, both before the trial court and the High Court, naturally because of some handicap. She had to be provided legal assistance by the Legal Services Authority. This is not to make any comment or observation on the nature of the defence made available with the appellant but only to notice her handicap in establishing her innocence.”
                                        As it turned out, para 10 then observes that, “Pw-1 deposed that he was told by the deceased at about 11:00 p.m. on 10.05.2013 that he had suffered a head injury because of a fall, and that the witness did not provide any first aid to the deceased though he along with his brother PW-2, did try to call an ambulance at about 12:00 am. Additionally, that he did not see any other injuries on the deceased. On the contrary, CW-1 deposed that PW-1 had applied Dettol to the wounds of the deceased.” What follows next is para 11 which envisages that, “Contrary to the statement of PW-1, his brother, PW-2 deposed that he was woken up at about 2-3 a.m. by the appellant who was crying and told him that her husband had suffered head injury. The deceased is then stated to have himself told the witness that the injury was not serious. The contradiction in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 is further compounded by the third brother PW-3, deposing that PW-2 informed him of the injury to the deceased at 12:00 am. All the three witnesses have deposed that the deceased was of heavy built, because of which they were unable to take him to the hospital on the motor-cycle, for the treatment. The post mortem however recites that the deceased was of average built. If the deceased had merely suffered a head injury by fall and was otherwise fit to talk to the witnesses, we see no reason why he could not have been taken to the hospital on a motorcycle. While PW-3 states that the deceased was wearing clothes, the post-mortem report shows that the deceased was brought in an underwear only. The clothes of the deceased were found near the well in a gunny bag. But PW-7 did not consider it necessary to have the blood group examined by the FSL, which in our opinion in the facts of the case is a major lapse.”  
                       While pooh-poohing the serious charges levelled against the appellant, it is then observed in para 12 that, “The post-mortem report makes it evident that the chop wounds could not have been caused by the small knife alleged to have been recovered. Fracture of the temporal bone with the knife was an impossibility. PW-6 in the deposition ruled out that the injury could be caused by a fall. The post mortem did not find any alcohol in the body of the deceased. The witness also opined that injury no. 4 could have been caused while the deceased may have attempted to save himself from assault. The multiple injuries could certainly not have been caused by one person and tells an entirely different story by itself that the assailants may have been more than one. The chop injuries were possible by a modertae and heavy weapon like a dao. In our opinion also, if the deceased was of average built, it is difficult to accept, according to normal prudence and human behaviour and capacity, that the appellant being a woman, could have made such severe and repeated assault on the deceased, who was her husband, with a small knife, without any resistance and suffered no injury herself.”
                                     Punching further into the holes of the prosecution version, it is then observed in para 13 that, “PW-7 claimed to have found a knife with the smell of Dettol. Even if the knife had been wiped to erase traces of blood the wooden handle could have revealed much if it had been sent to the FSL. The witness again offers no explanation why he did not do so. No bottle of Dettol has been recovered. There is absolutely no evidence that the deceased would often assault the appellant and the minor child in a drunken condition. The fact that PW-7 did not notice tears in the eyes of the appellant, deemed an unnatural conduct by the courts below, cannot be sufficient to draw an adverse inference of guilt against the appellant. The appellant being in a helpless situation may have been stunned into a shock of disbelief by the death of her husband. It is not uncommon human behaviour that on the death of a near relative, or upon witnessing a murderous assault, a person goes into complete silence and stupor showing no reaction or sensibility. We also find it difficult to believe and rely upon the evidence of CW-1 primarily because of her minority. If the deceased had been assaulted by the appellant in the room at night, it would certainly have led to noise and shouts and the witness could not have possibly slept throughout without waking up.”
                                    It also cannot be lost on us that the very basis of the prosecution case against the appellant stands eroded when we go through para 14. It is pointed out in para 14 that, “PW-1 deposed that he informed the police the next morning at about 8:00 a.m. But PW-7 has deposed that information was given to the police station by PW-1 at about 12:00 p.m. on 11.05.2013 and the General Diary entry no. 452 made in the police station at 12.20 p.m., and the F.I.R. registered at 7:45 p.m. These are suspicious circumstances which leaves enough time for planning after thinking for the manner in which allegations were to be made for deflecting that the occurrence took place in a manner other than what may have happened actually.”
                         To be sure, it is then brought out in para 15 that, “In the background of the aforesaid discussion regarding the nature of evidence and the manner of its appreciation, we deem it proper to set out the English translation in the paper book of defence taken by the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as follows:-
“Ans: On the date of occurrence at about 8-8:30 while I have returend from my work at Satgaon, I saw that my husband was lying in the room with bleeding injury. On my cry, Manoj Deka and his brothers come there with drink in the hand of one brother. Thereafter I saw Manoj Deka was putting Dettol on the wound of my husband. I also rang to 108 ambulance. When, I wanted to call police Manoj Deka, snatched the phone from me. On my crying neighbouring peoples arrived there. I tred to take my husband to medical but due to non co-operation by Manoj Deka and others, I failed to take him to Medical. On that night at about 9.30 my husband expired and Manoj Deka and other neighbours were sitting. Subsequently, Manoj Deka has falsely implicated me. I have the suspicion that my husband was physically assaulted earlier at some place by Mintu Nath, Dipak Das and Jeetu Deka while taking liquor and brought my husband on injured condition and laid in the room. I also saw the lock of my room in broken condition, when I arrived here. I have not killed my husband. I am innocent.”
In this same para, it is then pointed out that, “PW-2 has acknowledged in his evidence that he would have drinks with the deceased. According to the post-mortem report, the stomach of the deceased was found empty, suggesting that the assault had taken place earlier in the evening contrary to the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3 suggesting the assault in the late hours of the night by which time the deceased would undoubtedly have had his dinner.”
                      While underscoring the rights conferred by Section 313 of the Cr.P.C on the accused, para 16 then points out that, “Section 313, Cr.P.C. cannot be seen simply as a part of audi alteram partem. It confers a valuable right upon an accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered beyond a statutory right as a constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, even if it is not to be considered as a piece of substantive evidence, not being on oath under Section 313(2), Cr.P.C. The importance of this right has been considered time and again by this court, but it yet remains to be applied in practice as we shall see presently in the discussion to follow. If the accused takes a defence after the prosecution evidence is closed, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. the Court is duty bound under Section 313(4) Cr.P.C. to consider the same. The mere use of the word ‘may’ cannot be held to confer a discretionary power on the court to consider or not to consider such defence, since it constitutes a valubale right of an accused for access to justice, and the likelihood of the prejudice that may be caused thereby.Whether the defence is acceptable or not and whether it is compatible or incompatible with the evidence available is an entirely different matter. If there has been no consideration at all of the defence taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in the given facts of a case, the conviction may well stand vitiated. To our mind, a solemn duty is cast on the court in dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of the accused taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and to either accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing.”  
                        It is then lamented in para 17 that, “Unfortunately neither Trial Court nor the High Court considered it necessary to take notice of much less discuss or observe with regard to the aforesaid defence by the appellant under Section 313 Cr. P.C. to either accept or reject it. The defence taken cannot be said to be irrelevant, illogical or fanciful in the entirety of the facts and the nature of other evidence available as discussed hereinbefore. The complete non-consideration thereof has clearly caused prejudice to the appellant. Unlike the prosecution, the accused is not required to establish the defence beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused has only to raise doubts on a preponderance of probability as observed in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 SC 468. A similar view is expressed in M. Abbas vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103 as follows:-
“10….On the other hand, the explanation given by the appellant both during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and in his own statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC is quite plausible. Where an accused sets up a defence or offers an explanation, it is well settled that he is not required to prove his defence beyond a reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of probabilities….”
                           While allowing the appeal in para 19, it is then finally and perhaps most importantly held in para 18 that, “The entirety of the discussion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of evidence available coupled with the manner of its consideration, leaves us satisfied that the links in the chain of circumstances in a case of circumstantial evidence, cannot be said to have been established leading to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant was the assailant of the deceased, incompatible with any possibility of innocence of the appellant. The possibility that the occurrence may have taken place in some other manner cannot be completely ruled out. The appellant is therefore held entitled to acquittal on the benefit of doubt. We accordingly order the acquittal and release of the appellant from custody forthwith, unless wanted in any other case.” Rightly said!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.  

CJI Ranjan Gogoi Demonstrates His Firm Resolve And Firm Commitment To Expeditiously Fill Up Judicial Vacancies In Lower Courts

It is most reassuring, refreshing and reconsoling to note that for the first time in at least my memory have I ever noticed a Chief Justice of India who even before assuming office outlined his priorities very clearly and courageously – to fill up judicial vacancies especially in lower courts which are at an all time high and also in the high courts and even the Supreme Court and to ensure that justice is accessible to the poor, needy and deprived! We have seen for ourselves how many decades are consumed in deciding a very small petty case what to talk about complex cases like the one of Ayodhya which has been lingering since last more than 65 years! This must now come to an end and CJI Ranjan Gogoi appears fully committed to ensure this!

                                 To be sure, the Supreme Court on November 1 cautioned the States and the High Courts that it will resort to a “centralised selection mechanism” if they do not act promptly to fill the over 5,000 judicial posts lying vacant in the lower judiciary. The Apex Court did not pull back punches in reprimanding the States and also the High Courts for their inefficiency in filling the vacancies in the subordinate judiciary which is staggering at an all time high! It is a national shame that it takes many decades for cases to be decided even in lower courts and despite all this, the judicial vacancies are not filled up and it takes many months for the results of Preliminary exams to come and when it does come then another few months are consumed in conducting Mains and then months in interview and then again a lot of time in declaring the final merit list! Even after the final merit list is declared, it still takes a lot of time for successful candidates to ultimately join! This is especially true in big states like UP which has maximum pending cases and where maximum judges vacancies arise every year!  
                         Not just this, what is noticed is that some High Courts even attach minimum marks with interview for qualifying even though Supreme Court in Himani Malhotra v NCT (State of Delhi) and in other cases also clearly held that there would be no minimum marks for interview as it is whimsical, arbitrary and subject to the whhims and fancies of a single individual! Even vacancies are not notified for many years as we saw in Delhi where no vacancy was notified for HJS from 2010-2013 and in some other states like Haryana, Rajasthan etc the situation was much worse! Worst of all, arbitrary conditions are attached like candidate desiring to appear in exam must have minimum salary of few lakhs in a year as we saw in Haryana from 2014 onwards which deprives those bright lawyers from appearing in exam just because they don’t earn in few lakhs which under no circumstances can ever be justified because money can be no criteria for appearing in an exam for judge! Even eminent lawyers like KTS Tulsi did not get cases for initital few years in Supreme Court so was he not treated as lawyer and how can this be a handicap for barring him to appear in an exam for becoming Judge? By the way, money minded lawyers never want to become judge with few exceptions because for them money is first and top priority and as a Judge their salary is very miniscule when compared to their salary as a lawyer where they can mint money as much as they like by dint of their expertise and skills! This must all end and this is exactly what the CJI wants and very rightly so!
                                      Bluntly put, a Bench led by Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi and also comprising Justice UU Lalit and Justice KM Joseph lambasted the High Courts and the States for not doing enough to fill up judicial vacancies in the lower judiciary both in the PCS and HJS! They held that, “We are telling all high courts and states that we are keeping you under constant gaze. If you cannot fill vacancies, then we will take over and have a centralised exam. We want our judges to be in place.”
                     As it turned out, the Chief Justice of India (CJI) Ranjan Gogoi rebuked the states and high courts for not filling up vacancies. The CJI minced no words in putting across his firm and blunt message by observing that, “Our gaze is on all states. If the vacancies cannot be filled by you, we will take over and do what is needed….There are hordes of applications by candidates who are deserving and what are you doing? Nothing was initiated to address the issue till we began monitoring! Our recurring queries have also not yielded any definite replies!”   
                                What is even more disquieting to note is that even Centre itself is not happy with all this! The Centre has proposed a centralised examination to fill them up, pointing to a staggering 2,76,74,499 cases pending in subordinate courts! Statistics reveal that there are 5,223 vacancies in trial courts! Why still have states and high courts miserably failed in filling up vacancies in time and in ensuring that results are declared in time and soon fresh vacancies are notified? Why was there no sense of urgency? With what face will now they accuse Centre of meddling in their domain when they have just not ensured the filling up of judicial vacancies in time? What is the point in now opposing the suggestion?
                                        As things stand, the situation in Delhi and Haryana was discussed as an example. It was pointed out by the Bench that Delhi had taken at least a year to fill up just 200 vacancies! Pulling up the Delhi High Court, the CJI said that, “It is taking over a year to complete the selection and recruitment when the number of posts is only 200. This casual attitude is not justified!” 
                                  As if this was not enough, in Haryana, the Bench revealed that the examination held in 2015 for filling up 60 posts of Judges was announced and 19,000 law graduates applied but it was cancelled and the fresh advertisement issued in 2018 attracted a huge rush with 13,000 more candidates applying which understandably led to collapse of the official website on the last date of application. No wonder, CJI Ranjan Gogoi was constrained to remark that, “All high courts and public service commissions (agency that holds exams) have been very casual.” All High Courts and Public Service Commissisons which is the agency that holds exams must seriously do a lot of self-introspection because it is none other than the CJI and 2 Judges of the Apex Court also along with him who have come to this unpalatable conclusion which is a stark reality and cannot be bruhed away lightly!
                                             Not stopping here, CJI added that nothing was initiated to address the issue till the Supreme Court began monitoring it on the administartive side. Even then, he rued, recurring queries have not yielded any definite replies! Both States and high Courts have a lot of explaining to do on this count!
                                         It may be recalled that it was on October 22 that the Bench headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi took up the matter on its own volition under Article 142 of the Constitution and ordered all state governments and High Courts to update it on the status of recruitment of lower court Judges and whether the timeline for selection as laid down by the top court in a 2006 verdict by a Bench headed by the then CJI YK Sabharwal in April 2006 in the Malik Mazhar Sultan case was being followed. As per the order, appointment of new Judges to subordinate courts has to be completed in nine months. The vacancies must be notified by March 31 and they must be filled up by October 31!
                                   Be it noted, passing a suo motu order in the wake of the alarming number of vacancies for the post of Judges in the subordinate judiciary across the country, CJI Gogoi had required all the High Courts to relay to the registry of the Apex Court the following information by October 31 –
·      The dates on which the recruitment processes for lower and higher judicial services have been initiated and are expected to be completed;
·       Whether the time taken or likely to be taken is beyond the schedule prescribed by this court in Malik Mazhar Sultan v. UP Public Service Commission (2006). If yes, the reasons be furnished by the concerned registries;
·      Whether time expected to be taken to complete the ongoing process can be shortened to comply with the guidelines in Malik Mazhar which the court undertstands to be prescribing the outer time limit and not the minimum period;
·      The number of vacancies which have occurred in respect of the civil judge and the higher judicial services cadre since the date of issuance of advertisement of vacancies till the date on which the processes are expected to be completed;
·      Whether the infrastructure and manpower in different states are adequate if all posts which are borne in a cadre are to be filled up.
                              It would be imperative to mention here that deciding to examine the status in batches, the Bench summoned in person the Registrar General and authorized representatives of the Chief Secretaries of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Delhi and the North-Eastern states on November 15 to be present for fast forwarding recruitment process. It would certainly not be an exaggeration to conclude that  this is the most historic and commendable step taken by the CJI for which the whole nation must stand indebted to him instead of targeting him for not focusing on issues which in his opinion are not as important as this! The Bench of Apex Court headed by CJI has also asked the Registrars General of the concerned High Courts, the Secretaries of the State Public Service Commissions as well as the Authorized Officer(s) of the States concerned to interact with senior and eminent lawyer Shri Shyam Divan who is Amicus Curiae in this vital case to present the result/position before the Court in as precise a manner as possible!
                                         Needless to say, if what has been commendably and courageously undertaken by CJI to fill up  all judicial vacancies in the lower courts in next nine months is undertaken expeditiously, it would be the biggest revolution in judiciary ever witnessed till now and it will certainly witness the huge pending cases coming down considerably! Who will not like this to happen? Only those who place vested interests above national interets! Not even a single Judge post should ever be vacant under any circumstances just like the post of MP and MLAs are never kept vacant and immediately bye elections are held whenever the seat becomes vacant due to any reason like death of sitting MP or MLA etc! With CJI Ranjan Gogoi at the helm of affairs we all have every reason to be pretty confident that the filling up of all vacancies in lower courts will no longer be a mirage or utopia and will certainly translate into palatable reality by expeditiously filling up the vacancies for which the CJI undoubtedly deserves full credit as it is his firm resolve and firm commitment that he right from the day he assumed office has demonstrated that he means action  and will not tolerate status quo of any kind as long as he is the CJI! Very rightly so!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Aadhaar Held Mandatory For Government Subsidies And PAN After ApexCourt Upholds Its Validity By 4:1 Majority

                                        It must be stated first and foremost that in a landmark judgment with far reaching consequences directly affecting the common person, the Apex Court in Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) and another v Union of India and others in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 and connected matters has upheld the validity of Aadhaar for availing government subsidies and benefits and for filing income tax returns! The lone dissenting Judge in this landmark case is Justice Dr DY Chandrachud. He differed entirely from the majority and struck down Section 139AA.Image result for aadhar card
                                         Before proceeding ahead, let us discuss the entire chronological events that led to this landmark and laudable judgment by the Apex Court. They are as follows: –
January 2009: Planning Commission notification on UIDAI.
2010-2011: National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 introduced.
November 2012: Retired Justice KS Puttaswamy and others file PILs in Supreme Court challenging validity of Aadhaar.
November 2013: Supreme Court orders all states and Union Territories be impleaded as respondents.
March 3, 2016: Aadhaar Bill, 2016 introduced in the Lok Sabha; later passed as money bill.
May 2017: Former Union Minister and Congress leader Jairam Ramesh moves Apex Court challenging the Centre’s decision to treat Aadhaar Bill as a money bill.
August 24, 2017: Supreme Court nine-Judge Bench rules that right to privacy is a fundamental right.
December 15, 2017: Supreme Court extends deadline for mandatory linking of Aadhaar with various services and welfare schemes till March 31, 2018.
January 17, 2018: Supreme Court five-Judge Bench begins hearing Aadhaar case.
January 25, 2018: Apex Court asks Chhattisgarh High Court to modify in 10 days its order directing all trial courts in the state to mandatorily accept copies of Aadhaar card for releasing an accused on bail.
February 19, 2018: Delhi BJP leader Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay seeks direction to Election Commission to take appropriate steps to implement an ‘Aadhaar based election voting system’.
February 21, 2018: Supreme Court says the alleged defect that citizens biometric details under the Aadhaar scheme were being collected without any law, could be cured by subsequently bringing a statute.
March 7, 2018: Supreme Court says Aadhaar number not mandatory for enrolment of students in all India exams.
March 13, 2018: Supreme Court extends March 31 deadline of Aadhaar linking till it gives its order.
March 22, 2018: UIDAI CEO says breaking the Aadhaar encryption may take “more than the age of the universe for the fastest computer on earth”.
March 28, 2018: Social activist Reshma Prasad seeks direction to the Centre to create a separate third gender category option on PAN cards for transgenders.
April 3, 2018: Centre tells Apex Court that Aadhaar law is just, fair and reasonable.
April 17, 2018: Apex Court raises concerns that there is a threat of Aadhaar data misuse.
April 25, 2018: Supreme Court questions Centre on mandatory seeding of Aadhaar with mobile.
May 10, 2018: Supreme Court reserves verdict.
September 26: Supreme Court upholds constitutional validity of Aadhaar. It also strikes down provisions including its linking with bank accounts, mobile phones and admissions.  
                                            To be sure, Justice AK Sikri while authoring the majority judgment for himself, CJI Dipak Misra and Justice AM Khanwilkar set the ball rolling by opening the judgment with the famous time-tested adage which says that, “It is better to be unique than the best. Because, being the best makes you the number one but being unique makes you the only one.” Para 2 then adds that, “ ‘Unique makes you the only one’ is the central message of Aadhaar, which is on the altar facing constitutional challenge in these petitions. ‘Aadhaar’ which means, in English, ‘foundation’ or ‘base’, has become the most talked about expression in recent years, not only in India but in many other countries and international bodies. A word from Hindi dictionary has assumed secondary significance. Today, mention of the word ‘Aadhaar’ would not lead a listener to the dictionary meaning of this word. Instead, every person on the very mentioning of this word ‘Aadhaar’ would associate it with the card that is issued to a person from where he/she can be identified. It is described as an “Unique Identity’ and the authority which enrolls a person and at whose behest the Aadhaar Card is issued is known as Unique Identification Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘UIDAI’ or ‘Authority’). It is described as unique for various reasons. UIDAI claims that not only it is a foolproof method of identifying a person, it is also an instrument whereby a person can enter into any transaction without needing any other document in support. It has become a symbol of digital economy and has enabled multiple avenues for a common man. Aadhaar scheme, which was conceptualised in the year 2006 and launched in the year 2009 with the creation of UIDAI, has secured the enrolment of almost 1.1 billion people in this country. Its use is spreading like wildfire, which is the result of robust and aggressive campaigning done by the Government, governmental agencies and other such bodies. In this way it has virtually become a household symbol. The Government boasts of multiple benefits of Aadhaar.”
                                     Going forward, para 3 then goes on to say that, “At the same time, the very scheme of Aadhaar and the architecture built thereupon has received scathing criticism from a section of the society. According to them, Aadhaar is a serious invasion into the right to privacy of persons and it has the tendency to lead to a surveillance state where each individual can be kept under surveillance by creating his/her life profile and movement as well on his/her use of Aadhaar. There has been no other subject matter in recent past which has evoked the kind of intensive and heated debate wherein both sides, for and against, argue so passionately in support of their respective conviction. The petitioners in these petitions belonging to the latter category who apprehend the totalitarian state if Aadhaar project is allowed to continue. They are demanding scrapping and demolition of the entire Aadhaar structure which, according to them, is anathema to the democratic principles and rule of law, which is the bedrock of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners have challenged the Aadhaar project which took off by way of administrative action in the year 2009. Even after Aadhaar got a shield of statutory cover, challenge persists as the very enactment known as Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Aadhaar Act’) is challenged as constitutionally impermissible. The wide range of issues involved in this case is evident from the fact that it took almost four months for the parties to finish their arguments in these cases, and the Court witnessed highly skilled, suave, brilliant and intellectual advocacy, with the traces of passions as well.”
                                     As things stand, para 4 then points out that, “The issue has generated heated public debate as well. Even outside the Court, there are groups advocating in favour of the Aadhaar scheme and those who are stoutly opposing the same. Interestingly, it is not only the commoners who belong to either of the two groups but intelligentsia is also equally divided. There have been number of articles, interviews for discourses in favour of or against Aadhaar. Those in favour see Aadhaar project as ushering the nation into a regime of good governance, advancing socio-economic rights, economic prosperity etc. and in the process they claim that it may make the nation a world leader. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India, referred in the commendations by certain international bodies, including the World Bank. We clarify that we have not been influenced by such views expressed either in favour of or against. Those opposing Aadhaar are apprehensive that it may excessively intrude into the privacy of citizenry and has the tendency to create a totalitarian state, which would impinge upon the democratic and constitutional values. Some such opinions of various persons/bodies were referred to during the arguments. Notwithstanding the passions, emotions, annoyance, despair, ecstasy, euphoria, coupled with rhetoric, exhibited by both sides in equal measure during the arguments, this Court while giving its judgment on the issues involved is required to have a posture of calmness coupled with objective examination of the issues on the touchstone of the constitutional provisions.”
                                    More importantly, it is then revealed in para 5 that, “Initiative in spearheading the attack on the Aadhaar structure was taken by the petitioners, namely, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Mr. Pravesh Khanna, by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012. At that time, Aadhaar scheme was not under legislative umbrella. In the writ petition the scheme has primarily been challenged on the ground that it violates fundamental rights of the innumerable citizens of India, namely, right to privacy falling under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Few others joined the race by filing connected petitions. Series of orders were passed in this petition from time to time, some of which would be referred to by us at the appropriate stage. In 2016, with the passing of the Aadhaar Act, these very petitioners filed another writ petition challenging the vires of the Act. Here again, some more writ petitions have been filed with the same objective. All these writ petitions were clubbed together. There are number of interventions as well by various individuals, groups, NGOs, etc., some opposing the petitions and some supporting the Aadhaar scheme.”
               Summary and Conclusions
                                Now it is time to dwell on summary and conclusions. This has been enunciated in para 446, 447 and 448. First of all, let us see what para 446 stipulates. It states that –
“446 (a) The architecture and structure of the Aadhaar Act reveals that the UIDAI is established as a statutory body which is given the task of developing the policy, procedure and system for issuing Aadhaar numbers to individuals and also to perform authentication thereof as per the provisions of the Act. For the purpose of enrolment and assigning Aadhaar numbers, enrolling agencies are recruited by the Authority. All the residents in India are eligible to obtain an Aadhaar number. To enable a resident to get Aadhaar number, he is required to submit demographic as well as biometric information i.e. apart from giving information relating to name, date of birth and address, biometric information in the form of photograph, fingerprint, iris scan is also to be provided. Aadhaar number given to a particular person is treated as unique number as it cannot be reassigned to any other individual.
(b) Insofar as subsidies, benefits or services to be given by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, is concerned, these Governments can mandate that receipt of these subsidies, benefits and services would be given only on furnishing proof of possession of Aadhaar number (or proof of making an application for enrolment, where Aadhaar number is not assigned). An added requirement is that such individual would undergo authentication at the time of receiving such benefits etc. A particular institution/body from which the aforesaid subsidy, benefit or service is to be claimed by such an individual, the intended recipient would submit his Aadhaar number and is also required to give her biometric information to that agency. On receiving this information and for the purpose of its authentication, the said agency, known as Requesting Entity (RE), would send the request to the Authority which shall perform the job of authentication of Aadhaar number. On confirming the identity of a person, the individual is entitled to receive subsidy, benefit or service. Aadhaar number is permitted to be used by the holder for other purposes as well.
(c) In this whole process, any resident seeking to obtain an Aadhaar number is, in the first instance, required to submit her demographic information and biometric information at the time of enrolment. She, thus, parts with her photograph, fingerprint and iris scan at that stage by giving the same to the enrolling agency, which may be a private body/person. Likewise, every time when such Aadhaar holder intends to receive a subsidy, benefit or service and goes to specific/designated agency or person for that purpose, she would be giving her biometric information to that RE, which, in turn, shall get the same authenticated from the Authority before providing a subsidy, benefit or service.
(d) Attack of the petitioners to the Aadhaar programme and its formation/structure under the Aadhaar Act is founded on the arguments that it is a grave risk to the rights and liberties of the citizens of this country which are secured by the Constitution of India. It militates against the constitutional abiding values and its foundational morality and has the potential to enable an intrusive state to become a surveillance state on the basis of information that is collected in respect of each individual by creation of a joint electronic mesh. In this manner, the Act strikes at the very privacy of each individual thereby offending the right to privacy which is elevated and given the status of fundamental right by tracing it to Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India by a nine Judge Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy.
(e) The respondents, on the other hand, have attempted to shake the very foundation of the aforesaid structure of the petitioners’ case. They argue that in the first instance, minimal biometric information of the applicant, who intends to have Aadhaar number, is obtained which is also stored in CIDR for the purpose of authentication. Secondly, no other information is stored. It is emphasised that there is no data collection in respect of religion, caste, tribe, language records of entitlement, income or medical history of the applicant at the time of Aadhaar enrolment. Thirdly, the Authority also claimed that the entire Aadhaar enrolment is foolproof inasmuch as within few seconds of the biometrics having been collected by the enrolling agency, the said information gets transmitted from the Authorities/CIDR, that too in an encrypted form, and goes out of the reach of the enrolling agency. Same is the situation at the time of authentication as biometric information does not remain with the requesting agency. Fourthly, while undertaking the authentication process, the Authority simply matches the biometrics and no other information is received or stored in respect of purpose, location or nature or transaction etc. Therefore, the question of profiling does not arise at all.
(f) In the aforesaid scenario, it is necessary, in the first instance, to find out the extent of core information, biometric as well as demographic, that is collected and stored by the Authority at the time of enrolment as well as at the time of authentication. This exercise becomes necessary in order to consider the argument of the petitioners about the profiling of the Aadhaar holders. On going through this aspect, on the basis of the powerpoint presentation given by Dr. Ajay Bhushan Pandey, CEO of UIDAI, and the arguments of both the sides, including the questions which were put by the petitioners to Dr. Pandey and the answers thereupon, the Court has come to the conclusion that minimal possible data, demographic and biometric, is obtained from the Aadhaar holders.
(g) The Court also noticed that the whole architecture of Aadhaar is devised to give unique identity to the citizens of this country. No doubt, a person can have various documents on the basis of which that individual can establish her identity. It may be in the form of a passport, PAN card, ration card and so on. For the purpose of enrolment itself number of documents are prescribed which an individual can produce on the basis of which Aadhaar card can be issued. Thus, such documents, in a way, are also proof of identity. However, there is a fundamental difference between the Aadhaar card as a mean of identity and other documents through which identity can be established. Enrolment for Aadhaar card also requires giving of demographic information as well as biometric information which is in the form of iris and fingerprints. This process eliminates any chance of duplication. It is emphasised that an individual can manipulate the system by having more than one or even number of PAN cards, passports, ration cards etc. When it comes to obtaining Aadhaar card, there is no possibility of obtaining duplicate card. Once the biometric information is stored and on that basis Aadhaar card is issued, it remains in the system with the Authority. Wherever there would be a second attempt for enrolling for Aadhaar and for this purpose same person gives his biometric information, it would be immediately get matched with the same biometric information already in the system and the second request would stand rejected. It is for this reason the Aadhaar card is known as Unique Identification (UID). Such an identity is unparalleled.
(h) There is, then, another purpose for having such a system of issuing unique identification cards in the form of Aadhaar card. A glimpse thereof is captured under the heading ‘Introduction’ above, while mentioning how and under what circumstances the whole project was conceptualised. To put it tersely, in addition to enabling any resident to obtain such unique identification proof, it is also to empower marginalised section of the society, particulary those who are illiterate and living in abject poverty or without any shelter etc. It gives identity to such persons also. Moreover, with the aid of Aadhaar card, they can claim various privileges and benefits etc. which are actually meant for these people.
(i) Identity of a person has a significance for every individual in his/her life. In a civilised society every individual, on taking birth is given a name. Her place of birth and parentage also becomes important as she is known in the society and these demographic particulars also become important attribute of her personality. Throughout their lives, individuals are supposed to provide such information: be it admission in a school or college or at the time of taking job or engaging in any profession or business activity, etc. When all this information is available in one place, in the form of Aadhaar card, it not only becomes unique, it would also qualify as a document of empowerment. Added with this feature, when an individual knows that no other person can clone her, it assumes greater significance.
(j) Thus, the scheme by itself can be treated as laudable when it comes to enabling an individual to seek Aadhaar number, more so, when it is voluntary in nature. Howsoever benevolent the scheme may be, it has to pass the muster of constitutionality. According to the petitioners, the very architecture of Aadhaar is unconstitutional on various grounds.
(k) The Court has taken note of the heads of challenge of the Act, Scheme and certain Rules etc. and clarified that the matter is examined with objective examination of the issues on the touchstone of the constitutional provisions, keeping in mind the ethos of constitutional democracy, rule of law, human rights and other basic features of the Constitution.
                       Discussing the scope of judicial review, the Court has accepted that apart from two grounds noticed in Binoy Viswam, on which legislative Act can be invalidated [(a) the Legislature does not have competence to make the law; and b) law made is in violation of fundamental rights or any other constitutional provision], another ground, namely, manifest arbitrariness, can also be the basis on which an Act can be invalidated. The issues are examined having regard to the aforesaid scope of judicial review.
(l) From the arguments raised by the petitioners and the grounds of challenge, it becomes clear that the main plank of challenge is that the Aadhaar project and the Aadhaar Act infringes right to privacy. Inbuilt in this right to privacy is the right to live with dignity, which is a postuate of right to privacy. In the process, discussion leads to the issue of proportionality, viz. whether measures taken under the Aadhaar Act satisfy the doctrine of proportionality.
(m) In view of the above, the Court discussed the contours of right to privacy, as laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy, principle of human dignity and doctrine of proportionality. After taking note of the discussion contained in different opinions of six Hon’ble Judges, it stands established, without any pale of doubt, that privacy has now been treated as part of fundamental right. The Court has held in no uncertain terms that privacy has always been a natural right which gives an individual freedom to exercise control over his or her personality. The judgment further affirms three aspects of the fundamental right to privacy, namely:
(i) intrusion with an individual’s physical body,
(ii) informational privacy and
(iii) privacy of choice.
(n) As succinctly put by Nariman, J., first aspect involves the person himself/herself and guards a person’s rights relatable to his physical body thereby controlling the uncalled invasion by the State. Insofar as second aspect, namely, informational privacy is concerned, it does not deal with a person’s body but deals with a person’s mind. In this manner, it protects a person by giving her control over the dissemination of material that is personal to her and disallowing unauthorised use of such information by the State. Third aspect of privacy relates to individual’s autonomy by protecting her fundamental personal choices. These aspects have functional connection and relationship with dignity. In this sense, privacy is a postulate of human dignity itself. Human dignity has a constitutional value and its significance is acknowledged by the Preamble. Further, by catena of judgments, human dignity is treated as fundamental right as a facet not only of Article 21, but that of right to equality (Article 14) and also part of bouquet of freedoms stipulated in Article 19. Therefore, privacy as a right is intrinsic of freedom, liberty and dignity. Viewed in this manner, one can trace positive and negative contents of privacy. The negative content restricts the State from committing an intrusion upon the life and personal liberty of a citizen. Its positive content imposes an obligation on the State to take all necessary measures to protect the privacy of the individual.
(o) In developing the aforesaid concepts, the Court has been receptive to the principles in international law and international instruments. It is a recognition of the fact that certain human rights cannot be confined within the bounds of geographical location of a nation but have universal application. In the process, the Court accepts the concept of universalisation of human rights, including the right to privacy as a human right and the good practices in developing and understanding such rights in other countries have been welcomed. In this hue, it can also be remarked that comparative law has played a very significant role in shaping the aforesaid judgment on privacy in Indian context, notwithstanding the fact that such comparative law has only persuasive value. The whole process of reasoning contained in different opinions of the Hon’ble Judges would, thus, reflect that the argument that it is difficult to precisely define the common denominator of privacy, was rejected. While doing so, the Court referred to various approaches to formulating privacy.
(p) We have also remarked above, the taxonomy of privacy, namely, on the basis of ‘harms’, ‘interest’ and ‘aggregation of rights’. We have also discussed the scope of right to privacy with reference to the cases at hand and the circumstances in which such a right can be limited. In the process, we have also taken note of the passage from the judgment rendered by Nariman, J. in K.S. Puttaswamy stating the manner in which law has to be tested when it is challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental right to privacy.
 (q) One important comment which needs to be made at this stage relates to the standard of judicial review while examining the validity of a particular law that allegedly infringes right to privacy. The question is as to whether the Court, is to apply ‘strict scrutiny’ standard or the ‘just, fair and reasonableness’ standard. In the privacy judgment, different observations are made by the different Hon’ble Judges and the aforesaid aspect is not determined authoritatively , may be for the reason that the Bench was deciding the reference on the issue as to whether right to privacy is a fundamental right or not and, in the process, it was called upon to decide the specific questions referred to it. This Court preferred to adopt a ‘just, fair and reasonableness’ standard which is in tune with the view expressed by majority of Judges in their opinion. Even otherwise, this is in consonance with the judicial approach adopted by this Court while construing ‘reasonable restrictions’ that the State can impose in public interest, as provided in Article 19 of the Constitution. Insofar as principles of human dignity are concerned, the Court, after taking note of various judgments where this principle is adopted and elaborated, summed up the essential ingredients of dignity jurisprudence by noticing that the basic principle of dignity and freedom of the individual is an attribute of natural law which becomes the right of all individuals in a constitutional democracy. Dignity has a central normative role as well as constitutional value. This normative role is performed in three ways:
          First, it becomes basis for constitutional rights;
          Second, it serves as an interpretative principle for determining the scope of constitutional rights; and,
          Third, it determines the proportionality of a statute limiting a constitutional right. Thus, if an enactment puts limitation on a constitutional right and such limitation is disproportionate, such a statute can be held to be unconstitutional by applying the doctrine of proportionality.
(r) As per Dworkin, there are two principles about the concept of human dignity. First principle regards an ‘intrinsic value’ of every person, namely, every person has a special objective value which value is not only important to that person alone but success or failure of the lives of every person is important to all of us. It can also be described as self respect which represents the free will of the person, her capacity to think for herself and to control her own life. The second principle is that of ‘personal responsibility’, which means every person has the responsibility for success in her own life and, therefore, she must use her discretion regarding the way of life that will be successful from her point of view.
(s) Sum total of this exposition can be defined by explaining that as per the aforesaid view dignity is to be treated as ‘empowerment’ which makes a triple demand in the name of ‘respect’ for human dignity, namely:
     (i) respect for one’s capacity as an agent to make one’s own free choices;
     (ii) respect for the choices so made; and
    (iii) respect for one’s need to have a context and conditions in which one can operate as a source of free and informed choice.
(t) In the entire formulation of dignity right, ‘respect’ for an individual is the fulcrum, which is based on the principle of freedom and capacity to make choices and a good or just social order is one which respects dignity via assuring ‘contexts’ and ‘conditions’ as the ‘source of free and informed choice’. The aforesaid discourse on the concept of human dignity is from an individual point of view. That is the emphasis of the petitioners as well. That would be one side of the coin. A very important feature which the present case has brought into focus is another dimension of human dignity, namely, in the form of ‘common good’ or ‘public good’. Thus, our endeavour here is to give richer and more nuanced understanding to the concept of human dignity.
(u) We, therefore, have to keep in mind humanistic concept of Human Dignity which is to be accorded to a particular segment of the society and, in fact, a large segment. Their human dignity is based on the socio-economic rights that are read in to the Fundamental Rights as already discussed above.
          When we read socio-economic rights into human dignity, the community approach also assumes importance along with individualistic approach to human dignity. It has now been well recognised that at its core, human dignity contains three elements namely, Intrinsic Value, Autonomy and Community Value. These are known as core values of human dignity. These three elements can assist in structuring legal reasoning and justifying judicial choices in ‘hard cases’.
(v) When it comes to dignity as a community value, it emphasises the role of the community in establishing collective goals and restrictions on individual freedoms and rights on behalf of a certain idea of good life. The relevant question here is in what circumstances and to what degree should these actions be regarded as legitimate in a constitutional democracy? The liberal predicament that the State must be neutral with regard to different conceptions of the good in a plural society is not incompatible, of course, with limitation resulting from the necessary coexistence of different views and potentially conflicting rights. Such interferences, however, must be justified on grounds of a legitimate idea of justice, an “overlapping consensus” (“Overlapping consensus” is a term coined by John Rawls that identifies basic ideas of justice that can be shared by supporters of different religious, political and moral comprehensive doctrines) that can be shared by most individuals and groups. Whenever such tension arises, the task of balancing is to be achieved by the Courts.
               We would like to highlight one more significant feature which the issues involved in the present case bring about. It is the balancing of two facets of dignity of the same individual. Whereas, on the one hand, right of personal autonomy is a part of dignity (and right to privacy), another part of dignity of the same individual is to lead a dignified life as well (which is again a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution). Therefore, in a scenario where the State is coming out with welfare schemes, which strive at giving dignified life in harmony with human dignity and in the process some aspect of autonomy is sacrificed, the balancing of the two becomes an important task which is to be achieved by the Courts. For, there cannot be undue intrusion into the autonomy on the pretext of conferment of economic benefits.  
(w) In this way, the concept of human dignity has been widened to deal with the issues at hand. As far as doctrine of proportionality is concerned, after discussing the approaches that are adopted by the German Supreme Court and the Canadian Supreme Court, which are somewhat different from each other, this Court has applied the tests as laid down in Modern Dental College & Research Centre, which are approved in K.S. Puttaswamy as well. However, at the same time, a modification is done by focusing on the parameters set down of Bilchitz which are aimed at achieving a more ideal approach.
                                  To put things in perspective, para 447 then states explicitly that, “After stating the aforesaid manner in which different issues that arose are specified and discussed, these questions and conclusions thereupon are summarised below:
(1)         Whether the Aadhaar Project creates or has tendency to create surveillance state and is, thus, unconstitutional on this ground?
      Incidental Issues:
(a)          What is the magnitude of protection that need to be accorded to collection, storage and usage of biometric data?
(b)         Whether the Aadhaar Act and Rules provide such protection, including in respect of data minimisation, purpose limitation, time period for data retention and data protection and security?
Answer
(a)          The architecture of Aadhaar as well as the provisions of the Aadhaar Act do not tend to create a surveillance state. This is ensured by the manner in which the Aadhaar project operates.
(b)         We have recorded in detail the powerpoint presentation that was given by Dr. Ajay Bhushan Pandey, CEO of the Authority, which brings out the following salient features:
(i) During the enrolment process, minimal biometric data in the form of iris and fingerprints is collected. The Authority does not collect purpose, location or details of transaction. Thus, it is purpose blind. The information collected, as aforesaid, remains in silos. Merging of silos is prohibited. The requesting agency is provided answer only in ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ about the authentication of the person concerned. The authentication process is not exposed to the internet world. Security measures, as per the provisions of Section 29(3) read with Section 38(g) as well as Regulation 17(1)(d) of the Authentication Regulations, are strictly followed and adhered to.
(ii)  There are sufficient authentication security measures taken as well, as demonstrated in Slides 14, 28 and 29 of the presentation.
(iii)  The Authority has sufficient defence mechanism, as explained in Slide 30. It has even taken appropriate protection measures as demonstrated in Slide 31.
(iv)    There is an oversight by Technology and Architecture Review Board (TARB) and Security Review Committee.
(v) During authentication no information about the nature of transaction etc is obtained.
(vi) The Authority has mandated use of Registered Devices (RD) for all authentication requests. With these, biometric data is signed within the device/RD service using the provider key to ensure it is indeed captured live. The device provider RD service encrypts the PID block before returning to the host application. This RD service encapsulates the biometric capture, signing and encryption of biometrics all within it. Therefore, introduction of RD in Aadhaar authentication system rules out any possibility of use of stored biometric and replay of biometrics captured from other source. Requesting entities are not legally allowed to store biometrics captured for Aadhaar authentication under Regulation 17(1)(a) of the Authentication Regulations.
(vii) The Authority gets the AUA code, ASA code, unique device code, registered device code used for authentication. It does not get any information related to the IP address or the GPS location from where authentication is performed as these parameters are not part of authentication (v2.0) and e-KYC (v2.1) API. The Authority would only know from which device the authentication has happened, through which AUA/ASA etc. It does not receive any information about at what location the authentication device is deployed, its IP address and its operator and the purpose of authentication. Further, the authority or any entity under its control is statutorily barred from collecting, keeping or maintaining any information about the purpose of authentication under Section 32(3) of the Aadhaar Act.
(c) After going through the Aadhaar structure, as demonstrated by the respondents in the powerpoint presentation from the provisions of the Aadhaar Act and the machinery which the Authority has created for data protection, we are of the view that it is very difficult to create profile of a person simply on the basis of biometric and demographic information stored in CIDR. Insofar as authentication is concerned, the respondents rightly pointed out that there are sufficient safeguard mechanisms. To recapitulate, it was specifically submitted that there was security technologies in place (slide 28 of Dr Pandey’s presentation), 24/7 security monitoring, data leak prevention, vulnerability management programme and independent audits (slide 29) as well as the Authority’s defence mechanism (slide 30). It was further pointed out that the Authority has taken appropriate pro-active protection measures, which included disaster recovery plan, data backup and availability and media response plan (slide 31). The respondents also pointed out that all security principles are followed inasmuch as: (a) there is PK1-2048 encryption from the time of capture, meaning thereby, as soon as data is given at the time of enrolment, there is an end to end encryption thereof and it is transmitted to the Authority in encrypted form. The said encryption is almost foolproof and it is virtually impossible to decipher the same; (b) adoption of best-in-class security standards and practices; and (c) strong audit and traceability as well as fraud detection. Above all, there is an oversight of Technology and Architecture Review Board (TARB) and Security Review Committee. This Board and Committee consists of very high profiled officers. Therefore, the Act has endeavoured to provide safeguards.
(d) Insofar as use and protection of data is concerned, having regard to the principles enshrined in various cases, Indian and foreign, the matter is examined from the stand point of data minimization, purpose limitation, time period for data retention, data protection and security (qua CIDR, requisite entities, enrolment agencies and Registrars, authentication service agency, hacking, biometric solution providers, substantive procedural or judicial safeguards). After discussing the aforesaid aspect with reference to certain provisions of the Aadhaar Act, we are of the view that apprehensions of the petitioners stand assuaged with the striking down or reading down or clarification of some of the provisions, namely:
(i) Authentication records are not to be kept beyond a period of six months, as stipulated in Regulation 27(1) of the Authentication Regulations. This provision which permits records to be archived for a period of five years is held to be bad in law.
(ii) Metabase relating to transaction, as provided in Regulation 26 of the aforesaid Regulations in the present form, is held to be impermissible, which needs suitable amendment.
(iii) Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act is read down by clarifying that an individual, whose information is sought to be released, shall be afforded an opportunity of hearing.
(iv) Insofar as Section 33(2) of the Act in the present form is concerned, the same is struck down.
(v) That portion of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which enables body corporate and individual to seek authentication is held to be unconstitutional.
(vi) We have also impressed upon the respondents, to bring out a robust data protection regime in the form of an enactment on the basis of Justice B.N. Srikrishna (Retd.) Committee Report with necessary modification thereto as may be deemed appropriate.
(2) Whether the Aadhaar Act violates right to privacy and is unconstitutional on this ground? 
Answer:   
(a)          After detailed discussion, it is held that all matters pertaining to an individual do not qualify as being an inherent part of right to privacy. Only those matters over which there would be a reasonable expectation of privacy are protected by Article 21. This can be discerned from the reading of Paras 297 to 307 of the judgment.
(b)         The Court is also of the opinion that the triple test laid down in order to adjudge the reasonableness of the invasion to privacy has been made. The Aadhaar scheme is backed by the statute, i.e. the Aadhaar Act. It also serves legitimate State aim, which can be discerned from the introduction to the Act as well as the Statement of Object and Reasons which reflect that the aim in passing the Act was to ensure that social benefit to ensure that social benefit schemes reach the deserving community. The Court noted that the failure to establish identity of an individual has proved to be a major hindrance for successful implementation of those programmes as it was becoming difficult to ensure that subsidies, benefits and services reach the unintended beneficiaries in the absence of a credible system to authenticate identity of beneficiaries. The Statement of Objects and Reasons also discloses that over a period of time, the use of Aadhaar number has been increased manifold and, therefore, it is also necessary to take measures relating to ensuring security of the information provided by the individuals while enrolling for Aadhaar card.
(c)           It may be highlighted that the petitioners are making their claim on the basis of dignity as a facet of right to privacy. On the other hand, Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act is aimed at offering subsidies, benefits or services to the marginalised section of the society for whom such welfare schemes have been formulated from time to time. That also becomes an aspect of social justice, which is the obligation of the State stipulated in para IV of the Constitution. The rationale behind Section 7 lies in ensuring targeted delivery of services, benefits and subsidies which are funded from the Consolidated Fund of India. In discharge of its solemn Constitutional obligation to enliven the Fundamental Rights of life and personal liberty (Article 21) to ensure Justice, Social, Political and Economic and to eliminate inequality (Article 14) with a view to ameliorate the lot of the poor and the Dalits, the Central Government has launched several welfare schemes. Some such schemes are PDS, scholarships, mid day meals, LPG subsidies, etc. These schemes involve 3% percentage of the GDP and involve a huge amount of public money. Right to receive these benefits, from the point of view of those who deserve the same, has now attained the status of fundamental right based on the same concept of human dignity, which the petitioners seek to bank upon. The Constitution does not exist for a few or minority of the people of India, but “We the people”. The goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution do not contemplate statism do not seek to preserve justice, liberty, equality and fraternity for those who have the means and opportunity to ensure the exercise of inalienable rights for themselves. These goals are predominantly or at least equally geared to “secure to all its citizens”, especially, to the downtrodden, poor and exploited, justice, liberty, equality and “to promote” fraternity assuring dignity. Interestingly, the State has come forward in recognising the rights of deprived section of the society to receive such benefits on the premise that it is their fundamental right to claim such benefits. It is acknowledged by the respondents that there is a paradigm shift in addressing the problem of security and eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. The shift is from the welfare approach to a right based approach. As a consequence, right of everyone to adequate food no more remains based on Directive Principles of State Policy (Art 47), though the said principles remain a source of inspiration . This entitlement has turned into a Constitutional fundamental right. This Constitutional obligation is reinforced by obligations under International Convention.
(d)         Even the petitioners did not seriously question the purpose and bona fides of the Legislature enacting the law.
(e)          The Court also finds that the Aadhaar Act meets the test of proportionality as the following components of proportionality stand satisfied:
(i)                         A measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage).
(ii)                      It must be a suitable means of furthering this goal (suitability or rationale connection stage)
(iii)                   There must not be any less restrictive but equally effective alternative (necessary stage).
(iv)                   The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage).
(f)            In the process, the Court has taken note of serious judgments pronounced by this Court pertaining to right to food, issuance of BPL Cards, LPG connections and LPG cylinders at minimal cost, old age and other kind of pensions to deserving persons, scholarships and implementation of MGNREGA scheme.
(g)          The purpose behind these orders was to ensure that the deserving beneficiaries of the scheme are correctly identified and are able to receive the benefits under the said scheme, which is their entitlement. The orders also aimed at ensuring ‘good governance’ by bringing accountability and transparency in the distribution system with the pious aim in mind, namely, benefits actually reached those who are rural, poor and starving.
(h)         All this satisfies the necessity stage test, particularly in the absence of any less restrictive but equally effective alternative.
(i)             Insofar as balancing is concerned, the matter is examined at two levels:
i)                 Whether ‘legitimate state interest’ ensures ‘reasonable tailoring’? There is a minimal intrusion into the privacy and the law is narrowly framed to achieve the objective. Here the Act is to be tested on the ground that whether it is found on a balancing test that the social or public interest and the reasonableness of the restrictions outweigh the particular aspect of privacy, as claimed by the petitioners. This is the test we have applied in the instant case.
ii)              There needs to be balancing of two competing fundamental rights, right to privacy on the one hand and right to food, shelter and employment on the other hand. Axiomatically both the rights are founded on human dignity. At the same time, in the given context, two facets are in conflict with each other. The question here would be, when a person seeks to get the benefits of welfare schemes to which she is entitled to as a part of right to live life with dignity, whether her sacrifice to the right to privacy, is so invasive that it creates imbalance?
(j)             In the process, sanctity of privacy in its functional relationship with dignity is kept in mind where it says that legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to public arena. Reasonable expectation of privacy is also taken into consideration. The Court finds that as the information collected at the time of enrolment as well as authentication is minimal, balancing at the first level is met. Insofar as second level, namely, balancing of two competing fundamental rights is concerned, namely, dignity in the form of autonomy (informational privacy) and dignity in the form of assuring better living standards of the same individual, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that balancing at the second level is also met. The detailed discussion in this behalf amply demonstrates that enrolment in Aadhaar of the unprivileged and marginalised section of the society, in order to avail the fruits of welfare schemes of the Government, actually amounts to empowering these persons. On the one hand, it gives such individuals their unique identity and, on the other hand, it also enables such individuals to avail the fruits of welfare schemes of the Government which are floated as socio-economic welfare measures to uplift such classes. In that sense, the scheme ensures dignity to such individuals. This facet of dignity cannot be lost sight of and needs to be acknowledged. We are, by no means, accepting that when dignity in the form of economic welfare is given, the State is entitled to rob that person of his liberty. That can never be allowed. We are concerned with the balancing of the two facets of dignity. Here we find that the inroads into the privacy rights where these individuals are made to part with their biometric information, is minimal. It is coupled with the fact that there is no data collection on the movements of such individuals, when they avail benefits under Section 7 of the Act thereby ruling out the possibility of creating their profiles. In fact, this technology becomes a vital tool of ensuring good governance in a social welfare state. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the Aadhaar Act meets the test of balancing as well.
(k)          Insofar as the argument based on probabilistic system of Aadhaar leading to ‘exclusion’ is concerned, the Authority has claimed that biometric accuracy is 99.76% and the petitioners have also proceeded on that basis. In this scenario, if the Aadhaar project is shelved, 99.76% beneficiaries are going to suffer. Would it not lead to their exclusion? It will amount to throwing the baby out of hot water along with the water. In the name of 0.232% failure (which can in any case be remedied) should be revert to the pre-Aadhaar stage with a system of leakages, pilferages and corruption in the implementation of welfare schemes meant for marginalised section of the society, the full fruits thereof were not reaching to such people?
(l)             The entire aim behind launching this programme is the ‘inclusion’ of the deserving persons who need to get such benefits. When it is serving much larger purpose by reaching hundreds of millions of deserving persons, it cannot be crucified on the unproven plea of exclusion of some. It is clarified that the Court is not trivialising the problem of exclusion if it is there. However, what we are emphasising is that remedy is to plug the loopholes rather than axe a project, aimed for the welfare of large section of the society. Obviously, in order to address the failures of authentication, the remedy is to adopt alternate methods for identifying such persons, after finding the causes of failure in their cases. We have chosen this path which leads to better equilibrium and have given necessary directions also in this behalf, viz:
i)                 We have taken on record the statement of the learned Attorney General that no deserving person would be denied the benefit of a scheme on the failure of authentication.
ii)              We are also conscious of the situation where the formation of fingerprints may undergo change for various reasons. It may happen in the case of a child after she grows up; it may happen in the case of an individual who gets old; it may also happen because of damage to the fingers as a result of accident or some disease etc. or because of suffering of some kind of disability for whatever reason. Even iris test can fail due to certain reasons including blindness of a person. We again emphasise that no person rightfully entitled to the benefits shall be denied the same on such grounds. It would be appropriate if a suitable provision be made in the concerned regulations for establishing an identity by alternate means in such situations.
(m)     As far as subsidies, services and benefits are concerned, their scope is not to be unduly expanded thereby widening the net of Aadhaar, where it is not permitted otherwise. In this respect, it is held as under:
i)                 ‘Benefits’ and ‘services’ as mentioned in Section 7 should be those which have the colour of some kind of subsidies etc., namely welfare schemes of the Government whereby Government is doling out such benefits which are targeted at a particular deprived class.
ii)              It would cover only those ‘benefits’ etc. the expenditure thereof has to be drawn from the Consolidated Fund of India.
iii)           On that basis, CBSE, NEET, JEE, UGC etc. cannot make the requirement of Aadhaar mandatory as they are outside the purview of Section 7 and are not backed by any law.
(3)    Whether children can be brought within the sweep of Sections 7 and 8 of the Aadhaar Act?
Answer
a)  For the enrolment of children under the Aadhaar Act, it would be essential to have the consent of their parents/guardian.
b) On attaining the age of majority, such children who are enrolled under Aadhaar with the consent of their parents, shall be given the option to exit from the Aadhaar project if they so choose in case they do not intend to avail the benefits of the scheme.
c) Insofar as the school admission of children is concerned, requirement of Aadhaar would not be compulsory as it is neither a service nor subsidy. Further, having regard to the fact that a child between the age of 6 to 14 years has the fundamental right to education under Article 21A of the Constitution, school admission cannot be treated as ‘benefit’ as well.
d) Benefits to children between 6 to 14 years under Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan, likewise, shall not require mandatory Aadhaar enrolment.
e) For availing the benefits of other welfare schemes which are covered by Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, though enrolment number can be insisted, it would be subject to the consent of the parents, as mentioned in (a) above.
f) We also clarify that no child shall be denied benefit of any of these schemes if, for some reasons, she is not able to produce the Aadhaar number and the benefit shall be given by verifying the identity on the basis of any other documents. This we say having regard to the statement which was made by Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India, at the Bar.
(4) Whether the following provisions of the Aadhaar Act and Regulations suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality:
       (i) Sections 2(c) and 2(d) read with Section 32
       (ii) Section 2(h) read with Section 10 of CIDR
       (iii) Section 2(l) read with Regulation 23
      (iv) Section 2(v)
       (v) Section 3
       (vi) Section 5
       (vii) Section 6
      (viii) Section 8
       (ix) Section 9
       (x) Sections 11 to 23
        (xi) Sections 23 and 54
        (xii) Section 23(2)(g) read with Chapter VI & VII – Regulations 27 to 32      
        (xiii) Section 29
        (xiv) Section 33
        (xv) Section 47
        (xvi) Section 48
        (xvii) Section 57
        (xviii) Section 59   
     Answer          
(a)          Section 2(d) which pertains to authentication records, such records would not include metadata as mentioned in Regulation 26(c) of the Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016. Therefore, this provision in the present form is struck down. Liberty, however, is given to reframe the regulation, keeping in view the parameters stated by the Court.
(b) Insofar as Section 2(b) is concerned, which defines ‘resident’, the apprehension expressed by the petitioners was that it should not lead to giving Aadhaar card to illegal immigrants. We direct the respondent to take suitable measures to ensure that illegal immigrants are not able to take such benefits. 
(c) Retention of data beyond the period of six months is impermissible. Therefore, Regulation 27 of Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016 which provides archiving data for a period of five years is struck down.
(d) Section 29 in fact imposes a restriction on sharing information and is, therefore, valid as it protects the interests of Aadhaar number holders. However, apprehension of the petitioners is that this provision entitles Government to share the information ‘for the purposes of, as may be specified by regulations’. The Aadhaar (Sharing of Information) Regulations, 2016, as of now, do not contain any such provision. If a provision is made in the regulations which impinges upon the privacy rights of the Aadhaar card holders that can always be challenged.
(e) Section 33(1) of the Act prohibits disclosure of information, including identity information or authentication records, except when it is by an order of a court not inferior to that of a District Judge. We have held that this provision is to be read down with the clarification that an individual, whose information is sought to be released, shall be afforded an opportunity of hearing. If such an order is passed, in that eventuality, he shall also have right to challenge such an order passed by approaching the higher court. During the hearing before the concerned court, the said individual can always object to the disclosure of information on accepted grounds in law, including Article 20(3) of the Constitution or the privacy rights etc.
(f) Insofar as Section 33(2) is concerned, it is held that disclosure of information in the interest of national security cannot be faulted with. However, for determination of such an eventuality, an officer higher than the rank of a Joint Secretary should be given such a power. Further, in order to avoid any possible misuse, a Judicial Officer (preferably a sitting High Court Judge) should also be associated with. We may point out that such provisions of application of judicial mind for arriving at the conclusion that disclosure of information is in the interest of national security, are prevalent in some jurisdictions. In view thereof, Section 33(2) of the Act in the present form is struck down with liberty to enact a suitable provision on the lines suggested above.
(g) Insofar as Section 47 of the Act which provides for the cognizance of offence only on a complaint made by the Authority or any officer or person authorised by it is concerned, it needs a suitable amendment to include the provision for filing of such a complaint by any individual/victim as well whose right is violated.
(h) Insofar as Section 57 in the present form is concerned, it is susceptible to misuse inasmuch as: (a) It can be used for establishing the identity of n individual ‘for any purpose’. We read down this provision to mean that such a purpose has to be backed by law. Further, whenever any such “law” is made, it would be subject to judicial scrutiny. (b) Such purpose is not limited pursuant to any law alone but can be done pursuant to ‘any contract to this effect’ as well. This is clearly impermissible as a contractual provision is not backed by a law and, therefore, first requirement of proportionality is not met. (c) Apart from authorising the State, even ‘any body corporate or person’ is authorised to avail authentication services which can be on the basis of purported agreement between an individual and such body corporate or person. Even if we presume that legislature did not intend so, the impact of the aforesaid features would be to enable commercial exploitation of an individual biometric and demographic information by the private entities. Thus, this part of the provision which enables body corporate and individuals also to seek authentication, that too on the basis of a contract between the individual and such body corporate or person, would impinge upon the right to privacy of such individuals. This part of the section, thus, is declared unconstitutional.
(i) Other provisions of Aadhaar Act are held to be valid, including Section 59 of the Act which, according to us, saves the pre-enactment period of Aadhaar project, i.e. from 2009-2016.
(5) Whether the Aadhaar Act  defies the concept of Limited Government, Good Governance and Constitutional Trust?
Answer:
     Aadhaar Act meets the concept of Limited Government, Good Governance and Constitutional Trust.
(6) Whether the Aadhaar Act could be passed as ‘Money Bill’ within the meaning of Article 110 of the Constitution?
Answer:
(a)          We do recognise the importance of Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in a bicameral system of the Parliament. The significance and relevance of the Upper House has been succinctly exemplified by this Court in Kuldip Nayar’s case. The Rajya Sabha, therefore, becomes an important institution signifying constitutional federalism. It is precisely for this reason that to enact any statute, the Bill has to be passed by both the Houses, namely, Lok Sabha as well as Rajya Sabha. It is the constitutional mandate. The only exception to the aforesaid Parliamentary norm is Article 110 of the Constitution of India. Having regard to this overall scheme of bicameralism enshrined in our Constitution, strict interpretation has to be accorded to Article 110. Keeping in view these principles, we have considered the arguments advanced by both the sides.
(b)         The petitioners accept that Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act has the elements of ‘Money Bill’. The attack is on the premise that some other provisions, namely, clause 23(2)(h), 54(2)(m) and 57 of the Bill (which corresponds to Sections 23(2)(h), 54(2)(m) and 57 of the Aadhaar Act) do not fall under any of the clauses of Article 110 of the Constitution and, therefore, Bill was not limited to only those subjects mentioned in Article 110. Insofar as Section 7 is concerned, it makes receipt of subsidy, benefit or service subject to establishing identity by the process of authentication under Aadhaar or furnish proof of Aadhaar etc. It is also very clearly declared in this provision that the expenditure incurred in respect of such a subsidy, benefit or service would be from the Consolidated Fund of India. It is also accepted by the petitioners that Section 7 is the main provision of the Act. In fact, introduction to the Act as well as Statement of Objects and Reasons very categorically record that the main purpose of Aadhaar Act is to ensure that such subsidies, benefits and services reach those categories of persons, for whom they are actually meant.
(c)           As all these three kinds of welfare measures are sought to be extended to the marginalised section of society, a collective reading thereof would show that the purpose is to expand the coverage of all kinds of aid, support, grant, advantage, relief provisions, facility, utility or assistance which may be extended with the support of the Consolidated Fund of India with the objective of targeted delivery. It is also clear that various schemes which can be contemplated by the aforesaid provisions, relate to vulnerable and weaker section of the society. Whether the social justice scheme would involve a subsidy or a benefit or a service is merely a matter of the nature and extent of assistance and would depend upon the economic capacity of the State. Even where the state subsidizes in part, whether in cash or kind, the objective of emancipation of the poor remains the goal.
(d)         The respondents are right in their submission that the expression subsidy, benefit or service ought to be understood in the context of targeted delivery to poorer and weaker sections of society. Its connotation ought not to be determined in the abstract. For as an abstraction one can visualize a subsidy being extended by Parliament to the King; by Government to the Corporations or Banks; etc. The nature of subsidy or benefit would not be the same when extended to the poor and downtrodden for producing those conditions without which they cannot live a life with dignity. That is the main function behind the Aadhaar Act and for this purpose, enrolment for Aadhaar number is prescribed in Chapter II which covers Sections 3 to 6. Residents are, thus, held entitled to obtain Aadhaar number. We may record here that such an enrolment is of voluntary nature. However, it becomes compulsory for those who seeks to receive any subsidy, benefit or service under the welfare scheme of the Government expenditure whereof is to be met from the Consolidated Fund of India. It follows that authentication under Section 7 would be required as a condition for receipt of a subsidy, benefit or service only when such a subsidy, benefit or service is taken care of by Consolidated Fund of India. Therefore, Section 7 is the core provision of the Aadhaar Act and this provision satisfies the conditions of Article 110 of the Constitution. Upto this stage, there is no quarrel between the parties.
(e)           On examining of the other provisions pointed out by the petitioners in an attempt to take it out of the purview of Money Bill, we are of the view that those provisions are incidental in nature which have been made in the proper working of the Act. In any case, a part of Section 57 has already been declared unconstitutional. We, thus, hold that the Aadhaar Act is validly passed as a ‘Money Bill’.
(7) Whether Section 139AA of the Income Tax, 1961 is violative of right to privacy and is, therefore, unconstitutional?
Answer:
      Validity of this provision was upheld in the case of Binoy Viswam by repelling the contentions based on Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The question of privacy which, at that time, was traced to Article 21, was left open. The matter is reexamined on the touchstone of principles laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy. The matter has also been examined keeping in view that manifest arbitrariness is also a ground of challenge to the legislative enactment. Even after judging the matter in the context of permissible limits for invasion of privacy, namely (i) the existence of a law; (ii) a ‘legitimate State interest’; and (iii) such law should pass the ‘test of proportionality’, we come to the conclusion that all these tests are satisfied. In fact, there is specific discussion on these aspects in Binoy Viswam’s case as well.
(8) Whether Rule 9 of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 and the notifications issued thereunder which mandates linking of Aadhaar with bank accounts is unconstitutional?
Answer:  
(a) We hold that the provision in the present form does not meet the test of proportionality and, therefore, violates the right to privacy of a person which extends to banking details.
(b) This linking is made compulsory not only for opening a new bank account but even for existing bank accounts with a stipulation that if the same is not done then the account would be deactivated, with the result that the holder of the account would not be entitled to operate the bank account till the time sending of the bank account with Aadhaar is done. This amounts to depriving a person of his property. We find that this move of mandatory linking of Aadhaar with bank account does not satisfy the test of proportionality. To recapitulate, the test of proportionality requires that a limitation of the fundamental rights must satisfy the following to be proportionate: (i) it is designated for a proper purpose; (ii) measures are undertaken to effectuate the limitation are rationally connected to the fulfillment of the purpose; (iii) there are no alternative less invasive measures; and (iv) there is a proper relation between the importance of achieving the aim and the importance of limiting the right.
(c) The Rules are held to be disproportionate for the reasons stated in the main body of this Judgment.
(9) Whether Circular dated March 23, 2017 issued by the Department of Telecommunications mandating linking of mobile number with Aadhaar is illegal and unconstitutional?
Answer:
Circular dated March 23, 2019 mandating linking of mobile number with Aadhaar is held to be illegal and unconstitutional as it is not backed by any law and is hereby quashed.
(10) Whether certain actions of the respondents are in contravention of the interim orders passed by the Court, if so the effect thereof?
Answer:          
This question is answered in the negative.
                                   Having dwelt in detail on this landmark judgment, it must be revealed here that all major political parties have welcomed this landmark judgment including BJP and Congress! The Supreme Court has declared the Centre’s flagship Aadhaar scheme constitutionally valid but has also simultaneously struck down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, which allows not only the state, but also any “body, corporate or person” or private entity to demand an Aadhaar. Congress said that, “We welcome the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act. Private entities are no longer allowed to use Aadhaar for verification purposes.” Supreme Court advocate Prashant Bhushan said that, “The apex court in its verdict struck down a few portions and read down others in the Aadhaar Act. It did not call it unconstitutional, but said it is needed for getting subsidies in government schemes.” We have thus seen how the Apex Court has declared the Centre’s flagship Aadhaar scheme as constitutionally valid but struck down some of its provisions including its linking with bank accounts, mobile phones and school admissions. Rahul Rai, Director of Delhi-based NGO, Indian Institute of Human Rights, said that it was a balanced judgment. He said that, “The controversy over the Aadhaar has been going for a long time, and it had to be laid to rest some day. So, I am glad it has been in the apex court verdict. Also, it is heartening to learn that in the judgment, it has been spelt out that private companies cannot insist on having an Aadhaar, be it banking or telecom services.” Justices DY Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan who were also part of the Bench that delivered this landmark judgment wrote their individual opinions. While Justice Bhushan by and large agreed with the majority opinion but Justice Chandrachud differed strongly and said the Aadhaar Act could not have been passed as Money Bill as it amounted to a fraud on the Constitution. He said that bypassing the Rajya Sabha to pass the Act amounted to subterfuge and is liable to be struck down as violative of Article 110 of the Constitution. Noting that mobile has beome an important feature of life and its seeding with Aadhaar posed a grave threat to privacy, liberty, autonomy, Justice Chandrachud favoured deletion of consumers Aadhaar data by the mobile service providers. Activist Ranjana Kumari claimed that after this judgment, people will be “less suspicious” about getting their privacy violated! UIDAI  while welcoming ‘the historical and landmark majority judgment’ said that, “It has been established by the judgment that Aadhaar is not for the state surveillance as profiling is not possible using the minimal data that Aadhaar has. There are sufficient safeguards to disallow any abuse. Aadhaar Act has withstood the judicial scrutiny and the purpose of the Act is legitimate.” Finance Minister Arun Jaitley while hailing this landmark verdict as “historic” said that the opposition Congress has cut a very sorry figure after the Apex Court upheld the core of national biometric ID programme, which has helped save Rs 90,000 crore every year by plugging leakages in welfare schemes. Very rightly said!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkehra,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.  

Now Bar Council ID Card Is Valid Identity Proof For Train Journey As Railway Issues Circular Following Landmark Kerala HC Judgment

To begin with, it has to be appreciated and applauded in the right earnest that in a latest landmark judgment in W.P.(C) No. 35073 of 2014 delivered recently on August 8, the High Court of Kerala has in a historic move directed the Indian Railways to treat identity cards issued to lawyers by respective Bar Councils as a valid identity proof to undertake a train journey/travel. The court also asked the authorities concerned in the railways to issue appropriate orders notifying the above as expeditiously as possible. The railways have done accordingly by issuing a Circular and from now onwards the Bar Council ID Card is valid proof of identity for train journey as railways issues circular following landmark Kerala High Court judgment.Image result for id for train
                                        To be sure, the Circular issued by Joint Director Passenger Marketing of Railway Board following the judgment states that, “In pursuance of the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in W.P. (C) No. 35703 of 2014 the matter has been examined and it has been decided that photo identity cards with serial number issued to Advocates by Bar Councils of India may also be accepted as proof of identity of passengers for undertaking journey by train”. The Circular instructs Principal Chief Commercial Managers of all Zonal Railways to issue necessary instructions to all concerned to avoid inconvenience to passengers. It also directs the Zonal Managers to give wide publicity through all possible means to the revised instructions for the information of general public.
                                     Be it noted, this landmark and laudable judgment by Kerala High Court begins by pointing out that, “The petitioner, who is stated to be a practising Advocate on the Rolls of the Bar Council of Kerala, remonstratively accuses the Indian Railways of acting unfairly and discriminatorily in refusing to recognize and accept the photo identity cards issued by the Bar Council of Kerala as also that of the other States, as a valid proof of identity to undertake journey on trains in reserved seats.”
                     On the face of it, para 3 states explicitly that, “The singular grievance impelled by the petitioner in this writ petition is that even though several types and categories of identity cards are accepted by the Indian Railways, the photo identity cards issued by the various Bar Councils in India are expressly excluded. This, the petitioner predicates, is unfair and arbitrary, particularly because the said identity cards are issued by the various Bar Councils acting under the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961.” Absolutely right! Who can deny or dispute it?
                                 To put things in perspective, on August 8, the Kerala High Court through a landmark judgment of Justice Devan Ramachandran directed the Railways to accept ID cards issued by Bar Councils as valid proof as they are statutory bodies under the Advocates Act. The order was made in this case where the request to consider the lawyer identity cards were rejected by the Indian Railways stating that Bar Councils were not government bodies, and further they are available at different levels in the country (district, state, national) and hence in the absence of any uniformity in the cards issued by such bodies, the same ought not to be considered as valid and acceptable.
                                      Needless to say, para 10 points out that, “After Sri. C.S. Dias and Sri. Manayani made their submissions as above, I elicited the specific views of the Kerala Bar Council through their Senior Counsel Sri. Gracious Kuriakose and the learned senior counsel informs me that it is the unequivocal and firm stand of the Bar Council of Kerala that the identity cards issued by them be accepted by all Authorities, including the Indian Railways and that they are always willing to offer verification of such cards as and when it is so required by any Authority, including the Railways.”
                                     As it turned out, while disapproving the stand of Railways, Justice Devan Ramachandran then held in para 11 that, “ Once I hear the submissions of Sri. Gracious Kuriakose, the learned senior counsel as afore, it becomes ineluctable that there cannot be any further cause or concern for the Indian Railways, in accepting the photo identity cards issued by the various Bar Councils, since the respective Councils are obligated to verify and affirm the authenticity of a card issued by them, in case its genuineness is suspected for any reason by the competent Authorities of the Indian Railways. This is more so because they are statutory bodies, operating under the ambit of the Advocates Act, thus enjoining them to ensure the validity and rectitude of the cards and documents issued by them, if it is so required by any Authority, in terms of law.” It was also held that the notion of different level of Bar Councils was incorrect, there being only one respective Bar Council for a state and a Bar Council of India at the national level. The Court therefore asked the authority concerned in the railways to issue appropriate orders notifying the above as expeditiously as possible.
                                           It cannot be lost on us that para 12 then stipulates that, “In the above perspective and being guided by the specific averments in para 7 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Indian Railways, wherein they say that they will accept the identity card issued by the various Bar Councils if they undertake to verify its genuineness in case suspicions are raised on the authenticity of the cards, I order this writ petition and direct the competent Authority of the Indian Railways to issue appropriate proceedings/orders notifying the acceptance of the identity cards issued to Advocates by the Kerala Bar Council and all other Bar Councils in India as valid proof of identity for train journey/travel.”
                                     Finally and most importantly, para 13 then enunciates that, “This exercise shall be completed by the competent amongst the respondents 1, 5 and 6 as expeditiously as is possible, but not later than 2 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and the consequential orders shall be notified and published as per application procedure. This writ petition is thus ordered.”
                                All said and done, it is most heartening and refreshing to see that this landmark and laudable judgment delivered by the Kerala High Court through Justice Devan Ramachandran directing the Indian Railways to treat identity cards issued to lawyers by respective Bar Councils as a valid identity proof to undertake a train travel has now finally been implemented by the Railways by issuing the requisite Circular in this regard! This should have been there right from the start but better to be late than never! No doubt, full credit and full marks for this certainly goes to the Kerala High Court which has conveyed a loud and clear message to one and all that just like other identity cards, the identity cards issued to lawyers are also reliable identity proof and can be relied upon at any given point of time!    
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.
  

SC Sets Deadline On Sale Of BS-IV Vehicles; Says Health Of TeemingMillions Will Have To Take Precedence Over Greed Of A Few Auto Makers

It has to be stated right at the outset that in a landmark and laudable judgment titled MC Mehta v Union of India & Ors (In Re: Recommendation Nos. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of Report Nos. 71 and 78 submitted by EPCA) in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 13029 of 1985 authored by Justice Deepak Gupta for a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice Gupta himself, Justice Madan B Lokur and Justice S Abdul Nazeer while holding clearly and convincingly that Bharat Stage IV-compliant vehicles should not be permitted to be sold in India after 31.03.2020 has commendably and categorically observed that health of the teeming millions of this country will have to take precedence over the greed of a few automobile manufacturers. It was rightly held that, “Even a day’s delay in enforcing BS-VI norms is going to harm the health of the people.” It is bound to have far reaching and significant consequences which shall directly impact each and every citizen of India!
                           To begin with, para 1 of this landmark judgment sets the ball rolling by first and foremost pointing out that, “The seminal issue to be decided is whether Bharat Stage IV (for short BS-IV) compliant vehicles should be permitted to be sold in India after 31.03.2020.” Para 2 then points out that, “In an earlier judgment dated 13.04.2017, we have given detailed reasons for the order dated 29.03.2017 whereby this Court had directed that on and from 01.04.2017, vehicles which are not BS-IV compliant, shall not be sold by any manufacturer or dealer or motor vehicle company whether such vehicle is a two wheeler, three wheeler, four wheeler or commercial vehicle etc. We had also by the said order prohibited registration of non-BS-IV vehicles from 01.04.2017 except if such vehicles were sold on or before 31.03.2017. Since in the judgment dated 13.04.2017, we have set out in detail the history leading to implementation of the Bharat stage compliant fuels, it is not necessary to repeat the same here. However, a short recap of the same would be apposite to understand the issues in hand.”
                                       To recapitulate, it is then pointed out in para 3 that, “In 2003, the Government of India announced the National Auto Policy based on the recommendations of the Mashelkar Committee constituted in 2001. BS-IV compliant vehicles were made compulsory for four wheelers in different parts of the country on different dates starting from 01.04.2005, from which date registration of only BS-IV compliant vehicles were permitted in the metropolises of Delhi, Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Mumbai, Pune and Kolkata. Thereafter, it was made compulsory to have BS-IV compliant vehicles in some other cities from 01.04.2010. More cities were added on 21.05.2010 and on 14.07.2015. Finally, by amendment dated 19.08.2015 it was mandated that BS-IV norms would come into force throughout the country w.e.f. 01.04.2017.”
                                        Going forward, it is then pointed in para 4 that, “As far as two and three wheelers are concerned, they were made subject to BS-III norms on and with effect from 01.04.2010 by insertion of sub-rule 16 in Rule 115 of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’. With effect from 04.07.2014, it was mandated that on and from 01.04.2016 all two wheeler vehicles will comply with BS-IV emission norms and all existing models will shift to BS-IV emission norms from 01.04.2017. Similarly, Rule 17 was inserted in Rule 115 of the Rules on 12.06.2015 in respect of three wheelers wherein BS-IV standard would be applicable to new models on or after 01.04.2016. Resultantly, only those vehicles which were BS-IV compliant would be sold after 01.04.2017.”
                                         Not stopping here, para 5 then envisages that, “An issue was raised by the manufacturers of motor vehicles that they should be given reasonable and sufficient time for sale of stocks of those vehicles which are not BS-IV compliant vehicles but manufactured up to 31.03.2017. This Court did not accept the submission of the manufacturers and issued the direction referred to hereinabove. It would be interesting to note that though some of the manufacturers of two wheelers and three wheelers took a stand before this Court that great technological changes are required to make the vehicles BS-IV compliant, one of the largest manufacturers of two wheelers and three wheelers in India i.e. Bajaj Auto, filed an application in this Court praying that it was already manufacturing BS-IV compliant vehicles not complying to BS-IV norms should not be registered after 2017.”
                                        Needless to say, it is then pointed out in para 6 that, “The issue before us is somewhat similar. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel and Mr. Sandeep Narain, learned counsel appearing for the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (for short ‘SIAM’) have submitted that though they are not averse to manufacturing BS-VI compliant vehicles, they should be given some time to sell the stocks of non BS-VI compliant vehicles manufactured upto 31.03.2020. In this regard, they have made reference to the notification dated 20.02.2018 whereby sub-rule 21 has been inserted in Rule 115 of the Rules, which reads as follows:
     “In the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, in rule 115 after sub-rule (20), the following sub-rule shall be inserted namely:-
       “(21) New motor vehicles conforming to Emission Standard Bharat Stage-IV, manufactured before the 1st April 2020 shall not be registered after the 30th June, 2020:
        Provided that the new motor vehicles of categories M and N conforming to Emission Standard Bharat Stage-IV manufactured before the 1st April, 2020 and sold in the form of drive away chassis, shall not be registered after the 30th September, 2020.”
                                         To be sure, para 7 then says “It is submitted that the Government of India while balancing the need for a cleaner environment with the practical difficulties faced by the manufacturers has given a three months’ window to the automobile manufacturers to dispose of the vehicles conforming to BS-IV norms. In respect of certain categories of commercial vehicles in which only a chassis is sold and a body has to be built thereupon, the period of registration has been extended up to 30.09.2020.”
                               As things stand, para 8 then goes on to elaborate saying that, “It has been contended on behalf of SIAM that in Europe the normal practice is that about one year’s time is given to the manufacturers of vehicles when a higher quality of fuel is introduced and the fuel is introduced much earlier and thereafter an outer limit is fixed for sale of compliant vehicles. According to SIAM, BS-VI fuel will be available in the entire country only with effect from 01.04.2020. Therefore, it is not feasible for the manufacturers to switch over to BS-VI compliant vehicles overnight. They have to be given some reasonable time for sale of the accumulated stocks of non-BS-VI (i.e. BS-IV) compliant vehicles. It is further submitted that six to nine months’ time is required to shift the assembly line to make BS-VI compliant vehicles and if the request of the manufacturers is not accepted, they will have to start manufacturing BS-VI compliant vehicles well before 31.03.2020 and at least three to six months prior to the said date. It has also been contended that earlier BS-VI fuel was to be introduced with effect from 01.04.2024, which was pre-poned to 01.04.2023 and it was then pre-poned to 01.04.2021 and finally the date was advanced to 01.04.2020. It was decided to leapfrog from BS-IV fuel to BS-VI fuel without shifting to BS-V fuel. According to SIAM, this is creating a lot of difficulties for the manufacturers.”
                                       It is then brought out in para 9 that, “Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for one of the manufacturers, submits that his clients are already manufacturing vehicles which are both BS-IV and BS-VI fuel compliant and they are on the road already. Mr. A.N.S. Nadkarni, learned Additional Solicitor General submits that keeping in view the difficulties faced by the manufacturers and balancing the need to have a cleaner environment, three months period given to the manufacturers is reasonable. He also urges that the Rules have not been challenged by any party and, therefore, this Court should not go into the validity of the Rules.”    
                                    Delving deeper, para 10 then brings out that, “On the other hand, Ms. Aparajita Singh, learned amicus curiae, has made a passionate plea that no non-BS-VI compliant vehicle should be permitted to be sold in the entire country after 01.04.2020. She has drawn our attention to the Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee (for short ‘the Committee’) dated 07.08.2018. This Report mainly deals with National Capital Region (NCR) of Delhi but there are some references to the entire country. Some of the observations made by the Committee need to be considered and taken note of. The Committee in Para 5.15 notes that the problem of air pollution is affecting all human beings and any leniency on the part of the Government in tackling it will have a cascading effect on the health of the citizens. These observations have been made with specific reference to vehicular pollution and the need to ensure compliance of BS-VI norms with effect from 01.04.2020. There can be no two views that air pollution is hazardous to health. We may, also take note of certain observations of the Report of the Committee which show that one out of three children in Delhi suffers from respiratory problems. This is almost twice as high as compared to the city of Kolkata or rural areas. We may note that the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) database of more than 4,300 cities showed Indian cities of Gwalior, Allahabad, Raipur, Delhi, Ludhiana, Khanna, Varanasi and Patna as being among the most polluted in the world. (“World’s Most Polluted Cities”, World Economic Forum, 03.05.2018) Our attention has been drawn to various other documents which clearly show the deleterious effects of pollution on health. The hazards of pollution and its ill effect on the health of the citizens especially children are not limited to the city of Delhi or the NCR of Delhi but affects all the citizens of the country.”
                               Elaborating further on the efforts made, it is then explained in para 11 that, “The Union Government has spent about Rs 30,000 crores to manufacture BS-IV compliant fuel. We have been informed that another Rs 30,000/- crores of the taxpayers’ money have been expended by the Union to ensure that the fuel available in the country is BS-VI compliant. It is heartening to note that the Union, being concerned with the health of the citizens and also taking note of the urgent need for a clean environment, has taken steps to manufacture cleaner fuel. This fuel has already been made available in the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi from 01.04.2018 and we have been informed that barring a few places, it shall be available in the entire NCR from 01.04.2019. It will probably be available in many parts of the country prior to 01.04.2020 and the entire country will shift to BS-VI fuel from 01.04.2020. Obviously, the manufacture of clean fuel is being done in a phased manner because all the refineries cannot simultaneously start manufacturing clean fuel. It is not as if on 01.04.2020 just by waving a magic wand the entire country will change to BS-VI compliant norms. If all the refineries and manufacturers by taking note of the requirement to bring in BS-VI fuel, have introduced such fuel from 2018 and are introducing it in a phased manner in the entire country by 31.03.2020, we see no reason why manufacturers of automobiles, two wheelers, three wheelers etc. cannot also do so.”
                    While punching holes in the lame arguments forwarded by SIAM, para 12 then notes that, “We may note that whereas in this Court SIAM has been canvassing that the shift to BS-VI compliant vehicles is a long drawn out process requiring huge changes in technology, the very same manufacturers are selling and exporting BS-VI compliant vehicles to Europe and other countries. With regard to two wheelers it has been specifically urged that the technological changes are immense. To counter this argument the learned amicus curiae has drawn our attention to a Press Release issued by M/s. Hero MotoCorp., which is one of the largest motor manufacturers of two wheelers in the country. In this Press Release issued in July 2017 it has been stated that M/s. Hero MotoCorp. has begun developing BS-VI compliant models and it aims to introduce such products much before the timeline of 2020. The company has also stated that it will manufacture only BS-VI fuel compliant vehicles well before the date stipulated by the authorities. If one manufacturer can do this, we see no reason why other manufacturers of two wheelers cannot do so.” Very rightly so! It is most shameful to note that SIAM cites hundred lame excuses for not shifting to BS-VI compliant vehicles in India while simultaneously and most shamelessly selling and exporting BS-VI compliant vehicles to Europe and other countries! Even the Apex Court has noted this with utmost dismay! The Apex Court also rightly cites that when M/s Hero MotoCorp. has already started developing BS-VI compliant models then why can’t others do?   
                                    As it turned out, it is then observed in para 13 that, “With regard to trucks and buses, from a news item published in the Financial Express dated 06.07.2018, it is apparent that Eicher is already manufacturing trucks and buses which are not only BS-VI compliant but BS-VI CNG compliant. Another manufacturer of heavy vehicles i.e. Ashok Leyland had, in August 2018 through its subsidiary Optare obtained an order to manufacture the world’s first electric double decker buses. The technology needed to manufacture such electric buses is much more advanced and difficult as compared to the technological changes required to manufacture petrol and diesel vehicles which are BS-VI compliant. Similarly, TVS Motors on 07.08.2018 has issued a press note that it will be manufacturing BS-VI compliant vehicles much ahead of the deadline of 2020. Many members of SIAM in the Auto Expo held in February, 2018 have exhibited vehicles which are technologically much more advanced than BS-VI compliant vehicles. These manufacturers have not only asserted that they can manufacture electric vehicles but also asserted that they are developing hydrogen cell fuel vehicles along with hybrid, electric and CNG vehicles.”
                                         It is then clarified in para 14 that, “We have mentioned these facts only to highlight that some of the manufacturers are not willing to comply with the 31.03.2020 deadline not because they do not have the technology but because the use of technology will lead to increase in the cost of the vehicles which may lead to reduction in sales of the vehicles and ultimately their profit.” It is then rightly underscored in this same para that, “There can be no compromise with the health of the citizens and if one has to choose between health and wealth, keeping in view the expanded scope of Article 21 of the Constitution, health of the teeming millions of this country will have to take precedence over the greed of a few automobile manufacturers. The automobile manufacturers must behave responsibly. We expected that keeping in view our earlier order, they would have themselves volunteered to be BS-VI compliant by 31.03.2020. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with some of the manufacturers and they want to stretch on the timeline by a few days or months for no other reason but to make a little more money.”
                   Interestingly enough, it is then pointed out in para 15 that, “When we compare BS-VI fuel with BS-IV fuel, there is a massive improvement in environmental terms. Once BS-VI emission norms are enforced, there will be a 68% improvement in PM2.5. This is not a small change. It is a vast improvement and the faster it is brought, the better it is. The amicus curiae has strenuously urged that, at least, in the NCR of Delhi, the BS-VI norms be applied for sale of vehicles from 01.04.2020. We feel that it may not be practical to introduce BS-VI compliant vehicles region-wise or city-wise. In our view, the BS-IV experiment in this regard was not very successful. BS-VI compliant vehicles are going to be more expensive than BS-IV compliant vehicles. People have a tendency to buy cheaper vehicle(s) even from a neighbouring city. We also strongly feel that the problem of pollution is not limited to the NCR of Delhi but it is a problem which has engulfed the entire country especially the major cities. India has the dubious distinction of having 15 out of the 20 most polluted cities in the world. The pollution in Gwalior, Raipur and Allahabad is worse than Delhi. The situation is alarming and critical. It brooks no delay.”
                               Simply put, para 16 then enumerates various landmark delivered by the Apex Court from time to time. It stipulates that, “It is an established principle of law that the right to life, as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes the right to a decent environment (Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame AIR 1990 SC 630; (1990) 1 SCC 520). It includes within its ambit the right of a citizen to live in a clean environment (Bhavani River-Sakthi Sugars Ltd., In re, (1998) 2 SCC 601). With regard to vehicular traffic, this Court has issued a number of directions to ensure a clean environment and reduce pollution (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1998) 6 SCC 60, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1998) 6 SCC 63, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Matter regarding emission standard for vehicles), (1999) 6 SCC 12, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2002) 10 SCC 191, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2017 SCC Online SC 394). It has been held that the right to clean environment is a fundamental right (N.D. Jayal v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 362). The right to live in an environment free from smoke and pollution follows from the “quality” of life which is an inherent part of Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to live with human dignity becomes illusory in the absence of a healthy environment (Shantistar Builders vs Narayan Khimalal Gotame & Ors. Etc. AIR 1990 SC 630, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2004) 12 SCC 118, State of M.P. v Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 389). The right to life not only means leading a life with dignity but includes within its ambit the right to lead a healthy, robust life in a clean atmosphere free from pollution. Obviously, such rights are not absolute and have to co-exist with sustainable development. Therefore, if there is a conflict between health and wealth, obviously, health will have to be given precedence. When we are concerned with the health of not one citizen but the entire citizenry including the future citizens of the country, the larger public interest has to outweigh the much smaller pecuniary interest of the industry. In this case the automobile industry, especially when the entire wherewithal to introduce the cleaner technology exists.”
                                 In hindsight, it is then observed in para 17 that, “It is therefore necessary to ensure that BS-VI compliance is uniform throughout the country so that even those areas of the country which fortunately have not suffered the ills of extreme pollution are safe in the future. The sale of automobiles and other vehicles is rising exponentially and the number of vehicles on the road is increasing day by day. Therefore, even a day’s delay in enforcing BS-VI norms is going to harm the health of the people. We are dealing here with a situation where children and unborn children suffer from pollution and issues of intergenerational equity are involved. Do we as a society or as manufacturers of automobiles have a right to manufacture more polluting vehicles when we have the technology to manufacture less polluting vehicles? The answer is obviously a big NO. If we were to factor only economics even then it makes no economic sense to have more polluting vehicles on the roads. The effect of pollution on the environment and health is so huge that it cannot be compensated in the marginal extra profits that the manufacturers might make. The amount spent on countering the ills of pollution such as polluted air, damaged lungs and the cost of healthcare far outweigh the profits earned.”
                                     Truth be told, para 18 then observes that, “It was urged on behalf of the manufacturers that there are multiple sources of pollution and vehicles only contribute to 2% of the pollution. We are not in agreement with this submission because the Report of the Committee to which we have adverted hereinabove states that contribution of vehicles to ambient PM2.5 concentration during winter season is 25% and in the summer season it contributes 9%. Even if we were to accept the figures submitted by SIAM, we are of the view that no step is too small when it comes to fighting pollution. Small steps to reduce pollution when taken together will lead to large scale reduction in pollution which will result in much cleaner air, which eventually will result in a cleaner and better environment, healthier citizens and most importantly a healthier generation to come.” We all must adhere to what the Supreme Court has said! Ultimately, it is we and the coming generation who will gain the most if we abide by the landmark judgment delivered in this case!
                                    It cannot be lost on us what the Apex Court has said in para 19 of this landmark judgment. It is held that, “In view of the fact that these proceedings have been pending in court for a long time and also in view of the fact that it is because of orders of this Court that BS-IV and now BS-VI norms have been introduced from the dates which were not even thought of by the Government, we feel that we have to take suo moto  notice of the Rules. At the outset, we may notice that sub-rule 21 of Rule 115 is very vague. It does not talk of sale of vehicles. It only mentions registration of vehicles and permits registration of vehicles conforming to BS-VI norms up to 30.06.2020 and in case of categories M&N, up to 30.09.2020. This rule, in our view, is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution in as much as it extends time for registration of vehicles beyond 31.03.2020 and must be accordingly read down. Any extension of time in introducing the new norms which is not absolutely necessary adversely impacts the health of the citizens and is, therefore, violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Rule goes against the spirit of all the orders passed earlier by this Court. In the month of March, 2017 we were dealing with a situation when BS-VI norms were to be made effective throughout the country with effect from 01.04.2020 and this Court had directed that non-BS-IV compliant vehicles shall not be registered on or after 01.04.2017. The situation in the present case is totally different. 31.03.2020 is almost 1½ years away. There is sufficient time for the manufacturers to change over to the new system and, therefore, we see no reason why they should be given a window of three or six months for sale of accumulated vehicles. Every vehicle sold after the cut-off date of 01.04.2020 is bound to cause more pollution and, therefore, the manufacturers, in our considered view, cannot be permitted to sell any non-BS-VI compliant vehicle on or after 01.04.2020. On the one hand, the Government has been pro-active in spending huge amounts of money to move to the BS-VI technology, but on the other hand, the automobile industry is coming up with a variety of untenable excuses just to delay the introduction of BS-VI compliant vehicles by a few months. We, in our judgment dated 13.04.2017, had clearly held “when the health of millions of our countrymen is involved, notification relating to commercial activities ought not to be interpreted in a literal manner.” We have to give a purposive interpretation to notifications specially those dealing with public health issues and even more so, when health not only of the citizens at present but also the citizens in the future is involved. There is more than sufficient time for the manufacturers to manufacture BS-VI compliant vehicles. They already have the technology to do so. The automobile industry must show the will, responsibility and urgency in this regard.”
                                 Having said this, it must be noted now what para 20 says. It states that, “The Government has developed a policy of phasing out polluting vehicles and discouraging the manufacturers of polluting vehicles. This has been done in a gradual manner. Europe introduced Euro-IV fuel in the year 2009 and Euro-VI standards in 2015. We are already many years behind them. We cannot afford to fall back further even by a single day. The need of the hour is to move to a cleaner fuel as early as possible.”
                                          Finally and far more importantly, para 21 which is the concluding para concludes by saying that, “Therefore, in exercise of the power vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, we read down sub-rule 21 of Rule 115 and direct that sub-rule 21 of Rule 115 shall be interpreted and understood to read that no motor vehicle conforming to the emission standard Bharat Stage-IV shall be sold or registered in the entire country with effect from 01.04.2020.”
                                         All said and done, it is a landmark and laudable judgment which must be earnestly implemented in letter and spirit. We all are directly and deeply impacted by the impact of increasing pollution. We are already behind European and other countries as has been noted by Apex Court also. So, it brooks no more delay! The Apex Court stands fully justified in setting a deadline on sale of BS-IV vehicles and it also very rightly observed that health of teeming millions will have to take precedence over greed of a few auto makers!  
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

SC Refuses Complete Ban On Sale of Firecrackers; Online Sale Banned; Duration For Bursting Crackers Fixed

It has to be exclaimed with exuberance right at the outset that in a landmark judgment titled Arjun Gopal and others v Union of India and others in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 728 of 2015 with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 891 of 2016, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 895 of 2016, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 899 of 2016  and Writ Petition (Civil) No. 213 of 2017 delivered on October 23, 2018, the Supreme Court has passed a string of landmark directions which are certainly laudable and deserves to be implemented in totality. This landmark judgment was authored by Justice AK Sikri for himself and Justice Ashok Bhushan. No doubt, this landmark judgment will go a long way in ensuring that the environment is not slaughtered mercilessly by polluting it mercilessly!
                             Needless to say, this landmark judgment gets going by first and foremost pointing out that, “Writ Petition (Civil) No. 728 of 2015 was filed on September 24, 2015 on behalf of three infants, who are made petitioners in this writ petition. Petitioner No. 1 and 2, on the date of filing of this writ petition were six months old and petitioner No. 3 was fourteen months old. This petition has been filed through their next friends, i.e. their fathers, who are concerned about the health of their children as they feel that due to the alarming degradation of the air quality, leading to severe air pollution in the city of Delhi (where these petitioners reside), the petitioners may encounter various health hazards. Poor, very poor or severe air quality/air pollution affects all citizens, irrespective of their age. However, claim the petitioners, children are much more vulnerable to air pollutants as exposure thereto may affect them in various ways, including aggravation of asthma, coughing, bronchitis, retarded nervous system breakdown and even cognitive impairment. The petition accepts that there are number of reasons which have contributed to poor air quality in Delhi and National Capital Region (for short, ‘NCR’). At the same time, it is emphasised that air pollution hits its nadir during Diwali time because of indiscriminate use of firecrackers, the chemical composition whereof increases harmful particulate matters such as PM2.5 or PM10 at alarming level thereby bringing the situation of ‘emergency’. The petitioners have, thus, prayed for direction to the official respondents to take possible measures for checking the pollution by striking at the causes of the pollution, which includes seasonal crop burning, indiscriminate dumping of dust/malba and other pollutants, etc. The prayer also includes banning the use, in any form, of firecrackers, sparkles and minor explosives, in any form, during festivals or otherwise.”
                                             Simply put, we thus see here that the petitioner makes a strong case for banning the use in any form of firecrackers, sparkles and explosives, in any form, during festivals or otherwise as it has a very deleterious impact on the health of people especially children. It may be noted that the Bench of Justices AK Sikri and Ashok Bhushan had reserved its verdict on August 28 on the PILs filed by kid petitioners – Arjun Gopal, Aarav Bhandari and Zoya Rao Bhasin who were all aged between three and four years. Their lawyer Gopal Sankaranarayanan had sought a complete ban on sale, purchase and transportation of crackers.
                                      Truth be told, para 23 minces no words in stating clearly and convincingly that, “It can be discerned from the above that the air quality had worsened during Diwali. There were more patients with symptoms of eye, increased coughing and patients with high metal levels in urine. Even noise level had increased. These are the adverse impacts of firecracker bursting, though the study mentions that statistically it was not a significant increase.”
                                      To put things in perspective, para 42 then spells out quite clearly and categorically that, “We are of the opinion that the aforesaid suggestions strive a nice balance between the two competing interests. We accept the aforesaid measures as suggested by the Union of India and direct the Union of India and other concerned authorities to implement the same with immediate effect. In view thereof, following specific directions are issued:
(i)                         The crackers with reduced emission (improved crackers) and green crackers, as mentioned in Suggestion Nos. II and III above only would be permitted to be manufactured and sold.
(ii)                      As a consequence, production and sale of crackers other than those mentioned in Suggestion Nos. II and III is hereby banned.
(iii)                   The manufacture, sale and use of joined firecrackers (series crackers or laris) is hereby banned as the same causes huge air, noise and solid waste problems.
(iv)                   The sale shall only be through licensed traders and it shall be ensured that these licensed traders are selling those firecrackers which are permitted by this order.
(v)                      No e-commerce websites, including Flipkart, Amazon etc., shall accept any online orders and affect online sales. Any such e-commerce companies found selling crackers online will be hauled up for contempt of court and the court may also pass, in that eventuality, orders of monetary penalties as well.
(vi)                   Barium salts in the fireworks is also hereby banned.
(vii)                PESO is directed to review the clinical composition of fireworks, particularly reducing Aluminium content, and shall submit its report in respect thereof within a period of two weeks from today. For undertaking this exercise, PESO would also associate FRDC.
(viii)             Even those crackers which have already been produced and they do not fulfill the conditions mentioned in Suggestion Nos. II and III above will not be allowed to be sold in Delhi and NCR.
(ix)                   PESO will ensure fireworks with permitted chemicals only to be purchased/possessed/sold/used during Diwali and all other religious festivals, of any religion whatsoever, and other occasions like marriages, etc. It shall test and check for the presence of banned chemicals like Lithium/Arsenic/Antimony/Lead/Mercury.
(x)                      PESO will ensure suspension of the licenses of manufacture of such fireworks items and appropriate disposal of such stock.
(xi)                   PESO will ensure that only those crackers whose decibel (sound) level are within the limits are allowed in the market and will ensure to take action by suspending the licenses of the manufacturers on such violations and disposal of such lots. To add to it, as mentioned in the order dated September 12, 2017, the directions issued and restrictions imposed in the order passed by this Court on July 18, 2005 in Noise Pollution (V) shall continue to be in force.
(xii)                Direction Nos. 4 to 9 and 11 contained in the order dated September 12, 2017 shall continue to operate and are reiterated again.
(xiii)             Extensive public awareness campaigns shall be taken up by the Central Government/State Governments/Schools/IAs in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 728 of 2015 & Ors. Page 50 of 54 Colleges informing the public about the harmful effects of firecrackers.
(xiv)             On Diwali days or any other festivals like Gurpurab etc., when such fireworks generally take place, it would strictly be from 8:00 p.m. till 10:00 p.m. only. On Christmas even and New year eve, when such fireworks start around midnight, i.e. 12:00 a.m., it would be from 11:55 p.m. till 12:30 a.m. only.
(xv)                The Union of India, Government of NCT of Delhi and the State Governments of the NCR would permit community firecracking only (for Diwali and other festivals etc. as mentioned above), wherever it can be done. For this purpose, particular area/fields would be pre-identified and predesignated by the concerned authorities. This exercise shall be completed within a period of one week from today so that the public at large is informed about the designated places one week before Diwali. The areas designated now for the purpose of Diwali shall be valid for community fire cracking on other occasions/festivals as well, as mentioned above. Even for marriages and other occasions, sale of improved crackers and green crackers is only permitted. Insofar as other States are concerned, an endeavour shall be made by them also to explore the feasibility of community fire-cracking. However, it is made clear that Direction No.(xvi) pertaining to the duration within which fireworks can take place on all such occasions would be applicable throughout India. Similarly, Direction No. (xiii) for extensive public awareness campaigns is also a pan India direction.   
(xvi)             All the official respondents, and particularly the Police, shall ensure that fireworks take place only during the designated time and at designated places, as mentioned above. They shall also ensure that there is no sale of banned firecrackers. In case any violation is found, the Station House Officer (SHO) of the concerned Police Station of the area shall be held personally liable for such violation and this would amount to committing contempt of the Court, for which such SHO(s) would be proceeded against.
(xvii)          CPCB and respective State  Pollution Control Boards/Pollution Control Committees (SPCBs/PCCs) of the States and Union Territories shall carry out short-term monitoring in their cities for 14 days (commencing from 7 days prior to Diwali and ending 7 days after Diwali) for the parameters namely, Aluminium, Barium, Iron apart from the regulatory parameters against the short-term Ambient Air Quality Criteria Values (AAQCVs) proposed by CPCB with regard to bursting of firecrackers. This will help in generation of data on pollution caused by the bursting of firecrackers and would be helpful for regulation and control quantity of Aluminium, Barium and Iron used in the manufacture of firecrackers.”
                                                        To be sure, it is then observed in para 43 that, “One clarification needs to be given at this stage. Our discussion pertaining to the arguments based on Article 19(1)(g), Article 25 as well as the argument of loss of sustained revenue and unemployment, in case the manufacture and sale of the firecrackers is totally banned, is prima facie and we have not given our conclusive determination. It is because of want of detailed studies on various aspects which have been mentioned and taken note of during discussion in this order. However, we also make it clear that, prima facie, we do not find much merit in these arguments for which we have given our reasons in brief.”
                                                 In essence, para 44 then specifies that, “Having regard to the overall circumstances, we have decided that, for the time being, a balanced approach to tackle this problem is needed, which may take care of the concerns of both the parties and, at the same time, provide a reasonable and adequate solution. When the picture would become clearer after the requisite studies/research is undertaken, more stringent measures can be adopted in future if the situation so warrants.” Finally, it is observed in para 46 that, “The writ petition be listed on December 11, 2018.”
                                                   All said and done, this landmark judgment will certainly profusely check the noise pollution as well as the air pollution caused by fire crackers and other pollutants. It is also made clear that once the picture becomes clear after the requisite studies/research is undertaken then more stringent measures would be adopted in future if the situation so warrants so that no one dares to break the rules made in this regard! It is certainly a must read judgment for everyone!   
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

Devotion Cannot Be Subjected To Gender Discrimination, SC Allows Women Entry In Sabarimala By 4:1 Majority

It has to be exclaimed right at the start with considerable degree of satisfaction that in one of the most landmark judgment that Supreme Court which is the highest court in India has delivered since independence which has garnered not just national headlines but also international headlines, the Apex Court on September 28, 2018 in Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors v The State of Kerala & Ors in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006 by a 4:1 majority in one of the most keenly awaited judgment has very laudably permitted entry of women of all age groups to the Sabarimala temple, holding that ‘devotion cannot be subjected to gender discrimination’. It is one of the most progressive and path breaking judgment that we have witnessed in last many decades just like in the Shayara Bano case where Supreme Court not long time back had upheld triple talaq as unconstitutional! Very rightly so!
                                   Be it noted, the lone women in the Bench, Justice Indu Malhotra, dissented. Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice RF Nariman, Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice DY Chandrachud constituted the majority. The Bench was delivering this landmark and laudable judgment in a 2006 PIL filed by Indian Young Lawyers Association challenging the centuries-old tradition of Sabrimala Temple banning entry of women of menstruating age inside the temple. Why do we forget that even in temples of Lord Hanuman who as per mythological beliefs was a bachelor yet no women of any age has ever been stopped from entering his temple and even Muslims and people from other religions are not barred from paying their respect to him if anyone of them so desire?
                                 At the very outset, this landmark  judgment written by the CJI Dipak Misra for himself and Justice AM Khanwilkar notes that, “The irony that is nurtured by the society is to impose a rule, however unjustified, and proffer explanation or justification to substantiate the substratum of the said rule. Mankind, since time immemorial, has been searching for explanation or justification to substantiate a point of view that hurts humanity. The theoretical human values remain on paper. Historically, women have been treated with inequality and that is why, many have fought for their rights. Susan B Anthony, known for her feminist activity, succinctly puts, “Men, their rights, and nothing more; women, their rights, and nothing less.” It is a clear message.”
                               More importantly, para 2 then rightly touches the raw nerve by pointing out clearly and categorically that, “Neither the said message nor any kind of philosophy has opened up the large populace of this country to accept women as partners in their search for divinity and spirituality. In the theatre of life, it seems, man has put the autograph and there is no space for a woman even to put her signature. There is inequality on the path of approach to understand the divinity. The attribute of devotion to divinity cannot be subjected to the rigidity and stereotypes of gender. The dualism that persists in religion by glorifying and venerating women as goddesses on one hand and by imposing rigorous sanctions on the other hand in matters of devotion has to be abandoned. Such a dualistic approach and an entrenched mindset results in indignity to women and degradation of their status. The society has to undergo a perceptual shift from being the propagator of hegemonic patriarchal notions of demanding more exacting standards of purity and chastity solely from women to be the cultivator of equality where the woman is in no way considered frailer, lesser or inferior to man. The law and the society are bestowed with the Herculean task to act as levellers in this regard.”
            Continuing in the same vein, para 3 then minces no words in saying that, “Any relationship with the Creator is a transcendental one crossing all socially created artificial barriers and not a negotiated relationship bound by terms and conditions. Such a relationship and expression of devotion cannot be circumscribed by dogmatic notions of biological or physiological factors arising out of rigid socio-cultural attitudes which do not meet the constitutionally prescribed tests. Patriarchy in religion cannot be permitted to trump over the element of pure devotion borne out of faith and the freedom to practise and profess one’s religion. The subversion and repression of women under the garb of biological or physiological factors cannot be given the seal of legitimacy. Any rule based on discrimination or segregation of women pertaining to biological characteristics is not only unfounded, indefensible and implausible but can also never pass the muster of constitutionality.”
                                 Going forward, para 4 then enunciates that, “It is a universal truth that faith and religion do not countenance discrimination but religious practices are sometimes seen as perpetuating patriarchy thereby negating the basic tenets of faith and of gender equality and rights. The societal attitudes too centre and revolve around the patriarchal mindset thereby derogating the status of women in the social and religious milieu. All religions are simply different paths to reach the Universal One. Religion is basically a way of life to relaize one’s identity with the Divinity. However, certain dogmas and exclusionary practices and rituals have resulted in incongruities between the true essence of religion or faith and its practice that has come to be permeated with patriarchal prejudices. Sometimes, in the name of essential and integral facet of the faith, such practices are zealously propagated.”        
                                          It cannot be lost on us that para 5 then observes that, “Having stated so, we will focus on the factual score. The instant writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution seeks issuance of directions against the Government of Kerala, Devaswom Board of Travancore, Chief Thanthri of Sabarimala Temple and the District Magistrate of Pathanamthitta to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 years to the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala (Kerala) which has been denied to them on the basis of certain custom and usage; to declare Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 (for brevity, “the 1965 Act”) as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution of India and further to pass directions for the safety of women pilgrims.”
                                     It would be pertinent to mention here that para 6 then illustrates that, “The three-Judge Bench in Indian Young Lawyers Association and others v. State of Kerala and others, (2017) 10 SCC 689, keeping in view the gravity of the issues involved, sought the assistance of Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel as Amici Curiae. Thereafter, the three-Judge Bench analyzed the decision and the reasons ascribed by the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram and others AIR 1993 Kerala 42 wherein similar contentions were raised. The Bench took note of the two affidavits dated 13.11.2007 and 05.02.2016 and the contrary stand taken therein by the Government of Kerala.” Para 9 says that, “It is also worthy to note here that the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala, in S. Mahendran (supra), upheld the practice of banning entry of women belonging to the age group of 10 to 50 years in the Sabarimala temple during any time of the year.”
                                  Having said this, let us now turn to see what Para 95 enunciates. It says that, “Though, the respondents have urged that the pilgrims coming to visit the Sabarimala temple being devotees of Lord Ayyappa are addressed as Ayyappans and, therefore, the third condition for a religious denomination stands satisfied, is unacceptable. There is no identified group called Ayyappans. Every Hindu devotee can go to the temple. We have also been apprised that there are other temples for Lord Ayyappa and there is no such prohibition. Therefore, there is no identified sect. Accordingly, we hold, without any hesitation, that Sabarimala temple is a public religious endowment and there are no exclusive identified followers of the cult.”
                                       To put things in perspective, para 96 then stipulates that, “Coming to the first and the most important condition for a religious denomination, i.e., the collection of individuals ought to have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, there is nothing on record to show that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa have any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are just Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious denomination. For a religious denomination, there must be new methodology provided for a religion. Mere observance of certain practices, even though from a long time does not make it a distinct religion on that account.”
                                      It is then brought out in para 97 that, “Having stated that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 and that Sabarimala Temple is a public temple by virtue of the fact that Section 15 of the 1950 Act vests all powers of direction, control and supervision over it in the Travancore Devaswom Board which, in our foregoing analysis, has been unveiled as ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, resultantly fundamental rights including those guaranteed under Article 25(1) are enforceable against the Travancore Devaswom Board and other incorporated Devaswoms including the Sabarimala Temple.”
                                    Now coming to para 100, it clearly and categorically says that. “The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors, specifically attributable to women. Women of any age group have as much a right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practise a religion as guaranteed under Article 25(1). When we say so, we are absolutely alive to the fact that whether any such proposed exclusion of women from entry into religious places form an essential part of a religion would be examined at a subsequent stage.”
                                    As it turned out, para 101 then spares no punches in explicitly stating that, “We have no hesitation to say that such an exclusionary practice violates the right of women to visit and enter  a temple to freely practice Hindu religion and to exhibit devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. The denial of this right to women significantly denudes them of their right to worship. We concur with the view of the Amicus Curiae, learned senior counsel, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) is not only about inter-faith parity but it is also about intra-faith parity. Therefore, the right to practise religion under Article 25(1) in its broad contour, encompasses a non-discriminatory right which is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion.”
                      Simply put, para 104 then elucidates that, “Therefore, it can be said without any hesitation or reservation that the impugned Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed in pursuance of the 1965 Act, that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of such women to practice their religious belief which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right under Article 25(1) a dead letter. It is clear as crystal that as long as the devotees, irrespective of their gender and/or age group, seeking entry to a temple of any caste are Hindus, it is their legal right to enter into a temple and offer prayers. The women, in the case at hand, are also Hindus and so, there is neither any viable nor any legal limitation on their right to enter into the Sabarimala Temple as devotees of Lord Ayyappa and offer their prayers to the deity.”
                                      It was also clarified in para 105 that, “When we say so, we may also make it clear that the said rule of exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that allowing entry to women of the said age group would, in any way, be harmful or would play a jeopardizing role to public order, morality, health or, for that matter, any other provision/s of Part III of the Constitution, for it is to these precepts that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to.”
                                 Needless to say, it is then underscored in para 110 that, “The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to, by the opening words of the Article itself, public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. All the three words, that is order, morality and health are qualified by the word ‘public’. Neither public order nor public health will be at peril by allowing entry of women devotees of the age group of 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple for offering their prayers. As regards public morality, we must make it absolutely clear that since the Constitution was not shoved, by any external force, upon the people of this country but was rather adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.” Para 111 then seeks to make it clear that, “Having said so, the notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala temple for the simple reason that public morality must yield to constitutional morality.”
                          Conclusion
                              In a nutshell, it is then observed in para 144 that, “In view of our aforesaid analysis, we record our conclusions in seriatim:
(i)             In view of the law laid down by this Court in Shirur Mutt (supra) and S.P. Mittal (supra), the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination. They do not have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are exclusively Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious denomination.
(ii)          Article 25(1), by employing the expression ‘all persons’, demonstrates that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion is available, though subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) itself, to every person including women. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors specifically attributable to women.
(iii)       The exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabrimala temple by virtue of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules violates the right of Hindu women to freely practise their religion and exhibit their devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. This denial denudes them of their right to worship. The right to practise religion under Article 25(1) is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion.
(iv)       The impugned Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed under the 1965 Act, that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of Hindu women to practise their religious beliefs which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right of religion under Article 25(1) a dead letter.
(v)          The term ‘morality’ occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean. Since the Constitution has been adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality in Article 25 has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.     
(vi)       The notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala temple.
(vii)    The practice of exclusion of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years being followed at the Sabarimala Temple cannot be regarded as an essential part as claimed by the respondent Board.
(viii)  In view of the law laid down by this Court in the second Ananda Marga case, the exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabarimala Temple cannot be designated as one, the non-observance of which will change or alter the nature of Hindu religion. Besides, the exclusionary practice has not been observed with unhindered continuity as the Devaswom Board had accepted before the High Court that female worshippers of the age group of 10 to 50 years used to visit the temple and conducted poojas in every month for five days for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children.
(ix)       The exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate legislation in the form of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed by the virtue of the 1965 Act, is neither an essential nor an integral part of the religion.
(x)          A careful reading of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules makes it luculent that it is ultra vires both Section 3 as well as Section 4 of the 1965 Act, for the simple pure reason that Section 3 being a non-obstante provision clearly stipulates that every place of public worship shall be open to all classes and sections of Hindus, women being one of them, irrespective of any custom or usage to the contrary.
(xi)       Rule 3(b) is also ultra vires Section 4 of the 1965 Act as the proviso to Section 4(1) creates an exception to the effect that the regulations/rules made under Section 4(1) shall not discriminate, in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular section or class.
(xii)    The language of both the provisions, that is, Section 3 and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the 1965 Act clearly indicate that custom and usage must make space to the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus to offer prayers at places of public worship. Any interpretation to the contrary would annihilate the purpose of the 1965 Act and incrementally impair the fundamental right to practise religion guaranteed under Article 25(1). Therefore, we hold that Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is ultra vires of the 1965 Act.”
                                         As things stand, Justice RF Nariman in his separate but concurring judgment too strongly backed the majority judgment that Sabarimala custom must yield to fundamental right of women to worship. He also rightly pointed out that although the rights claimed by the Thantri and the believers in the custom of the temple have protection under Article 25(1), the right of a woman believer is also protected under Article 25(1), and her right should prevail over the right to maintain the exclusionary custom.  
                                              Interestingly enough, Justice RF Nariman while concluding in para 32 notes that, “I, therefore, concur in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of India in allowing the writ petition, and declare that the custom or usage of prohibiting women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple is violative of Article 25(1), and violative of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 made under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Further, it is also declared that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is unconstitutional being violative of Article 25(1) and Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India.”
                                            It is notable that another eminent Judge Dr DY Chandrachud also concurred with the majority judgment. He held in para 119 that, “I hold and declare that:
1)  The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not satisfy the judicially enunciated requirements to constitute a religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution;
2)  A claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality. Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality;
3) In any event, the practice of excluding women from the temple at Sabarimala is not an essential religious practice. The Court must decline to grant constitutional legitimacy to practices which derogate from the dignity of women and to their entitlement to an equal citizenship;
4) The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status is a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatize individuals, have no place in a constitutional order;
5) The notifications dated 21 October 1955 and 27 November 1956 issued by the Devaswom Board, prohibiting the entry of women between the ages of ten and fifty, are ultra vires Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act 1965 and are even otherwise unconstitutional; and
6) Hindu women constitute a ‘section of class’ of Hindus under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2 of the 1965 Act. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules enforce a custom contrary to Section 3 of the 1965 Act. This directly offends the right of temple entry established by Section 3. Rule 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act.
                            Before concluding, it must be brought out that there was only one dissenting Judge – Indu Malhotra. Ironically, she was the only women Judge in the five-Judge Bench who delivered this landmark judgment. She summarized her analysis as follows in para 16:
1.  The Writ Petition does not deserve to be entertained for want of standing. The grievances raised are non-justiciable at the behest of the Petitioners and Intervenors involved herein.
2.  The equality doctrine enshrined under Article 14 does not override the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 25 to every individual to freely profess, practise and propagate their faith, in accordance with the tenets of their religion.
3.  Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would imply the harmonisation of the Fundamental Rights, which include the right of every individual, religious denomination, or sect, to practise their faith and belief in accordance with the tenets of their religion, irrespective of whether the practise is rational or logical.
4.  The Respondents and the Intervenors have made out a plausible case that the Ayyappans or worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple satisfy the requirements of being a religious denomination, or sect thereof, which is entitled to the protection provided by Article 26. This is a mixed question of fact and law which ought to be decided before a competent court of civil jurisdiction.
5.  The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age group does not fall within the purview of Article 17 of the Constitution.
6.  Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is not ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act, since the proviso carves out an exception in the case of public worship in a temple for the benefit of any religious denomination or sect thereof, to manage their affairs in matters of religion.
                                   
                                          All said and done, it is one of the most landmark, laudable and progressive judgment that I have ever read in recent times. This alone explains why most of the Judges barring Justice Indu Malhotra have been all unanimous in deciding that women aged between age group of 10 to 50 years should not be barred from entering Sabarimala temple in any way and are fully entitled to go there. No politics should be done over it but politicians love to dabble in everything and support this worst discrimination against women even while talking about providing women equality in all spheres! This landmark judgment must be implemented in letter and spirit and all devotees and politicians must appreciate that they have to respect this final judgment delivered by the highest court of our country which is the Supreme Court and should refrain from stopping the interested women devotees from having a darshan of the holy Sabarimala shrine! Those who feel aggrieved by this judgment have every right to go for review petition but no one has the right to take law in their hands and stop women from entering the holy shrine as permission has been granted to them by the top court of India that is the Supreme Court!  
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi,
A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,
Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.