It is significant to note that the Supreme Court most recently on April 9, 2019 has very strongly and sternly reiterated in a latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 629 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 618/2019) has reiterated in no uncertain terms that the consent for sexual intercourse obtained by a person by giving false promise of marriage would not excuse him from rape charges. All those men who dare to indulge in sex after giving false promise of marriage must now always bear it in mind that they will not be excused from rape charges as has been held in this most recent case. This commendable and notable ruling is bound to send a large and clear warning to all men that they cannot take women for granted and have sex with them by falsely promising to marry and then later reneging and escaping from all liabilities!

First and foremost, the ball is set rolling in this latest judgment authored by Justice MR Shah for himself and Justice L Nageswara Rao by pointing out in para 1 that, “The application for impleadment of the prosecutrix is allowed, in terms of the prayer made.” It is then mentioned in para 1.1 that, “Leave granted”.

For the uninitiated, para 2 then states that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 10.10.2018 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1270/2014; by which the High Court has dismissed the said appeal preferred by the appellant herein – the original accused and has confirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court convicting the original accused and has confirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court convicting the original accused for the offence under Section 376(1) of the IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for six months, the original accused has preferred the present appeal.”

To recapitulate, it is then unfolded in para 3 that, “The prosecution case in brief was that the prosecutrix was the resident of Koni, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur. Prosecutrix was familiar with the accused since 2009 and there was love affair between them. The appellant had even proposed her for marriage and this fact was within the knowledge of their respective family members. At the time of incident, accused was posted as Junior Doctor in the government hospital of Maalkharoda and at that time the prosecutrix was doing her studies of Pharmacy in Bhilai. On 28.4.2013 the accused expressed his desire to the prosecutrix that he wanted to meet her and accordingly on 29.4.2013 at 7.25 a.m. the prosecutrix boarded Durg Danapur Express train and reached Sakti railway station from where the accused took her on a motorcycle to his house situated at Maalkharoda and there she stayed from 2 pm of 29.4.2013 to 3 pm of 30.4.2013 and during this period despite refusal of the prosecutirx the accused established physical relation with her on the pretext of marrying her. On 30.4.2013 the accused asked the prosecutrix to leave by saying that on 1st or 2nd May he will talk to his parents about their marriage and he will soon marry with her. On 30.4.2013 at about 6 in the evening accused Anurag Soni and the prosecutirx reached Bilaspur by train and from where their friend namely Umashankar took them on a motorcycle to the house of Mallika Humne, friend of prosecutrix, where the accused dropped her and went back. Next morning accused dropped the prosecutrix at Railway Station, Bilaspur from where she boarded train for Bhilai (Durg). Accused asked the prosecutrix not to tell about the incident to anyone and as a result of which the prosecutrix did not disclose the incident to anyone, but from 2.5.2013 to 5.5.2013 the prosecutrix had repeatedly asked from the accused about the marriage and when she did not receive any reply from the accused, on 6.5.2013, she informed her family members about the incident and then the family members of the prosecutrix had gone to the house of accused at village Kharod and informed his family members about the incident whereupon the family members of accused had said that now marriage of accused and prosecutrix was the only option available. In the meantime, members of both the families used to visit house of each other, however, after keeping the prosecutrix and her family members in dark for about two months, the accused had refused to marry the prosecutrix and performed marriage with another girl and then on 21.6.2013 the prosecutrix submitted written report (Ex. P-3) in the police station Maalkharoda in respect of rape committed by the accused upon her on the pretext of marriage based on which FIR (Ex. P-4) for the offence under Section 376 of IPC was registered against the accused.”

As anticipated, we then see that para 3.1 brings out the following: “That during the course of investigation, the investigating officer recorded the statement of concerned witnesses including the prosecutrix. The investigating officer collected the medical evidence and other evidence. After completion of the entire investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC.”

Furthermore, it is then pointed out in para 3.2 that, “That the learned magistrate committed the case to the learned Sessions Court which was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 201/2013. That the learned Sessions Court framed the charge against the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. The accused denied the charge so framed and claimed trial, and therefore he came to be tried by the learned Sessions Court for the aforesaid offence.”

To be sure, it is then stated in para 3.3 that, “The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 13 witnesses including the prosecutrix (PW3) as under:

1. Pritam Soni PW1

2. Manikchand PW2

3. Prosecutrix PW3

4. Patwari Ghanshyam PW4

5. Dr. C.K. Singh PW5

6. Dr. K.L. Oraon PW6

7. Amritlal PW7

8. Pankaj Soni PW8

9. Dr. P.C. Jain PW9

10. Constable Jawaharlal PW10

11. Sub-Inspector S.P. Singh PW11

12. Inspector Sheetal Sidar PW12

13. Srimati Priyanka Soni PW13

Simply put, it is then observed in para 3.4 that, “After the closing pursis were submitted by the prosecution, three witnesses were examined on behalf of the accused in defence. The statement of appellant-accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein he denied the circumstances appearing against him and pleaded innocence and false implication. As per the accused his marriage was already fixed with one Priyanka Soni and this was in the knowledge of the prosecutrix, even then the prosecutrix and her family members continued to pressurise him to marry the prosecutrix, and then he married with Priyanka Soni on 10.6.2013 in Arya Samaj. Therefore, it was the case on behalf of the accused that a false FIR was lodged against him.”

Needless to say, it is then narrated in para 4 that, “That on appreciation of evidence, the learned Sessions Court observed and held that the prosecutrix gave consent for sexual intercourse on a misrepresentation of fact and the promise by the accused that he would marry the prosecutrix and therefore the said consent cannot be said to be a consent and therefore the accused committed the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Thereupon, the learned Sessions Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment.”

Going forward, it is then illustrated in para 5 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Court, the accused preferred appeal before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the appeal and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court convicting the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”

Be it noted, it is then noted in para 6 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal and confirming the conviction and sentence of the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC, the original accused has preferred the present appeal.”

After hearing the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length, it is then observed in para 9 that, “In the present case, the accused has been convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. It is the case on behalf of the appellant-accused that as it is a case of consensual sex, the Courts below have committed an error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Both the Courts below have accepted the case of the prosecution that the consent of the prosecutrix was given on the basis of misconception of fact and, therefore, considering Section 90 of the IPC, such a consent cannot be said to be a consent and, therefore, the accused has committed the rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC and thereby has committed an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Therefore, the question which has been posed before this Court is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the evidence on record, the Courts below have committed any error in holding the accused guilty for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC?”

What’s more, it is then elucidated in detail in para 13 that, “Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the following facts emerging from the evidence on record are required to be considered:

(i) That the family of the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other and, therefore, even the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other.

(ii) That though the accused was to marry another girl – Priyanka Soni, the accused continued to talk of marriage with the prosecutrix and continued to give the promise that he will marry the prosecutrix.

(iii) That on 28.04.2013 the appellant expressed his wish telephonically to meet with the prosecutrix and responding to that the prosecutrix went to the place of the accused on 29.04.2013 by train, where the accused received her at the railway station Sakti and took her to his place of residence in Malkharauda.

(iv) That during her stay at the house of the accused from 2.00 pm on 29.04.2013, they had physical relation thrice;

(v) That as per the case of the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix initially refused to have physical relation, but then the appellant allured her with a promise to marry and had physical relation with her;

(vi) That, thereafter the prosecutrix called the accused number of times asking him about the marriage, howeer, the accused did not reply positively;

(vii) That thereafter the prosecutrix informed about the incident to her family members on 06.05.2013;

(viii) That the family members of the prosecutrix negotiated with the family members of the accused;

(ix) That on 23.05.2013, the appellant expressed his willingness to marry the prosecutrix and a social function was scheduled on 30.05.2013, which did not take place;

(x) That, again the family members of both the parties had talks, in which the marriage was negotiated and a social function was scheduled on 10.06.2013, which was again not held and further, the social event was fixed for 20.06.2013;

(xi) That on 20.06.2013, the appellant telephonically informed the prosecutrix that he has already married;

(xii) That, Priyanka Soni PW-13, who is the wife of the accused stated that one year prior to the marriage that took place on 10.06.2013, the negotiators were going on; and

(xiii) That the accused married Priyanka Soni on 10.06.2013 in Arya Samaj, even prior to the social function for the marriage of the accused the prosecutrix was scheduled on 10.06.2013 and even thereafter the social event was fixed for 20.06.2013.”

Having said this, the Apex Court then hastened to elegantly add further in para 14 that, “Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the prosecution has been successful in proving the case that from the very beginning the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix; he gave false promises/promise to the prosecutrix to marry her and on such false promise he had a physical relation with the prosecutrix; the prosecutrix initially resisted, however, gave the consent relying upon the false promise of the accused that he will marry her and, therefore, her consent can be said to be a consent on misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and such a consent shall not excuse the accused from the charge of rape and offence under Section 375 of the IPC. Though, in Section 313 statement, the accused came up with a case that the prosecutrix and his family members were in knowledge that his marriage was already fixed with Priyanka Soni, even then, the prosecutrix and her family members continued to pressurise the accused to marry the prosecutrix, it is required to be noted that first of all the same is not proved by the accused. Even otherwise, considering the circumstances and evidence on record, referred to hereinabove, such a story is not believable. The prosecutrix, in the present case, was an educated girl studying in B-Pharmacy. Therefore, it is not believable that despite having knowledge that appellant’s marriage is fixed with another lady – Priyanka Soni, she and her family members would continue to pressurise the accused to marry and the prosecutrix will give the consent for physical relation. In the deposition, the prosecutrix specifically stated that initially she did not give her consent for physical relationship, however, on the appellant’s promise that he would marry her and relying upon such promise, she consented for physical relationship with the appellant-accused. Even considering Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, which has been inserted subsequently, there is a presumption and the court shall presume that she gave the consent for the physical relationship with the accused relying upon the promise by the accused that he will marry her. As observed hereinabove, from the very inception, the promise given by the accused to marry the prosecutrix was a false promise and from the very beginning there was no intention of the accused to marry the prosecutrix as his marriage with Priyanka Soni was already fixed long back and, despite the same, he continued to give promise/false promise and alluded the prosecutrix to give her consent for the physical relationship. Therefore, considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and considering the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have rightly held that the consent given by the prosecutrix was on misconception of fact and, therefore, the same cannot be said to be a consent so as to excuse the accused for the charge of rape as defined under Section 375 of the IPC. Both the Courts below have rightly convicted the accused for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”

To put it succinctly, it is then held in para 15 that, “Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the accused-appellant that the accused had marriage with Priyanka Soni on 10.06.2013 and even the prosecutrix has also married and, therefore, the accused may not be convicted is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. The prosecution has been successful by leading cogent evidence that from the very inception the accused had no intention to marry the victim and that he had mala fide motives and had made false promise only to satisfy the lust. But for the false promise by the accused to marry the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix would not have given the consent to have the physical relationship. It was a clear case of cheating and deception.”

It is then held in this same para 15 while condemning the most reprehensible and rapidly multiplying rape crime and without mincing any words that, “As observed hereinabove, the consent given by the prosecutrix was on misconception of fact. Such incidents are on increase now-a-days. Such offences are against the society. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. As observed by this Court in a catena of decisions, while a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim. Rape is a crime against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim. Being the most hated crime, the rape tantamount to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman, and offends both her esteem and dignity. Therefore, merely because the accused had married with another lady and/or even the prosecutrix has subsequently married, is no ground not to convict the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. The appellant-accused must face the consequences of the crime committed by him.”

Lastly, it is then held in para 16 that, “In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that both the Courts below have rightly convicted the appellant-accused under Section 376 of the IPC. We also maintain the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 376 of the IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the request made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused, the sentence of 10 years’ RI awarded by the courts below is hereby reduced to seven years RI, the minimum which was prescribed at the relevant time of commission of offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Consequently, the present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid modification in the sentence only.”

What should I say of these two Judges – Justice L Nageswara Rao and Justice MR Shah? What should I say about this extremely landmark and laudable judgment delivered by them? I am too small a fry to comment on them. But one thing is for sure: They have left no doubt in sending a loud and clear message to all men that if you dare to indulge in sex with any women by showing a carrot in the form of a false promise to marry, you too then shall be held liable in the same manner just like any other rapist who forcibly rapes woman as you have obtained her consent falsely for which you certainly must face the consequences! They certainly do deserve all the laurels and lavish praise for not hesitating in calling a spade a spade! This will certainly now deter all men from ever indulging in sex with a women after giving false promise of marrying her! Each and every Judge not just in India but all over the world must always adhere and abide by what has been laid down by these two learned Judges in this latest, landmark and laudable judgment so that no men ever thinks that he can get away most easily even after openly cheating a women by first promising to marry her and then having sex with her and still worse then dumping her shamelessly like a commodity from his own life without incurring any kind of liability whatsoever!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

First and foremost, the ball is set rolling in para 1 by penning down in this commendable and noteworthy judgment authored by Justice Ajay Rastogi for himself and Justice AM Khanwilkar that, “The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla dated 24th March, 2008 filed at the instance of the State of Himachal Pradesh whereby the High Court was pleased to partially allow the appeal filed by the respondents and altered the nature of offence from one under Section 307/34 IPC to one under Section 326 IPC and reduced the sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- each to 5 years rigorous imprisonment and increased the fine to Rs. 25,000/- each and in default, to undergo further imprisonment of six months.”

For the uninitiated, the background is then chalked out in para 2 wherein it is pointed out that, “In the instant case, the victim has suffered 16% burn injury which was caused due to acid attack on the darkest day of her life, i.e. on 12th July, 2004. To unfold the prosecution version in nutshell that, on 12th July, 2004 at about 9.00 a.m. PW-13 Shami Verma resident of Mashobra, who was present at BCS at Khalini-Dhalli By-Pass saw PW-5 Kumari Ishita (victim) crying with burn injuries, who had jumped into the water tank nearby. PW-13 Shami Verma took out PW-5 Kumari Ishita-victim from the tank and informed to the Police Post, New Shimla, that a girl with burn injuries was present near her residence and this information (Exhibit PR) was recorded by the Incharge of the Police Post, New Shimla, who deputed a police officer on wireless set to go to the site. PW-36 Shakuntla Sharma went to the site and shifted the victim to the hospital and recorded her statement on which a case was registered. During investigation, PW-5 Kumari Ishita (victim) stated that when she was going to college, two boys came on a scooter and threw some acid over her from a jug and run away from the spot. After investigation, challan was filed against both the accused respondents who were tried by the learned trial Court leading to their conviction which convicted them for offence under Section 307/34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 10 years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each by judgment dated 30th November, 2005 which came to be challenged by them in appeal before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh.”

As it turned out, para 3 then states that, “Taking note of the chemical burns caused by sulphuric acid of around 16% which is evident from the report of Dr. Piyush Kapila (PW-2), Department of Forensic Medicine, the High Court arrived at the conclusion that the offence under Section 307/34 IPC was not made out and converted the offence from Section 307/34 IPC to Section 326 IPC and sentenced them for a period of 5 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 25,000/- each vide impugned judgment dated 24th March, 2008.”

Needless to say, para 4 then brings out that, “The accused respondents have accepted the coniction and have undergone their sentence in terms of the judgment impugned dated 24th March, 2008 and have deposited the fine amount of Rs. 25,000/- each as informed to this Court and were released on 9th December, 2008 after undergoing sentence in terms of the impugned judgment.”

To be sure, it is then also brought out in para 5 that, “The main thrust of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that it was a case of acid attack on innocent young victim of 19 years and learned trial Court has rightly convicted the accused respondents under Section 307/34 IPC and sentenced them to 10 years rigorous imprisonment and there was no reasonable and cogent justification for the High Court to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court dated 30th November, 2005 and once they had been held guilty, their alteration of punishment is uncalled for and prayed for restoring the conviction and sentence held by the learned trial Court dated 30th November, 2005. Learned counsel further submitted that if this Court is not inclined to restore the conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court dated 30th November, 2005, at least the victim is entitled for compensation admissible under the law.”

On the contrary, it is then pointed out in para 6 that, “Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the judgment of the High Court dated 24th March, 2008 and submitted that the respondents were young at the given point of time on the date of incident dated 12th July, 2004 and looking into the chemical burns of 16% which the victim had suffered, by no stretch of imagination, it could be considered to be a case of Section 307 IPC of committing an attempt to murder. Further, in the given facts and circumstances, it was not even a case of Section 326 IPC but they have accepted the wrong which had been committed by them and after undergoing sentence in terms of the impugned judgment, both were released on 9th December, 2008 and there is no justification to restore the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court dated 30th November, 2005. In support of his submission, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Sachin Jana and Another Vs. State of West Bengal 2008(3) SCC 390 and submitted that it was a case where the victims suffered more than 50% burn injury caused due to acid and the conviction was under Section 307 IPC and yet this Court had reduced the sentence to 5 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 25,000/-.”

Simply put, para 7 then states that, “In this background, the question for consideration is whether the imposition of sentence by the High Court is proportionate to the crime in question and whether the victim is entitled to what has been awarded under the impugned judgment.”

On the one hand, para 8 points out that, “Learned counsel for the appellants submits that by no stretch of imagination, the period undergone, can be regarded as appropriate for the offence under Section 326 IPC and definitely not when there is acid attack. She submitted that there may not be any misplaced sympathy and exhibition of unwarranted mercy to pave the path of injustice to the victim.”

On the other hand, para 9 then discloses that, “Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the incident has happened long back on 12th July, 2004 and by this time, the victim as well as the respondents have been living their individual lives and respondents have undergone the sentence passed and were released on 9th December, 2008. They are leading a reformed life and after a long lapse of time, to send them to custody would tantamount to a gross injustice to them.”

What’s more, para 10 then envisages that, “The two-Judge Bench of this Court in Sachin Jana and another’s case (supra) where the accused persons faced trial for offence under Sections 148, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC on account of 50% burn injury which was caused due to acid attack were convicted by the High Court for offence under Section 307/34 IPC but their custodial sentence was reduced to 5 years and a fine of Rs. 25,000/-. The relevant extract is as under:-

“9. It is to be noted that three persons suffered injuries on account of acid poured on them. The doctor had indicated that each of the injured persons suffered more than 50% burn injury which was caused due to acid and the same was sufficient to cause death if not attended by medical aid at appropriate time.

12. When the evidence on record is analysed, it is clear that Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC has clear application. The acid burns caused disfigurement.

13. Considering the nature of dispute the custodial sentence is reduced to 5 years. However, each of the appellants is directed to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000. If the amount is deposited by the appellants within six weeks from today, out of each deposit, Rs. 10,000 shall be paid to each of the victims PWs 1, 2 and 3: in case the amount of fine imposed is not deposited, the default custodial sentence of one year each”.”

Going ahead, the Bench then stipulates in para 11 that, “The matter in reference to the victim suffered due to acid attack was further considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ravada Sasikala Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another 2017 (4) SCC 546 where learned trial Court convicted the accused person under Section 326 and 448 IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. The High Court while confirming the conviction under Section 326 IPC released the accused to the period which he had already undergone of 30 days which came to be interfered by this Court and the punishment and sentence of one year under Section 326 IPC was restored. But while doing so, this Court also ousted the compensation which the victim may be entitled for under Section 357 and Section 357-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”).”

It is most heartening to note that it is then very rightly noted in para 12 without mincing any words that, “Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that in the present case the victim had suffered an uncivilised and heartless crime committed by the respondents and there is no room for leniency which can be conceived. A crime of this nature does not deserve any kind of clemency. This Court cannot be oblivious of the situation that the victim must have suffered an emotional distress which cannot be compensated either by sentencing the accused or by grant of any compensation.”

Delving deeper, it is then held after considering all the points in para 13 that, “After going through the material on record, we are of the considered view that the accused respondents have rightly been held guilty and their conviction under Section 326 IPC and sentence for 5 years at least needs no interference but at the same time, we are disposed to address on victim compensation which may at least bring some solace to the victim for the sufferings which she had suffered.”

While referring to past leading and relevant case laws, it is then held in para 14 that, “In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad Vs. State of Maharashtra 2013 (6) SCC 770, a two-Judge Bench of this Court referred to the amended provision, 154th Law Commission Report that has devoted entire chapter of victimology, wherein the emphasis was on the victim.

Continuing in the same vein, para 15 then states that, “In Laxmi Vs. Union of India and Others 2014 (4) SCC 427, this Court observed that Section 357-A came to be inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31st December, 2009 which, inter alia, provides for preparation of a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation. This Court further directed that acid attack victims shall be paid compensation of at least Rs 3 lakhs by the State Government/Union Territory concerned as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost.

Not stopping here, it is then held in para 16 that, “In State of M.P. Vs. Mehtaab 2015(5) SCC 197, this Court directed the compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs noticing the fact that occurrence took place in 1997 and it observed that the said compensation was not adequate and accordingly, in addition to the said compensation to be paid by the accused, held that the State was also required to pay compensation under Section 357-A CrPC and reliance was placed on the decision in Suresh Vs. State of Haryana 2015(3) SCC 227.”

Moving on, it is then unfolded in para 17 that, “Victim Compensation Scheme has been considered by this Court in State of H.P. Vs. Rampal 2015 (11) SCC 584 and this Court opined that compensation of Rs. 40,000/- was inadequate taking note of the fact that the life of young child aged 20 years was lost and taking note of the precedents observed that in the interest of justice, the accused is required to pay a sum of Rs. 1 lakh and the State to pay a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs as compensation.”

Most importantly, it is then held in para 18 that, “Taking note of the precedents of which reference has been made, we consider it appropriate to observe that both the accused shall pay the additional compensation of Rs1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Fifty Thousand) each and the State of Himachal Pradesh shall pay the compensation as admissible under the Victim Compensation Scheme as in vogue to the acid victim (Ishita Sandhu, D/o Late Shri Rikhi Ram Sandhu) (Appellant No. 2). If the accused does not pay the additional compensation amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Fifty Thousand) each within six months, the defaulting accused shall suffer rigorous imprisonment of six months. The State shall deposit the compensation before the trial Court within three months from today and the learned trial Court, after proper identification of the victim, disburse at the earliest.”

To put things in perspective, para 19 then enunciates that, “The impugned judgment of the High Court stands modified and the appeal is accordingly disposed of. Lastly, it is held in para 20 that, “Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.”

No doubt, it is an exceptional, elegantly written and excellent judgment which will send the right, loud and clear message to one and all that acid throwing will not be taken lightly under any circumstances and the accused should be prepared not just to suffer jail sentence but also pay huge penalty as fine! No justification by accused of any kind would be able to stand scrutiny before the court! The State Government must ensure that it deposits the compensation before the Trial Court within three months and the learned trial Court after proper identification of the victim disburse it at the earliest! It merits no reiteration that all the courts from top to bottom must always ensure that acid throwing is not taken lightly ever and accused as we see in this landmark case are made to pay heavily so that it acts as a suitable deterrent to others from indulging in such wanton and despicable acts!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

s/o Col BPS Sirohi,

A 82, Defence Enclave,

Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera,

Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.