Everything is either taboo or inappropriate when it comes to women.

Sexual harassment at the workplace

‘If you want to keep your job then hush!’. Well, the norm is if a girl is harassed and mind you irrespective of her age, it is because either her dressing was inappropriate or she was out late.  Well, then what excuse or explanation do you have when a 90-year-old grandmother or a 3-month-old baby girl or even a cow is sexually harassed?

I’m guessing society will blame the parents of the three-month-old baby or the owner of the cow. The person who commits the cause is never blamed just because he happens to be a MAN.

THIS HAS TO END!

Do you want to know why girls are out there alone? Because they need to make a living. They need to get their life going and feed their starving children back home.

Women are scared to travel in busses and trains after their work in the evenings. They are living in constant fear of the men standing or sitting behind them. 

What happens when women are denied their rights at their workplace? What happens when women are harassed in their offices? Will a well-dressed woman working in a nine to five job be blamed for her inappropriate dressing or staying out at odd hours?

Something that men should ponder upon – What if these silent women one day react?  Men won’t be able to even comprehend the power inside a woman. Because that is how amazingly she carries it.

In the end, it is expected of women to hush and forget the whole thing and show up every day at work with a big smile.

Women are made to do this every time in fear of losing their jobs or standing in society. They are terrified of having their names be dragged through all this negative attention and the frown on the faces of their children and family.

Men on the other hand can shrug it off.

Girls are taught right from the age of 6 how to behave, talk, dress and eat. Boys are not given much attention because boys are boys. They are expected to be naughty and reckless. In case a girl talks back or rebels, she is punished harshly and looked down upon. She is titled as the bad sheep of the family bringing dishonour to the name.

Parents and elders, when you make sure your daughters are at home on time and not roaming around at night and calling them up every minute of the day for updates and to know their every move, it is also just as important for you to check on your sons.

Even if you trust them and give your word on their behalf, circumstances can at times prove otherwise. It is never a shame or frowned upon when you check in on your boys, instead you are just making sure the girls out there are safe.

And that is something you can contribute to this world.

Our character basically is a composite of our habits. ” Sow a thought, reap a habit; Sow an action, reap a habit so habit reap a character; So a character reap a destiny.”

Formula : B2 PTS 3

1. B- ” Be productive”
Be a responsible person

2. B- “Begin with the end in mind”
Be clear with your destiny

3. P- “Put first things first”
Prioritize your work

4. T- “Think to Win”
You also win, I also win.

5. S- “Seek first to understand then to be understood”
First listen what others are saying then you talk.

6. S- “Synergize”
Work as a team.

7. S- “Sharpen the saw”
Think twice, cut once.

William Shakespeare was an English playwriter, poet, and actor, widely known as the greatest writer in the English Writer in the English language and world’s greatest dramatist. He also called the national poet of England also “Bard of Avon”.

William Shakespeare was born in Stratford-upon-Avon in Warwickshire, England in April 1564. William was the son of John Shakespeare, a successful tradesman and alderman, and of Mary Arden, a daughter of the gentry.

The House in Stratford is known as “Shakespeare’s Birthplace”, although this statue is uncertain. Shakespeare’s father was a renowned glove maker and owned many titles during his. Lifetime, including ale taster, chamberlain, alderman,  bailiff, and chief alderman

Growing Up:

William Shakespeare probably attended the Stratford Grammar School in central Stratford, which likely provided an intensive education in Latin grammar, and translating such authors as Cicero, Virgil, and Shakespeare’s beloved Ovid. It is presumed that the young Shakespeare attended this school because John Shakespeare’s position as alderman allowed his children a free education at the school. 

On November 28 1582 at age of 18, Shakespeare got married with Anne Hathaway at Temple Grafton, near Stratford. Two neighbours of Anne, Fulk Sandalls and John Richardson, posted bond that there were no impediments to the marriage. There appears to have been some haste in arranging the ceremony, as Anne was three months pregnant. After his marriage, William Shakespeare left few traces in the historical record until he appeared on the London literary scene. On May 26, 1583 Shakespeare’s first child, Susanna, was baptized at Stratford. after on February 2, 1585 a son, Hamnet, and a daughter, Judith, were baptized soon. In 1596 Hamnet died at the age of eleven of unknown cause.

The late 1580s are known as Shakespeare’s “Lost Years” because no evidence has survived to show exactly where he was or why he left Stratford for London. One legend, long since thoroughly discredited, pronounces that he was caught poaching deer on the park of Sir Thomas Lucy, the local Justice of the Peace, and had to flee. Another theory is that Shakespeare could have joined Leicester’s or Queen’s Men as they travelled through Stratford while on tour.

London and Theatrical Career:

By the end of 1592, Shakespeare became an established playwriter in London, receiving acclaim for such plays as Henry VI, “The Comedy of Errors”, and Titus Andronicus. By 1598 Shakespeare had moved to the parish of St. Helen’s, Bishopsgate, and appeared at the top of a list of actors in Every Man in His Humour written by Ben Jonson. Shakespeare became an actor, writer, and finally part-owner of a playing company, known as the Lord Chamberlain’s Men—the company took its name, like others of the period, from its aristocratic sponsor, the Lord Chamberlain. The group became popular enough that after the death of Elizabeth I and the coronation of James I (1603), the new monarch adopted the company after which it became known as the King’s Men. In 1604, Shakespeare acted as a matchmaker for his landlord’s daughter. Legal documents from 1612, when the case was brought to trial, show that in 1604, Shakespeare was a tenant of Christopher Mountjoy, a Huguenot tire-maker (a maker of ornamental headdresses) in the northwest of London.

Later Years:

Shakespeare “retired” to Stratford in about 1610-11, although he still spent much time in London and attending to his company’s affairs. His retirement was not entirely without controversy; he was drawn into a legal quarrel regarding the enclosure of common lands. In the last few weeks of Shakespeare’s life, the man who was to marry his younger daughter Judith—a tavern-keeper named Thomas Quiney—was charged in the local church court with “fornication.” A woman named Margaret Wheeler had given birth to a child and claimed it was Quiney’s; she and the child both died soon after.

Shakespeare died on April 23, 1616 at the age of 52. He remained married to Anne until his death and was survived by his two daughters, Susannah and Judith. Susannah married Dr. John Hall. Neither Susannah’s nor Judith’s children had any offspring, and as such, there are no known direct descendants of the poet and playwright alive today. It was rumoured, however, that Shakespeare was the real father of his godson, William Davenant.

Education is na important tool which is very useful in everybody’s life. Education is what differentiates us from other living beings on earth.

It makes man the smartest creature on earth. It empowers humans and gets them ready to face challenges of life efficiently. With that being said, education still remains a luxury and not a necessity in our country.

Educational awareness needs to be spread through the country to make education accessible. But, this remains incomplete without first analyzing the importance of education.

Only when the people realize what significance it holds, can they consider it a necessity for a goof life. In this essay on education, we will see the importance of education and how it is a doorway to success.

Education is about learning skills and knowledge. It also means helping people to learn how to do things and support them to think about what they learn.

It’s also important for educators to teach ways to find and use information. Education needs research to find out how to make it better.

Through education, the knowledge of society, country and of the world is passed on from generation to generation.

This may include education in morality, for example learning how to act as loyal, honest and effective citizen.

Education may help and guide individuals from one class to other. Educated individuals and groups can do things like, help less educated people and encourage them to get educated.

Cas

Introduction

This Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is being documented, to make sure about and secure, the right against extradition, of the candidate displaced people in India, to keep with the Constitutional assurances under Article 14 and Article 21, read with Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India, which ensures against discretionary expulsion of Rohingya exiles who have taken shelter in India in the wake of getting away from their nation of origin Myanmar in light of the across the board separation, viciousness, and carnage against this network in their home State.

The applicants are enlisted and perceived by the UNHCR in India in 2016 and are conceded displaced person I-cards as per the Reuters report dated 14th August 2017, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, told parliament toward the beginning of August that the focal government had guided state specialists to spot and oust illicit workers including Rohingya, who face oppression in Buddhist-dominant part Myanmar. An expected 40,000 Rohingya live in India and simply like the Petitioners numerous others, are even enlisted with the UN evacuee organization in India. The applicants present this proposed expulsion is in opposition to the Constitutional insurances of Article 14, Article 21, and Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India, which gives equivalent rights and freedom to every ‘individual’. This demonstration would even be in logical inconsistency with the guideline of ‘non-refoulment’, which has been broadly perceived as a standard of Customary International law.                                                                                                                       

Brief of the case                                                    

India’s stand on the proposed expelling of Rohingyas from India and India’s commitments to monitor the Rohingya people group under International Treaty commitments and Constitutional assurances in sync with the Reuters. Addressing a report dated 14th August 2017, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, told parliament toward the beginning of August that the focal government had guided state specialists to spot and extradite illicit outsiders including Rohingya, who face abuse in Buddhist-dominant part of Myanmar. An expected 40,000 Rohingya dwell in India and simply like the Petitioners numerous others are even enlisted with the UN displaced person organization in India. UNHCR has given character cards to the candidates and around 16,500 Rohingyas in India are enlisted with UNHCR.

Mr. Rijiju said in a meeting toward the beginning of August that UNHCR enrollment was superfluous as India wasn’t a signatory to the displaced person show. “Most definitely they’re all unlawful migrants. they need no premise to gauge here. Anyone who is an unlawful transient is extradited”, the Minister is accounted for to have said. The solicitors are oppressed by the Hon’ble priests articulations and proposed requests of expulsion, that conflicts with the Constitutional assurances to displaced people in India, under Article 14 and Article 21 moreover as Article 51(c) of the Constitution that commits India to regard law, furthermore the universal guideline of non-refoulment or not sending back evacuees to a region where they face threat, which has been viewed as a segment of the standard statute. That the applicants face the peril of oppression, savagery, and gore, on the off chance that they’re expelled back to Myanmar must be agreed the assurance of the Indian State to keep with standard statute guideline of non-refoulement and Constitutional arrangements under Articles 14 and 21 that give a structure to the insurance of displaced people in India.

National Human Rights Commission notice to the Ministry of Home Affairs on proposed expelling of Rohingyas. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has given notification to the Ministry of Home Affairs, taking suo moto perception of media reports concerning the plans of the govt of India to extradite around 40,000 illicit Rohingya settlers from Myanmar, who are dwelling in different pieces of India. The NHRC report dated eighteenth August 2017, states: “The Commission has seen that exiles are not any uncertainty outside nationals but rather they’re men and before making a colossal stride the govt of India must explore each part of things, keeping the reality into a center that the individuals from the Rohingya people group have crossed into India outskirts are living here for long, have a dread of abuse once they’re pushed back to their local nation. The Commission has additionally seen that the Supreme Court of India has reliably held that the fundamental Right cherished under Article 21 of the Constitution concerning Right to Life and private Liberty, applies to all or any, regardless of the reality whether they are residents of India or not”. 

The solicitors are oppressed by the Hon’ble pastors’ announcements and proposed requests of expulsion, that conflicts with the Constitutional certifications to displaced people in India, under Article 14 and Article 21 just as Article 51 (c) of the Constitution that commits India to regard law, moreover as the worldwide rule of non-refoulment or not sending back outcasts to a zone where they face peril, which has been viewed as a part of standard law. That the applicants face the threat of abuse, savagery, and carnage, if they’re expelled back to Myanmar and Bar and Bench must be agreed on the assurance of the Indian State to keep with standard statute rule of non-refoulment and Constitutional arrangements under Articles 14 and 21 that give a structure to the insurance of displaced people in India.

National Human Rights Commission notice to the Ministry of Home Affairs on proposed expelling of Rohingyas The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has given notification to the Ministry of Home Affairs, taking suo moto comprehension of media reports concerning the plans of the govt of India to extradite around 40,000 unlawful Rohingya migrants from Myanmar, who are dwelling in different pieces of India. The NHRC discharge dated eighteenth August 2017, states: “The Commission has seen that evacuees are not any uncertainty outside nationals but rather they’re men and before making a tremendous stride the govt of India must examine each part of things, keeping the reality into a center that the individuals from the Rohingya people group have crossed into India fringes are living here for long, have a dread of mistreatment once they’re pushed back to their local country…The Commission has likewise seen that the Supreme Court of India has reliably held that the essential Right revered under Article 21 of the Constitution concerning Right to Life and private Liberty, applies to all or any, regardless of the reality whether they are residents of India or not”.

Concerned Provisions of Law

Article 14 Right to equality expresses: “The State will not deny individual correspondence under the watchful eye of the law or the equivalent security of the laws inside the region of India.” This content ensures displaced people in India the privilege of uniformity under the steady gaze of the law and equivalent treatment under the law. 

Article 21 Right to life and freedom “No individual will be vacant his lifetime of individual freedom except per method set up by law” That in concurring assurance to evacuees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deciphered these established arrangements to build the security of the privilege to uniformity and subsequently the privilege to life and private freedom of displaced people. 

Article 32 provides: (1) the option to move to the Supreme Court by fitting procedures for the requirement of the rights given by this Part is ensured. The Supreme Court will have the ability to give bearings or requests or writs, including writs inside the idea of habeas corpus, mandamus, disallowance, hearing, and certiorari, whichever could likewise be suitable, for the authorization of any of the rights gave by this Part. Without partiality to the forces on the Supreme Court by statements (1) and (2), Parliament may by law enable the other court to practice inside the neighborhood furthest reaches of its locale all or any of the forces exercisable by the Supreme Court under condition (2). The privilege ensured by this content will not be suspended except as in any case accommodated by this Constitution. 

Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy, requires cultivating regard for law and settlement commitments inside the dealings of sorted out people groups with one another. Article 14 Right to equity expresses: “The State will not deny individual fairness under the steady gaze of the law or the equivalent security of the laws inside the region of India.” This content ensures displaced people in India the privilege to balance under the steady gaze of the law and accordingly equivalent treatment under the law. Article 21 Right to life and freedom “No individual will be unfilled his lifetime of individual freedom aside from per method set up by law” That in concurring assurance to evacuees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deciphered these established arrangements to build the insurance of the privilege to fairness and thusly the privilege to life and private freedom of exiles. 

Grounds

The activity of Respondent 1, in looking to oust the applicants and different individuals from the Rohingya people group disregards their privileges ensured under the Constitution of India, in particular the right to fairness under article 14 and in this manner the privilege to life and private freedom under article 21. The Delhi court in Donagh Lian Kham v. Association of India, 226 (2016) DLT 208, states, “The standard of “non-refoulement”, which forbids the removal of a displaced person, who secures danger in his local nation under his race, religion, and political conclusion, is required to be taken as a piece of the assurance under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as “non-refoulement” influences/ensure the life and freedom of someone are as a rule, regardless of his nationality.” Article 51(c), a Directive Principle of State Policy, expects India to cultivate regard for the law of countries and settlement commitments inside the dealings of composed people groups with one another, henceforth India must regard the different conventions and arrangements that give a system to evacuee insurance and stretch out such insurance to the Rohingya outcasts in India.

The solicitors are being abused in their nation of origin. Indeed, even today, they capture that just if they’re ousted to the nation in their local district, they may confront a severe danger of substantial mischief. The proceeded with savagery against the Rohingyas in Myanmar has been accounted for generally inside the media. The rule of captivation, articulated unequivocally under Article 33(1) of the 1951 world association Convention on the Status of Refugees denies sending back evacuees to a territory where they face peril – is considered a piece of the standard law of countries and official on all states whether they have marked the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention or not, commanding India to perceive this guideline inside the security of the Rohingya outcasts and thwart their extradition to their nation where they’re confronting separation and danger to their life

Conclusion

Given the above realities and conditions, it’s most deferentially asked that this Hon’ble Court is likewise satisfied: To give a suitable writ, request or heading, guiding the Respondents to not oust the candidates and different individuals from the Rohingya people group who are available in India. To give suitable writ or request guiding the respondents to gracefully the candidates and different individuals from the Rohingya people group in India, such essential enhancements to ensure that they’ll board human conditions varying by the law of countries in the treatment of outcasts. To pass such different requests as this Hon’ble Court may esteem fit and right inside the enthusiasm of value, equity, and inner voice.

• https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/rohingya-deportation-case
• https://educentric.in/blog-details.html?id=28

1. Hindu women and their rights with respect to the case of Khushi Ram v. Nawal Singh
2. The status of UAPA undertrials in the light of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
3. An analysis of the Gokarna Mahabaleshwar Temple Management case

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This article is written by Dhananjai Singh Rana, Student, BBA LLB (Hons.), Amity Law School Noida. The article deals with the analysis of the Rohingya case in the light of the constitutional provisions contested thereon.

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• Brief of the case                                                    
• Concerned Provisions of Law
  • Grounds
• Conclusion
• References

Introduction

This Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is being documented, to make sure about and secure, the right against extradition, of the candidate displaced people in India, to keep with the Constitutional assurances under Article 14 and Article 21, read with Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India, which ensures against discretionary expulsion of Rohingya exiles who have taken shelter in India in the wake of getting away from their nation of origin Myanmar in light of the across the board separation, viciousness, and carnage against this network in their home State.

The applicants are enlisted and perceived by the UNHCR in India in 2016 and are conceded displaced person I-cards as per the Reuters report dated 14th August 2017, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, told parliament toward the beginning of August that the focal government had guided state specialists to spot and oust illicit workers including Rohingya, who face oppression in Buddhist-dominant part Myanmar. An expected 40,000 Rohingya live in India and simply like the Petitioners numerous others, are even enlisted with the UN evacuee organization in India. The applicants present this proposed expulsion is in opposition to the Constitutional insurances of Article 14, Article 21, and Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India, which gives equivalent rights and freedom to every ‘individual’. This demonstration would even be in logical inconsistency with the guideline of ‘non-refoulment’, which has been broadly perceived as a standard of Customary International law.                                                                                                                       

Brief of the case                                                    

India’s stand on the proposed expelling of Rohingyas from India and India’s commitments to monitor the Rohingya people group under International Treaty commitments and Constitutional assurances in sync with the Reuters. Addressing a report dated 14th August 2017, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, told parliament toward the beginning of August that the focal government had guided state specialists to spot and extradite illicit outsiders including Rohingya, who face abuse in Buddhist-dominant part of Myanmar. An expected 40,000 Rohingya dwell in India and simply like the Petitioners numerous others are even enlisted with the UN displaced person organization in India. UNHCR has given character cards to the candidates and around 16,500 Rohingyas in India are enlisted with UNHCR.

Mr. Rijiju said in a meeting toward the beginning of August that UNHCR enrollment was superfluous as India wasn’t a signatory to the displaced person show. “Most definitely they’re all unlawful migrants. they need no premise to gauge here. Anyone who is an unlawful transient is extradited”, the Minister is accounted for to have said. The solicitors are oppressed by the Hon’ble priests articulations and proposed requests of expulsion, that conflicts with the Constitutional assurances to displaced people in India, under Article 14 and Article 21 moreover as Article 51(c) of the Constitution that commits India to regard law, furthermore the universal guideline of non-refoulment or not sending back evacuees to a region where they face threat, which has been viewed as a segment of the standard statute. That the applicants face the peril of oppression, savagery, and gore, on the off chance that they’re expelled back to Myanmar must be agreed the assurance of the Indian State to keep with standard statute guideline of non-refoulement and Constitutional arrangements under Articles 14 and 21 that give a structure to the insurance of displaced people in India.

National Human Rights Commission notice to the Ministry of Home Affairs on proposed expelling of Rohingyas. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has given notification to the Ministry of Home Affairs, taking suo moto perception of media reports concerning the plans of the govt of India to extradite around 40,000 illicit Rohingya settlers from Myanmar, who are dwelling in different pieces of India. The NHRC report dated eighteenth August 2017, states: “The Commission has seen that exiles are not any uncertainty outside nationals but rather they’re men and before making a colossal stride the govt of India must explore each part of things, keeping the reality into a center that the individuals from the Rohingya people group have crossed into India outskirts are living here for long, have a dread of abuse once they’re pushed back to their local nation. The Commission has additionally seen that the Supreme Court of India has reliably held that the fundamental Right cherished under Article 21 of the Constitution concerning Right to Life and private Liberty, applies to all or any, regardless of the reality whether they are residents of India or not”. 

The solicitors are oppressed by the Hon’ble pastors’ announcements and proposed requests of expulsion, that conflicts with the Constitutional certifications to displaced people in India, under Article 14 and Article 21 just as Article 51 (c) of the Constitution that commits India to regard law, moreover as the worldwide rule of non-refoulment or not sending back outcasts to a zone where they face peril, which has been viewed as a part of standard law. That the applicants face the threat of abuse, savagery, and carnage, if they’re expelled back to Myanmar and Bar and Bench must be agreed on the assurance of the Indian State to keep with standard statute rule of non-refoulment and Constitutional arrangements under Articles 14 and 21 that give a structure to the insurance of displaced people in India.

National Human Rights Commission notice to the Ministry of Home Affairs on proposed expelling of Rohingyas The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has given notification to the Ministry of Home Affairs, taking suo moto comprehension of media reports concerning the plans of the govt of India to extradite around 40,000 unlawful Rohingya migrants from Myanmar, who are dwelling in different pieces of India. The NHRC discharge dated eighteenth August 2017, states: “The Commission has seen that evacuees are not any uncertainty outside nationals but rather they’re men and before making a tremendous stride the govt of India must examine each part of things, keeping the reality into a center that the individuals from the Rohingya people group have crossed into India fringes are living here for long, have a dread of mistreatment once they’re pushed back to their local country…The Commission has likewise seen that the Supreme Court of India has reliably held that the essential Right revered under Article 21 of the Constitution concerning Right to Life and private Liberty, applies to all or any, regardless of the reality whether they are residents of India or not”.

Concerned Provisions of Law

Article 14 Right to equality expresses: “The State will not deny individual correspondence under the watchful eye of the law or the equivalent security of the laws inside the region of India.” This content ensures displaced people in India the privilege of uniformity under the steady gaze of the law and equivalent treatment under the law. 

Article 21 Right to life and freedom “No individual will be vacant his lifetime of individual freedom except per method set up by law” That in concurring assurance to evacuees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deciphered these established arrangements to build the security of the privilege to uniformity and subsequently the privilege to life and private freedom of displaced people. 

Article 32 provides: (1) the option to move to the Supreme Court by fitting procedures for the requirement of the rights given by this Part is ensured. The Supreme Court will have the ability to give bearings or requests or writs, including writs inside the idea of habeas corpus, mandamus, disallowance, hearing, and certiorari, whichever could likewise be suitable, for the authorization of any of the rights gave by this Part. Without partiality to the forces on the Supreme Court by statements (1) and (2), Parliament may by law enable the other court to practice inside the neighborhood furthest reaches of its locale all or any of the forces exercisable by the Supreme Court under condition (2). The privilege ensured by this content will not be suspended except as in any case accommodated by this Constitution. 

Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy, requires cultivating regard for law and settlement commitments inside the dealings of sorted out people groups with one another. Article 14 Right to equity expresses: “The State will not deny individual fairness under the steady gaze of the law or the equivalent security of the laws inside the region of India.” This content ensures displaced people in India the privilege to balance under the steady gaze of the law and accordingly equivalent treatment under the law. Article 21 Right to life and freedom “No individual will be unfilled his lifetime of individual freedom aside from per method set up by law” That in concurring assurance to evacuees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deciphered these established arrangements to build the insurance of the privilege to fairness and thusly the privilege to life and private freedom of exiles. 

Grounds

The activity of Respondent 1, in looking to oust the applicants and different individuals from the Rohingya people group disregards their privileges ensured under the Constitution of India, in particular the right to fairness under article 14 and in this manner the privilege to life and private freedom under article 21. The Delhi court in Donagh Lian Kham v. Association of India, 226 (2016) DLT 208, states, “The standard of “non-refoulement”, which forbids the removal of a displaced person, who secures danger in his local nation under his race, religion, and political conclusion, is required to be taken as a piece of the assurance under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as “non-refoulement” influences/ensure the life and freedom of someone are as a rule, regardless of his nationality.” Article 51(c), a Directive Principle of State Policy, expects India to cultivate regard for the law of countries and settlement commitments inside the dealings of composed people groups with one another, henceforth India must regard the different conventions and arrangements that give a system to evacuee insurance and stretch out such insurance to the Rohingya outcasts in India.

The solicitors are being abused in their nation of origin. Indeed, even today, they capture that just if they’re ousted to the nation in their local district, they may confront a severe danger of substantial mischief. The proceeded with savagery against the Rohingyas in Myanmar has been accounted for generally inside the media. The rule of captivation, articulated unequivocally under Article 33(1) of the 1951 world association Convention on the Status of Refugees denies sending back evacuees to a territory where they face peril – is considered a piece of the standard law of countries and official on all states whether they have marked the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention or not, commanding India to perceive this guideline inside the security of the Rohingya outcasts and thwart their extradition to their nation where they’re confronting separation and danger to their life

Conclusion

Given the above realities and conditions, it’s most deferentially asked that this Hon’ble Court is likewise satisfied: To give a suitable writ, request or heading, guiding the Respondents to not oust the candidates and different individuals from the Rohingya people group who are available in India. To give suitable writ or request guiding the respondents to gracefully the candidates and different individuals from the Rohingya people group in India, such essential enhancements to ensure that they’ll board human conditions varying by the law of countries in the treatment of outcasts. To pass such different requests as this Hon’ble Court may esteem fit and right inside the enthusiasm of value, equity, and inner voice.

References

• https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/rohingya-deportation-case
• https://educentric.in/blog-details.html?id=283
• https://legaldesire.com/analysis-balance-national-interest-human-rights-rohingya-crisis-india/

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1. Hindu women and their rights with respect to the case of Khushi Ram v. Nawal Singh
2. The status of UAPA undertrials in the light of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
3. An analysis of the Gokarna Mahabaleshwar Temple Management case

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 Ponnuswami Mudaliar was the first respondent who had purchased at Koilpatti through his agent  who was the 2nd respondent, where  26 boras of karunganni cotton, and entrusted it on 5-8-1952 to the appellant who used to run a lorry service for transport of gods and used it as mean for  common carrier, where it was carried and delivered at Coimbatore. The lorry hire money had  tobe paid at the destination. The goods were added in the lorry of the appellant, and it had started its journey on the very day. While the lorry was going near Oddanchatram, a place in the Madurai District and  it was noticed thatthe cotton bales were on fire, the origin and cause of it is not being ascertainable from the present evidence. There were a lot of efforts which were made to turn down the fire but did not have much success. The driver and appellant due to their respected efforts were  able to salvage some cotton  by risking themselves; the rest was entirely burnt by the fire. The appellant could  not even deliver to the first respondent. the salvaged cotton. In these circumstances, respondents had instituted the suit, out of which the appeal arised, for recovering of a sum of Rs. 6730 and subsequent interest as damages for the loss of the goods.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The claim  mainly was on the fact that  the appellants had failed and could not deliver the consignment as they had agreed upon. There was also the plea which was that the loss of goods was result of  the gross negligence of the appellant and servants, and that they should be held liable for the non delivery. The suit was filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge Coimbatore, on the fact  that a part of cause of action had arose  at Coimbatore where the cotton was agreed to be delivered and lorry charges were to be paid.

The appellant and the driver  were impleaded and were parties to the suit which  denied that there was any type of  negligence on their part, they also  stated that they had taken all the reasonable care a  sane person could take and there shouldn’t be any liability attached to them.the jurisdiction of the court in Coimbatore was not be accepted as they said that it the hearing should take place where the loss had occurred .the learned subordinate upheld that there and lorry was properly equipped and well protected and fire was not because of negligence, therein and that it was not attributable to any type of negligence on the part of the driver. But he held that the liability as bailee was there was a special liability of the appellant which  as a common carrier for not having safely delivered the goods. Rejecting the plea as the want of jurisdiction on the ground that a part of which the cause of action arose at Coimbatore, he assessed the damagesand the amount  for the loss of goods in a sum of Rs. 6731 and passed a decree and  for that amount against the appellant in favour of  first respondent. And hence,The claim against the driver was dismissed.

ARGUMENTS OF THE CASE;

In Appeal MR KS RAMAMURTHY raises two points that even a common carrier the appellants liability would be of a regular bailee under sec 151 sec 152 and insisted that his lient took reasonable care that a man of ordinary prudence would take and argued that his client should not be held liable. The second contention is that the claim for damages based as it was on an alleged breach of duty on the part of a common carrier, should be held to be on tort, and the cause of action could be held to arise only at the place where the accident took place,and that not being within the jurisdiction of the Coimbatore Court, the lower Court had no jurisidiction to entertain the suit.

The first claim be explained as a common carrier would be someone who would transport the goods of one person from a place to another for some sought of reward for people who would chose to employ him. the duty of the common carrier would be is to receive all goods and ensure they are in proper condition and provided they are packed properly and he has the convenience to carry them. The common carrierwho is  employed would be bound to provide safeltyof the goods during carriage and till delivery but  unless prevented by an act of God, enemies of the States or unless there is loss or damage to goods arises from an inherent defect in the goods that he has no role to play in  or by the reason of their packing.

A common carrier is totally responsible for the safety of the goods entrusted to him in all the events but except when loss or an injury arises from solely form act of God or the Queen enemies which is not related or from the fault  which could be of the consignor, or inherent vice in the goods by themselves. He is therefore liable and even when he is overwhelmed and when robbed by an huge or uncontrollable number of persons. He is an insurer of the safety of the goods  and against everything which is  extraneous and that  which may cause certain loss and or injury except for  the act of God or of  the Queen’s enemies and say if there has been an unjustifiable deviation or type of a negligence which is other fundamental breach of contract from  his part,so  he will liable for the loss and injury due to the Queens enemies  or it would seem, due to the  act of God. The responsibility that as an insurer which is imposed upon a common carrier by the customs of the realm when  it is not necessary to prove a contract between him with the  owner of the goods to establish the  liability. So if there is Failure on the part of the carrier and he could not deliver the goods safely then there is a breach of a duty which is placed upon him by the common law so therefore, an action of tort lies against him for such a breach, the owner  who is not being bound to prove any type of contract. Where, however say there is a contract, liability could arise either at common law or  maybe under the contract and the contract could limit the carrier’s responsibility.

Thus, a common carrier and  to whom goods were entrusted for the  transport, that they  should provide a resonably fit and a proper vehicle which could be used for the  carriage of the goods could be entrusted and carry them safely they should be loaded and unloaded  properly to deliver the same at the destination. A common carrier being thus under an obligation to deliver the goods safely so that he  would be liable to what happens to them during the time when he is in their  custody. His liability therefore can  be said to be that of an insurer. Under the common law of England where  there were two categories of bailees and  on whom the law had imposed a greater responsibility by common carriers and innkeepers as these were held liable for the safety of all the goods and were  entrusted to them in all the events but for except  the loss or injury to them that  was occasioned by an act of God and say the Kings enemies or from the fault of the consignor which could be  due to the inherent defect in the goods as  An act of God will be an what u call an extraordinary occurrence and due to natural causes that which is not the result of any type of  human intervention which therefore  could not be avoided by any amount and  of any foresight and  proper care. A fire that has been  caused by the lightning. But say an accidental fire that as in the present case even though it might not have been resulted from any act of or by any omission of the appellant so it could not be said that there is  to be an act of God.

 In the Irrawaddy Flotilla Co. V. Bugwandasthe case which could be used an example when theb Privy Council held that the duties and liabilities of a common carrier in India were governed by the principles of the English common law and that his responsibility which is  to the owner was of the virtue and him exercising the public employment for a certainty of a reward an as incident to the contract which is  between him and the consignor. Under Section-3 of the Carriers Act we can say that  a common carrier  who would not be liable for any  loss of damage or of  goods above Rs. 100 in value which come within the schedule of the Act and it is to be duly followed and unless the value of the goods has been declared  where it is expressly of by the consignor then cotton is not one of the goods which is specified in the schedule and Under Section- 5, in a case where there is  loss of the consignor and would be entitled to recover not merely say  the value of the good but also the charges which are to be paid for carriage. So It will be open to a carrier to limit his liability by signing a special contract, signed by the owner of the goods.and it embodies the principle of negligence, for the obvious reason that the liability of common carrier is that of an insurer and we can say that It would, therefore not follow that, but withstanding the fact that actually  there was no negligence from  the part of the appellant and  he would be liable to compensate not only the first respondent but also  for the loss of the goods that had occurred during the carriage thereof by the lorry  which is belonging to the former.  Therefore we can  agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned subordinate Judge on this question.

ISSUES IN THE CASE

 It is next contended that as the suitbeing one for damages for injury and  to the goods by reason when there  a breach of duty of the carrier and could be argued that  it should be held to be an action in tort and also should have to be instituted where  in a Court which is having jurisdiction over the place where the accident or loss occurred. SEC-19 claims that case should only be fought where loss had occurred and therefore it would be invalid in the court of law  In the case of a claim for damages for a tort and say  the commission of the tortious act which  will undoubtedly form a part and it would be of cause of action so thedamage suffered would  also be a part of it. It is not disputed before us and also that neither the place where the breach of duty took alleged took had place nor the one where the loss occurred was within the jurisdiction of the Coimbatore Court which as its  being not contended or argued and that the place of delivery was the one and that’s where the loss occurred.so  It is equally not disputed, that if so the suit is construedand  as one based on a contract the Coimbatore Court will have jurisdiction because  as admittedly a part of cause of action that had a arose at that place. Under the circumstances as it becomes necessary for  to consider to which category and also the claim in the present case belonging to.

The suit is one where there is  consignor of goods for non-delivery thereof at the destination.. It is stated that the loss was the result of gross negligence  from the part of the defendants. This is on the basis that defendants had not shown enough care to care of the goods as a result of which negligence on their  behalf  andhas been substantially the cause of action alleged is on a breach of contract to where to deliver the goods and also to take that amount of care which is required and of a bailee under Section 151 and  section 152 of the Contract Act. It was however contended that for the appellant that the relevant paragraph as  in the plaint proceed not on the basis  say of any express or implied contract and to deliver the goods safely but  at destination but say on the common law liability and  of the carrier for breach of duty to ensure a safe carriage of good  and that the claim which  in such a case can only be in found  tort and never in contract.

Even assuming that the plaintiff in the instant case should only be construed only as alleging a breach of duty and  on the part of the appellant for  the claim for damages but cannot for that reason be said to be unrelated to a case on thef breach of a contractual obligation. The claim is made by the consignor himself who had  entered into a contract  son with the appellant for the carriage of the goods form Koilpatti to Coimbatore which having regarded to the nature of the business and say of the appellant implied and to  a safe carriage of the goods. A breach of that obligation then would be a breach of contract as It may be  that by virtue  of the public employment of the appellant where  and the nature of his obligations that  he would be liable in tort. And That would only mean that so far as the consignor who is concerned and he can at his option sue on contract where on tort. also  where the claim is madeand by  by the consignee where his the position might be different and as he not being a party to the contract of carriage made by the consignor, he will not be able to enforce a contractual obligation but can only be  sued on tort.

At the present day we can differentiate tort and contract from one another in that the duties in the former are primarily fixed by law, while in the latter they are fixed by the parties themselves. Moreover, in tort we can the duty is towards persons and generally  in contract  as it is towards a specific person or maybe  specific persons where  In a case under the Country Courts Act 1919, an action failed by stock broker to client where the client was held to lie in contract Greer and they had said that The distinction in the modern view for this purpose and between contract and tort may be put like where  ‘Where the breach of duty alleged arises out of a liability independently of the personal obligation undertaken by contract’where  it is tort, and it may be a tort and even though there may happen and  to be a contract between the parties, if the duty is in fact arises independently of that contract where there is a breach of contract  that occurs where that is complained and is a breach of duty arising out of the obligation undertaken by the contract.

The same subject is dealt with in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. I (Simonds Edn.) at page 36 thus :

“In deciding whether an action is founded on contract or on tort, the substance of the action must be looked at and the form of it as stated in the pleadings is immaterial. Where the breach of duty alleged arises out of a liability independently of the personal obligation undertaken by contract the action may be said to be founded on tort, and it may still be founded on tort even though there may happen to be a contract between the parties, if the duty in fact arises independently of that contract; an action may be said to be founded on contract where that which is complained of is a breach of duty arising out of the obligations undertaken by the contract.”

Where there is a contractual obligation to deliver the goods at a particular place, an undertaking can be implied having the regard to the context and in which the contract is made, namely, with say a common carrier who would have  has such an obligation to deliver the goods safely at the required destination. In that case then  there would be a personal obligation. An independent obligation also would also exist by reasona and  of the duty which the carrier owes by reason say of his calling. The mere existence of a independent ground of liability on tort that  cannot take away the right of the party where fot it to the contract it can sue for breach. But such a person who will not be bound to sue on the contract then he may rest his claim on and move on to alternative basis of tort. This option exists only to a  party to the contract like where however the action is laid which is against the carrier by the consignee like who is not a party to the contract and the liability which is  sought to be enforced  that would be independent of itsb contract eventhough proof of the contract  which might be necessary to show that the defendant who was acting as a carrier and as so  such liable as an insurer that  In such a case the liability for the breach of duty and also  to deliver the goods safely  which would be independent of the terms of its contract entered into between the consignor and the common carrierMr. Ramamurthi however contends which was entered and  that no claim on the basis of contract which can lie suppose when a common carrier is sought to be proceeded against and  for the breach of his duty where to  deliver safely the goods which entrusted to him for carriageand   whether the action which  is laid at the instance like  of the party to the contract or  with others  and that in  that in almost all cases the liability will only be on the basis of something like a civil wrong which is  committed by the carrier. Learned counsel relied in on  this connection on London and North Western Rly. Co. V. Richard Hudson and Sons Ltd., 1920 AC 324 where Lord Dunedin, dealing with the liability of common carrier carrying goods.

The action in that case was brought at the instance of the consignee of the goods, between whom and the carrier there was no privity of contract; it was held that the former could sustain a claim for loss of goods during transit on the basis of a tort. That decision itself recognises that there could be a liability of the carrier for breach of contract in appropriate cases. The decision in Shiam Narain Tickoo v. Bombay Baroda and Central India Rly., ILR 41 All 488 was next relied on. That was an action against a railway company for the damages laid by the husband for the death of his wife on account of injuries sustained by her in an accident to the train wherein she traveled. The learned Judges did not decide the question whether an action for breach of contract would lie where the railway did not carry the passenger safely. Their view was that an action on contract would not lie at he instance of the plaintiff in that case who was not a party to the contract and whose claim was based on tort and under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act.

JUDGEMENT OF THE CASE

Apart from danger arisingand  say, from the nature of goods that the defendant received, the carrier is by his office bound to transport the goods as clearly as if there had been a ‘special contract which is binding on  him, and therefore he is answerable to the owner for sale and also for sound delivery.

It is therefore clear that the liability of a common carrier for nondelivery of goods so far as a party to the contract is concerned it can be  at his option be that he rested on contract or not. Whether in such a case the claim is made on one basis or other it would depend on the construction of the plaint and also the substance of it being the decisive factor. In the present case the plaintiff is clear as the reference is made to the contract and of the carriage of goods not merely as a matter of history but as the starting point of the appellant’s obligations and the appellant did what a man with prudence would do .It is stated that by the terms of his employmen that  the appellant was legally bound to deliver safely the goods. The claim made for breach of that obligation is one on the basis of the contract and not on the basis of a tort. Thus there being a contractual obligation to deliver the goods at Coimbatore, a part of the cause of action for the suit arose at that place. The lower court had therefore the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass a judgement

The appeal is therefore failed and it is dismissed with costs

CONCLUSION

In this case the appeal was not successful because the defendant has taken reasonable care than any man with prudence would do and it was judged he was not negligent and he even tried to save as many good as possible by causing harm to himself.even though the contract was broken the defendant is not liable to pay any money to the appellant.

ACCEPTANCE IN LAW OF CONTRACTS

INTRODUCTION;

Section 2[h]of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, defines the term contract. According to the Section, a contract is an agreement enforceable by law. Therefore, according to the Section, there are two essentials for the formation of a contract.

• Firstly, there should be an agreement to do or abstain from doing an act; and 
• Secondly, the agreement should be enforceable by law.

Therefore, the law of contracts is that branch of law which decides the circumstances in which the promise made by a person shall be legally binding on the person who makes the promise. While all the contracts are agreements but not all agreements are contracts. An agreement, in order to turn into a contract, should have its legal enforceability. The agreements which are not legally enforceable are not contracts but are mere void agreements which are not enforceable by law or are voidable at the option of one party.

Section 2(b) of the Indian Contract Act talks about the acceptance of an offer. According to the Section, the person to whom an offer is made to do or abstain from doing an act with a view to obtain the assent of such a person, if gives his assent thereto, is said to have accepted the offer. This article talks about acceptance, which is one of the essentials of a valid contract according to the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Acceptance of an offer is the expression of assent to its terms. Acceptance must generally be made in the manner specified by the offer. If no manner of acceptance is specified by the offer, then acceptance may be made in a manner that is reasonable under the circumstances. An acceptance is only valid, however, if the offeree knows of the offer, the offeree manifests an intention to accept, and the acceptance is expressed as an unequivocal and unconditional agreement to the terms of the offer.

Many offers specify the method of acceptance, whether it be oral or written, by phone or in person, by handshake or by ceremony. Other offers leave open the method of acceptance, allowing the offeree to accept in a reasonable manner. Most consumer transactions fall into this category, as when a shopper “accepts” a merchant’s offer by taking possession of a particular good and paying for it at the cash register. But what constitutes a “reasonable” acceptance will vary according to the contract.

Some offers may only be accepted by the performance or non-performance of a particular act. Once formed, these types of agreements are called unilateral contracts, and they are discussed more fully later in this essay. Other offers may only be accepted by a return promise of performance from the offeree. Once formed, these agreements are called bilateral contracts, and they are also discussed more fully later in this essay.

Problems can arise when it is not clear whether an offer anticipates the method of acceptance to come in the form of performance or a return promise. Section 32 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts attempts to address this issue by providing that “in case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering performance, as the offeree chooses.” A growing number of jurisdictions are adopting this approach.

Jurisdictions are split as to the time when an air-mailed acceptance becomes effective. Under the majority approach, known as “the mailbox rule,” an acceptance is effective upon dispatch in a properly addressed envelope with prepaid postage, even if the acceptance is lost or destroyed in transit. Under the minority approach, acceptance is effective only upon actual receipt by the offeror, no matter what precautions the offeree took to ensure that the acceptance was properly mailed.

In certain cases acceptance can be implied from a party’s conduct. Suppose a consumer orders a personal computer (PC) with exact specifications for its central processing unit (CPU), hard drive, and memory. Upon receipt, the consumer determines that the PC does not match the specs. If the consumer nonetheless pays the full amount on the invoice accompanying the PC without protest, the consumer has effectively communicated a legally binding acceptance of the non-conforming good.

Acceptance cannot generally be inferred from a party’s silence or inaction. An exception to this rule occurs when two parties have a prior course of dealings in which the offeree has led the offeror to believe that the offeree will accept all goods shipped by the offeror unless the offeree sends notice to the contrary. In such instances, the offeree’s silence or inaction constitutes a legally binding acceptance upon which the offeror can rely.

Rules regarding Valid Acceptance

1] Acceptance can only be given to whom the offer was made

In the case of a specific proposal or offer, it can only be accepted by the person it was made to. No third person without the knowledge of the offeree can accept the offer.

Let us take the example of the case study of Boulton v. Jones. Boulton bought Brocklehurst’s business but Brocklehurst did not inform all his creditors about the same. Jones, a creditor of Brocklehurst placed an order with him. Boulton accepted and supplied the goods. Jones refused to pay since he had debts to settle with Brocklehurst. It was held that since the offer was never made to Boulton, he cannot accept the offer and there is no contract.

When the proposal is a general offer, then anyone with knowledge of the offer can accept it.

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2] It has to be absolute and unqualified

Acceptance must be unconditional and absolute. There cannot be conditional acceptance, that would amount to a counteroffer which nullifies the original offer. Let us see an example. A offers to sell his cycle to B for 2000/-. B says he accepts if A will sell it for 1500/-. This does not amount to the offer being accepted, it will count as a counteroffer.

Also, it must be expressed in a prescribed manner. If no such prescribed manner is described then it must be expressed in the normal and reasonable manner, i.e. as it would be in the normal course of business. Implied acceptance can also be given through some conduct, act, etc.

However, the law does not allow silence to be a form of acceptance. So the offeror cannot say if no answer is received the offer will be deemed as accepted.

3] Acceptance must be communicated

For a proposal to become a contract, the acceptance of such a proposal must be communicated to the promisor. The communication must occur in the prescribed form, or any such form in the normal course of business if no specific form has been prescribed.

Further, when the offeree accepts the proposal, he must have known that an offer was made. He cannot communicate acceptance without knowledge of the offer.

So when A offers to supply B with goods, and B is agreeable to all the terms. He writes a letter to accept the offer but forgets to post the letter. So since the acceptance is not communicated, it is not valid.

4] It must be in prescribed mode

Acceptance of the offer must be in the prescribed manner that is demanded by the offeror. If no such manner is prescribed, it must be in a reasonable manner that would be employed in the normal course of business.

But if the offeror does not insist on the manner after the offer has been accepted in another manner, it will be presumed he has consented to such acceptance.

So A offers to sell his farm to B for ten lakhs. He asks B to communicate his answer via post. B e-mails A accepting his offer. Now A can ask B to send the answer through the prescribed manner. But if A fails to do so, it means he has accepted the acceptance of B and a promise is made.

5] Implied acceptance

Section 8 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, provides that acceptance by conduct or actions of the promisee is acceptable. So if a person performs certain actions that communicate that he has accepted the offer, such implied acceptance is permissible. So if A agrees to buy from B 100 bales of hay for 1000/- and B sends over the goods, his actions will imply he has accepted the offer.

MODE OF ACCEPTANCE

1) A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance. 

(2) An acceptance of an offer becomes effective when the indication of assent reaches the offeror.

(3) However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties have established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act without notice to the offeror, the acceptance is effective when the act is performed. 

COMMENT

1. Indication of assent to an offer

For there to be an acceptance the offeree must in one way or another indicate “assent” to the offer. The mere acknowledgement of receipt of the offer, or an expression of interest in it, is not sufficient. Furthermore, the assent must be unconditional, i.e. it cannot be made dependent on some further step to be taken by either the offeror (e.g. “Our acceptance is subject to your final approval”) or the offeree (e.g. “We hereby accept the terms of the contract as set forth in your Memorandum and undertake to submit the contract to our Board for approval within the next two weeks”). Finally, the purported acceptance must contain no variation of the terms of the offer or at least none which materially alters them (see Article 2.1.11).

2. Acceptance by conduct

Provided that the offer does not impose any particular mode of acceptance, the indication of assent may either be made by an express statement or be inferred from the conduct of the offeree. Paragraph (1) of this Article does not specify the form such conduct should assume: most often it will consist in acts of performance, such as the payment of an advance on the price, the shipment of goods or the beginning of work at the site, etc.

3. Silence or inactivity

By stating that “[s]ilence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance”, paragraph (1) makes it clear that as a rule mere silence or inactivity on the part of the offeree does not allow the inference that the offeree assents to the offer. The situation is different if the parties themselves agree that silence shall amount to acceptance, or if there exists a course of dealing or usage to that effect. In no event, however, is it sufficient for the offeror to state unilaterally in its offer that the offer will be deemed to have been accepted in the absence of any reply from the offeree. Since it is the offeror who takes the initiative by proposing the conclusion of the contract, the offeree is free not only to accept or not to accept the offer, but also simply to ignore it.

According to paragraph , an acceptance becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror (see Article 1.10(2)). For the definition of “reaches” see Article 1.10(3). The reason for the adoption of the “receipt” principle in preference to the “dispatch” principle is that the risk of transmission is better placed on the offeree than on the offeror, since it is the former who chooses the means of communication, who knows whether the chosen means of communication is subject to special risks or delay, and who is consequently best able to take measures to ensure that the acceptance reaches its destination.

As a rule, an acceptance by means of mere conduct likewise becomes effective only when notice thereof reaches the offeror. It should be noted, however, that special notice to this effect by the offeree will be necessary only in cases where the conduct will not of itself give notice of acceptance to the offeror within a reasonable period of time. In all other cases, e.g. where the conduct consists in the payment of the price, or the shipment of the goods by air or by some other rapid mode of transportation, the same effect may well be achieved simply by the bank or the carrier informing the offeror of the funds transfer or of the consignment of the goods.

An exception to the general rule of paragraph (2) is to be found in the cases envisaged in paragraph (3), i.e. where “by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties have established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act without notice to the offeror”. In such cases the acceptance is effective at the moment the act is performed, irrespective of whether or not the offeror is promptly informed thereof.

• Implied acceptance: Acceptance which is not explicitly made by means of speech or writing but, by the conduct of the person to whom an offer is made. The striking of hammer thrice by the auctioneer in order to show his acceptance to the offer made by a bidder is an example of implied acceptance to the offer made by the bidder at an auction to the auctioneer;
• Express acceptance: Acceptance which is made by means of words, oral or written is known as an express acceptance. For example, A offers B his watch for sale through a mail and A replies in positive to the offer by email.

Acceptance: absolute and unqualified

Acceptance to be legally enforceable must be absolute and unqualified. Section 7(1) of the Indian Contract Act provides that in order to turn an offer into an agreement the acceptance to the offer must be absolute and unqualified. The logic behind the principle that the acceptance to the offer must be absolute and unqualified is that when acceptance is not absolute and is qualified it results into a counter offer which leads to the rejection of the original offer made by the offeror to the offeree. If the offeree makes any variations in the original terms of the contract proposed to him and then accepts the contract, such an acceptance would result in the invalidity of the contract.

For example, if A offers to sell his bike to B for Rupees 10,000. But B persuades A to sell him the bike for 7,000 rupees to which A denies and if B at any later point of time agrees to buy the bike for 10,000 rupees. Then A is under no obligations to sell him the bike as the counteroffer made by B puts an end to the original offer.

It is also important that the acceptance made by the offeree should be in toto, i.e. acceptance should be given to all the terms and conditions of the offer as acceptance of only a part of the offer is not a good acceptance under the law. For example, A makes an offer to B of sale of 30 kg of wheat at Rupees 700 but B agrees to buy only 10 kg of wheat. Here the acceptance made by B is not in toto with respect to the terms of the contract and therefore, the acceptance made by B is no acceptance in the eyes of law and therefore, A is under no obligation to sell him wheat since there is no contract between them.

Partial acceptance

It is a settled principle of law of contract that the offer which is put before the offeree should be accepted by him in entirety and he can not accept the offer partially by agreeing only to the terms of the contract which are favourable to him while rejecting the rest of the conditions under the offer as an incomplete acceptance of the offer would result into counter-proposal and therefore, it will not bind the offeror as there is no binding contract between him and the offeree.

In Ramanbhai M. Nilkanth vs Ghashiram Ladliprasad, an application was made in a company for certain shares was made on the condition that the applicant would be appointed as a cashier in the new branch of the company. The company without fulfilling the condition made an allocation of the shares to the applicant and demanded the share money from him. The court, in this case, held that the petitioner’s application for 100 shares was conditional and there was no intention on the part of the company to accept the terms of the contract in entirety where he applied for shares until he was appointed as a cashier by the company and therefore, there was only a partial acceptance of the offer.

Acceptance with subsequent condition

In the law of contract, the term “condition” is used in a loose sense and it is used synonymously as “terms”, ‘’condition” or ”clause”. In its proper sense, the term condition means some operative term subsequent to acceptance and prior to acceptance, it is a fact on which the rights and duties of the parties to the contract depend on. The fact can be any act or omission by any of the contracting parties, an act of the third party or happening or not happening of any natural event. Conditions are of three types, which are as follows:

• Express condition: In an express condition, certain facts can operate as condition as it has been expressly agreed upon by the parties to the contract;
• Implied condition: When certain facts which operate as a condition are not expressly mentioned by the parties but can be inferred by the conduct of the parties to contract is known as an implied condition;
• Constructive condition: When the court believes that the parties to a contract must have intended to operate certain conditions because the court believes that the Justice requires the presence of the condition. These conditions are known as constructive conditions.  

A contract comes into force by the acts or conduct of one party to the other party. The acts or conduct of the party can be turned into a promise only by meeting of mind or an agreement between both the parties. An acceptance that carries a subsequent condition may not have the effect of counter-proposal. Thus, where a person ‘A’ accepted the terms of the contract for the sale of a good by accompanying the acceptance with the warning that if money was not delivered to him by a particular date then, the contract will remain repudiated. The acceptance of the offer would not be deemed to be a counter-proposal.

Acceptance of counter proposals

In certain cases, the person whose proposal or offer has not been accepted absolutely or unqualifiedly by the offeree as the offeree attaches a counter-proposal to the original proposal, the offeror becomes bound by the counter-proposal. If, by the conduct of the offeror, he indicates that he has accepted the terms of the counter-proposal laid down by the offeree.

In the case of Hargopal v. People’s Bank of Northern India Ltd., an application for shares was made with a conditional undertaking by the bank that the applicant would be appointed as a permanent director of the local branch. The shares were allotted to the applicant by the Bank without fulfilment of the condition and the applicant was given his shares and the applicant accepted the same without any protest regarding the non-fulfilment of the terms of the contract. When there arose a dispute between the parties in a court of law. The applicant contended that the allotment was void on the ground of non-fulfilment of the conditions which were stipulated in the original contract. The court rejected the contention from the applicant’s side by holding that the same can not be pleaded by him as he has waived the condition by his conduct.

In Bismi Abdullah and sons v. FCI, the court held that where tenders were invited subject to the deposit of money. It was open to the tenderers to waive the requirement and acceptance given to a tender without making the deposit is binding upon the tenderer. 

In D.S. Constructions Ltd v. Rites Ltd, the court held the where the tenderer made variations to the terms of his tender within the permissible period, but the variations were only partly accepted by the other side without the tenderer’s consent lead to repudiation of the contract and so there was no contract at all. Therefore, the earnest money deposited by the party can not be forfeited.

Provisional Acceptance

Provisional acceptance is the type of acceptance by the offeree which is made subject to the final approval. A provisional acceptance does not ordinarily bind either party to the contract until the final approval is given to the provisional acceptance made by the offeree. Until the approval is given, the offeror is at liberty to cancel the offer made to the offeree.

In Union of India v. S. Narain Singh, the High Court of Punjab held that where the condition attached to the auction sale of the liquor was that the acceptance of the bid shall be subject to confirmation by the Chief Commissioner. The contract will not be complete till the highest bid is confirmed by the Chief Commissioner and till the confirmation is made the person whose bid is provisionally accepted is at liberty to withdraw the bid.

Similarly, in Mackenzie Lyall And Co. vs Chamroo Singh And Co., the bid at an auction was of provisional acceptance in nature ad the terms of the contract stated that the bid shall be referred to the owner of the goods for his approval and sanction.the court in this case also, allowed the person to revoke his bid whose bid was provisionally accepted.

In Somasundaram Pillai vs The Provincial Government Of Madras, the court held that the bidder would be at liberty to withdraw his will prior to the final approval of the provisional acceptance where the terms of the contract expressly mention that a bid which has been provisionally accepted can not be canceled subsequently.

When a provisional acceptance is subsequently ratified or accepted then it is the duty of the offeree to inform the same to the offeror, as it is then when the offeror becomes bound by the terms of the contract. Acceptance is not complete until it is communicated by the offeror.

Acceptance and withdrawal of tenders

A Tender is a legal offer or proposal to do or abstain from doing an act and it binds the party to performance to the party to whom the offer is made. A tender can be made with respect to money or specific articles. If the tender is not an offer than it falls in the same category as a quotation of price. When the tender is accepted it becomes a standing offer. A contract can arise only when an offer is made on the basis of the tender.

In Bengal Coal Co. v. Homee Wadia & Co., the defendant signed an agreement. One of the terms of the contract was that the undersigned from the day of signing the contract has to abide by the condition stipulated by the contract which provides that they shall be required to provide a certain quality of coal to the other party for a period of 12 months. The defendant abided by the terms of the contract for some time but before the expiry of the term of the contract, the defendants refused to comply with the conditions which were stipulated under the contract. The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendant for breach of contract. The court held that there was no contract between the parties and the terms stipulated thereof were just the part of a standing offer and the successive orders given by the plaintiff was an acceptance of the offers of the quantity offered by the defendant and therefore the order given by the plaintiff and the offer of the defendant together constituted a series of contract. The defendants, in this case, are not free to revoke the offers which were actually given by them. But barring those offers aside, the defendants had the complete power of revocation.

In Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs Dayal Wood Work, the purchase orders were issued in terms of an arrangement of supply. But the purchase offer itself contained the provision that the tenderer can refuse to supply the goods. The court, in this case, held that there was no concluded contract that came into force and therefore, the contractor was at liberty to refund his security deposit.

In a case where the tenderer has on some consideration promised not to withdraw the tender or where there is a statutory provision restraining the withdrawal of the tender, the tender becomes irrevocable. Just as the tenderer has the right to revoke his tender in the same way the acceptor of the tender also has the right to refuse to place any order.

In  Madho Ram vs The Secretary Of State For India, the military authorities accepted a tender for the supply of certain goods but during the period of tender, no requisition was ever issued. In an action against the military authorities, the court held that the military authority was not bound whatsoever by the acceptance of their offer to purchase any or all the goods specified under the contract without any covenant to that issue. And so the party giving his assent to the offer may at any time declare to the tenderer that they no longer want to place an order for the purchase of goods.

Letter of intent to accept

A letter of intent to accept an offer is sometimes issued prior to the final acceptance of the offer. Letter of intent does not have any binding effect on any of the parties to the contract. In Dibakar Swain v. Cashew Development corp. The letter of acceptance issued by the company only indicated their intention to enter into the tender. The acceptance was not clearly reduced into writing. The court held that there was no binding contract entered into by the parties and no work order can be issued and so the amount which was deposited by the tenderer can not be forfeited.

Liability for failure to consider tender

If a valid tender is opened then it must be duly considered by the inviting authority because if the valid tender is not duly considered it would be unfairness on the part of the tenderer. In Vijai Kumar Ajay Kumar v. Steel Authority Of India Limited, the court of appeal observed that in certain circumstances, the invitation to tender can give rise to the binding contractual obligation on the part of the person who invited the tenders who conformed the conditions of the tender.

In A. K. Construction v. State of Jharkhand, the contract was awarded to a person who was not a qualified tenderer and he was chosen at the cost of a qualified tenderer who brought an action against the decision of granting the tender to the unqualified tenderer. The court, in this case, allowed the awardee of the tenderer to complete his work and also allowed the aggrieved party compensation of one lakh rupees to be recovered from the salary of the guilty officers who were guilty of awarding the tender unreasonably. 

Non-compliance with requirements

In Vijay Fire Protection Systems v. Visakhapatnam Port Trust And Anr., the authorities inviting the tender made it clear to the tenderers that only one brand of pump sets would be accepted. The authorities even gave the last minute opportunity to the tenderers to change the quotations. The tenderer to whom the tender for the supply of goods was given refuted to comply with the terms of the contract. Subsequently, the authorities who invited the tender cancelled the contract between them and the tenderer thereof. The court held that the decision made by the authorities was not arbitrary and they were having the right to do so.

In Kesulal Mehta vs Rajasthan Tribal Areas, one of the conditions in the tender was that the tenderer should have at least one year of work experience in the work in question. The court, in this case, held that such conditions could be relaxed and any otherwise competent contractor could be given the tender and he could be at a later point of time be required to produce the certificate of work.

In KM Pareeth Labha v. Kerala Livestock Development Board, it was held that where a tender invited the quotations for disposal of trees. The tender should mention the approximate value of the trees which could be assessed by the tenderers who can quote their price. 

Tender with concessional rate 

In Kanhaiya Lal Agrawal vs Union Of India & Ors, in this case, tender offered firm rates, as well as concessional rate, provided the tender gets finalized within a shorter period of time than generally followed. The court held that it did not result in the formation of a conditional offer which hinges on the happening or non-happening of any event and the condition which was put forth was only meant for bringing about more expeditious acceptance.

Certainty of terms

An agreement regarding the sale of immovable property should identify the property with certainty. The agreement should be based on mutuality and should fix the price. In New Golden Bus Service vs State Of Punjab And Ors., the tender was made inviting the tender for hiring services for the vehicle but it did not stipulate any time period. The lowest tenderer was awarded the tenderer for a period of three years. The court, in this case, held that there was nothing wrong in it as an open-ended tender can not be regarded as void because of the reason for its vagueness. The tender, in this case, specified that the tender can not be issued for a  vehicle that is more than six months old and the tenderer who was awarded the tender complies with the specified conditions specified under the tender. The acceptance of substitute vehicles which were of equal efficiency and cost by the authority inviting the tender was not arbitrary.

Preventing from tendering and blacklisting

In Utpal Mitra vs The Chief Executive Officer, a bidder was prevented by some elements inside the office from submitting the tender. The authorities carried on the enquiry confirming the allegations. The person who was so ruled out from the tender was later on permitted to submit his tender after two intervening holidays and his tender was later on accepted. The court held that no prejudice was caused to the other tenderers as the work issued to them was not interfered with.

In Merittrac Services Private v. Post Graduate Institute, it was held that the provision of blacklisting a contractor arises only when the contract is awarded and the tenderer fails to perform any conditions stipulated in the contract. For the purpose of seeking permission for making his proposal, some material facts may be required from the bidder about his experience.

The party allocating the contracts has the indispensable power of blacklisting the contractor. But when in cases where the party is the state, the decision to blacklist is open to judicial review to ensure proportionality and principle of natural justice.

Conclusion

Contracts have become an indispensable part of everyday life of the people so much so that most of the people enter into a contract without even realizing it. There are many essentials which are required for making a valid contract. After the formation of a valid contract, the ultimate object which is stipulated by both the parties in terms of consideration are sought after. Once the object for which the contract was entered into is achieved the parties to the contract as no longer bound by their respective contractual liability.

[UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION  VS UNION OF INDIA 4^TH MAY 1989 Bhopal gas tragedy];

INTRODUCTION

The Bhopal Gas Leak Tragedy that occurred at midnight of

2nd  December, 1984, by the escape of deadly chemical  fumes

from the appellant’s factory was a great industrial disaster

and  it took an immediate toil of 2600 human lives and   left

tens of thousands of innocent citizens of Bhopal  physically

affected  in various ways. As per the figures  furnished  by

the  Union of India in its amended plaint a total number  of

2,660  persons          suffered agonising and     excruciating  deaths

between 30,000 to 40,000 persons sustained serious  injuries

as a result of the said disaster.

    Legal  proceedings for the recovery of compensation          for

the victims were initiated against the multi-national compa-

ny  first  in the U.S. Courts and later in Distt.  Court  at

Bhopal in Suit No. 113 of 1986. The present appeals  concern

with  the order dated 4th April, 1988 passed by  the  Madhya

Pradesh     High  Court whereby it modified  the  interlocutory

order dated 17.12.1987 made by the Distt. Judge and  granted

interim       compensation  of Rs.250 crores. Both the  Union  of

India  and  the Union Carbide Corporation have appealed  to

this Court against that order.

    The         Court          by its order dated the 14th  February,          1989

made in these appeals directed that there shall be an  over-

all  settlement          of the claims in the suit for       470  million

U.S.  Dollars  and  termination of all      civil  and  criminal

proceedings. On May 4, 1989 the Court pronounced its reasons

for its aforesaid order dated 14.2.89thus:

    The Statement of the reasons is not made with any  sense

of  finality  as to the infallibility of the  decision;          but

with  an open mind to be able to appreciate any tenable      and

compelling legal or factual infirmities that may be  brought

out, calling for remedy in review under Article 137 of

the Constitution. [132C-D]

129

    The basic consideration motivating the conclusion of the

settlement  was the compelling need for urgent relief.          Con-

siderations  of excellence and niceties of legal  principles

were greatly over-shadowed by the pressing problems of          very

survival for a large number of victims. [133A, C]

    The         instant  case is one where damages  are  sought  on

behalf of the victims of a mass disaster, and having  regard

to  the        complexities and the legal question  involved,   any

person          with  an  unbiased vision would not  miss  the          time

consuming  prospect for the course of the litigation in      its

sojourn through the various courts, both in India and  later

in  United  States. This Court considered  it  a  compelling

duty.  both judicial and humane, to secure immediate  relief

to  the victims. In doing so, the Court did not    enter          upon

any  forbidden ground. What this Court did was in  continua-

tion of what had already been initiated. [133E-F, H; 134A]

    The         range         of  choice for the Court in  regard  to  the

figures       was, therefore, between the maximum of 426  million

U.S. Dollars offered by Shri Nariman and the minimum of      500

million       U.S.  Dollars suggested by  the  Attorney  General.

[134F-G]

    Having  regard  to all the circumstances  including   the

prospect of delays inherent in the judicial process in India

and thereafter in the matter of domestication of the  decree

in the United States for the purpose of execution, the Court

directed that 470 million U.S. Dollars which upon  immediate

payment and with interest over a reasonable period,  pending

actual      distribution amongst the claimants, would  aggregate

very nearly to 500 million U.S. Dollars or its rupee equiva-

lent  of  approximately          Rs.750 crores          which  the  Attorney

General had suggested. be made the basis of the          Settlement.

[134G-H; 135A-B]

    The Settlement proposals were considered on the premises

that the Government had the exclusive statutory authority to

represent  and          act  on behalf of the  victims       and  neither

counsel      had any reservation as to this. The order was          also

made  on  the  premises that the Bhopal Gas  Leak  Disaster

(Registration and Processing of Claims) Act 1985 was a valid

law. [135B-C]

    There might be different opinions on the  interpretation

of  laws  or on questions of policy or even on what  may  be

considered  wise or unwise; but when one speaks        of  justice

and truth, these words mean the same thing to all men  whose

judgment is uncommitted. [140B-C]

The compulsions of the need for immediate relief to tens of

130

thousands  of  suffering victims could not wait     till  these

questions, vital though they be, are resolved in due  course

of judicial proceedings. [142D-E]

    A  settlement  has been recorded upon  material  and  in

circumstances  which persuaded the Court that it was a          just

settlement. This is not to say that this Court will shut out

any  important          material and  any  compelling  circumstances

which  might impose a duty on it to exercise the  powers  of

review.       Like  all other human institutions, this  Court  is

human and fallible. What appears to the Court to be just and

reasonable in that particular context and setting, need          not

necessarily appear to others in the same day. Which view  is

right, in the ultimate analysis, is to be judged by what  it

does  to  relieve the undeserved suffering of  thousands  of

innocent citizens of this country. [142F-G]

    Decisions  of  courts cannot be reacted  or          altered  or

determined by agitational pressures. If a decision is wrong,

the process of correction must be in a manner recognised  by

law.  All  of those who invoke the corrective  processes  in

accordance  with  law shall be heard and the court  will  do

what the law and the course of justice requires. The  matter

concerns  the  interests of a large number of victims  of  a

mass  disaster. The Court directed the settlement    with the

earnest hope that it would do hem good and bring them  imme-

diate   relief,          for, tomorrow might be too  ate for  many  of

them. But the case equally concerns the credibility of,          and

the public confidence in, the judicial process. [143B, D-E]

Those who trust this Court will not have cause for despair.

JUDGEMENT

The following Order of the Court was delivered: ORDER The Bhopal Gas Leak tragedy that occurred at midnight on 2nd December, 1984, by the escape of deadly chemical fumes from the appellant’s pesticide-factory was a horrendous industrial mass disaster, unparalleled in its magnitude and devastation and remains a ghastly monument to the de-huma- nising influence of inherently dangerous technologies. The tragedy took an immediate toll of 2,660 innocent human lives and left tens of thousands of innocent citizens of Bhopal physically impaired or affected in various degrees. What added grim poignance to the tragedy was that the industrial-enterprise was using Methyl Iso-cyanate, a lethal toxic poison, whose potentiality for destruction of life and biotic-communities was, apparently, matched only by the lack of a pre-package of relief procedures for management of any accident based on adequate scientific knowledge as to the ameliorative medical procedures for immediate neutralisation of its effects.

It is unnecessary for the present purpose to refer, in any detail, to the somewhat meandering course of the legal proceedings for the recovery of compensation initiated against the multi-national company initially in the Courts in the United States of America and later in the District Court at Bhopal in Suit No. 113 of 1986. It would suffice to refer to the order dated 4 April, 1988 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which, in modification of the interlocutory- order dated 17 December, 1987 made by the learned District Judge, granted an interim compensation of Rs.250 crores. Both the Union of India and the Union Carbide Corporation appealed against that order.

This Court by its order dated 14 February, 1989 made in those appeals directed that there be an overall settlement of the claims in the suit, for 470 million US dollars and termination of all civil and criminal proceedings. The opening words of the order said:

“Having given our careful considera- tion for these several days to the facts and circumstances of the case placed before us by the parties in these proceedings, including the pleadings of the parties, the mass of data placed before us, the material relating to the proceedings in the Courts in the United States of America, the offers and counter-offers made between the parties at different stages during the various proceedings, as well as the complex issues of law and fact raised before us and the submission made thereon, and in particular the enormity of human suffering occasioned by the Bhopal Gas disaster and the pressing urgency to provide immediate and substantial relief to victims of the disaster, we are of opinion that the case is pre-emi- nently fit for an overall settlement between the parties covering all litigations, claims, rights and liabilities related to and arising out of the disaster ….. “

(Emphasis Supplied) It appears to us that the reasons that persuaded this Court to make the order for settlement should be set-out, so that those who have sought a review might be able effec- tively to assist the Court in satisfactorily dealing with the prayer for a review. The statement of the reasons is not made with any sense of finality as to the infallibility of the decision; but with an open mind to be able to appreciate any tenable and compelling legal or factual infirmities that may be brought out, calling for remedy in Review under Arti- cle 137 of the Constitution.

The points on which we propose to set-out brief reasons are the following:

(a) How did this Court arrive at the sum of 470 million US dollars for an over-all settle- ment?

(b) Why did the Court consider this sum of 470 million US dollars as ‘just, equitable and reasonable’?

(c) Why did the Court not pronounce on certain important legal questions of far reaching importance said to arise in the appeals as to the principles of liability of monolithic, economically entrenched multi-national compa- nies operating with inherently dangerous technologies in the developing countries of the third world–questions said to be of great contemporary relevance to the democracies of the third-world?

There is yet another aspect of the Review pertaining to the part of the settlement which terminated the criminal proceedings. The questions raised on the point in the Re- view-petitions, prima facie, merit consideration and we should, therefore, abstain from saying anything which might tend to pre-judge this issue one way or the other.

The basic consideration motivating the conclusion of the settlement was the compelling need for urgent relief. The suffering of the victims has been intense and unrelieved. Thousands of persons who pursued their own occupations for an humble and honest living have been rendered destitute by this ghastly disaster. Even after four years of litigation, basic questions of the fundamentals of the law as to liabil- ity of the Union Carbide Corporation and the quantum of damages are yet being debated. These, of course, are impor- tant issues which need to be decided. But, when thousands of innocent citizens were in near destitute conditions, without adequate subsistential needs of food and medicine and with every coming morrow haunted by the spectre of death and continued agony, it would be heartless abstention, if the possibilities of immediate sources of relief were not ex- plored. Considerations of excellence and niceties of legal principles were greatly over-shadowed by the pressing prob- lems of very survival for a large number of victims. The Law’s delays are, indeed, proverbial. It has been the unfortunate bane of the judicial process that even ordinary cases, where evidence consists of a few documents and the oral testimony of a few witnesses, require some years to realise the fruits of litigation. This is so even in cases of great and unquestionable urgency such as fatal accident actions brought by the dependents. These are hard realities. The present case is one where damages are sought on behalf of the victims of a mass disaster and, having regard to the complexities and the legal questions involved, any person with an unbiased vision would not miss the time consuming prospect for the course of the litigation in its sojourn through the various courts, both in India and later in United States.

It is indeed a matter for national introspection that public response to this great tragedy which affected a large number of poor and helpless persons limited itself to the expression of understandable anger against the industrial enterprise but did not channel itself in any effort to put together a public supported relief fund so that the victims were not left in distress, till the final decision in the litigation. It is well known that during the recent drought in Gujarat, the devoted efforts of public spirited persons mitigated, in great measure, the loss of cattle-wealth in the near famine conditions that prevailed. This Court, considered it a compelling duty, both judi- cial and humane, to secure immediate relief to the victims. In doing so, the Court did not enter upon any forbidden ground. Indeed, efforts had earlier been made in this direction by Judge Keenan in the United States and by the learned District Judge at Bhopal. What this Court did was in continuation of what had already been initiated. Even at the opening of the arguments in the appeals, the Court had suggested to learned counsel on both sides to reach a just and fair settlement. Again, when counsel met for re-scheduling of the hearings the suggestion was reiterated. The response of learned counsel on both sides was positive in attempting a settlement, but they expressed a certain degree of uneasiness and scepticism at the prospects of success in view of their past experience of such negotiations when, as they stated, there had been uninformed and even irresponsible criticism of the attempts at settlement. The learned Attorney General submitted that even the most bona fide, sincere and devoted efforts at settlement were likely to come in for motivated criticism. The Court asked learned counsel to make available the particulars of offers and counter offers made on previous occasions for a mutual settlement. Learned counsel for both parties furnished particulars of the earlier offers made for an overall settlement and what had been considered as a reasonable basis in that behalf. The progress made by previ- ous negotiations was graphically indicated and these docu- ments form part of the record. Shri Nariman stated that his client would stand by its earlier offer of Three Hundred and Fifty Million US dollars and also submitted that his client had also offered to add appropriate interest, at the rates prevailing in the U.S.A., to the sum of 350 million US dollars which raised the figure to 426 million US dollars. Shri Nariman stated that his client was of the view that amount was the highest it could go upto. In regard to this offer of 426 million US dollars the learned Attorney-General submitted that he could not accept this offer. He submitted that any sum less than 500 million US dollars would not be reasonable. Learned counsel for both parties stated that they would leave it to the Court to decide what should be the figure of compensation. The range of choice for the Court in regard to the figure was, therefore, between the maximum of 426 million US dollars offered by Shri Nariman and the minimum of 500 million US dollars suggested by the learned Attorney General. In these circumstances, the Court examined the prima facie material as to the basis of quantification of a sum which, having regard to all the circumstances including the prospect of delays inherent in the judicial-process in India and thereafter in the matter of domestication of the decree in the United States for the purpose of execution and di- rected that 470 million US dollars, which upon immediate payment and with interest over a reasonable period, pending actual distribution amongst the claimants, would aggregate very nearly to 500 million